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ABSTRACT
This research is aimed at analyzing the legal aspects of state 
enterprise reform in the People's Republic of China. It 
attempts not only to explain relevant laws and regulations in 
the context of China's complex economic, social and political 
environments, but also to reveal the basic nature and the 
practice of these laws and regulations.
Since the late 197 0s, considerable efforts have been made 
by the Chinese authorities to use formal laws and regulations 
to adjust different and often conflicting interests emerging 
in the course of the programme of reforms, and, in particular, 
to reshape and protect the rights and interests of state 
enterprises. Among the most noteworthy of the efforts at state 
enterprise reform are the official conferment of legal 
personality and management rights to state enterprises, the 
establishment of a director responsibility system, the 
adoption of a bankruptcy law, and employment of the 
contracting system for settling the government -- enterprise 
relationship. These attempts have had some effect, and state 
enterprises have gained the capacity to act as independent 
legal entities. Furthermore, state enterprises, in some places 
and from time to time, have come to possess a certain degree 
of autonomy which was impossible prior to the reforms.
Nevertheless, these efforts have not been as effective 
and authoritative as they were designed and expected to be. 
Many enacted laws and regulations have not been followed in 
practice. Indeed, in many respects, they are readily 
undermined or even completely disregarded.
The relevant laws and regulations are strongly policy- 
oriented. Being the mere embodiment of state policies, they 
can be easily undermined as a result of policy changes. The 
ineffective application of many laws and regulations is due 
less to the defects in their legal and technical provisions 
than to the ambiguity and uncertainty of the policies 
underlying state enterprise reform.
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FOREWORD
As a Chinese law graduate studying abroad, I am one of the 
many beneficiaries of the policies of reform and opening to 
the outside world. In undertaking research on the legal 
aspects of state enterprise reform, I attempt to explore the 
interaction of the law and the reform process -- two of the 
most appealing phenomena in the post-Mao era, I hope that this 
research is not only useful to the further understanding of 
Chinese state enterprises, but also helpful to the general 
comprehension of the role of the law in economic reforms.
My interest in doing this research springs from a number 
of considerations. It originated in my unfinished LLM studies 
of civil and economic law at the Graduate School of the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing. This became 
more developed during my study of Company Law while taking a 
LLM at Queen Mary College, London University. But more 
importantly, I have long believed that in furthering its 
economic reforms, China is in need of a company law. I also 
believe that only after successful reform in state enterprises 
will a comprehensive company law become possible and 
meaningful in China. There is no doubt in my mind that such a 
company law has to develop from the existing legal framework 
governing state enterprises. Therefore, before understanding 
or even talking about a company law for China, detailed, 
technical and comparative research into the existing legal 
regulation of Chinese state enterprises is necessary as a 
first step. Such research, in my view, is a duty for persons 
like myself, who have studied both in China and in the West.
The scholarship which I have held for the last four years 
has enabled me to complete this study in time. I must, 
therefore, take this opportunity to express my sincere thanks 
to the Chinese government and the British Council, both of 
which have provided this scholarship. I would also like to 
thank the Central Research Fund of London University for 
providing generous support for my study visit to China.
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I am grateful to Michael Palmer for his supervision and 
support throughout this research. Without his thoughtful 
instructions and great patience, this thesis would have hardly 
been possible. My thanks are also due to Yuan Cheng who has 
offered very valuable help to my research and writing.
I dedicate this thesis to my mother who died sadly soon 
after I was enrolled as a first-year student at a Chinese 
primary school, and to my father who, despite his suffering 
loneliness and poor health at home, has continuously shown a 
helpful and precious encouragement to my studies in London.
Finally, the laws and regulations cited in this thesis 
are as they stand on July 31, 1992.
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TABLE A: Abbreviations
I. Organisations
abbres. full English translations
ABIC
AL L 
CCP 
GAC
NPC
SABIC
WSC
Administrative Bureau for 
Industry and Commerce 
Administrative Litigation Law 
Chinese Communist Party 
Government Administration 
Council 
National People's Congress 
State Administrative Bureau for 
Industry and Commerce 
Worker -- Staff Congress
II. Major Laws
abbres. full English translations
EBL
ECL
GPCL
SEL
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 
Economic Contract Law 
General Principles of Civil Law 
State Enterprise Law
III. Journals and Newspapers in Chinese
abbres. Chinese pinyin English translations
BJRB
FX Faxue
FXPL Faxue Pinglun
FXJK Faxue Jikan
Beijing Daily (Beijing)
Law Science Monthly (Shanghai 
Law Review (Wuhan)
Law Science Quarterly 
(Chongqing)
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FXYJ Faxue Yanjiu Studies in Law (Beijing)
FXZZ Faxue Zazhi Law Journal (Beijing)
FZJS Fazhi Jianshe Legal Construction (Beijing)
FZRB Fazhi Ribao Legal Daily (Beijing)
GMRB Guangming Ribao Enlightenment Daily (Beijing)
GRRB Gongren Ribao Workers' Daily (Beijing)
JJF Jingji Fa Economic Law (Beijing)
JJGL Jingji Guanli Economic Administration 
(Beij ing)
JJRB Jingji Ribao Economic Daily (Beijing)
JJYF Jingji Yu Fa Economy and Law (Beijing)
JJYFZ Jingji Yu Fazhi Economy and Law (Shengyang)
MZYFZ Minzhu Yu Fazhi Democracy and Legal System 
(Shanghai)
RMRB Renmin Ribao Peoples' Daily (Beijing)
XHYB Xinhua Yuebao Xinhua Monthly (Beijing)
ZFLT Zhengfa Luntan Tribune of Political Science 
and Law (Beijing)
ZGFX Zhongguo Faxue Laws in China (Beijing)
ZGFZB Zhongguo Fazhibao China Legal News (Beijing)
ZGJJTZGG Zhongguo Jingji China's Economic System
Tizhi Gaige Reform (Beijing)
III. Publications in English
BBC SWB British Broadcasting Corporation,
Summary of World Broadcasts (London) 
FBIS (CHI) Foreign Broadcast Information Service
(Daily Report, China) (Washington)
IV. Collection of Legal Documents in Chinese
English Citation Chinese Pinyin
Bulletin of the NPCSC Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui
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Changwu Weiyuanhui Goncrbao 
(Series, Beijing)
Bulletin of the State Council
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Guowuvuan Gongbao (Series, 
Beij ing)
Bulletin of the Supreme People's Court
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Zuigao Renmin Favuan Gongbao 
(Series, Beijing)
Collection of Company Laws and Regulations
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi 
Fagui Huibian (Law Press, 
Beijing, 1991)
Laws and Regulations of the PRC
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Fagui Huibian (Series, Law 
Press, Beijing)
Laws and Regulations of the PRC Central Government (1949-1950)
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Zhongyang Renmin Zhengfu Faling 
Huibian (Law Press, Beijing, 
1980)
Selected Enterprise Laws and Regulations
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Qiye Fagui Xuanbian (Law Press, 
Beijing, 1981)
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adopted on April 12, 1986 
effective from January 1, 1987
Implementing Rules Concerning the Law on Wholly Foreign Owned 
Enterprises
promulgated on and effective 
from December 12, 1990 
Implementing Regulations Concerning the Law on Sino-Foreign 
Equity Joint Ventures
promulgated on and effective 
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Implementing Measures on Provisional Regulations Concerning 
Private Enterprises
promulgated on January 16, 1989 
effective from February 1, 1989 
Implementing Regulations Concerning the Provisional
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Provisional Regulations Concerning the Work of Directors in 
State Industrial Enterprises
promulgated on and effective 
from January 2, 1982
Provisional Regulations Concerning the Worker -- Staff 
Congress in State Industrial Enterprises
promulgated on Septmeber 15, 
1986, effective from October 1, 
1986
Provisional Regulations Concerning the Work of Grassroots 
Party Organisations in State Industrial Enterprises
promulgated on September 15, 
1986
effective from October 1, 1986
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from April 1, 19 83
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from July 13, 1981 
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State Enterprise Law (SEL)
adopted on April 13, 1988 
effective from August 1, 1988
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
I. Aim and Structure of the Research
A. Chinese economic reforms and the law
Since 197 9, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has attempted 
to reconstruct many aspects of its economy. The reform of 
state enterprises, which began to be introduced as early as 
197 9 and was formally commenced nationwide in 1984, has been 
generally regarded as the most difficult and most fascinating 
part of the economic reforms as a whole.1 This is mainly 
because state enterprises are the dominant form of business 
organisation in the PRC, and occupy the most important 
position in the Chinese national economy. The significance and 
complexity of state enterprise reform lies not only in its 
enormous economic implications, but also in the profound 
social and political changes that it is likely to introduce.2
1 For a general assessment of Chinese economic reforms, 
see Lin Wei and Arnold Chao (ed.), China's Economic Reforms, 
University of Pennsylvania Press (Philadelphia) 1982; see also 
Brucel L. Reynolds (ed.), Reform in China: Challenges and 
Choices, M.E. Sharpe, Inc, (Armonk, New York / London) 1987. 
For a specific discussion of enterprise reform, see, for 
example, Gene Tidrick and Chen Jiyuan (ed.), China's 
Industrial Reform, Oxford University Press 1987. To a 
significant extent, many parts of urban economic reforms, 
including planning, pricing, banking, taxation, social 
security, and housing, are either directly or indirectly 
connected with state enterprise reform.
2 The political significance of Chinese state enterprise 
reform has become more obvious since the collapse of the 
Soviet socialist regime in 1991. Chinese authorities and many 
Chinese scholars consider that one of the most fundamental 
reasons for the collapse of the soviet empire was the weakness
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Moreover, many aspects of the reform concerning state 
enterprises are pioneering efforts when viewed in the general 
context of the on-going economic reforms. Property ownership 
is one aspect which was proved extremely controversial and has 
yet to be properly addressed by the Chinese authorities.
The most fundamental aim of state enterprise reform, as 
conceived by the Chinese leadership, is to "invigorate"
(gaohuo) enterprises. According to this general policy, while 
the rights and interests of the state in state enterprises 
must be preserved, attempts should be made to give such 
enterprises relative autonomy, that is, an appropriate degree 
of independence and protection from excessive and malign 
government intervention.
According to Chinese official views, in pursuing state 
enterprise reform, and indeed economic reforms as a whole, not 
only administrative and economic methods but also legal 
mechanisms should be employed to regulate and adjust the 
various interests involved in and affected by the reforms. The 
deliberate combination of these three methods constitutes a 
striking contrast with the PRC practice for many years prior 
to the late 1970s when administrative instructions and orders 
were almost exclusively relied on by the government to run 
state enterprises. Nevertheless, the relative importance of 
each of these three methods, in terms of the attention paid to 
them by the Chinese leadership, is not easy to ascertain. 
While the role of economic levers, including taxation, pricing 
and credit, has recently been given more attention, Chinese 
authorities from time to time still tend to resort to old 
administrative measures to cope with complicated problems.
The growing importance of the law in China's economic
of the state sector of the Soviet economy. Therefore, since 
late 1991, the Chinese government has renewed its commitment 
and, indeed attached more attention, to the need for the 
reform of large and medium-sized state enterprises. It also 
increasingly recognises the political significance of such 
reform. For a report on the special conference on "making a 
good job of" large and medium-sized state enterprises, 
organised by the CCP Central Committee in September 1991, see 
RMRB, Sept.28, 1991, p.l.
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reforms is widely acknowledged.3 Indeed, the unprecedented 
willingness of the Chinese leadership to build an appropriate 
legal system to serve China's drive for modernisation has been 
repaid with the many volumes of laws and regulations adopted 
since 1979. Moreover, despite the unfortunate disruption 
caused by the events of June 1989, the trend to enact more 
laws and regulations to govern various aspects of the society 
has continued, and is very likely to continue in the future.
As far as state enterprises are concerned, in addition to 
the General Principles of Civil Law (GPCL) of 1986,4 the most 
significant legislation is the State Enterprise Law (SEL) 
which was adopted by the National People's Congress on April 
13, 1988 and in force on August 1, 1988. This law, the 
"overall spirit" of which was characterized by one observer as 
"consistent with economic progress",5 was the first major law 
to be adopted in the PRC for the formal regulation of state 
enterprises. In addition, several other aspects of state 
enterprise reform have also been put under systematic legal 
regulation. For example, the Provisional Regulations
3 For a discussion of the developments of Chinese law in 
the early 1980s, see Stanley Lubman, "Emerging Functions of 
Formal Legal Institutions in China's Modernisation", China Law 
Reporter, Fall 1983, pp.195-266; Richard Baum, "Modernisation 
and Legal Reform in Post-Mao China: The Rebirth of Socialist 
Legality", Studies in Comparative Communism, Summer 1986, 
pp.6 9 -10 3.
For a later observation, see Walter Gellhorn, "China's 
Quest for Legal Modernity", Journal of Chinese Law, Vol.l, 
No.l, Spring 1987, pp.1-22. For a comprehensive review of the 
achievements and problems until 1989, see Anthony Dicks, "The 
Chinese Legal System: Reforms in Balance", The China
Quarterly, No.116, September 1989, pp.540-76.
4 Adopted at the Fourth Session of the Sixth National 
People's Congress on Apr.12, 1986 and effective as from Jan.l, 
1987, For an assessment of this important legislation, see 
Henry Zheng, "China's New Civil Law", American Journal of 
Comparative Law, Vol.34, 1986, pp.669-704.
James Feinerman, "The Evolving Chinese Enterprise", 
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Winter 
1989, pp.203-14, at p.214. "The New State Enterprise Law: 
China Takes A Step Towards Comprehensive Corporate Law", East 
Asian Executive Reports, June 1988, pp.9-11.
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Concerning the Contracting System of State Industrial 
Enterprises were promulgated by the State Council in 1988. In 
spite of many ambiguities and uncertainties/’ these 
Regulations represent a major step towards imposing legal 
control over the contracting system implemented in the 
overwhelming majority of Chinese large and medium-sized state 
enterprises.
B. Existing literature and problems
Since the early 1980s, the reform of state enterprises 
has attracted extensive attention from both Chinese and 
foreign observers. Much research has been conducted in order 
to evaluate the manner in which this reform has proceeded. 
This research reflects the views and concerns of relevant 
scholars in their attempts to examine the achievements and 
objective problems of China's enterprise reform. Although this 
literature is quite extensive, in my view, the overall 
regulation of Chinese state enterprises has yet to receive the 
kind and degree of attention that would lead to penetrating 
and accurate insight into the most important legal aspects of 
state enterprise reform.
First, existing Western analyses do not provide a 
comprehensive view of the legal regulation of Chinese state 
enterprises. In the West, much of the writing on Chinese state 
enterprise reform has concentrated on the analysis of 
economic, political and social aspects of the reform. It has 
neglected the legal dimension of state enterprise reform, and 
indeed economic reforms as a whole.7 While economic, political 
and social analyses are very important in that they may 
provide basic explanations of various problems to be tackled
6 See the discussion below in Chapter Eight.
7 For a critical summary of the inadequate attention paid 
by Western scholars in the legal aspects of China's reforms, 
see Stanley Lubman, "Studying Chinese Law: Limits, 
Possibilities and Strategy", American Journal of Comparative 
Law, Vol.39, No.2, 1991, pp.293-341, at 339.
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or being brought about by the ongoing reform, the legal 
implications of, and the efforts through law to address, these 
problems need to be examined in an accurate and scholarly 
manner. For example, the concept of "property right"
(caichancruan) is not viewed in the same way by economists and 
lawyers. Economists tend to be interested in analyzing the 
economic profits arising from the operation of the property. 
It follows that it may make little difference whether or not 
enterprises actually owns the property, so long as the 
property can be used to make profits. In contrast, lawyers are 
more specific and accurate in that they have to define the 
precise legal nature of the property rights. This is because 
the concrete nature of proprietorial rights varies from full 
"ownership" to mere "management", from operating by 
"contracting" to operating by "leasing". As a result, a 
detailed and interesting account of the property rights of 
Chinese state enterprises,8 may offer little help for 
understanding the problem from the legal point of view. An 
examination from economic and political viewpoints of the 
changing relationship between the directors and party 
secretaries in state enterprise reform highlights the 
complexity of this issue.9 But such analyses may well fail to 
address the problems involved because they may not reveal the 
difficulties in making the legal provisions of the SEL. They 
may also fail to distinguish the effects of legal provisions 
as opposed to other factors, such as political, social and 
ideological considerations. Obviously, these problems must be 
examined from a legal point of view in order to achieve a 
comprehensive and essential understanding of state enterprise 
reform.
See, for example, David Granik, Chinese State 
Enterprise, University of Chicago Press (Chicago and London) 
1990. This research, which was mainly based on the data 
collected in the early and mid 1980s, reflects the view of an 
economist on Chinese enterprise reform.
9 See Heath B. Chamberlain, "Party Management Relations 
in Chinese Industries: Some Political Dimensions of Economic 
Reform", The China Quarterly, No.112, 1987, pp.631-61.
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There have been, of course, several attempts to analyze 
legal aspects of Chinese state enterprise reform. These are 
represented by the publication in English of a number of 
articles written by both Western and Chinese writers. 
Generally speaking, property rights10 and bankruptcy rules11 
have received the most attention. In addition, the legal 
person system,12 and taxation system11 have also been 
discussed to a limited extent. However, these studies are 
concerned only with isolated features of the legal regulation 
of Chinese state enterprises. Many other fundamental aspects 
of the reform have thus been neglected. For example, at the 
time of writing, I am not aware of any specific discussion on 
the question of the legal guarantee of enterprise autonomy, 
although this is clearly one of the most important subjects in 
the legal analysis of state enterprise reform. Furthermore,
10 See, for example, Howard Chao and Yang Xiaoping, "The 
Reform of the Chinese System of Enterpriser Ownership", 
Stanford Journal of International Law, Vol.23, 1987, pp.365- 
97; Wang Liming and Liu Zhaonian, "On the Property Rights 
System of the State Enterprises in China", Law and 
Contemporary Problems, Vol.52, 1989, pp.19-42; Edward Epstein, 
"The Theoretical System of Property Rights in China's General 
Principles of Civil Law: Theoretical Controversy in the
Drafting Process and Beyond", Law and Contemporary Problems, 
Vol.52, 1989, pp.177-216; Paul Cantor and James Kraus,
"Changing Patterns of Ownership Rights in the People's 
Republic of China: A Legal and Economic Analysis in the
Context of Economic Reforms and Social Conditions", Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law, Vol.23, 1990, pp.479-538.
11 See, for example, Henry R. Zheng, "Bankruptcy Law of 
the People's Republic of China -- Principle, Procedure and 
Practice", Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol.19, 
1986, pp.683-732; Ta-Kuang Chang, "The Making of the Chinese 
Bankruptcy Law: A Study in the Chinese Legislative Process", 
Harvard International Law Journal, Vol.28, 1987, pp.333-72; M. 
Minor and K. Steven-Minor, "China's Emerging Bankruptcy Law", 
International Lawyer, 1988, pp.1217-26.
12 See, for example, Zhao Zhongfu, "Enterprise Legal 
Persons: Their Important Status in Chinese Civil Law", Law and 
Contemporary Problems, Vol.52, 1989, pp.1-18.
12 See Yang Xiaoping, "Progress and Problems in the 
Development of a New Income Tax System for State-Owned 
Enterprises in China", in Journal of Chinese law, Vol.3, 
Summer No.l 1989, pp.95-115.
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the legal status of enterprise directors, which was the most 
central issue in enacting the SEL, has been much complicated 
by its historical, political, and ideological factors. But 
this topic has not been examined by Western observers from the 
legal standpoint. In addition, many practical aspects of state 
enterprise reform, such as the contracting system, need to be 
carefully examined in order to consider the practical 
implementation of enterprise autonomy policy.
Since the late 1980s, there have also been a number of 
English-language account of legal and economic reforms in 
China. As far as the SEL is concerned, James Feinerman in 
particular has provided several discussions of this law.14 His 
comments serve as a good introduction to the SEL, but are more 
explanatory than analytical. A general and brief introduction 
of the SEL such as Feinerman's provides only a bird's-eye view 
of the main issues involving state enterprise reform. But it 
cannot offer a thorough investigation into this complicated 
matter.15
Interesting and useful research on legal institutions and 
economic reforms in China has been carried out by Donald 
Clarke.1'1 However, his main concerns appear to be the issues 
relating to legal rules and relevant institutional design. 
While the formulation and implementation of legal rules were 
examined and a study of some particular rules is provided by 
Clarke's writing, he mainly focuses on relevant institutions, 
including law-making bodies, government departments, and the 
judicial system. His analysis is primarily concerned with
14 See Feinerman, supra note 5; Feinerman, "The New State 
Enterprise Law: China Takes A Step Towards Comprehensive 
Corporate Law", East Asian Executive Reports, June 1988, pp. 9-
1 1 .
15 This is also a main problem in his latest attempt to 
analyze China's economic reforms. See James Feinerman, 
"Economic and Legal Reform in China, 197 8-1991", Problems of 
Communism, Sept-Oct 1991, pp.62-75.
1G Donald Clarke, "What's Law Got to Do with It? Legal 
Institutions and Economic Reform in China", UCLA Pacific Basin 
Law Journal, Vol.10, No.l, Fall 1991, pp.1-76.
24
state enterprise reform, but does not approach the issue from 
the standpoint of company or corporation law. As a result, 
readers are left without a full and clear understanding of 
either the legal status of state enterprises under 
contemporary Chinese law or the various efforts which have 
been made to place state enterprises within a proper legal 
framework. Inadequate examination of state enterprises per se 
may make it more difficult to fully account for the decisive 
reasons behind the failure of the institutional design and 
legal efforts regarding state enterprises. This is partly due 
to the chronic and widespread lack of judicial independence, 
which affects many legal subjects -- not state enterprises in 
particular. In fact, failure to realise state enterprise 
autonomy can only be understood by reference to the special 
status of state enterprises and their relations with 
government departments. In addition, Clarke discusses only 
selected aspects of the legal rules and institutions relating 
to state enterprises. Therefore, many fundamental aspects of 
the legal regulation of state enterprise reform remain 
unexamined.
In my view, although general discussion of institutional 
aspects of economic and legal reforms is valuable, it is the 
process of the law-making and the achievements, as well as 
defects, existing in the enacted laws and regulations, that 
should be the focus of careful study in the case of state 
enterprise reform. More specifically, key issues for 
consideration include the response of the law to the needs of 
enterprise reform, the ways in which the laws and regulations 
have been formulated, the personality and property rights that 
have been granted to state enterprises, and the degree of 
autonomy that is guaranteed by law and implemented in 
practice. Clearly, in order to answer these questions, many 
internal issues concerning state enterprises must be analyzed. 
In other words, it is necessary to pay close attention to the 
internal functioning components and institutions of state 
enterprises, as well as their outside relations with other 
entities.
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Secondly, existing research contributed by Chinese 
lawyers on state enterprise reform has been inadequate. It is 
true that, with the increasing emphasis on the role of law in 
contemporary China, Chinese legal scholars have engaged in 
extensive discussions concerning various issues in state 
enterprise reform. These discussions reached a peak in the mid 
1980s -- in particular, immediately after the promulgation of 
the SEL in 1988. A considerable number of books and articles 
were published.17 However, many of these discussions are 
explanatory, rather than analytical in nature. Many Chinese 
writers are only interested in providing answers to questions 
raised by the written law and neglect analysis of the often 
complex social, economic and political issues underlying these 
questions and answers. Furthermore, many scholars in China 
tend to praise the current treatment of state enterprise 
reform; they do not attempt to criticize and make suggestions 
concerning possible improvement.
One of the most obvious examples is the "right of 
management" (iingyingguan) accorded by both the GPCL and the 
SEL to state enterprises . As will be shown in many chapters of 
this thesis, the concept of management right -- which is no 
more than a compromise between radical and conservative 
reformers -- has failed to grant state enterprises the very
17 See, for example, Wang Zongfei and others, Gongye 
Qiyefa Wenda (Questions and Answers Concerning the SEL), China 
Agricultural Machinery Press (Beijing) 1988; Economic 
Legislation Bureau under the State Economic Commission, Qiyefa 
Jianqhua (Explanations Concerning the SEL), Enterprise 
Management Press (Beijing) 1988; Song Haobo and Liu Yanli, 
Gongye Qiyefa Gailun (Introduction to the SEL), China Goods 
and Materials Press (Beijing) 1988; Editorial Group, Quanmin 
Suoyouzhi Gongye Qiyefa Jianqzuo (Lectures on the SEL) , 
Machinery and Industry Press (Beijing). Also see Wang Baoshu, 
"Lun Quanmin Suoyouzhi Gongye Qiyefa Zai Qiye Lifa Shang de 
Tupo" (On the Breakthroughs of the SEL in Enterprise 
Legislation), ZGFX, No.4, 1988, pp.3-10; Wang Baoshu, "Lun
Quanmin Suoyouzhi Gongye Qiyefa Xingzhi" (On the Nature of the 
SEL), FXZZ, No.2, 1988, pp.12-4; Ma Junju and Yu Yanman,
"Suoyouquan he Jingyingquan Fengli Shi Qiyefa de Linghun" (The 
Separation of the Ownership from the Management is the Soul of 
the SEL), FXPL, No.3, 1988, pp.1-5. Similarly, the
promulgation in 1986 of the EBL was also followed by a number 
of publications explaining this law as it stands in text.
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kind of independence and autonomy needed for efficient 
management and real responsibility.
An additional shortcoming of legal research within China 
on state enterprises is that there has been little discussion, 
from the legal standpoint, of problems resulting from the 
actual implementation of the SEL.la Although complaints about 
the failure to guarantee autonomy for state enterprises are 
popular in many walks of Chinese society -- including lawyers 
and economists -- Chinese lawyers have conducted little 
research into the defects of the legal framework governing 
state enterprises. This is but one reflection of the 
essentially passive role played by Chinese lawyers in efforts 
to protect state enterprises from government intervention.
Thirdly, and most critically, both inside and outside 
China, research into the legal regulation of state enterprises 
has failed to pay sufficient attention to the complicated 
interaction between law and policy. As will be demonstrated in 
many chapters of this thesis, the promulgation of a number of 
formal laws and regulations does not mean that the law itself 
has always been explicit. Failure to place written laws and 
regulations in a broader policy spectrum leads to inaccurate 
and partial interpretation of these laws and regulations. This 
is particularly so in the case of state enterprises which 
possess very complex social, political as well as economic 
features. Many Chinese lawyers tend to either disregard or 
underestimate various policy considerations underlying legal 
provisions and provide an idealised and highly theoretical 
account of the laws and regulations being examined. Relevant 
chapters of this thesis will attempt to show that the legal 
person concept, and the contracting system, and worker's 
participation in enterprise management are all examples of 
such idealisations and overpraise.
In examining the laws and regulations concerning Chinese
18 There are a few exceptions. See, for example, Luo 
Mingda and Bian Xiangping, "Lun Qiyefa Shishi Zhong de Ruogan 
Wenti Jiqi Duice" (On the Several Problems and Countermeasures 
in the Implementation of the SEL), FXPL, No.5, 1989, pp.8-14.
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state enterprises, some Western observers also fail to take 
into account the historical, political, social, and economic 
realities and considerations underlying the nominal legal 
provisions. This is so in the case of the PRC Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law. As shown in Chapter Eight, some of the 
published papers on this subject simply attempt to "interpret" 
the law as it stands, and fail to analyze the factors 
underlying the Law's various provisions. Nor have such 
discussions fully explained the subsequent failure to enforce 
the Law.
Just as the making of Chinese law is generally believed 
to be strongly policy-oriented, so the implementation of the 
law is strongly influenced by government policies. The latter 
are unstable and often contradictory. In the end, written laws 
and regulations have to be viewed in light of the many 
complicated social, political and economic conditions which 
underline the law. The functions of the law are therefore 
restrained by government administrative measures and policies 
which maintain a significant role in controlling state 
enterprises.
In particular, in view of the strong tradition of policy 
domination of enterprises in the PRC prior to economic 
reforms, it is particularly necessary to study both the ways 
through which policies are transformed into law and the 
effects of the law vis-a-vis subsequent policy changes. Only 
after detailed examination of the dynamic interaction between 
the law and policy may research on state enterprise reform be 
carried out thoroughly.
C . Aim and methodology
Basically, the legal regulation of Chinese state 
enterprises can be approached with two main questions in mind. 
First, is it practical to employ laws and regulations to 
govern state enterprises? Secondly, are written laws and 
regulations effective?
These two questions may, however, be examined as two
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closely related issues that depend not only on each other but 
also on many other common factors. The first of these 
additional common factors is that, for most of the period 
between the 1950s and the late 1970s, law was ignored in the 
PRC. It follows that considerable difficulties may almost 
inevitably complicate proposed legal regulation of any 
particular area of Chinese society. Secondly, the current 
economic reforms are far from settled in many aspects. This 
uncertainty casts serious doubt on the formulation as well as 
the implementation of the law. This is especially the case in 
laws governing state enterprises, which have proved to be the 
most controversial sector in the entire corpus of post-Mao 
economic reforms.
Given these common factors and potential obstacles to 
progress, the interdependence of the practicability and the 
effectiveness of legal regulation of state enterprises is more 
or less apparent. If the laws adopt a down-to-earth approach 
in an attempt to solve specific problems, and if sufficient 
account is taken of the social, economic and political 
environment in which state enterprises are operating, then 
written laws are more likely to be applied effectively. 
Otherwise, they will be meaningless.
When commenting on research into Chinese law, Professor 
Jean Escarra pointed out in the 1920s that four methods might 
be used. They are: observation, building the technical
structure of an institution, history, and comparative 
jurisprudence.10 If the classification of these four methods 
is to be applied here, then this research is mainly conducted 
as an investigation into "building the technical structure of 
an institution". In the present study, by "institution" is 
meant the laws governing Chinese state enterprises -- though 
the concept of "institution" is also used to refer to concrete
10 See "Western Methods of Research into Chinese Law", in 
The Chinese Social and Political Science Review, Vol.VIII, 
Jan. 1924. Cited in Yang Honglie, Zhoncrcruo Falii Fada Shi 
(Development History of Chinese Law), Commercial Press 
(Nanjing) 1930, p.13. Professor Escarra was a legal advisor to 
the then Chinese Republican Government.
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systems established within state enterprises, such as the 
director responsibility system and the worker -- staff 
congress.
Research into a legal institution may suffer, however, if 
insufficient attention is paid to the complex social, economic 
and political environment which may not only shape the law but 
also determine the functions of law. As Stanley Lubman"0 has 
rightly pointed out, the search for the functions of legal 
concepts and legal institutions in a broader social context 
should be the essential strategy for the study of Chinese law. 
Nevertheless, in the search policies play a key role, albeit 
sometimes "behind the scenes". To a significant extent, policy 
factors which underline legal provisions should be regarded as 
the decisive criteria for assessing the success or failure of 
the establishment of relevant legal concepts and legal 
institutions, even though these policy factors may not always 
be explicitly recorded.
This research is mainly concerned with state enterprises 
in the PRC. Nevertheless, I will analyze a number of issues 
comparatively. In addition to the analyses of different legal 
treatments regarding different types of enterprises operating 
in contemporary China, attention is also paid to the 
comparisons at two other levels: one is to compare the Chinese 
situations with the past experiences of the socialist Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe; the other is to compare the Chinese 
case with relevant law and practice in the West. An example of 
the former is the comparison made in the respect of the 
relationship between state enterprises and the government 
authorities."1 Examples of the latter include the ultra vires 
rule,22 directors' duties,21 workers' participation,24 and
Supra note 7 .
21 See Chapter Four.
22 See Chapter Three.
21 See Chapter Six.
24 See Chapter Seven.
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bankruptcy rules.2'-’
The research upon which this thesis is based relies 
primarily on documentary sources. The extensive attention paid 
by many observers to Chinese state enterprise reform has 
provided me with access to much material in Chinese and 
English-language publications. Although most of these 
materials are not aimed at the legal analysis of this reform, 
they nevertheless offer valuable insight into both the 
operation of Chinese state enterprise and the difficulties in 
reforming state enterprises in the PRC. In addition to relying 
on the published materials, I myself made two visits to China 
of two months each. During these visits, fieldwork was carried 
out in order, inter alia, to assess the accuracy of my 
documentary sources. In particular, I conducted interviews, in 
Beijing and Nanjing, with law professors, relevant government 
officials, factory directors, party secretaries, and trade 
union officials within enterprises. They provided me with 
valuable first-hand information about the implementation of 
the laws relating to state enterprises.
D. Scope and structure
This thesis is unable, for reasons of space, to discuss 
all the legal aspects of Chinese state enterprise reform. For 
example, although both the contracting and shareholding 
systems have been employed to reform state enterprises, this 
thesis deals only with the contracting or chengbao system.25 
This is because the shareholding system, or guf enzhi, which 
was introduced in the mid-1980s is so far still in the stage 
of cautious experimentation rather than in large-scale 
operation. Moreover, as will be analyzed in Chapter Two, 
relevant documents concerning shareholding enterprises were
25 See Chapter Eight.
25 See Chapter Nine below.
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not formally promulgated until June 1992.27 And these 
documents are only semi-legal in that they were adopted 
neither by the NPC nor by the State Council. They were only 
issued by the State Economic Reform Commission and relevant 
Ministries as temporary and experimental measures. Therefore, 
they are neither "laws" nor "regulations", but merely 
documents which purport to have certain legal effect.28 In 
fact, given the controversy involved and the limited 
experience, the effects of such experimentation remain to be 
seen. Accordingly, I can only provide a preliminary view of 
this experimentation in the relevant chapters, although I try 
to give greater attention to it in the concluding chapter of 
the thesis.
It must be noted that the Chinese government has 
persistently made clear that the shareholding system must be 
experimented with on the basis of the public ownership 
including state and collective ownership. However, the 
involvement of private shareholders poses a serious threat to 
the property ownership structure of shareholding enterprises. 
As a result, shareholding enterprises may eventually be 
governed by a Company Law which differs from the SEL. Thus, 
this thesis will ignore shareholding enterprises and focus on
27 These documents consist of fifteen items at three 
different levels. At the first level is a general document: 
Measures Concerning the Experimentation of Shareholding 
Enterprises (for the text in Chinese, see RMRB, Jun.19, 1992, 
p.2; for the English text, see BBC SWB, Jun.19, 1992, FE/1411 
Cl/1-3); at the second level are two major documents: 
Normative Opinions Concerning Limited Liability Companies, and 
Normative Opinions Concerning Companies Limited by Shares. At 
the third level are a series of documents relating to macro 
administration, accounting, labour and wages, taxation, 
auditing, fiscal administration, material supply and sale, 
state assets administration, industrial and commercial 
registration, statistics, issuance and trading of shares, and 
shareholding experimentation of new projects. For a report 
announcing the promulgation of these document, see RMRB, 
J un.19, 1992, p.l.
28 According to the official view, these documents have 
only "relative legal nature" (xiangdui de falu xingzhi) until 
a Company Law has been adopted. See the report, RMRB (Overseas 
edn.), Jun.24, 19 92, p.2.
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state enterprises which are wholly owned by the state and 
which do not issue shares to the public.
Indeed, even by focusing on the reform of traditional
wholly state owned state enterprises, it is not possible for
this thesis to analyze many issues which are directly 
connected with this complex reform. For example, the issue of 
competition -- which certainly does affect the performance of 
state enterprises -- has to be put aside. Moreover, the policy 
towards enterprise grouping -- a policy which has been 
emphasized by the Chinese government as a method for 
reorganising industrial structure and promoting economic 
efficiency -- is only discussed to a limited extent.29 In 
addition, the local government control of state enterprises, 
which can be very significant in some cases, is only discussed 
generally and without reference to any detailed case study.30
Nevertheless, by selecting and addressing in detail 
issues which I consider to be the most important and relevant, 
my analysis and discussion should provide a good view of both 
the progress made, and the difficulties which still exist, in 
the legal regulation of state enterprises in China.
Although the structure of this thesis broadly follows the 
traditional approach used for analyzing Western company or
corporation laws, it is also necessary to look at certain
issues peculiar to the PRC context. For example, the problem 
of corporate personality which nowadays does not require much 
explanation in most treatises on company law in the West must 
be examined in detail. This is because the legal person 
concept is given considerable emphasis by both PRC authorities 
and scholars; much hope has been placed on this concept within 
China for enhancing the independence of state enterprises. 
Another example is the issue of worker's participation in 
enterprise management. In the West, this topic is usually 
treated in the context of labour law or the law of industrial
29 See the discussion concerning legal personality in 
Chapter Three of the thesis.
30 See, for example, Chapter Four of the thesis concerning 
enterprise autonomy.
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relations. However, in China, the issue of workers' 
participation is officially viewed as a subject of great 
importance, which is treated in detail in the SEL. It has also 
generated much controversy. Accordingly, it deserves special 
analysis within the context of this research.
The thesis is divided into ten chapters. The remainder of 
this chapter continues to introduce the main topic of the 
present study, namely enterprises. While emphasis is given to 
the distinctive features of state enterprises in the PRC's 
socialist economy, other types of enterprises currently 
operating in China are also discussed in order to provide the 
reader with a more comprehensive view of the Chinese 
enterprise system.
Chapter Two reviews theories of the company and 
enterprise law and the Chinese experience of enterprise law 
and policy. The discussion covers the period of the 
development of modern enterprises in China since the 1860s. It 
looks at, in particular, the late Qing law reform in the 
1900s, and concludes with the adoption of the SEL in 1988. The 
PRC experience in relation to the law and policy of 
enterprises since 1949 is examined in order to provide a 
broader understanding of the issues of state enterprises, and 
of the position of the law in relation to policy.
Chapter Three examines the role of the legal person 
concept in state enterprise reform and the law. It focuses on 
the introduction and the application of the notion of legal 
person to state enterprises in economic reforms. It gives 
particular attention to the apparent difficulties experienced 
in defining property rights for state enterprises as legal 
persons. Other problems such as liability, the ultra vires 
rule, and the possibility of lifting the corporate veil are 
also discussed.
The legal analysis of the relations between state 
enterprises and miscellaneous government departments is 
conducted in two separate chapters -- Chapters Four and Five. 
The general legal guarantee of enterprise autonomy, freedom 
from government manipulation, is analyzed in Chapter Four.
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This is the most central issue in the legal regulation of 
state enterprises. "Relative" (xiangdui de) autonomy of 
enterprises is widely described by the Chinese government as 
not only the starting point but also the declared aim of state 
enterprise reform. This policy is so important that the SEL 
and relevant regulations have addressed it in detail.
The financial autonomy of state enterprises is examined 
in Chapter Five. To a significant extent, the autonomy of 
state enterprises is dependent on their financial autonomy. 
However, this issue is so fundamental that frequent and 
significant policy changes -- which may undermine relevant 
legal norms -- have been made during the reform. It remains an 
area which will see further changes.
Chapter Six is concerned with the legal status of 
enterprise directors. The discussion examines the difficulties 
encountered in establishing the authority of directors in 
state enterprises. The most difficult issue has been the 
proper treatment, including a legal definition, of the 
management power and status of both enterprise directors and 
party secretaries within state enterprises. In addition, the 
discussion also points out the inadequacy of Chinese law 
concerning the legal duties of enterprises directors.
Chapter Seven concerns workers' participation in 
enterprise management. Worker's participation is an issue of 
political and ideological importance which also receives legal 
treatment in the SEL and relevant regulations. But, as will be 
shown, rights of participation are not only conceptually vague 
but also remain difficult to enforce in practice.
Chapter Eight discusses the issues of liquidation, 
bankruptcy, and reorganisation of state enterprises. The 
introduction of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law in 1986 was seen 
as a significant step towards promoting business efficiency of 
state enterprises. However, due to considerable controversy, 
as well as defects in the social security system, the law has 
not really been enforced.
Chapter Nine examines the contracting system as an 
important legal mechanism employed in state enterprise reform.
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To a great extent, the discussion assesses the effects and the 
limits of the contracting system on the legal authorization of 
autonomy to state enterprises.
In the final chapter, conclusions are drawn about the 
results of the existing legal regulation of Chinese state 
enterprises, and on the general analysis of the interaction of 
law, policy, and administrative powers in the process of 
economic reforms. The thesis ends with an examination of 
recent developments and a discussion about the future 
prospectus of the laws governing state enterprises.
II. Different Enterprises in the PRC
The term "enterprise" (giye) as a legal concept, although 
used widely, has no fixed and strict meaning in the 
legislation of the PRC. Generally speaking, an enterprise may 
be defined as an economic unit which is engaged in production 
and service activities and which conducts independent 
accounting.-11 Such a general description is, however, of 
little significance to the legal analysis of enterprises 
since, as we shall see, the nature and the characteristics of 
different enterprises may vary greatly.
As a result of the post-Mao economic reform and policy of 
opening to the outside world, the Chinese economy is moving 
towards a "mixed" type of economy.-12 In contemporary China, 
many types of enterprises coexist and to a certain extent
n -phis is the definition of "enterprise unit" in Faxue 
Cidian (Law Dictionary), Shanghai Dictionary Press 1985, 
pp.325-6. Compare with the definition that an enterprise is "a 
venture or undertaking especially one involving financial 
commitment" (see Black's Law Dictionary, West Publishing Co., 
5th edn. 1979, pp.476-7).
32 The term "mixed economy" is used here to refer to an 
economy in which state, private and other enterprises coexist. 
However, "free market" which is seen by some Western observers 
as a precondition for using the term of "mixed economy" does 
not yet exist in contemporary China. For a discussion on the 
definition of "mixed economy", see W. Friedmann (ed.), Public 
and Private Enterprise in Mixed Economies, Stevens & Sons 
(London) 1974, pp.360-2.
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compete with one another. By the end of 1991 the number of 
enterprises registered in the PRC reached nearly 5 million. 
Of these, the number of state enterprises, collective 
enterprises, and associated enterprises accounted for 4.82 
million; 14 the number of private enterprises totalled about 
108,OOO;^’ and the number of foreign investment enterprises 
was 37,189.'"
A. State enterprises
In the West, state enterprises are widely known as 
"public corporations", 17 "government enterprises", or "public 
enterprises". Despite the virtual absence of a statutory 
definition in Western legislation, "public corporations" are 
seen to be invariably associated with public affairs or public 
interests/8 All public corporations possess legal
For this information, see Baokan Wenzhai (Digest of 
Newspapers and Periodicals), Mar.3, 1992, p. 2. This figure
does not include individual business and individual 
partnership, both of which are sometimes generally regarded as
"enterprises" (give).
34 Ibid.
jr' Ibid.
iu Ibid. The numbers for equity joint ventures, 
cooperative joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises were respectively 22,791, 8497 and 5901.
J7 The term "Public corporation" in the West (or "public 
companies" as used in the UK legislation) is also used to 
describe corporations whose shares are traded by the public. 
In this sense, the term "public corporation" is used to 
distinguish from "private corporations" (or "private 
companies" in the UK) which impose restrictions on the trading 
of their shares.
'a For example, a public corporation is defined as "an 
artificial person . . . created for the administration of public 
affairs." See Black's Law Dictionary, supra note 1, pp.1105-6. 
Similarly, public corporations are described as "corporate 
bodies established by statute to own, manage, and operate 
utilities and industries in the public interest". See David M. 
Walker, The Oxford Companion to Law, Clarendon Press (Oxford) 
1980, p.1013.
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personality. However, because of their close connection with 
the government, they are vulnerable to administrative and 
political interference.39
In China, the official definition of a "state enterprise" 
(quoving give)40 is "enterprise owned by the whole people" 
(quanmin suoyouzhi give). State enterprises represent the most 
orthodox form of economic organisation and also constitute the 
most important part of a socialist economy. In the PRC, state 
enterprises, especially those of large and medium-size, have 
been the "backbone" in the national economy. For example, by 
1991 there were about 11,540 large and medium-sized state
39 See for example the analysis in W. Friedmann and J.F. 
Garner (ed.), Government Enterprise: A Comparative Study 
(hereafter "Government Enterprise"), Stevens & Sons (London) 
1970 .
40 Strictly speaking, the term "state enterprise" can be 
understood as referring to either "enterprise owned by the 
state" (quovou give) or "enterprise managed by the state" 
(quoving give). Such a distinction may appear to have purely 
theoretical significance. However, as some scholars noted, in 
the process of the economic reforms, Chinese state enterprises 
which used to be directly "managed" by governmental 
authorities should be transformed to enterprises which are 
merely owned by the state but managed by the enterprises 
themselves. See for example Wang Baoshu and Cui Qingzhi, 
Gongye Qiyefa Daqanq (Outline of Enterprise Law) , Current 
Affairs Press (Beijing) 1985, "Postscript", at p.180. For a 
discussion of this transformation, see Chapter Two of the 
thesis.
Before 1952, in communist-controlled areas of China, 
there existed a distinction between "state - owned industries" 
(guoying gongye) which referred to enterprises owned and 
managed by a government or military region above provincial 
level and "public factory" (guoying qongchang) which was owned 
and managed by a province or county. On Sept. 1952, the 
Government Administration Council issued the Provisions 
Concerning the Usages of Names of State Enterprises, which 
required that from then on "state enterprises" (guoying give) 
should be used to refer to enterprises invested and managed by 
the Central Government and departments of large administrative 
regions, including those trusted by an administrative region 
to a province or city to manage, and that enterprises invested 
and managed by governments under the provincial level should 
be called "local state enterprises" (difanq guoying qiye). For 
the text of these Provisions in Chinese, see Laws and 
Regulations of the Central PRC Government (1952), p.112.
38
industrial enterprises.41 This number was only 2.5 per cent 
of the total number of all Chinese industrial enterprises, but 
the output of these large and medium-sized state enterprises 
accounted for about 45.6 per cent of the total output of all 
Chinese industrial enterprises.42 Moreover, the income 
contributed by these large and medium-sized state enterprises 
to the state constituted more than sixty per cent of the total 
provided by all Chinese industrial enterprises.43 On the other 
hand, the number of workers employed by state enterprises had, 
even by the end of 1989, already topped one hundred million.44 
Thus, state enterprises are extremely important in the Chinese 
economy and it is simply impossible to underestimate their 
significance. Let us now examine the main features of state 
enterprises.
In the mid-197 0s, a Hungarian academic, inspired by the 
economic reforms taking place at that time in Eastern Europe, 
summarised the principal criteria for describing a socialist 
state enterprise as: "separate enterprise property as basis of 
the economic activity; the enterprise's status as state organ; 
the enterprise as a collective body; the principle of 
compliance with the plan; independent economic accounting; 
legal personality". 4-‘ Some of these features, such as state 
organ and state planning, reflected the then prevailing
41 por C2_assjLfication of Chinese state enterprises and 
its effect on enterprise legislation, see the discussion 
below.
42 Information from the editorial "Jizhong Liliang Gaohuo 
Guoying Dazhongxing Qiye" (Putting Together Our Strength and 
Invigorating Large and Medium-Sized State Enterprises), RMRB 
(Overseas edn.), Oct.7, 1991, p.l.
43 Ibid.
44 RMRB, Feb.3, 1990, p.l. This number accounted for
almost one tenth of the total Chinese population. The 
importance of this figure becomes clearer when one notes that 
as a agricultural country, eighty per cent of the Chinese 
population are peasants and farmers.
45 Laos Ficzere, The Socialist State Enterprise, Akademiai 
Kiado (Budapest, Hungary) 1974, p.35.
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situation of Chinese state enterprises. However, other
features, such as separate enterprise property and legal
personality, were completely unthinkable at that time for the
Chinese leadership. This was mainly because during the 19 60s
and 1970s Chinese state enterprises operated under
comprehensive government administration and therefore did not
possess any real independence.40
In the course of the economic reforms started in 197 9,
almost all the features described by that Hungarian academic
in the 1970s have been officially acknowledged in China and
incorporated into relevant laws, especially the GPCL and the
SEL. Basically, the SEL defines a state enterprise as,
a socialist work unit which is engaged in producing and 
managing commodities and which enjoys autonomy in 
accordance with the law in respect of its business 
operations, which is responsible for its profits and 
losses, and which conducts independent accounting.47
On the one hand, this definition illustrates basic
features of state enterprises; on the other hand, however, it
fails to reveal explicitly some important aspects of the
distinctive nature of state enterprises . Many of the features
of Chinese state enterprises will be explored in detail in the
following chapters. At this stage, the characteristics of the
state enterprise may be generally described in terms of three
different aspects: economic, social and administrative, and
political.
1. Economic organisation
The economic feature seems to be common for all types of 
enterprises across the world. That is, enterprises must be 
engaged in economic exchanges by producing goods or providing 
services. However, prior to economic reforms, this feature was 
far from being an explicit feature for Chinese state 
enterprises. For many years, Chinese state enterprises were 
"appendages" (fushuwu) of governments and their departments,
40 For a more detailed description, see Chapters Two and
Three of this study.
47 Art. 2 .
40
rather than independent economic entities. In fact, in the 
wake of economic reforms, fierce debates arose in China 
regarding the economic nature of state enterprises. This 
debate appeared to focus on the degree of autonomy which a 
state enterprise should possess. But the crucial issue 
underlying the debate was whether or not the Chinese economy 
was a commodity economy in which state enterprises, like many 
other types of enterprises, might become independent economic 
entities. That debate came to an end in October 1984 when the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China adopted the 
Decision Concerning Reforms of the Economic System ("Party 
Decision"). This Party Decision, which has had a profound 
impact on the process of Chinese urban economic reforms, for
the first time in PRC history explicitly recognised that the
Chinese economy was a planned commodity economy based on
public ownership.48 As a result of this development, state 
enterprises have been required to become independent commodity 
producers and managers. Therefore, by officially denying the 
governmental nature of state enterprises, the economic aspect 
of the state enterprises has been acknowledged and emphasized.
One important point, however, should be noted. That is, 
although they are encouraged to make profits, state
enterprises are not necessarily profit-making institutions. 
According to the orthodox socialist theory, the fundamental 
aim of socialist production is not to pursue economic profits, 
but to satisfy the increasing material and cultural needs of 
the people. This feature has also been expressly recognised by
48 Since mid-1992, a new term has been emerging in China. 
Many people, led by the General Secretary of the CCP, Jiang 
Zemin, have preferred to use the notion of "socialist market 
economy" (shehui zhuyi shichang jingji) to describe the nature 
of the contemporary Chinese economy. It must, however, be 
noted that this new term, by defining the economy as a market 
economy, contradicts the constitutional provision which 
prescribed the Chinese economy as an essentially "planned 
economy" with the "supplementary role" of the regulation by 
the market, (see Art.15, 1982 Constitution).
41
the SEL.40
As a matter of fact, when the draft SEL was published in 
early 1988 for public . .it was suggested by some
academics50 that the law should explicitly recognise the 
profit-making goal of state enterprises as people would not 
permit the continuous operation of loss-making enterprises. 
This proposal was, however, not accepted. Many possible 
reasons may account for this rejection. The most important may 
have been that the profit-making orientation would, in the 
orthodox view, conflict with the above noted paramount aim of 
socialist production. Moreover, state enterprises are not pure 
economic organisations since they are also administrative and 
political institutions .:,i
2. Social and administrative organisation 
In the PRC, social and administrative features of state 
enterprises were most pronounced before the post-Mao era of 
economic reforms. For many years until the late 1970s, 
governments at different levels and their departments directly 
managed enterprises. And to a great extent through the overall 
administration of enterprises, the government was able to 
command effectively the society. As such, enterprises merely 
operated as state organs and performed various administrative
40 Art.3 of the SEL provides that the fundamental tasks 
of the state enterprise shall be to develop commodity 
production, create wealth, increase accumulation (of wealth) 
and meet "the growing needs of the people with respect to 
their material and cultural lives" in accordance with state 
plans and market demand.
50 See for example professor Xie Huaishi, "Qiyefa Mouxie 
Tiaowen Zhi Wojian" (My Opinions on Some Provisions of the 
Draft SEL), GMRB, Feb.4, 1988, p.3.
r>1 Immediately after June 1989, the tendency to put 
emphasis on the economic feature of state enterprises was 
attacked mainly on the ground of the socialist nature of state 
enterprises. See Fan Ping, "Shixing Dangzheng Fenggong Yu 
Jianchi He Jianqiang Dang de Lingdao" (Implementing the 
Separation of the Party from the Administration and Adhering 
to and Strengthening the Leadership of the Party) , BJRB, 
Oct.11, 1989, p.3. Also see Chapter Six of the thesis.
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functions. Connected with the administrative functioning are 
the social functions that state enterprises had to (and still 
do) carry out. For example, state enterprises, in particular 
large or medium-sized ones, were (and still are) required to 
provide their workforce with many social and welfare services 
which in the West are usually provided by government agencies, 
social and economic institutions, as well as the market. These 
services range from the building and distribution of housing 
facilities to the education of workers' children. It is mainly 
because of these social functions that Chinese state 
enterprise are often informally referred to in the PRC as 
"small societies" (xiao shehui).
Urban economic reforms introduced since 1984 have aimed 
at reducing government intervention with regard to the 
management of enterprises and, more generally, at granting 
enterprises a certain degree of independence. As will be shown 
in Chapter Four, the SEL grants relative autonomy to state 
enterprises and requires them to concentrate on economic 
performance. In addition, government authorities are required 
to take up many social responsibilities previously performed 
by enterprises. Nevertheless, the social and administrative 
features of state enterprises can be neither eliminated 
immediately nor eradicated completely. For example, state 
economic plans -- comprising guidance as well as compulsory 
plans -- continue to play a significant role in the PRC's 
socialist economy.^  Moreover, the state enterprise is still 
held responsible for administering labour on behalf of the 
state, though it has been given more autonomy to employ and 
dismiss workers. In addition, enterprises continue to carry 
out many social responsibilities and are not allowed to pass 
these responsibilities to the government and the public.5J
s“ For an assessment of the role of the state plan in 
contemporary China, see Chapter Three below.
For example, in the current housing reform, though the
state and the individuals stand to contribute more towards 
housing construction, enterprises themselves are still put 
under an obligation to make large contributions.
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The social and administrative features of enterprises may 
severely affect the economic functioning of the latter. 
Enterprises have to carry out state economic plans, and their 
autonomy in making decisions concerning production, pricing 
and many other aspects is still limited. It follows that 
profit-making may not always be set as the ultimate aim of 
their operations. Indeed, there always exists a contradiction 
between economic efficiency -- through effective production 
and services -- and social efficiency -- through the 
performance of various social responsibilities. This 
contradiction has added considerable difficulties to state 
enterprise reform. For example, because of the consideration 
for social issues such as employment and social stability, 
many state enterprises continuously making losses are not 
necessarily threatened by the bankruptcy law.54
3. Political organisation
The socialist nature of state enterprises lies
particularly in their political role.55 In socialist
-Wifi- o^ jecb'i^ .
countries, it is generally believed that political ' v of
enterprises can boost workers' enthusiasm which ultimately
enhances production efficiency. Worker's participation in
enterprise management is not only a matter of social and
political necessity but also an important means for promoting
economic ends, and therefore must be guaranteed by law.56
Moreover, in order to uphold and reinforce the leadership of
the Communist Party, the establishment of grass root party
organisations is required within state enterprises. In order
to maintain their authority within enterprises, party
organisations must be involved in enterprise management. This
has proved a difficult area in state enterprise reform and
54 See the discussion in Chapter Eight of the thesis.
55 For a detailed account of this aspect, see Andrew G. 
Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism (Work and Authority in 
Chinese Industry), University of California Press 1986, 
especially Chapter 3, "The Party-State in the Factory".
56 See Chapter Six of the thesis.
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subsequent legal treatment of state enterprises/'7
Thus, Chinese socialist state enterprises possess not 
only economic and social, but also administrative and 
political characteristics, and these features combine to make 
the nature of state enterprises very complicated indeed. It 
must, nonetheless, be noted that these three aspects of 
Chinese state enterprises may not always hold an equal weight. 
Before the post-Mao economic reforms, the administrative 
aspects of state enterprises were most significant and their 
economic features were largely neglected. However, since the 
beginning of economic reforms in the late 197 0s and early 
1980s, the economic aspect of state enterprises has been 
promoted to occupy a more important position in their overall 
functioning. Of course, such changes in emphasis are bound to 
affect the operational aim and structure of state enterprises. 
For example, the stress placed on the economic function of 
state enterprises in the era of economic reforms has not only 
required a reduction in enterprises' administrative functions, 
but also necessarily touched the nerve of the political aspect 
of state enterprises. Indeed, as will be shown in the 
discussion of later chapters, the new policy has caused 
considerable confusion and chaos within state enterprises.
B. Other enterprises
In order to understand the social, economic and political 
environment within which state enterprises are operating, it 
is necessary to examine briefly those enterprises with which 
state enterprises are competing. Some of the concepts 
discussed below are either unknown or easily misunderstood in 
the West. Indeed, some concepts, such as gongsi or "company" 
and jiti give or "collective enterprise", are almost 
incomprehensible, even for Chinese lawyers.
G7 See Chapter Six of the thesis.
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1. Collective enterprise
"Collective enterprise" (jiti give) and its longer name - 
- 1 collectively-owned enterprise" (jiti suoyouzhi give) -- are 
widely used terms in China. A collective enterprise may be 
formed in various ways. Traditionally, a collective enterprise 
is established on the basis of capital contributions made by 
members of collectives such as township, street, commune, 
production team, and many other units. Moreover, these 
collectives may by themselves invest to set up collective 
enterprises. In addition, a collective enterprise may be 
formed as a result of the financial support from the state or 
other enterprises. For example, since the late 1970s, in order 
to ease the problem of unemployment, state and collective 
enterprises have been encouraged by the government to invest 
in new businesses. A great majority of these newly-created 
businesses are by nature collective enterprises, and they give 
priority in employment to those people whose parents work in 
the units which first invested in, and thereby set up, these 
collective enterprises .58
Collective enterprises may be established in urban as 
well as rural areas. In fact, one of the most notable 
achievements in Chinese rural economic reforms has been the 
dramatic growth of rural enterprises. These rural enterprises 
are usually called xiangzhen give or "township enterprises". 
Most township enterprises are classified by Chinese 
authorities as collective enterprises.59 In fact, in many
58 Although these newly established enterprises are deemed 
to be independent legal persons, they do have administrative 
connections with those enterprises which promoted them. To 
certain extent, the original investment made by an enterprise 
is treated as a loan repayable by the newly founded 
enterprise.
59 Strictly speaking, Xiangzhen give which developed from 
the so-called "commune-team enterprises" (shedui give) is not 
a legal term. The Circular on Transmitting the "Report on 
Initiating a New Situation in Commune-Team Enterprises" 
submitted by the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and 
Fishery and the Leading Party Group of the Ministry, jointly 
issued by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 
and the State Council on Mar.l, 1984, defined xiangzhen give
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areas, especially the coastal provinces, township enterprises 
have become the dominant economic force in the local economy.
A legal analysis on Chinese collective enterprises is by 
no means an easy task. As one Chinese lawyer put it, "of the 
existing discussions concerning various enterprises, the 
discussions on collective enterprises are the most ambiguous 
and complicated."60 Many difficulties exist in examining the 
nature of collective enterprises. The State Council has 
promulgated two sets of regulations concerning collective 
enterprises: Regulations Concerning Collective Enterprises in 
Rural Areas,61 and Regulations Concerning Collective 
Enterprises in Cities and Towns.6,1 In addition, the Ministry 
of Agriculture has also adopted the Interim Provisions 
Concerning Peasants' Joint Stock Cooperative Enterprises.63 
But the absence of a comprehensive treatment of various types 
of collective enterprises may cause many problems, including 
ambiguity and inconsistency in the relevant legislation.
A collective enterprise requires capital contribution 
from the collective and possibly its members and other units, 
but the mere fact that the capital contribution of an 
enterprise is made by two or more entities does not
as "enterprises formed by communes (township) and production 
teams (villages), cooperative enterprises jointly-operated by 
some peasants, and other forms of cooperative industries and 
industrial enterprises." From this definition, xiangzhen giye 
embraces not only collective enterprises, but also individual 
and private enterprises.
60 Zhao Xudong, "Jiti Qiye Faren Yanjiu", ZGFX, No. 1, 
1991, pp.62-9, at 62.
61 Adopted by the State Council on May 11, 1990 and
effective as from July 1, 1990. The regulations, as indicated
in Art.2, do not apply to agricultural production
cooperatives, rural supply and marking cooperatives, or rural 
credit cooperatives.
62 Promulgated on Sept.9, 1991, and effective as from
Jan.l, 1992. For the text in Chinese, see RMRB, Sept.18, 1991, 
p.2. For the English translation of the Regulation, see BBC 
SWB, Oct.16, 1991, FE/1204, Cl/1-6.
63 Promulgated on Feb.12, 1990. For the text in Chinese,
see Collection of Company Laws and Regulations, pp.1288-94.
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necessarily make the enterprise a collective one. This is 
because individual partnership and some limited liability 
companies are in fact "private businesses", rather than 
"collective enterprises"/’4 In addition, "cooperatives" as a 
type of economic organisation may not even be included in the 
larger category of "collective economy."65
In order to distinguish a collective enterprise from a 
non-collective enterprise, one has to consider the following 
features. First, a collective enterprise must be collectively 
owned by the "working people" (laodonq qunzhong). Of course, 
the actual meaning of such collective ownership may vary from 
enterprise to enterprise, depending on the identities of the 
capital contributors of the enterprise in question. According 
to the Regulations Concerning Collective Enterprises in Cities 
and Towns,1,6 "the collective ownership of the working people" 
may have three different meanings. The first is collective 
ownership by the working people of the enterprise concerned. 
This is often the case where various individuals who work in 
the enterprise are direct investors in, and beneficiaries of, 
a small-sized collective such as a production team. The second
64 See the discussion below regarding "private
enterprises".
65 "Cooperative economy" (hezuo jingji) in China is a very 
complicated field indeed. Confusion between the meaning of 
"cooperatives" and that of "collective enterprises" may only 
be explained from the historical point of view. In the early
days of the PRC, various forms of cooperative were very
popular. However, in the mid-1950s, with the compulsory and 
swift move towards the complete collectivization of the 
individual economy, all cooperatives were ordered to be 
transformed into collective enterprises. For many years 
between the late 1950s and late 1970s, cooperatives
disappeared. It is only since the beginning of the economic 
reforms that cooperatives have been encouraged to develop. 
However, most cooperatives have lost their original 
characteristics and become collective enterprises. Unlike 
other cooperatives, they are more like individual and private 
businesses, including partnerships. For a discussion of this 
development, see Huang Daoxia, Hezuozhi Yaniiu (Studies on the 
Cooperative System), Rural Reading Material Press (Beijing) 
1987, pp.38-40.
Art . 4 .
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meaning of the collective ownership is collective ownership by 
the working people of the joint economic organisation to which 
the collective enterprise belongs. This is usually the case 
where a collective unit such as a township is large in scale, 
and only a small number of its members are working in the 
enterprise concerned. The third possibility is that, for a 
collective enterprise with two or more principal investors, 
the collectively owned assets of the working people in one of 
above two situations must occupy a dominant position. Here the 
dominant position means that under ordinary circumstances, the 
collectively-owned assets of the working people should 
constitute not lower than fifty-one per cent of the 
enterprise's total assets.67 However, it must be noted that, 
despite the provision that the property of collective 
enterprises is owned by the working people of the 
collective,(an issue further explored in Chapter Three), the 
law seems to suggest that those collective enterprises which 
are legal persons may also own the property which they manage.
Secondly, a collective enterprise must be under 
collective and "democratic management". Profits made by the 
collective enterprises must be mainly distributed according to 
labour rather than capital contributions/’* These features are 
seen as being able not only to guarantee the ownership status
r>7 Ibid. However, this article also provides that such a 
proportion may be lowered appropriately under special 
circumstances and after approval by the original examining 
departments.
68 See Art s. 4, 5, & 9 of the Regulations Concerning
Collective Enterprises in Cities and Towns; also see Arts.18 
& 26 of the Regulations Concerning Collective Enterprises in 
Rural Areas. As far as profit distribution is concerned, 
according to the Regulations Concerning Collective Enterprises 
in Cities and Towns, the profits after taxation must be 
distributed autonomously by the enterprise in accordance with 
the ratios set by the state concerning accumulation funds, 
public welfare funds, labour remuneration, and payment for 
investment and shares (Art.46). The payment for investment and 
shares must be combined with the profitability of the 
enterprise. If the enterprise is suffering losses, then no 
such payment may be made until the losses have been made up 
(Art.48).
of the workers in the enterprises, but also to prevent 
enterprises from "exploiting" their workers.
Thirdly, the legal personality of collective enterprises 
is uncertain. While collective enterprises in cities and towns 
may, after registration, automatically acquire legal person 
status/'5' it seems that not all collective enterprises in 
rural areas may obtain legal personality. In fact, rural 
collective enterprises may become legal persons only after 
examination and registration by relevant authorities.70 Some 
rural collective enterprises may not be eligible for legal 
person status because they do not possess the necessary 
qualifications.71 However, it is not clear what types of 
collective enterprises are disqualified in this way from 
becoming legal persons. Furthermore, the issue of civil 
liability for collective enterprises that are not legal 
persons is uncertain, though it is likely that such liability 
may be resolved by reference to general principles regarding 
individual partnership7^ or special contracts concluded in 
advance.
Fourthly, unlike individual partnerships, the property of 
collective enterprises cannot be divided and taken away either 
by the workers of the enterprise or by the members of the 
collectives which formerly promoted the enterprises . Instead,
t,J Art. 6 of the Regulations Concerning Collective 
Enterprises in Cites and Towns.
70 See Art.10 of the Regulations Concerning Collective 
Enterprises in Rural Areas.
71 In this case, these collective enterprises can only 
obtain from the appropriate Administrative Bureau of Industry 
and Commerce a "Business License", rather than a "Legal Person 
Business License". For the differences between ordinary 
Business License and Legal Person Business License, see 
Arts.38 & 39 of the Implementing Rules of the Regulations 
Concerning the Administration of Legal Person Registration, 
adopted by the State Administrative Bureau for Industry and 
Commerce on Nov.3, 1988. Also see the different treatment for 
Business License and legal Person Business License in Art.14 
of the Regulations Concerning Collective Enterprises in Rural 
Areas.
11 See Arts.30-35, GPCL .
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in order to protect collective property, special regimes 
govern the property arrangement in case of liquidation of the 
collective enterprises. In principle, the remaining assets, if 
any, of a collective enterprise after its liquidation shall be 
kept in the hand of the collective which promoted the 
enterprise in the first place.7"
As such, to a certain extent, collective enterprises 
resemble state enterprises. In the PRC, both state enterprises 
and collective enterprises are officially regarded as public 
ownership enterprises in nature. It would be misleading to 
refer to Chinese collective enterprises either as the "private 
sector of the economy" or as "private enterprises".74 In fact, 
it is because of this public ownership character that both 
collective and state enterprises may be given the same or 
similar treatment for certain areas. For example, workers' 
participation in enterprise management is supported by law for 
both state and collective enterprises. Also, in implementing 
the director responsibility system, the status of the Party 
organisation within collective enterprises is not free from 
confusion, though this confusion may not be as significant as
7‘ For example, according to Art.19 of the Regulations 
Concerning Collective Enterprise in Cities and Towns, the
remaining assets of a collective enterprise after its
liquidation shall be handled in accordance with the following 
principles: (1) for a collective enterprise with investments
from, and shares held by, the state, units other than the 
enterprise concerned, individuals and workers of the
enterprise, the remaining assets shall be distributed to these
investors and shareholders according to the ratio of their 
investments and shares to the total assets of the enterprise; 
(2) the remaining assets will be allocated exclusively by the 
enterprise's superior management organs for the workers' 
unemployment, old age pension and resettlement and retraining 
funds. They may not be used for other purposes.
74 One example for such misuse is an article entitled 
"Private Enterprise in China: the Developing Law of Collective 
Enterprises" (by Howard Chao and Yang Xiaoping), in 
International Lawyer, Vol.19, 1985, pp.1215-37. It is,
however, correct in the West to describe all the enterprises 
which are not owned by the government as "private" sector of 
the economy.
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that encountered in state enterprises.75 In addition, because 
of their public nature, collective enterprises are from time 
to time put under favourable legal regimes. Thus, compared to 
private enterprises, collective enterprises enjoy preferential 
treatment in taxation.76
Despite the similarities between collective and state 
enterprises, collective enterprises still differ from the 
state enterprises in many respects. The most important 
difference is that collective enterprises are not owned by the 
state. It follows that the legal regulation of collective 
enterprises differs from that of state enterprises . Generally 
speaking, collective enterprises enjoy a more flexible legal 
regime than are state enterprises. For example, collective 
enterprises are not subject to state plans. The management 
autonomy of collective enterprises is also protected by the 
law and is theoretically free from government intervention. We 
will briefly discuss, where relevant, the similarities as well 
the differences between the legal treatment of state 
enterprise and collective enterprises.
2 . Private enterprise77
"Private enterprise" (siying give) in the Chinese context 
is a specific concept with a definite meaning. According to
75 See the discussion in Chapter Five of the thesis.
76 While the income taxes for collective enterprises are 
levied in accordance with eight grade progressive rates 
ranging from ten per cent to fifty-five per cent, the income 
tax rate set for all private enterprises is fixed at thirty- 
five per cent.
During the mid-1980s, many private enterprises sought to 
connect themselves with collective enterprises in order to 
enjoy preferential treatment. This led to the decision made by 
the Chinese government in late 1988 to reclassify enterprises, 
disqualifying many previously claimed collective enterprises 
and ordering them to re-register as private enterprises or 
even individual businesses.
77 For a general discussion on the legal approach to 
private enterprises, see Alison W. Conner, "To Get Rich Is 
Precarious: Regulation of Private Enterprise in the People's 
Republic of China", Journal of Chinese Law, Vol.5, No.l, 
Spring 1991, pp.1-46.
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the Provisional Regulations Concerning Private Enterprises 
adopted on June 3, 1988, a private enterprise is an "economic 
organisation whose property is owned by individuals, which has 
eight or more employees, and whose purpose is to make 
profits."78 This definition of "private enterprise" differs 
from the earlier use of this concept . The most notable 
difference lies in the requirement concerning the number of 
employees for private enterprises; the Provisional Regulations 
Concerning Private Enterprises adopted in 195079 only 
generally provided that "private enterprises are various 
economic enterprises which are invested in and run by 
individuals to make profits", and no specific requirement for 
the number of employees was present. At present, however, if 
a private undertaking does not have the minimum number of 
eight employees, it may not be termed "private enterprise". 
Rather, it is usually called an "individual enterprise" (qeti 
give) which is subject to different laws and regulations.80
78 Art. 2 .
79 See Art.2 of the Provisional Regulations Concerning 
Private Enterprises issued by the Government Administration 
Council in December 1950. For the text in Chinese, see Laws 
and Regulations of the PRC Central Government (1949-50), 
pp.705-11.
80 As far as income taxation if concerned, while private 
enterprises are made subject to the Provisional Regulations 
Concerning Private Enterprises adopted by the State Council on 
Jun.25, 1988, individual businesses have to pay income taxes 
in accordance with the Provisional Regulations Concerning 
Income Tax of Individual Industrial and Commercial Households 
in Urban and Rural Areas, promulgated by the State Council on 
Jan.7, 1986. The latter regulations set ten grade progressive 
rates ranging from seven per cent to sixty per cent.
At first sight, "eight" or more employees would appear to 
be a "magic number" . But in the Chinese official view, this 
requirement has practical as well as ideological 
justifications. In Marxist theory, a private enterprise which 
employs eight or more people would enable its investors, by 
exploitation, to live on the work of these employees. Indeed, 
before 1988, the Chinese government merely allowed individual 
businesses to employ up to seven, but not more, workers 
(including possibly two assistants and five apprentices) . For 
the discussion on the debate concerning the definition on 
private enterprises, see Conner, supra note 79, pp.9-10.
For a description of individual businesses, see Henry
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From the legal definition, it can be seen that the 
private enterprise has many characteristics that differentiate 
it from public ownership enterprises, especially state 
enterprises. First, the property of a private enterprise is 
owned by individuals. Secondly, it is expressly acknowledged 
that the purpose of a private enterprise is to make profits. 
This represents a striking difference from state enterprises 
to which, as noted earlier, the SEL has refused to attach the 
element of profit-making. Thirdly, workers in private 
enterprises are merely "employees"81 of the proprietors of 
private enterprises.
In the PRC, private enterprises have suffered many bitter 
experiences. In the early 1950s, private enterprises were 
initially encouraged; their rights and interests were 
protected by the Provisional Regulations Concerning Private 
Enterprises (adopted in 1950).82 However, towards the mid- 
1950s, private enterprises were first restricted and then 
compulsorily transformed into collective enterprises or 
dissolved. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, private enterprises 
were virtually non-existent. In the early 1980s, with the 
beginning of economic reforms, individual businesses were 
legalized by the Constitution of 1982.81 But the Constitution 
did not expressly authorize private businesses which operated 
on a relatively large scale. Indeed, until 1988, apart from 
several attempts to legalize private enterprises through local 
legislation, the legality of private enterprises with 
relatively large scale operations remained uncertain. On April 
12, 1988, the First Session of the Seventh National People's
Zheng, China's Civil and Commercial Law, Butterworths 1988, 
pp.3 32-34.
81 The term "employee" (guyuan) is not officially used for 
public ownership enterprises. Instead, people working for 
public ownership enterprises are usually termed "workers and 
staff" (zhigong). See Chapter Seven of the thesis.
82 For a discussion of the Regulations, see Chapter Two 
of the thesis.
81 See Art. 11.
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Congress amended the 1982 Constitution by declaring that 1 the 
state permits the private sector of the economy to exist and 
develop within the limitations prescribed by law." It was 
after this amendment that the State Council adopted the
Provisional Regulations Concerning Private Enterprises 
"Private Enterprise Regulations".
According to the Private Enterprise Regulations, a 
private enterprise may take one of three forms: sole trader, 
partnership, or limited liability company.84 However, only the 
third form, that is, the limited liability company, may
acquire legal personality and assume independent liability. 
Thus, in private enterprises which take the form of either 
sole traders or partnership, the owners or partners have to 
bear personal liability for the debts of the enterprises.
3. Foreign-related enterprise
"Foreign-related enterprises" (shewai give), or "foreign 
investment enterprises" (waishanq touzi give) have been 
permitted in China since the policy of opening to the outside 
world was initiated in 1979. Generally speaking, there are 
three types of foreign investment enterprises operating in 
China: "equity joint ventures" (hezi i ingying qiye) ,
"cooperative joint ventures" (hezuo jingying qiye), and
"wholly foreign owned enterprises" (waizi qiye) .85
A relatively systematic legal framework has been
established in China to govern foreign investment enterprises. 
With the exception of issues relating to registration, foreign 
investment enterprises are considered under laws and 
regulations separate from those governing Chinese enterprises. 
Moreover, different foreign investment enterprises, though 
sharing many common problems, are governed by different laws
84 See Art. 6 .
85 For a study on the similarities and differences between 
these three kinds of enterprises, see Zhou Ziya, "A 
Comparative Studies of Three Kinds of Enterprise Involving 
Foreign Investment in China", in Legal Aspects of Foreign 
Investment in the People's Republic of China, China Trade
Translation Company Limited (Beijing) 1988, pp.110-25
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and regulations. The only exception is taxation which has only 
been unified since 1991,80 Until 1992, major laws adopted to 
govern foreign investment enterprises are the Law on Sino- 
Foreign Equity Joint Ventures,87 the Law on Wholly Foreign- 
Owned Enterprises,88 and the Law on Sino-Foreign Cooperative 
Joint Ventures.89 In addition, detailed implementing rules 
concerning equity joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises have also been promulgated.90
Of these three types of foreign investment enterprises, 
only equity joint ventures, being limited liability companies, 
are automatically eligible to obtain legal personality under 
Chinese law. Whether or not the other two types of enterprises 
can obtain legal personality depends on whether or not they 
can meet the requirements for a legal person as set by the 
GPCL.91 If they qualify as Chinese legal persons, they may 
claim ownership rights in their property. If not, investors 
have to bear personal liability for the debts of the 
enterprises. Such liability may be ascertained by contract, or 
it may be joint and several liability.
For equity and cooperative joint ventures, the
aG See the Tax Law on Foreign Investment Enterprises and
Foreign Enterprises, adopted by the National People's Congress 
on Apr.9, 1991 and effective from Jul.1, 1991. For the text in
English, see China Law and Practice, Vol.5, No.3, 1991, pp.25-
35. Also see Implementing Rules Concerning Tax Law on Foreign
Investment Enterprises and Foreign Enterprises, promulgated by
the State Council on Jun.30, 1991. For the text in English,
see ibid., No.7, 19 91, pp.16-50.
87 Adopted on July 1, 197 9 and effective as from July 8,
1979 .
88 Adopted on and effective as of Apr.13, 1988.
89 Adopted on and effective as of Apr.12, 1986.
90 The Implementing Rules for the Law on Sino-Foreign 
Joint Ventures were promulgated by the State Council on 
Sept,20, 1983. The Implementing Rules for the Law on Wholly
Foreign Owned Enterprises were approved by the State Council 
on Oct.28, 1990 and promulgated by the Ministry of Foreign
Economic Relations and Trade on Dec.12, 1990.
91 See Art.37. Also see Chapter Two of the thesis.
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involvement of Chinese capital, especially in the case of the 
state capital, does not necessarily mean that these 
enterprises have to face similar problems to those encountered 
by Chinese public ownership enterprises. In fact, generally 
speaking, joint ventures have been put into a relatively 
flexible legal framework. Most importantly, the management 
autonomy of joint ventures is not in doubt -- at least, it is 
not as disputable as it is for state enterprises, as will be 
shown in our later discussions.
4. Company
In the Chinese context, the term 1 company" (gongs i) and 
its relationship to "enterprise" (qiye), deserve careful 
explanation and clarification. It would be wrong to equate 
unconditionally the concept of "company" as used in 
contemporary China with the term "company" as employed in the 
West.
In Western jurisdictions, in spite of the difficulties in 
giving a precise definition for the term of "company",92 the 
concept is often used to refer to companies limited by shares 
as well as unlimited companies. In many civil law countries, 
companies may also take the form of limited liability 
companies, and limited companies with unlimited liability 
shareholders.
In China, despite the fact that some local legislation 
does purport to govern "companies",92 there is no 
comprehensive and national company law.94 The absence of a
92 See Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law, Stevens 
(London), 4th edn. 1979, Chapter 1; Farrar's Company Law, 
Butterworths (London), 2nd edn. 1988, Chapter 1.
93 For example, the Regulations on Foreign-Related 
Companies in the Special Economic Zones in Guangdong Province 
was adopted on Sept.28, and effective from Jan.l, 1987. For a 
specific discussion, see Clement Shum, "Companies With Foreign 
Equity Participation in China", Journal of Business Law 
(London), March 1991, pp.185-95,
94 There have been only a number of semi-legal documents 
promulgated in June 1992. See supra note 27.
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company law, however, does not mean that the company does not 
exist in China. In fact, "company" (gonqsi) which is often 
seen as associated with profit-making, has become a 
particularly popular term since the early 1980s. In fact, the 
excessive and uncontrollable development in recent years of 
various companies has prompted the Chinese authorities to 
launch two nationwide campaigns to "crackdown" (zhenqdun) on 
companies .9r>
In the Chinese context, the relationship between qiye 
(enterprise) and gongsi (company) may be analyzed as follows.
First, give is usually understood to include gonqsi. In
other words, ordinary companies are merely a type of
broadh
enterprise „ .^defined ■  ^ as to embrace various
business organisations, including even individual and 
partnership enterprises as mentioned above.
Secondly, the two terms should be distinguished from each 
other. Essentially, for one reason or another, not all giye 
are gongsi. The term gonqsi may have special meaning both in 
law and in economics. As far as the economic aspect is 
concerned, while profit-making may be usually seen as an 
important goal of companies, this, as discussed earlier, may 
not always be applicable to state enterprises. Moreover, as 
regards the legal treatment, companies may be governed by 
special regimes which differ from those governing other normal 
enterprises not entitled gonqsi. This is illustrated by the 
different laws and regulations regarding the administration of 
the approval procedure and registration of "companies" and 
non-companies .9'
In many cases, the term gonqsi is used in contemporary
95 The first was conducted in 1985. This was marked by the 
promulgation of the Interim Provisions on the Administration 
of Registration of Companies. The second started in late 1988 
and officially concluded in late 1991.
9(' For a discussion, see Chapter Two of the thesis.
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PRC to refer to either companies limited by shares97 or 
limited liability companies, 9,H or indeed both. A general term 
especially accommodating these two types of company is "stock 
enterprises1 or "shareholding enterprises" (qufenzhi qiye) . 
This form of company is comparable to Western companies and 
may attract investors of private and public property 
ownership, including foreign investors.99
Thirdly, as exceptions, some gonqsi are not ordinary 
give. Such companies are not genuine business organisations. 
Instead, they are purely administrative organs, or 
organisations which perform more administrative than business 
functions. Usually, these organisations are termed 
"administrative companies" (xinqzhenq gonqsi) .100
97 A companies limited by shares is defined as "an 
enterprise legal person whose registered capital is composed 
of equal-value shares, whose capital is raised through issuing 
shares (or warrants), whose shareholders bear limited 
liability towards its debts, and which shall bear liability 
with all of its assets". See Art.1 of the Normative Opinions 
Concerning Companies Limited by Shares, adopted by the State 
Economic Reform Commission on May 15, 1992 and promulgated in 
June 1992. For the text in Chinese, see FZRB, Jun. 19, 1992,
pp.2-3. For the English text, see BBC SWB, Jul.6, 1992,
FE/1425 Cl/1-13.
9H A limited liability company is defined as "an 
enterprise legal person whose capital is contributed by two or 
more shareholders, whose shareholders bear limited liability 
towards the company to the extent of their respective 
contribution, and which shall be liable with all of its 
assets." See Art.l, Normative Opinions Concerning Limited 
Liability Companies, adopted by the State Economic Reform 
Commission on May 15, 1992 and promulgated in June 1992. For 
the text in Chinese, see FZRB, Jun.22, 1992, p.2. For the text 
in English, see BBC SWB, Jun.27, 1992, FE/1418 Cl/1-7.
99 Foreign investors can either set up shareholding 
enterprises in special economic zones in China, or have equity 
participation in Chinese shareholding enterprises through 
purchasing "B" shares which are specially issued to 
foreigners.
100 The existence of administrative companies has far 
reaching implications in China. For example, in Shanghai, most 
administrative companies were established in the 1950s in the 
campaign to supervise and take over private and state- 
capitalist companies. Because these companies confused 
business operation and government administration, the reform
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For the purpose of this thesis, the relationship between 
qiye and gonqsi is treated as follows. First, administrative 
companies as government departments are not considered as 
falling within the domain of the present discussion. Secondly, 
as indicated earlier, companies which take the form of 
companies limited by shares and limited liability companies 
are not specifically discussed. They are only discussed for 
the purpose of comparison with ordinary state enterprises. And 
thirdly, although companies may be placed under special 
regimes for certain purposes, many state enterprises entitled 
gongsi are included in this discussion; these companies do not 
differ in nature from ordinary state enterprises which are 
usually entitled "factory" (chang). For example, "the Shoudu 
Iron and Steel Company" (Shoudu Gangtie Gongsi, "SISC"),101 
though entitled as a gongsi, is in fact a typical large-sized 
state enterprise and is therefore subject to the jurisdiction 
of the SEL and many other relevant laws and regulations 
applicable to ordinary state enterprises.102
of administrative companies was launched by the end of 1985. 
Until 1987, of the total seventy-seven municipal 
administrative companies, fifty-nine had been abolished or 
absolved, eight had been transformed into business 
enterprises, and the remaining ten were also reformed in one 
way or another. See Editing Committee, Shanghai Jingji Gaige 
Shinian (Ten Years of Shanghai's Economic Reforms), Shanghai 
People's Press 1989, p.35.
101 Located in the suburbs of Beijing, the SISC is one of 
the China's largest enterprises producing iron and steel. For 
a case study of workers' participation in this company, see 
Chapter Seven below.
10-i For a discussion of the problems concerning the 
jurisdiction of enterprise law and company law, see Chapter 
Two of the thesis. Also see Chapter Ten for a general 
discussion of future of enterprise and company law in China.
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CHAPTER TWO
ENTERPRISES, LAWS AND POLICIES IN CHINA
I. Enterprises, Laws and Policies in China Before 1949
A. Modern enterprises and late Ping law reform
It is well-known that imperial Chinese law was mostly a 
criminal law. In order to maintain imperial power, criminal 
and administrative laws were emphasized, whereas civil law 
especially commercial law was neglected. Indeed, for hundreds 
of years, the Chinese rulers followed the idea of "encouraging 
agriculture and restricting commerce" (zhonqnonq gingshanq) 
which made difficult industrial and commercial activity. Only 
individual^businesses could survive, and then on a limited 
scale.1 This situation remained unchanged until the later 
period of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) when, under both 
foreign and domestic pressure, the Chinese rulers found it 
necessary to adopt a more flexible attitude towards industry 
and commerce.
In the early 1840s, the Qing government was defeated by 
the British in the Opium War, and in subsequent years, the 
government had to enter into agreements with Western nations, 
allowing the citizens of the latter to establish businesses in 
China, especially in the treaty ports. Being angry about the 
invasion of foreign powers, some Chinese launched the so- 
called "Foreign Matters Movement" (vanqwu vundong) from the 
1860s for the purposes of "self-saving" (zii iu) and "self-
1 It is widely recognised that even in late Ming Dynasty 
and early Qing Dynasty, in some areas of China, there were 
signs of the seeds of capitalism. But those seeds could not 
develop to a significant degree due to the unfavourable social 
and economic environment.
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strengthening" (zigiang). From the 187 0s onwards, many modern 
enterprises which relied on Western technology were 
established. At first, most enterprises were operated by the 
government (guanban) . At a later stage, more companies were 
operated by merchants (shangban). But throughout the whole 
process, many enterprises took the forms of either "merchants 
operating under official supervision" (guandu shangban) or 
"joint operations by the government and merchants" (guanshang 
heban).2 At that time, the government's attitude towards 
commerce changed from the conservative view of "encouraging 
agriculture and restricting commerce" to a more accommodating 
policy of "promoting industry and commerce as well as 
agriculture" (nonggongshang bingjii) . At first, enterprises 
operated by the government were primarily associated with 
military and manufacturing industries such as weapon-making 
and ship-building. Later, government-operated enterprises were 
expanded to civilian industries to include cotton spinning, 
paper-making, mining and railways.3
The Foreign Matters Movement and the favourable 
government policy led to a boom in modern enterprises in 
China.4 However, the early development of modern enterprises
1 See, for example, Han-Sheng Chuan, Hanveping Gongsi 
Shilue (A Brief History of the Hanyeping Iron and Coal Mining 
and Smelting Company (1890-1926) ), The Chinese University of 
Hong Kong, 1972 . This book provides a very good case study of
the first iron factory in East Asia. The factory experienced 
guanban, guandu shangban and shangban forms in three different 
stages before it finally failed.
3 For a detailed description of government enterprises in 
late Qing, see Ye Wanan and Qiu Xianming, Zhongguo Zhi 
Gongying Shengchang Shiye (Public Industrial Business in 
China), Central Relics Supply Press (Taibei) 1985. Also for a 
discussion of the development of modern Chinese enterprises, 
see Chen Zhen and Yao Luo, Zhongguo Jindai Gongyeshi Ziliao 
(Materials Relating to History of Modern Chinese Industry), 
Life, Reading & New Knowledge (Three Associations Press, 
Beijing) 1957, pp.1-57.
4 It is estimated that by the beginning of the Twentieth 
Century, there were more than 57 0 companies and that their 
total investment amounted more than 690 million dollars. 
Information from Xu Lizhi, "Qingmo de Shangshi Lifa Jiqi 
Tedian" (Commercial Legislation and its Features in the Late
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was not accompanied by the introduction of immediate 
legislation and sound legal protection. Although the operation 
of many companies was governed by their own constitutions and 
by-laws, comprehensive company and commercial legislation did 
not take place until the early 1900s when foreign laws were 
studied and law reform was undertaken under official 
sponsorship.5 In fact, it was not until April 22, 1903 that
an imperial edict ordered the drafting of a commercial code. 
The drafting took only a few months and the Commercial Code 
was given imperial approval on January 21, 1904.6 This Code,
which was based on Japanese Commercial Code of 1899, was the 
first modern Commercial legislation in Chinese history. It was 
composed of two parts: "General Regulations for Merchants"
(shangren tonglu) , and "Company Law" (gongsi lti) . The Company 
Law, which was the main part of the Commercial Code, defined 
a company as "an organization whose capital is raised and 
business is jointly managed".7 Four types of companies were 
allowed to operate: (1) the joint stock company (hezi
gongsi);a (2) the joint stock company with limited liability 
(hezi youxian gongsi);9 (3) the share company (gufen
Qing Dynasty), FXYJ, No.3, 1989, pp.89-94 at p.89.
5 For a comprehensive discussion of the late Qing law 
reform, see Joseph K H Cheng, Chinese Law in Transition: The 
Late Ch'ing Law Reform, 1901-1911, University Microfilms 
International 1981.
0 For an English translation of this Code, see E.T. 
Williams, Recent Chinese Legislation Relating to Commercial, 
Railway and Mining Enterprises, Shanghai Mercury Limited, 
1904, at pp.7-45.
7 Art.1, Company Law.
8 Art.4, ibid. "A company whose capital is raised from, 
and whose name if given by, two or more people".
9 Art.6, ibid. " A company whose capital is raised from
two or more people and which declares to limit its liability 
to the amount of its capital".
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gongsi) ;10 and (4) the company limited by shares (quf en
vouxian gongsi) .11
During the first decade of the Twentieth Century, there
were many other important legislation regarding company
matters. For example, in June 1904, Tentative Regulations
Concerning Company Registration were approved. And on April
25, 1906, a Bankruptcy Law came into existence. In addition,
in the 19 0 0s, the Qing government also promulgated many
regulations to encourage the development of enterprises by
rewarding businessmen and companies.12
It is very difficult to give an accurate account of the
practical implementation of these company laws and regulations
in relation to the development of modern enterprises in the
Qing Dynasty. Compared with the Bankruptcy Law which was
short-lived and not enforced in practice,13 the 1904 Company
Law survived a decade before being abolished in 1914. The
Company Law declared that it offered protection to companies,
as it provided that
all companies already established, together with such as 
may be hereafter established, as well as all 
associations, factories, hongs, firms, shops and stores, 
may apply for registration at the Ministry of Commerce, 
so that they may all alike enjoy the benefits of
10 Art.10, ibid. "A company which is formed, whose capital 
is raised from and whose business is managed by, seven or more 
people. "
11 Art.13, ibid. "A company which is formed, whose capital 
is raised from, and whose business is managed by, seven or 
more people, and which declares the amount of its capital and 
limits its liability to that amount.”
12 Two such examples are Regulations for Commercial 
Decoration Rewards (1906), Regulations for Rewarding Chinese 
Business Companies (1906) .
13 The Bankruptcy Law was repealed on Dec.2, 1907. For an 
analysis of the law and its failure of being enforced, see 
Thomas Mitrano, The Chinese Bankruptcy Law of 1906-1907 : A 
Legislative Case History, reprinted from Monumenta Serica 
1972-1973, Vol.XXX, Harvard Law School, Studies in East Asian 
Law: China, No.25.
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protection.14
Furthermore, the Company Law claimed to place various 
companies, including those operated by officials or merchants 
or jointly by officials and merchants, under its regulation.15 
However, the "benefits of protection" offered by the law were 
in reality far from effective. Most notably, although the 
Company Law authorised the management of a company to its 
board of directors,1(' in practice, the involvement of 
officials and gentry made it impossible for companies to 
pursue independent and efficient business management.17 This 
was not only the case for companies operated by the government 
or jointly operated by merchants and the government, but was 
also true for those companies operated by merchants.18 
Although the main intentions in allowing the development of 
merchant companies were to attract private investment and to 
promote management efficiency, ls) the "official supervision" 
by government administration or yamen meant that significant
14 Art. 23 .
15 Art .30.
16 See Art.30, Arts.85-97.
17 For a brief description of the characteristics of 
"Confucian official as economic administrator", see Frank 
King, A Concise Economic History of Modern China (1840-1961), 
Praeger (New York) & Pall Mall (London) 1969, pp.28-30.
18 For a comprehensive examination of guandu shangban 
enterprises, including a detailed case study of the China 
Merchant's Company, see Albert Feuerwerker, China's early 
Industrialisation: Sheng Hsuan-Huai (1844-1916) and Mandarin 
Enterprises, Harvard University Press (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts) 1968, especially pp.150-88. It was found that 
mere provisions of the Company Law and the regulations of the 
company were not able to prevent problems associated with 
"official supervision".
11 The latter intention was particularly obvious for those 
companies which were operated by the government but had to be 
transformed to merchant operation in order to enhance 
efficiency. There were also other reasons for the adoption of 
the guandu shangban form. For example, by adopting this form, 
some enterprises were given monopolistic powers or tax 
privileges.
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inefficiency was inevitable. In addition, official exaction 
from companies was common, enriching officials at the cost of 
the companies.20
Of course, pervasive official intervention was just one 
of many reasons accounting for the poor management of modern 
enterprises in late Qing. Among other important factors were 
the shortage of capital and the backwardness of technology. As 
a result, despite the government's declared policy of
encouragement and some people's anxious desire to develop 
modern enterprises, the promotion of modern enterprises in the 
late Qing was largely a failure. However, the commercial
legislation of the late Qing is very important in terms of 
Chinese legal history. For the first time, importation of
western laws, especially commercial laws, into China was 
carried out on a large scale. The codification of commercial 
laws, including company law, did not fully realise its 
potential, but it did have some impact on subsequent
commercial legislation in China.
B. Republican period
The Qing Dynasty was overthrown by the so-called Xinhai 
Revolution of October 10, 1911. Then came a government
entitled the Republic of China. In 1914, the Republican
government abolished the Qing Commercial Code of 1904, and 
replaced it with two separate Acts: the General Rules for
Merchants (shangren tongli) and the Company Regulations 
(gongsi tiaoli), both of which were based on the unadopted
version of the draft Qing Commercial Code of 1911.21
20 See Feuerwerker, supra note 18, especially the summary 
at p .3 0 .
21 The Company Regulations allowed four types of 
companies, namely, (1) the unlimited company (wuxian gongsi); 
(2) the limited liability company with members of unlimited 
liability (lianghe gongsi); (3) the company limited by shares 
(gufen youxian gongsi); and (4) the company limited by shares 
with shareholders of unlimited liability (gufen lianghe 
gongsi). These Company Regulations were subsequently revised 
in 1914 and 1923.
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In the late 192 0s, a new Company Law was drafted. It was 
promulgated on December 26, 1929. Subsequently, the
Implementing Rules for the Company Law were promulgated on 
February 21, 1931. Both of them came into effect on July 1,
1931.
At the early period of the Republic of China, one of the 
basic principles underlying its economic policy was the 
"Principle of People's Livelihood" (minsheng zhuvi),22 Under 
the guidance of this principle, the state policy towards 
businesses followed the tenet of "controlling (private) 
capital" (jiezhi ziben) . This tenet had many legal 
implications. In addition to the favourable protection offered 
to minority shareholders (as indeed reflected in the 1929 
Company Law), "public enterprises" (gongying shive) were put 
at a very important position in the national economy.
Under the Republican rule, the main economic sectors in 
which the operation of public enterprises was allowed or 
encouraged were: first, areas for the prevention of the
domination by private capital; secondly, industries which had 
the nature of monopoly; thirdly; areas where private 
investment was unable to develop; and finally, social services 
which did not aim at making profits.24 However, despite these
22 The Republican Constitution, adopted on Dec.25, 1946, 
provided that "national economy shall be based on the 
Principle of People's Livelihood and shall seek to effect 
equalisation of land ownership and restriction of private 
capital in order to attain a well-balanced sufficiency in 
national wealth and people's livelihood." (Art.142)
22 For an account of the coexistence of public and private 
economy and its relations to the development in Taiwan, see Wu 
Nengyuan, "Taiwan Jingji Fazhan de Ruogan Wenti -- Lun Taiwan 
Gongminying Shuanggui Bingcun de Jingji Tizhi" (Several 
Problems Concerning the Economic Development in Taiwan -- On 
the Economic System of the Dual Existence of Public and 
Private Economy in Taiwan), Dongfanq Wenhua (Journal of 
Oriental Studies), Vol.XXVII, Nos.1 & 2, 1989, pp.38-50.
24 The Republican Constitution provided that "public 
utilities and other enterprises of a monopolistic nature 
shall, in principle, be under public operation. In cases 
permitted by law, they may be operated by private citizens." 
(Art.144) It continued to stipulate that "with respect to
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assumed limits, public enterprises were so widespread that 
they actually dominated the national economy. In fact, state 
capital occupied a monopolistic position, whereas the scale of 
private businesses was limited by law and government policies. 
Public enterprises inherited many of the characteristics of 
enterprises operated by the government and enterprises 
operated by merchants under official supervision in late Qing. 
The special connection which existed between businesses and 
government officials and the lack of effective competition 
meant that low economic efficiency was common.
According to the Law on the Administration of State 
Enterprises, adopted on January 20, 1949, state enterprises25 
may take one of the three forms: first, enterprises solely
owned and operated by the government; secondly, enterprises 
jointly operated by the government and private investors in 
accordance with special laws concerning the administration of 
enterprises; and thirdly, enterprises which were jointly 
operated by the government and private investors in accordance 
with the Company Law but in which the government owned more 
than fifty per cent of the capital.20 In particular, in order 
to accommodate public enterprises, the amended Company Law 
which was promulgated on April 12, 1946 created a new type of 
company -- "limited liability company" (youxian zeren gonqsi).
The dominance of public enterprises continued after 1949
private wealth and privately-operated enterprises, the state 
shall restrict them by law if they are deemed detrimental to 
a balanced development of national wealth and people's 
livelihood." (Art.145) Also see Ye and Qiu, Zhongguo Zhi 
Gongying Shengchang Shiye (Public Industrial Businesses in 
China), Central Relics Press (Taibei) 1985, p.212.
25 In Republican terminology, "state enterprise" (guoying 
shiye) is a concept which is narrower than "public enterprise" 
(gongying shiye). While the former refers to enterprises 
exclusively or mainly by the central government, the latter is 
broader in that in includes enterprises exclusively or mainly 
owned by central as well as local government.
20 See Art, 3 .
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on Taiwan."7 Only since the late 1950s and early 1960s has the 
private economy been allowed to play a substantial role. This 
new policy was in fact not only a necessary step to promote 
the economic efficiency of public enterprises but also a 
direct result of foreign pressure/*1 At the same time, a 
number of public enterprises have been privatised.29 
Consequently, the overriding role of public enterprises in 
Taiwan has gradually declined.10 Nevertheless, and although 
often criticised for their inefficient management, official 
involvement and excessive government intervention,21 public 
enterprises which mainly rely on their statutory monopoly and 
privileges still occupy an important position in many 
industries including banking, railway, petroleum, electricity, 
and chemical fertilizer.
A detailed review of the enterprise law and policy under 
Republican rule is beyond the scope of this study. Suffice it 
to indicate that the 192 9 Company Law, which mainly concerns 
private businesses and has since been amended several times,J2
27 The dominance of public enterprises on Taiwan actually 
began in 1945 when the Nationalist Government nationalised all 
the property and enterprises handed over by the Japanese 
government and private businesses after Japan's defeat.
28 Such pressure came particularly from the United States 
which provided financial help to Taiwan on the condition that 
private economy had to be developed in order to promote its 
economic development. See Wu, supra note 23, pp.43-4.
29 On Jan.26, 1953, regulations were adopted to transform 
public enterprises into private enterprises.
20 Of the total industrial output, the percentage 
accounted by public enterprises fell from 56.6 in 1952 to 18.7 
in 1980. See Ye and Qiu, supra note 24, pp.228-9.
21 See Ye and Qiu, ibid., pp.244-6; Liu Fengwen and Zuo 
Hongchou, Gongying Shiye de Fazhan (Development of Public 
Enterprises), Associated Economy Publishing Company (Taibei), 
1984, pp.177-82. Also see Wu, supra note 23, p.46.
12 For a comprehensive review and comments on China's 
company legislation, see Lai In-Jaw, "Zhongguo Gongsi Lifa Zhi 
Huigu Yu Qianzhan" (The Chinese Company Law: A Retrospect and 
Prospect), in Taida Faxue Luncong (The National Taiwan 
University Law Journal), Vol.13, No.2, 1984, pp.193-230. The
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has contributed significantly to the miracle of Taiwan's 
economic development in the last decades. As will be shown 
below, the 1946 Republican Company Law did have some impact on 
PRC legislation in the 1950s. Nevertheless, enterprise laws 
and policies in the PRC followed a very different path from 
that taken in the Republic of China before 1949 and that have 
continued in modified term to be practised in Taiwan since 
1949. It should be noted that existing Company Law in Taiwan 
will certainly influence future company legislation in 
mainland China, although the likely extent of such influence 
is not yet clear.
II. Socialist Enterprise Laws and Policies in China
The main contents of socialist laws and policies 
governing state enterprises in China will be discussed in 
detail in later chapters when specific aspects of the legal 
regulation of state enterprises are examined. The discussion 
below intends to provide an outline of enterprise laws and 
policies from the 1930s until the development of post-Mao 
"enterprise laws". The main aim of such an outline is to 
illuminate the development and evolution of Chinese 
enterprises and relevant governing laws and policies as a 
whole so that laws and policies concerning state enterprises 
can be understood in a broader and changing setting.
A. Before 1949
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was founded in 1921. In
latest amendment took place in Oct.1990. The main amendments 
concerned associated enterprises, reinvestment by companies, 
issue of shares of public enterprises, and employees' shares.
33 Currently, some areas in Southern China, such as 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone in Guangdong Province, are 
attempting to "transplant" company and commercial legislation 
from Hong Kong. But legislation from Taiwan would seem more 
transplantable. This is not only because of the similar civil 
law background, but also because of the common language shared 
by mainland China and Taiwan.
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the attempt to gain political power, from the late 1920s 
onwards, many rural “base areas" (qeniiidi) were established. 
In those base areas and so-called "liberated areas"
(i iefanqqu) , many economic regulations were promulgated for 
guidance during a particular period. These economic 
regulations shared two common characteristics. On the one 
hand, they were basically local documents. Most were 
promulgated by local Communist authorities and only applicable 
to limited areas. On the other hand, they were strongly 
policy-oriented. Although there were some documents entitled 
"regulations" (tiaoli), it seems that none of those economic 
regulations took the form of "law" In fact, most of
enterprise regulations were issued as "decisions" (jueding), 
"orders" (xunling), "outlines" (dagang), and "administrative 
programmes" (shizheng qanglincr) . They were not only subject to 
frequent adjustments in accordance with changing political 
needs, but were also very brief and simple in their content 
and structure.
Generally speaking, the regulations of various 
enterprises in this period took the following three forms:
First, there were many general economic policies. The 
Resolution on Economic Policy adopted by the First Chinese 
Soviet National Congress in 1931Jil was the first important 
document of this type. It contained three paragraphs 
concerning industry. First, the Soviet government would 
nationalise all economic "lifelines" (including concessions, 
banks, customs, railways and so on) which were held by 
"imperialists" while allowing some foreign enterprises to 
reset lease agreements and to continue their operations, 
provided that they complied with relevant Soviet laws and 
regulations. Secondly, enterprises and handicraft industry
i4 See Zhonqhua Suweiai Gonqheguo Falii Wenjian Xuanbian 
(Selected Legal Documents in the Chinese Soviet Republic), 
Jiangxi People's Press 1984, pp.239-41. For a general 
introduction of the laws in the Chinese Soviet Republic, see 
W.E. Butler (ed.), The Lecral System of the Chinese Soviet 
Republic, Transnational Publishers Inc. (Dobbs Ferry, New 
York) 1983.
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owned by Chinese private investors were to be allowed to 
continue their operations without being nationalised. However, 
their activities would be placed under the supervision of 
workers' committees and factory committees. Thirdly, special 
attention was paid to the development of those enterprises 
which would guarantee supplies for the Red Army, Thus, this 
Resolution set out the main economic policy for the period of 
1934-1937. During the Anti-Japanese War (1937-1945), many 
governments in “border areas" (biangu) adopted administrative 
programmes which provided for basic political, economic and 
social principles. For example, the Administrative Programmes 
of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region (May 1, 1941)35
stated that:
developing industrial operation and commercial 
circulation, rewarding individual business, protecting 
private property, welcoming investment from other areas, 
practising free trade, opposing monopoly control, in the 
meantime developing people's cooperative, and helping the 
development of handicraft industry.'6
From late 1945 to 1949, Communist-controlled areas were 
gradually enlarged. In order to promote economic development, 
detailed economic policies were put on the agenda. The 
Administrative Programmes of the Democratic Government in 
North-East China (August 11, 1946)37 declared that "individual 
industry and commerce must be protected, rewarded and helped; 
public enterprises must be resumed and developed; and 
cooperative business must be developed".38 Therefore it seems 
that private, public and cooperative enterprises were stressed 
equally. There were, however, some policy changes in 
subsequent years. For example, according to the Administrative 
Programmes of the People's Government of North China (August
<r' See Zhongguo Xinminzhuzhuvi Geming Shiqi Geniudi Fazhi 
Wenxian Xuanbian (Selected Legal Documents in Base Areas 
During the Chinese New Democratic Revolution), Vol.l, China 
Social Sciences Publishing House (Beijing) 1981, pp.34-7.
36 Art. 11, ibid .
37 Ibid . pp . 66-8 .
38 Ibid. par. 4 .
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1948) , 19 "any aspect of industry may be, unless otherwise 
limited by laws and regulations, operated by private 
enterprises", nevertheless, "state industry should lead 
private enterprises". Moreover,
The key areas of state industry should be machine- 
manufacturing, munitions, important industrial material- 
manufacturing and the chemicals -- medicines industry, 
and other industries which are urgently needed to support 
the War or people's livelihood but which are nevertheless 
impossible or inappropriate for individual business to 
operate.
State enterprises may lease in the form of state 
capitalism to individuals or cooperatives to operate 
those industries and mining which are not possible for 
state enterprises themselves to run; state industries 
must according to plans supply necessary machines, raw 
materials and powers to individual industries and 
cooperative industries which are beneficial to the 
national economy and the people's livelihood, and 
encourage the development of the individual industry and 
cooperatives.
As a whole these policy declarations, at least for a certain 
period of time, were no less important as guides to practice 
than formal laws.
Secondly, there were also certain specific regulations on 
state enterprises, cooperatives, and private businesses. The 
Regulations Concerning the Administration of Soviet State- 
Owned Factories, adopted on April 10, 1934,40 was the first
legislation adopted to govern state enterprises under Chinese 
Communist rule. These Regulations contained only eleven 
articles, but nevertheless covered many issues, including 
factory leadership, administration of factories, workers' 
wages and status, director's responsibility and accounting 
rules.
In addition, on April 22, 1932, the Provisional Central
Chinese Soviet Government adopted Temporary Organisational 
Regulations on Cooperatives.41 These Regulations declared
19 Ibid . , pp. 71-85.
40 For the text, see supra note 35, pp.289-90.
41 Ibid, pp.266-7, For an English translation, see Butler 
(ed.), supra note 34, pp.171-2.
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cooperatives to be one of the main ways for developing the 
Chinese Soviet economy,42
Private businesses were encouraged. In January 1932, the 
Provisional Central Chinese Soviet Government adopted the 
Temporary Regulation on Investment on Industrial and 
Commercial Businesses.4' These Regulations provided that 
private capital might be invested freely in the Soviet 
China.44 Even state-owned enterprises, mining and forests 
could be leased through agreements to private businessmen for 
management.45 Investors, however, had to report in advance and 
in considerably detail to the local Soviet government the 
amount of capital, company's articles of association or its 
name, business coverage and names of its directors. After the 
business certificate had been issued, the company could carry 
out the stipulated business functions .4,1
Thus, enterprise policies and laws between 1927 and 1949 
in Chinese Communist areas were relatively simple and 
undeveloped. Although private investment was encouraged, the 
whole structure of company regulations was quite different 
from either the situation in China before 1927 or that in the 
Republican Government-controlled areas of the same period. The 
late Qing rulers imported many commercial laws from Western 
countries and initiated an era in which the national economy 
was to be developed by encouraging private companies. In 
contrast, the Communist government in China began in the early 
1930s to import Marxist and Soviet models in constructing its 
economy. As a result, it relied heavily on state enterprises 
and cooperatives, and therefore initiated a new era of 
"socialist enterprise law".
42 Art. 1, ibid .
43 Ibid., p.265. For an English Translation, see Butler 
(ed.), supra note 34, p.173.
44 Ibid . Art . 1 ,
4r> Ibid. Art. 3 .
46 Ibid. Art. 2 .
74
It should be noted that although socialist policy and law
had priority in its application in base areas and liberated
areas, there are some indications that Republican laws were
also taken into account by some local Communist authorities.
In order to eradicate the impact of these laws, in February
1949, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) issued an "Order on Abolishing All Guomindang Laws and
Establishing Judicial Principles in Liberated Areas'1.47 The
Order stipulated that all Guomindang laws would be totally
abolished in liberated areas and therefore pushed the
socialist nature of Chinese law to an extreme point. The Order
particularly stated that
People's judicial work should be based on people's new 
laws. Because people's laws are not complete, the working 
principles of judicial organs should be: follow guiding
principles' (gangling) , laws' (falu) , orders' (mingling) , 
regulations' (tiaoli), and resolutions' (iueding) when 
they are present; and follow new democratic policies' 
(xinminzhuzhuyi zhengce) when guiding principles and so 
on are absent.
This Order had very deep implications for the subsequent 
development of the PRC legal system. As will be shown below, 
law had since been placed at a relatively subordinate position 
and policies had always played a very active and extremely 
important role. To a great extent, the over-reliance on 
policies was an excuse for the neglect of law, at least until 
the late 197 0s.
B. 1949-1978
1. 1949-1956
The PRC was formally established on October 1, 1949.
Subsequently, the government devoted itself to building a 
socialist economy in which public ownership would occupy a 
central position.
The economic structure established before 1949 in 
mainland China was, according to the Communist view, basically
47 See the text in Chinese, supra note 35, pp.85-7
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composed of four kinds of property: property held by "foreign 
imperialists"; "bureaucratic capital" (quanliao ziben) held by 
the Republican government and powerful officials; "national 
capital" (minzu ziben) held by the national bourgeoisie; and 
an individual economy which included activities such as the 
handicrafts industry. The PRC government adopted different 
policies towards different types of enterprise.48 First, 
enterprises owned by "imperialists" and "the bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie were to be confiscated and converted into 
socialist state-owned enterprises. This process had actually 
taken place even before 1949 in the "liberated areas". It was 
also declared, by the time of the foundation of the PRC in 
1949, the new government had already successfully controlled 
national economic lifelines and made the state-owned economy 
the leading component of the national economy.49 Nevertheless, 
the confiscation of "imperialist property" continued after 
1949. In 1952, the Central People's Government promulgated 
"Measures on Rectification of Government Shares and Properties 
in Enterprises".80 The Measures furthered the rectification 
and subsequent confiscation of properties held in a concealed 
form by the former Republican government in private 
enterprises. By 1951, such confiscation almost ended. 
Socialist state ownership was firmly established.
48 These arrangements were also reflected in the Common 
Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference of September 1949, which acted as a provisional 
constitution for several years until the introduction of a 
formal Constitution in 1954.
49 See Zhu Jiannong, Zhonqquo Shehuizhuyi Suovouzhi Wenti 
Yani iu (Research on the Problem of Chinese Socialist 
Ownership), People's Publishing House 1985, pp.19-20.
50 Promulgated on Jan.5, 1951, see Siying Gonqshangye De 
Shehuizhuyi Gaizao Zhengce Falinq Huibian (Collection of 
Policies and Laws on the Socialist Reform of Private Industry 
and Commerce, 1949-1952), Finance and Economy Publishing House 
(Beijing) 1957, Vol.l, pp.111-6.
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Secondly, national capital was to be peacefully 
redeemed51 and then gradually transformed into public 
ownership. While bureaucratic capital constituted eighty per 
cent of the former Republican economy, national capital 
accounted for only twenty per cent of the Republican 
economy.53 In view of the facts that national economy was 
recovering from the War Against the Japanese and the Civil 
War, and that state enterprises could only form a part of the 
national economy, the new government decided to allow national 
capital to exist. But national capital had to be restricted on 
the ground that private investors were accused of exploiting 
employees. The Common Programme of the Chinese Political 
Consultative Conference, which was adopted in September 29, 
1949 and employed as a temporary state constitution until 
1954, provided:
The cooperative economy of state capital and private 
capital is state-capitalist economy. Under necessary and 
possible conditions, private capital should operate in 
the direction of state-capitalism, for example, 
processing for state enterprises, operating joint state- 
private ventures with, or managing state enterprises and 
exploiting rich resources of the state in the form of 
leasing .51
In the summer of 1953, the reform of "capitalist industry 
and commerce" began. The 1954 Constitution set out the basic 
policy in this reform:
51 The Chinese authority declared that the peaceful 
redemption of national capital was a great victory as no 
violence was engaged in the process of expropriation. 
Actually, the redemption was, as even the Chinese authority 
admitted, opposed by the capitalists. Here, "redemption" did 
not mean that the state gave especially a certain amount of 
money to capitalists. Rather, by the form of state-capitalism, 
the state gave capitalists an opportunity to exploit (usually 
without their own labour) the people. This opportunity which 
were practised in many ways such as the sharing of dividends 
and interests by capitalists was the price of redemption. See
Zhu, supra note 49, pp.27-38.
53 The number of private industrial enterprises backed by 
national capital was about 123,000, and 1,640,000 workers were 
employed. Information from Zhu, supra note 49, p.25.
53 See Art . 31.
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The state protects the right of capitalists to own 
the means of production and other capital according to 
law.
The policy of the state towards capitalist industry 
and commerce is to use, restrict and transform them. By 
way of government administration, the leadership of the 
state sector of the economy, and the supervision by 
workers and the masses, the state makes use of positive 
functions of capitalist industry and commerce which are 
beneficial to national welfare and the people's 
livelihood, restricts their negative functions which are 
harmful to national welfare and the people's livelihood, 
encourages and guides their transformation into various 
form of state-capitalist economy, and gradually replaces 
capitalist ownership with the ownership by the whole 
people.
The state forbids capitalists from engaging in 
unlawful activities which harm the public interest, 
disrupt social-economic order, or undermine state 
economic plans.54
Thirdly, reform of the individual non-agricultural 
economy took a different process from that of either 
bureaucrat or national capital. The individual economy was 
basically regarded to be non-exploitative as individual 
businessmen supported themselves with their own labour. 
Nevertheless, the individual economy had since 1949 been on 
the agenda of reform because at that time the individual 
economy was also thought to be against socialist public 
ownership. The aim of the reform was set to lead individual 
businessmen to move to collective ownership by way of 
cooperatives. In 1952, a plan was drawn up to realise the 
collectivisation of individual non-agricultural economy in a 
period of fifteen years or more. The 1954 Constitution 
confirmed this transition:
The cooperative sector of the economy is either 
socialist, when collectively owned by the working masses, 
or semi-socialist, when in part collectively owned by the 
working masses. Partial collective ownership by the 
working masses is a transitional form by means of which 
individual peasants, individual handicraftsmen, and other 
individual working people organise themselves in their 
advance towards collective ownership by the working 
masses.
The state protects the property of the cooperatives, 
encourages, guides and helps the development of the
54 Art. 10 .
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cooperative sector of the economy. It regards the 
promotion of producers' cooperatives as the chief means 
for the transformation of individual farming and 
individual handicrafts.55
In late 1955, the reform of handicrafts cooperatives was 
attacked on the ground that it was too slow. Soon after, the 
socialist reform of handicrafts economy was virtually 
completed within just a few months -- rather than the fifteen 
years or more originally suggested.50
The period of 1951-1978 saw a shift in the national 
policy towards individual economy. The trend was towards a 
significant decline in the importance of the individual 
economy.57 The crucial element underlying the policy shift was 
an emphasis on the property ownership. Public ownership, 
especially state ownership, was considered the ideal form for 
a socialist economy. The individual economy had to be 
transformed as quickly as possible to collective or state 
ownership. On the other hand, individual property and 
interests were thought to be totally alien to socialist 
economy, and were labelled as 1 capitalist tails" (ziben zhuvi 
weiba) which had to be eliminated for a socialist economy.
During this period of transformation in the Chinese 
economy, the co-existence of policy and law was the basic 
framework within which all forms of enterprises had to 
operate. Policies played a very important role, especially in 
relation to state enterprises. "Directives" (zhishi) were the 
principal manifestation of policies. On February 28, 1950, the 
Commission on Finance and Economy under the Government 
Administration Council (GAC) issued a Directive on
55 Art . 7 .
56 By the end of 1956, 91.7 per cent of all handicraftsmen 
had been collectivised, with a total output of 7,600 million 
Yuan -- about per cent of national handicrafts' output. See 
Zhu, supra note 49, p.66.
57 For a detailed description, see Liu Hong and others, 
Zhonqquo Xianjieduan Geti Jingji Yanj iu (Studies on the 
Present Chinese Individual Economy), People's Press (Beijing) 
1986, pp.16-9.
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Establishing Factory Management Committee in State-Owned and 
Public Factories.58 This Directive, by reinforcing and 
extending nationally the Implementing Regulations on 
Establishing Factory Management Committees and Workers' 
Congresses in State-Owned and Public Factories issued by the 
People's Government of North China on August 10, 1949, ordered 
that factory management committees be established in order to 
practise democratisation of management.59
There were also policies regarding the registration of 
enterprises. On March 30, 1951, the Commission on Finance and 
Economics under the GAC issued a Directive ordering all public 
and joint state-private enterprises to register with the
58 For the text in Chinese, see Laws and Regulations of 
the PRC Central Government (1949-1950), pp.453-56. Here 
"public factory" (gongying gongchang) was an abandoned usage 
referring to a factory owned and managed by a province or 
county (including state organs and army). These "public 
factories" used to be also called "local industries" (difang 
gongye), in contrast to "state-owned industries" (guoying 
gongye) owned and managed by a government or military region 
above provincial level. Sometimes state-owned factories and 
public factories were jointly named "public industries" 
(gongying gongye), in contrast to "private industries" (siying 
gongye). (For a further observation on this distinction, see 
Zhu Jianhua (ed.), Dongbei Jiefangqu Caizheng Jingii Shigao (A 
History of Finance and Economy in North-East Liberated Areas), 
Heilongjiang People's Press 1987, footnote at p.206.) The 
confusion was, however, sorted out in the Stipulations about 
the Usages of Names of State Enterprises Etc issued by the 
Government Administration Council on Sept.2, 1952 (see the 
text in Chinese, in Laws and Regulations of the PRC Central 
Government (1952), p.112). These Stipulations pointed out that 
from then on the term "state enterprises" (guoving give) 
should be used to refer to enterprises invested in and managed 
by the Central Government and departments of large 
administrative regions, including those entrusted by an 
administrative region to a province or city to manage. 
Enterprises invested in and managed by governments under 
provincial level should be called "local state enterprises" 
(difang guoving giye).
59 This was also provided in Art. 32 of the Common 
Programme of the Chinese People's Consultative Conference 
(September 1949).
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competent authorities.00 Soon after, on May 4, 1951, a
supplementary directive was issued by the same Commission on 
the registration of public and joint state-private 
enterprises .01
Although policies were a very important source for norms 
governing enterprise matters during that time, it was also 
understood by the PRC leadership that formal laws and 
regulations could be used to encourage economic development. 
Since the laws of the Republic of China were abolished in the 
PRC from late 1948 onwards, there was a short period when no 
appropriate laws applied. In particular, the legal status of 
private companies, which had been registered under Guomindang 
laws and survived in the newly-established state of the PRC, 
remained uncertain. In order to free private investors of 
their apprehensions and to encourage the development of 
private enterprise, the Central Bureau on Private Enterprises 
under the GAC began in April 1950 to draft the provisional 
regulations on private enterprises. At the same time, the 
Legal Bureau under the GAC was also engaged in drafting a new 
company law, but this law was never published. Instead, on 
December 29, 1950, Provisional Regulations on Private
Enterprises (hereinafter "Regulations") were adopted and 
promulgated by the GAC. The Regulations applied not only to 
companies but also to sole traders and to partnerships. Three 
months later, on March 30, 1951, the Commission on Finance and 
Economy, promulgated the Implementing Measures for the 
Regulations. Thus, the Regulations, together with the 
Implementing Measures, constituted a relatively comprehensive 
legal treatment of private enterprises. On the one hand, there
G0 See the text in Chinese, in Selected Enterprise Laws 
and Regulations, p .141. Here "competent authority" meant 
either county administrative organs in charge of industry and 
commerce or the Commission on Finance and Economy itself when 
an enterprise was a "company" (gongsi) or it was to be under 
direct control of a central ministry.
61 Ibid. pp.141-2. The contents for registration were 
listed as: name of the enterprise, business coverage, place of 
the enterprise, organs in charge of the enterprise, date of 
its formation, "references" (beikao) and other particulars.
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was an inseparable continuity between the old Republican laws 
and the new law on private enterprises . Not only were sole 
traders and partnerships permitted but also five forms of 
companies, as provided in the Republican Company Law, were 
given official endorsement/’2 The Regulations also provided 
that enterprises approved prior to the introduction of the 
Regulations would continue to operate unless otherwise 
provided in law/'3 These enterprises "must register with 
competent local or central authorities", but those which had 
already registered with local administrative organs of 
industry and commerce and which have been kept in registration 
files were not required to register again/’4
On the other hand, the Regulations also introduced some 
new measures. First, registration procedures were strict. All 
new private enterprises had to be approved before 
registration/5 The main purpose of this compulsory procedure 
was described(,fi as the protection of the interests of 
investors and to prevent "blind" (mangmu) development of 
private enterprises. In fact, this procedure, by putting 
limitations on free enterprises, enabled the state to control 
effectively, and to limit the number and the scale, of private 
enterprises.
Secondly, state economic planning was put on the agenda.
62 During the drafting of the Regulations, it was 
suggested to keep only three of the five company forms, ie. 
company limited by shares, unlimited company, limited 
liability company. But it was vetoed as first, more choices 
should be left to investors: and secondly,a change in company 
forms would mean reorganisation of previously-formed companies 
and therefore add more difficulties. See Xue Muqiao (Director 
of the Central Bureau on Private Enterprises), "Siying Qiye 
Qicao Jinguo Jiqi Shuoming" (Drafting Process of and 
Explanation on Provisional Regulations on Private 
Enterprises), in Siying Gonqshangye Shehuizhuyi Gaizao Faling 
Xuanbian, supra note 50, pp.95-6.
63 Art . 13 .
(’4 Ibid.
65 Art. 11.
6fi Art . 11 .
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The Regulations provided:
In order to prevent "blind" (mancrmu) production, to 
adjust relationships between production and selling, and 
gradually to transform our economy into a planned 
economy, the government may when necessary make plans for 
production and selling of some important commodities. 
Both public and private enterprises have to comply with 
these plans/17
Thirdly, distribution of profits had to follow compulsory 
procedures. According to the Regulations, the profits of sole 
traders or partnership could be distributed in accordance with 
either law, contract, or professional customs. In contrast, 
the profits of companies had to be distributed in accordance 
with the procedures provided by the Regulations.68 These 
compulsory arrangements for the distribution of profits were 
mainly meant to restrict "exploitation" by the owners of 
private enterprises. Last, but not least, labour protection 
was stressed. Article 7 provided that enterprises had to 
implemented sincerely all labour laws and regulations 
promulgated by the government. These features of the 
Regulations represented a new philosophy in enterprise law, a 
compromise between old capitalist law and new socialist law. 
Accordingly, an editorial carried in People's Daily69 pointed 
out that the new law was a document setting out the relations 
between several types of economic element and between several 
"classes" .
Although the Regulations were characterized as
67 Art. 6.
68 According to Art.25 of the Regulations, the procedures 
for the distribution of the profits were: (1) paying income
taxes and making up losses; (2) devoting ten per cent towards 
as accumulation funds for the purpose of expanding business 
and safeguarding future losses; (3) distributing dividends for 
shareholders and providing remuneration for directors, 
supervisors and managers; (6) setting aside a welfare fund and 
a "reward fund" for employees; and (7) other purposes.
69 Jan. 17 , 1951, p. 1.
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"provisional",70 they have been very important in the legal 
history of the PRC. The Regulations were the first major item 
of enterprise legislation to be introduced after 1949 . In 
addition, although the Regulations were concerned with private 
enterprises, some of the principles embodied in the
Regulations were actually applicable to other types of 
enterprise as well. In fact, the Regulations made express 
reference to state and state-private enterprises, to such
matters as "joint businesses" (lianying) ,71 and to the need 
for compliance with state economic plans.11 On the other hand, 
the provisions in Regulations concerning enterprise 
registration were referred to as applicable to state and 
state-private enterprises. The two Directives issued by the 
Commission on Finance and Economy under the GAC in March and 
May 1951, as mentioned above, all required that both state and 
state-private enterprises should register according to the 
provisions in the Regulations.
Private enterprises, although having some new features, 
were still regarded as "capitalist" in nature under the 
Regulations. As a result, they had to be more radically
transformed in the direction of socialism. While the 1950
Regulations were not replaced by a subsequent Private 
Enterprise Law as had been originally planned, they were made 
marginal by the Provisional Regulations on State-Private 
Industrial Enterprises (hereinafter "Provisional
70 When the Regulations were passed, it was genuinely 
thought that they were going to be amended within two or three 
years, and then superseded by a comprehensive "Private 
Enterprise Law". See Xue, supra note 62, p.102. But the plan 
was not carried out until the new 1 Provisional Regulations on 
Private Enterprises" in 1988, It is interesting to note that 
both were characterised as "provisional". Actually they are 
not exceptions to Chinese law where many laws and regulations 
are simply termed "provisional". But not even legislators can 
know how long a "provisional" tag will stand. The word 
"provisional" which itself reflects a controversial and 
uncertain nature of the subject makes the subject open to 
subsequent political, economic or social changes.
71 Art . 5 .
7J Art . 6 .
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Regulations"),71 adopted by the GAC on September 2, 1954. The
Provisional Regulations defined a state-private industrial
enterprise as an "industrial enterprise which is invested in
by the state or by another state-private enterprise and which 
Operated
is jointly ■ l by state-appointed cadres as well as by
capitalists".74 The principle for the formation of such 
enterprises was described as "in accordance with the state's 
needs, the possibility of reforming the enterprise concerned, 
and capitalists' willingness to cooperate".75 In principle, 
"the legal interests of private shares are to be protected", 
but "socialist elements shall occupy leading position".76 
These enterprises were to be jointly managed by government 
officials and private investors, and were put under direct 
government control.77 The government was empowered not only 
to decide important issues which could not be resolved in 
enterprises78 but also to hear and approve board of directors' 
reports over important decisions.79
The administrative positions of representatives from both 
the state and private investors were to be decided by 
negotiations between the government and private investors.80 
Workers were given the opportunity to participate in 
enterprise management.81 Enterprises had to implement state
7i Although the Provisional Regulations specified that 
they were applicable to "industrial enterprises" only, it was 
nevertheless provided in Art.26 that the Provisional 
Regulations also applied to state-private enterprises in the 
areas of transportation and construction.
74 Art. 2 .
75 Ibid.
70 Ibid . Art. 3 .
77 Art . 23 .
78 Art . 10 .
79 Art . 19 .
80 Art . 11 .
81 Art . 13 .
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plans,83 and to learn from state enterprises in making 
decisions concerning wages and welfare while taking into 
account their own special situation.8-1 In addition, they had 
to follow government instructions on such matters as 
production, management, accounting, labour, safety and
health.84 The Provisional Regulations also provided compulsory 
rules for the distribution of profits.85
Generally speaking, the Provisional Regulations set out 
the basic structure of, and defined relations within, state-
private enterprises. It was assumed from the beginning that
private investors had the right to participate in the
management of such enterprises. Nevertheless they were subject 
to extensive government control. In reality, private investors 
possessed little bargaining power, and had to accept the rules 
provided in the law, and the orders and instructions of the 
government.
Like the Regulations, the Provisional Regulations were 
intended as a purely interim item of legislation. As noted 
above, the transformation of capitalist industry and commerce 
was completed so quickly that the Provisional Regulations 
survived for less than two years. After the state- 
capitalization of all industries in 1956, private investors 
could still hold high positions and participate in 
enterprises' management, but their capital incomes (excluding 
wages) were no longer connected with the operation of 
enterprises in which they had invested. Instead, they were 
given only "dividends" at a fixed rate for their capital 
investment. The Provisional Regulations were made obsolete, 
because private investors had lost their rights of control 
which had originated in their investment in enterprises. Like 
state enterprises, state-private enterprises were put under
83 Art.4.
83 Art. 14 .
84 Art. 15 .
85 Arts. 17 and 18.
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extensive government control. In September 1966, the Chinese 
government decided to cease the payment of dividends to 
private investors. Henceforth, joint state-private enterprises 
were state enterprises.
2. 1957-1978
From the late 1950s onwards, with the gradual 
disappearance of private enterprises, public ownership 
enterprises came to be the only official form of enterprise. 
Until the late 1970s, no formal legislation was adopted to 
govern enterprises. For state and collective enterprises, only 
a few policy-oriented documents were promulgated.
On November 15, 1957, the State Council -- successor to
the GAC -- promulgated "Provisions on Improving Industrial 
Administration System".8'’ These provisions were aimed at 
reforming the highly-centralised administration system by 
giving local governments and enterprises managers more powers. 
The incentives and measures contained in these Provisions were 
sound, but were soon drowned by the so-called "Great Leap 
Forward" beginning in 1958. During the campaign of the "Great 
Leap Forward", many collectively-owned enterprises were 
suddenly converted into state-owned enterprises -- collective 
ownership was officially thought to be a lower degree of 
public ownership. In rural areas, all the property previously 
owned by cooperatives were changed to the ownership of commune 
-- itself suspected of being state or collectively-owned in 
nature.87 This rash advance was temporarily stopped 
subsequently. In 1961, the Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) issued "Provisions on Some Policy 
Problems Concerning Handicrafts Industry in Cities and 
Countryside (Tentative Draft)." These Provisions ordered some 
state-owned factories which had been wrongly transformed from 
cooperatives to revert to cooperative form. Moreover, the
8Cl These provisions had been approved by the Standing 
Committee of the NPC. See the text of these provisions in 
Chinese, Selected Enterprise Laws and Regulations, pp.37-43.
87 See Zhu, supra note 49, p.110.
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"Regulations on the Work of Rural People's Communes (Amended 
Draft)" confirmed collective ownership of communes. It was 
held that people's communes should carry out the economic 
system of "three ownerships," that is, "ownership by the 
commune, the production brigade and the production team, with 
the production team as the basic accounting unit" (sanj i 
suoyou, duiwei iichu).
The "Great Leap Forward" came to an end in 19 60, but this 
campaign had deep implications for the subsequent development 
of the Chinese economy. Collective enterprises continued to 
exist, but they had to be managed in almost the same way as 
state enterprises. The government could freely insist on 
"equalitarianism, and indiscriminate transfer of resources" 
(yiping erdiao) between collective and state enterprises. To 
some extent, collective enterprises themselves were happy with 
the extensive government control that then entailed, and many 
even attempted to keep up with state enterprises on important 
issues such as production and selling, the leadership system, 
workers' wages and welfare. Indeed, copying state enterprises 
was often the only way for a collective enterprise to survive 
the accusation of having "private" elements. Thus, there were 
not many differences between collective and state enterprises.
One important document worthy of note here is the 
"Regulations Concerning the Work of State Industrial 
Enterprises (Draft)"88 issued by the CCP Central Committee on 
September 16, 1961. These Working Regulations confirmed the
system of director responsibility under the leadership of the 
Party committee and the system of workers' congress, both 
arrangements having already been announced in 1956.89 It was 
valid until the Cultural Revolution, which not only affected 
politics and society but also seriously undermined the 
operation of enterprises. In fact, during the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976), no formal legislation was adopted for
88 See the text in Chinese, Selected Enterprise Laws and 
Regulations, pp.45-73.
89 For a discussion, see Chapters Six and Seven below.
the regulation of state enterprises which, as a rule, were 
directly managed by the government and its departments.
III. Economic Reforms and Enterprise Laws
A. Revival of the law
The Chinese economic reforms started in the late 1970s.
From the very beginning of the reforms, the Chinese leadership
turned its attention to the potential role of the law. As
early as December 1978, in his famous speech entitled
"Emancipate the Mind, Seek Truth From Facts and Unite as One
in Looking to the Future",'10 Deng Xiaoping pointed out the
necessity of using laws and regulations to govern the economic
reforms. In particular, Deng raised the issue of "economic
democracy" which focused on the delegation of decision-making
powers to various units, including state enterprises. He
further indicated that, in order to ensure such democracy,
China's legal system should be strengthened.
Democracy has to be institutionalised and written into 
law, so as to make sure that institutions and laws do not 
change whenever the leadership changes, or whenever the 
leaders change their views or shift the focus of their 
attention.91
Thus, in Deng's view, one of the major advantages of law is 
its stability and continuity. This feature makes the law more 
reliable and valuable than policies which are changeable from 
time to time.
In order to build a sound legal system for China's 
modernisation, Deng suggested that many laws should be
■Kl See the text, in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975 
-- 1982), Foreign Languages Press (Beijing) 1984, pp.151-65. 
This speech served as the keynote address for the Third 
Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP 
that immediately followed and formally initiated the post-Mao 
economic reforms.
91 Ibid. , pp.157-58 .
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enacted.<JJ As far as enterprises were concerned, not only
management autonomy but also management responsibility had to
be provided for by law to enterprises, their managers and
relevant persons. To achieve this aim, Deng emphasized that
the relations between one enterprise and another, between 
enterprises and the state, between enterprises and 
individuals, and so on should also be defined by law, and 
many of the contradictions between them should be 
resolved by law.93
Following Deng's instructions, for the first time in the
history of the PRC, enterprise legislation has been carried
out on an impressively large scale.
B. Development of "enterprise laws"
1. Overall view
As indicated in Chapter One above, the major laws and 
regulations which have been adopted since 1979 are: the Law on 
Equity Joint Ventures (1979), the Law on Wholly Foreign-Owned 
Enterprises (1986), the Law on Cooperative Joint Ventures 
(1988), Provisional Regulations Concerning Private Enterprises 
(1988), the State Enterprise Law (SEL) (1988), Regulations 
Concerning Rural Collective Enterprises (1990), and 
Regulations Concerning Urban Collective Enterprises (1991). In 
addition, the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (EBL) was adopted in
-u The laws mentioned in his speech included: criminal and 
civil codes, procedural laws and other necessary laws 
concerning factories, people's communes, forests, grasslands 
and environmental protection, as well as labour laws and a law 
on investment by foreigners. According to Deng, "legal 
provisions will have to be less than perfect to start with, 
then be gradually improved upon. Some laws and statutes can be 
tried out in particular localities and later enacted 
nationally after the experience has been evaluated and 
improvements have been made. Individual legal provisions can 
be revised or supplemented one at a time, as necessary; there 
is no need to wait for a comprehensive revision of an entire 
body of law. In short, it is better to have some laws than 
none, and better to have jihem sooner than later." Ibid. , 
p.158. There remarks have had profound impact on post-Mao 
legislation.
93 Ibid. , p . 158 .
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1986 and came into force in 1988.
The development of "enterprise laws" in the PRC has two 
basic features. The first is that, legislation has been 
carried out with apparently more and earlier success in 
relation to foreign investment enterprises than in relation to 
domestic enterprises. This fact illustrates the existence of 
considerable difficulties facing the legislation on domestic 
enterprises in the reform era. Furthermore, this fact reflects 
different attitudes of the Chinese policy-makers towards 
different enterprises. While laws and regulations have to be 
promulgated as soon and comprehensive as possible to protect 
the rights and interests of foreign investors, policies may 
remain as the main source for governing and guiding domestic 
enterprises.94 The delay of legislation concerning domestic 
enterprises has been particularly obvious where there is 
notable policy uncertainty in the process of reforms. Harsh 
legislation is widely considered to be inappropriate, 
irresponsible, and difficult to implement,91-’
Another noteworthy feature of contemporary Chinese 
enterprise law is that enterprise legislation has been carried 
out in the light of the system of property ownership. In 197 9 
when a factory law began to be drafted, it was suggested that 
the law should be applicable to all enterprises, regardless of 
their property ownership. However, many people were worried 
about the difficulties in drafting a law of such a broad
94 This has been underscored by the fact that detailed 
regulations have been promulgated by Chinese authorities for 
implementing laws governing foreign investment enterprises. 
Such examples include the Implementing Regulations Concerning 
the Law on Equity Joint Ventures (promulgated on Sept.20, 
1983), Implementing Rules Concerning the Law on Wholly- 
Foreign-Owned Enterprises (promulgated on Dec.12, 1990).
Whereas for Chinese domestic enterprises, only Provisional 
Regulations Concerning Private Enterprises have been followed 
by the Implementing Measures. Comprehensive Implementing 
Regulations for the SEL have failed to be promulgated. For a 
discussion, see Chapter Ten of this study.
yG Nevertheless, in some cases, legislation may be adopted 
under the pressure from the central leadership. This was the 
case for the EBL which was adopted despite great opposition 
and the absence of the SEL. See Chapter Eight.
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application.
Subsequently, laws governing foreign investment 
enterprises were differentiated. In order to attract foreign 
investment, the Law on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures was 
promulgated in 1979. Subsequently, in October 1980, it was 
decided by the National People's Congress that a law governing 
state enterprises should be given priority and separate 
treatment.1'0 Since then, many laws have been drafted and 
adopted on the basis that enterprises of different property 
ownership shall apply different laws and regulations.97
90 For a discussion of this development, see Yang Zixuan 
(ed.), Gongye Qiyefa Jiaocheng (Textbook on Industrial 
Enterprise Law), Law Press 1986, p.19.
97 It should be noted that since the mid-1980s, this way 
of enterprise legislation has caused increasing concern among 
Chinese scholars. One of their greatest worries is the overlap 
among, and inconsistencies between, different enterprise 
legislation. In addition, the existing methods of enterprise 
legislation is widely seen as blocking the way for future 
company legislation. For a discussion, see Li Cheng, "Xianxing 
Qiye Fenlei Fangfa Yu Gongsi Lifa" (Current Methods for 
Classifying Enterprise and Company Legislation), in FXPL, 
No. 4, 1990, pp.14-7. Also see Zhao Xudong, "Zhongguo Gongsi
Lifa de Jige Wenti1 (Several Issues Concerning Chinese Company 
Legislation), ZFLT, No.1, 1991, pp.38-43 & p.67.
Many Chinese scholars have advocated the idea of 
classifying enterprises and making laws on the basis of the 
"legal forms" (f alii xingshi) . In other words, the criterion 
for deciding whether an enterprise is subject to a particular 
law should be whether the enterprise is a "sole trader" 
(duzi) , a "partnership" (hehuo), or an "company" (gongsi) . 
Such an attempt, if implemented, would bring the legislative 
structure of Chinese enterprises in line with Western 
practices. However, as this suggestion ignores the importance 
of property ownership, and as limited companies are still in 
a stage of experimentation, it remains to be seen whether or 
not this attempt will fit the Chinese case. Also see the 
discussion in Chapter Ten below concerning the future 
prospects of enterprise law.
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2. Difficulties in enacting the SEL98
Compared to the rapid and comprehensive legislation on 
foreign investment enterprises, the enactment of the SEL was 
rather complex and time-consuming. The SEL, from its 
conception in 1979 to its formal adoption in 1988, took a 
total of ten years . It also experienced the greatest publicity 
of any law in the legislative history of the PRC. The most 
controversial issue complicating the enactment of the SEL was 
the enterprise leadership system -- an issue to be examined in 
some detail in Chapter Six of this study.
In response to Deng's call in late 1978 for the enactment
of a factory law, the Law Committee under the Standing
Committee of the NPC took the initiative in early 1979 to
draft an enterprise law. After two years of preparation, in
September 1981, the draft law was put forward to the State
Council for deliberation. At that time, the reform of the
enterprise leadership system had just started. The new
director responsibility system was at a stage of initial
experimentation. Many of the old structures, especially the
system of the director responsibility under the leadership of
the Party committee, still prevailed in most state
enterprises. In these circumstances, the State Council decided
prom's
to publish the proposed law as _ regulations.
Subsequently, in April 1983, the Provisional Regulations 
Concerning State Industrial Enterprises were adopted by the 
State Council. And the old enterprise leadership system was 
upheld.
By the end of 1983, the Central Committee of the CCP 
called for the reform of the leadership system in more 
enterprises. This call led to a new period in the process of 
the drafting of the SEL. In May 1984, the Central Committee of
98 For a detailed description of this process, see Section 
of Enterprise System under the State Commission for 
Restructuring Economic Systems, and Office of Guidance 
Committee on Enterprise Management under the State Council, 
Zhonqguo Qiye Gaiqe Shinian (Ten Years of Enterprise Reform in 
China), Reform Press (Beijing) 1990, pp.443-45.
The legislative process of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 
will be briefly discussed in Chapter Eight of the thesis.
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the CCP decided that the director responsibility system was to 
be implemented. As a result, more cities and other areas were 
chosen for experimenting with the new system.
In January 1985, the draft SEL was for the first time 
presented to the Standing Committee of the NPC for
deliberation. From then on until early 1988, the Standing 
Committee of the NPC deliberated the draft SEL four times, but 
failed to agree on the suitability of the draft law. In
particular, members of the NPC Standing Committee were
concerned with the status of both Party committees and
mangers.
In order to pave the way for an early adoption of the 
SEL, the Chinese authorities made a number of efforts. These 
efforts included the promulgation in 1986 of three sets of 
policy regulations respectively concerning directors, Party 
committee, and workers' congresses within state enterprises," 
and the adoption in late 1986 of the EBL.100
On January 11, 1988, the Standing Committee of the NPC
made an unprecedented move in the legislative history of the 
PRC by ordering the publication of the draft SEL for public 
solicitation and discussion. The draft law which was published 
in major official newspapers attracted extensive attention 
from enterprise managers, economists, lawyers, and many 
ordinary people. They not only showed their support for the 
earlier adoption of the SEL, but also made many suggestions 
for improving the draft SEL. Finally, by taking into 
consideration some of the suggestions expressed from the 
public, the NPC officially adopted the SEL on April 13, 1988.
The long and disputed process by which the SEL was 
produced reflected the enormous difficulties encountered in 
Chinese state enterprise reform. The formal adoption of the 
SEL in 1988 temporarily put an end to ten years of controversy 
and uncertainty. However, as will be shown in this study, many
" See the discussion in Chapters Six and Seven.
100 To a certain extent, the premature birth of the EBL
was used as a strategy for forcing the early adoption of the
SEL. See the discussion in Chapter Eight.
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fundamental problems facing state enterprise reform have not 
been radically addressed and properly solved.
C. Classification of state enterprises and the law
In the West, state enterprises have, with few 
exceptions,101 not been formally classified by law. 
Nonetheless, in academic discussions, one widely accepted 
method of classifying public enterprises is represented both 
by the different forms which state enterprises take and by the 
different degrees of government control and consequential 
autonomy of enterprises. According to this approach, a public 
enterprise may be placed into one of three categories: first, 
departmental undertakings operated by a government department 
with finances and accounts at least partly integrated with 
those of the government; secondly, public corporations 
operating under specific legal provisions which provide that 
enterprises are wholly-owned by the government, or their 
control is to be exercised in certain ways; and thirdly, 
companies established under the company law of the country 
concerned in which the government owns significant shares to 
ensure control.10"
If this approach of classification is applied, Chinese 
state enterprises should be categorized from a developmental 
point of view. Before the post-Mao economic reforms, state 
enterprises were directly managed by government departments. 
As such, all state enterprises of that time might be put into
101 One such exception is Canada which attempted to 
classify public corporations by statute {e.g. Financial 
Administration Act 1951) for certain specific purposes. For a 
discussion on the merits and demerits of such classification, 
see W. Friedmann and J.F. Garner (ed.), Government Enterprise, 
Stevens & Sons (London) 1970, pp.204-6.
10“ See R.P. Short, "The Role of Public Enterprises: an 
International Statistical Comparison", in R.H. Floyd, C.S. 
Gray and R.P. Short, Public Enterprises in Mixed Economies, 
IMF Washington 1984, p.112. Also see Henry Parris, Pierre 
Pestiean and Peter Saynor, Public Enterprise in Western 
Europe, Croom Helen (London) 1987, p.23.
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the first category, that is, departmental undertakings." 
However, as a result of the post-Mao economic reforms, with 
the proposed separation of government administration from 
enterprise management, state enterprises have been granted 
with legal personality and with relative autonomy which is at 
least nominally guaranteed by law. Thus, except for a few 
enterprises which could be labelled as departmental 
undertakings because of their close resemblance to government 
departments,103 most state enterprises in contemporary China 
fall into the second category. In other words, they are public 
corporations operating under special legal provisions -- in 
particular, the SEL. As for the third category of public 
enterprises, China is experimenting with shareholding 
companies. Some companies which are controlled by the state on 
the basis of equity participation are comparable to public 
companies of the third category prevailing in the West, but 
such companies are still few in number.104
This study is mainly concerned with state enterprises of 
the second category, that is, state enterprises which are 
independent entities, not organised under ordinary company 
law, and closely associated with government departments.
In the Chinese context, one useful mode of classifying 
state enterprises is to divide them into large, medium, and 
small-size on the basis of their production capacity and the 
value of the fixed property held by the enterprises 
concerned.1<|r’ Although the SEL applies to all state
103 One of such example would be China International Trust 
and Investment Corporation (CITIC) . This company has been 
formed mainly to handle foreign investment issues, including 
investing in joint ventures. It is put under the direct 
control of the State Council.
104 Until the end of 1991, there were a total of 2,300 
shareholding companies. And this number include companies 
which were not controlled by the state.
lor' The production capacity should be regarded as a more 
important criterion. The value of the fixed property, as a 
second choice, can only be used for those state enterprises 
"whose coverage of productions is too broad to be classified 
in terms of their production capacity". For a report, see RMRB
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enterprises, the classification of state enterprises in terms
of their size has special legal implications for the
enterprises in question. For example, the rates of income tax
differ in accordance with the size of state enterprises.106
Moreover, state enterprises of different sizes may also be put
under different legal regimes governing the ways for carrying
out corporate management. For example, while small-sized state
enterprises may be leased out to for management, large and
medium-sized state enterprises must be operated under the
"contracting1 or chengbao system.107
Another category of criterion adopted by the Chinese
government for classifying state enterprises is the nature of
production or services. Under this approach, state enterprises
can be classified into industrial enterprises, commercial
enterprises, transportation enterprises, foreign trade
enterprises, and many other types of enterprises. The SEL, as
its full name suggests, is mainly concerned with state
industrial enterprises. Nevertheless, it is expressly provided
in the SEL that
the principles contained in this Law shall apply to 
enterprises owned by the whole people which engage in 
communications and transportation, post and 
telecommunications, geological prospecting, construction 
and installation, commerce, foreign trade, the supply of 
materials and goods, agriculture and forestry, and water 
conservation.108
To a certain extent, it is difficult to understand why the Law 
was not simply called "State Enterprise Law", rather than the 
present "State Industrial Enterprise Law".109 The only
(overseas edn.), Sept.18, 1991, p.3.
10,1 See Chapter Five of the thesis. Recently, there is a 
tendency to unify the tax treatment for all enterprises.
107 For a specific discussion on the chengbao system and 
a comparison between the chengbao system and the leasing 
system, see Chapter Nine below.
108 Art . 65 .
109 One prominent professor of Chinese law once informed 
me that he himself felt "ridiculous" when he was asked to co­
author a book entitled "State Industrial Enterprise Law".
97
reasonable explanation for this may be that industrial 
enterprises constitute the most important part of the national 
economy and have taken the lead in the urban economic reform 
programmes initiated in 1984.110 For the purpose of this 
thesis, the discussions are concerned with state industrial 
enterprises unless otherwise stated.
IV. Conclusion
In the PRC, comprehensive enterprise legislation has been 
possible since 1979 as China started its economic reforms. 
Before 1979, legal regulation of enterprises was occasionally 
attempted. Policies and informal documents prevailed in the 
administration of enterprises. Even adopted regulations were 
easily made obsolete by policy changes.
To a great extent, the inactivity of law meant the large 
absence of binding legal norms to the behaviour of enterprises 
and their managers. As a result, the national economy 
suffered, for responsibility could not be attached to anyone.
Given the past experience, grave shadow must be cast on 
the post-Mao economic and legal reforms. The fact that 
relevant policies are predominantly important and frequently 
changed is likely to undermine the authority and stability of 
laws and regulations . This is especially true for state 
enterprises which face great policy uncertainty in their 
reforms.
Throughout Chinese socialist history, property ownership 
has always been officially considered to be the most important 
factor in making, and subsequently changing, laws and policies 
concerning enterprises. Enterprises of different ownership are 
treated by different policies and governed by different laws 
(if any) . Compared to other enterprises, state enterprises are 
more complex in that the rights and interests involved are 
more difficult to tackle. The factor of the state ownership 
not only signifies the immense difficulties caused by the
110 See Yang, supra note 96, pp.19-20
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presence of various government authorities, but also brings 
great confusion over the legal status of enterprises, their 
managers and workers. In the economic reforms, the success of 
the legal regulation of state enterprises has to depend on the 
proper treatment of many different interests and, certainly, 
of property rights.
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CHAPTER THREE
LEGAL PERSONAlITY OF STATE ENTERPRISES
This chapter examines the legal personality of Chinese state 
enterprises, and related issues. The discussion is divided 
into five parts. In the first part, after reviewing the 
background of the concept of "legal person" (faren) , the 
discussion explains the reasons for the positive reception of 
the legal person concept in Chinese law. This is followed by 
an analysis of the legal requirements for Chinese legal 
persons with special reference to state enterprises. In the 
second part, the issue of property rights of state enterprises 
as legal persons is explored. In particular, the discussion 
seeks to illustrate the immense difficulties involved in 
defining property rights for state enterprises. The third part 
of this chapter discusses two constitutional issues, namely, 
the legal capacity of state enterprises and the ultra vires 
rule. The fourth part assesses the problems concerning the 
legal personality of state enterprises. Two major issues are 
discussed: "lifting the corporate veil", and "dual legal
persons . " The final part offers a conclusion with a summary of 
the functions and limits of the notion of legal personality in 
relation to state enterprises.
I. State Enterprise Reform and Corporate Personality
A. Legal personality: background
In Western company law, it is well-established that a 
limited company possesses legal personality, which 
distinguishes the company itself from its members. While 
common law jurisdictions have firmly adopted the notion of
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corporate personality, 1 civil law countries tend to use the 
general and abstract concept of "legal person" (or "juristic 
person") to express the same meaning.2 In addition, in spite 
of its Western capitalist origin, the concept of legal person 
has also been occasionally used in the laws of socialist 
countries, including the former Soviet Union.J
In China, although for a long time certain organisations 
had independent property and took part in social and economic 
activities in their own names, the notion of legal personality 
for organisations was not accepted in law until the adoption 
of the Civil Code (1929) of the Republic of China -- the first 
comprehensive civil legislation in China.4 After the founding 
of the PRC in 1949, all the laws previously adopted by the 
Republican authorities were abolished in mainland China, 
though some legal concepts survived. "Legal person", as one of 
those surviving concepts, first formally appeared in Temporary 
Measures Concerning the Conclusion of Contracts Between State 
Organs, State Enterprises, and Cooperatives (hereinafter 
"Measures") .r' Article 5 of the Measures provided: "a contract
1 For example, in English law, the principle of corporate 
personality was established merely a hundred years ago by the 
House of Lords in Salomon v. Salomon, (1897) A.C. 22.
2 For example, the German Civil Code of 1900 used the 
notion of "juristic person".
i The concept of legal person appeared in the Soviet 
Civil Code of 1923. Art.11 of the Fundamental Principles of 
Civil Legislation of the USSR and Union Republic (1961) 
stated: "organisations which possess separate property and
non-property rights and bear duties in their own names, and be 
plaintiffs or defendants in court, arbitrazh, or arbitrations 
tribunal shall be juridical persons", "juridical persons shall 
be" "state enterprises and other state organisations" etc. See 
W.E. Butler, The Soviet Legal System -- Legislation and 
Documentation, Ocean Publications Inc, 1978, p.397.
4 For an early and general discussion, see Hu Changqing, 
Zhongguo Minfa Zonqlun (General Discussion on Chinese Civil 
Law), Commercial Press (Beijing) 1933, p.102.
J Adopted by the Financial and Economic Committee under 
the : . ' Administration Council on Sept. 27, 1950. For the
text in Chinese, see Laws and Regulations of the PRC Central 
Government (1949-1950), p.696.
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or deed must be concluded between legal persons represented by 
their responsible persons". Despite this provision, the 
meaning and implications of legal person remained ambiguous as 
no other legislation was available to explain this concept. 
Furthermore, the Provisional Regulations Concerning Private 
Enterprises^ promulgated soon after the Measures, though 
referring to the five types of companies which existed under 
the Company Law (1929) of the Republic of China, did not even 
mention the concept of corporate personality. In fact, apart 
from some academic discussions,7 there is no evidence to 
suggest the continuous use of this term by Chinese authorities 
in the coming years up to the early 1980s . Indeed, for most of 
this period, law was put aside in the PRC. And the concept of 
legal person was attacked as a bourgeois legal concept.
When China started its legal construction efforts in the 
late 1970s, the concept of legal person was soon revived in 
the minds of some Chinese lawyers aware of its importance, 
they began to advocate for the establishment of this concept.8
6 Promulgated on Dec.29, 1950. See the text in Chinese, 
ibid., pp.7 05-11.
7 For example, one book on civil law defined a legal 
person as a "social organisation which is established in 
accordance with legal procedure, which is able to 
independently participate in civil activities in its own name, 
and which can be plaintiff and defendant in court 
proceedings." The term of legal person was described as 
applicable to state enterprises, official organs, 
cooperatives, state-capitalist enterprises and social 
organisations. See Teaching and Research Section of the 
Central School of Political and Legal Cadres, Zhonghua Renmin 
Gonqhequo Minfa Jiben Wenti (Fundamental Issues in the Civil 
Law of the PRC), Law Press 1958, p.68. However, it appears 
that even at that time, academic discussions had to 
distinguish carefully the socialist or capitalist nature of 
legal persons.
8 See Liu Qishan and Bai Youzhong, "Yingdang Queli Faren 
Zhidu" (The Legal Person System Should be Established), RMRB, 
Apr.23, 1981, p. 5; Gao Shuyi, "Faren Zhidu Dui Woguo Shixian 
Sihua de Xianshi Yiyi" (Practical Importance of the Legal 
Person System on Realising Our Four Modernisations), FXYJ, 
No. 4, 1980, pp.15-17; Yu Nengbin and Yang Zhenshan, "Minshi 
Zhuti -- Faren" (Civil Subjects -- Legal Persons), ZGFZB, 
Sept.4, 1981, p.3; also see Chen Kecong, "Zuowei Minshi Zhuti
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In the early 1980s, the fact that the concept of legal person 
was an invention of Western law seemed to restrain some people 
from unconditionally welcoming the adoption of this concept in 
PRC law.9 But this did not turn out to be a critical obstacle 
as many advocates sought to reinforce their argument by 
expressly citing the precedent established in the Soviet civil 
law regarding the legal person institution.10 Indeed, earlier 
discussions among Chinese lawyers showed that they approached 
the legal person concept and its features in a way similar to 
their Soviet counterparts.11
Despite the apparent enthusiasm of academics, support for 
the concept of legal person remained uncertain for several 
years. The Economic Contract Law ("ECL")12 was the first law 
in which "legal person" was formally employed. But this law, 
to a great extent, used the term as a convenient tool for 
defining the contractual capacity of business organisations. 
Like the Measures of 1950, the ECL required that an economic 
contract be concluded only between legal persons.11 Except for 
the fact that enterprises were formally given the capability
Zhi Yi de Faren" (Legal Persons As a Kind of Civil Subjects), 
GMRB, Nov.17, 1981, p.3.
y For a summary of different opinions concerning the 
adoption of the legal person concept, see Wang Baoshu and Cui 
Qingzhi, Jincrii Faxue Yanjiu Zongshu (Summary of Research on 
Economic Law), Tianjin Education Press 1989, pp.72-4.
10 See, for example, Liu and Bai, supra note 8.
11 For example, one commentator attempted to define a 
legal person as "a social organisation which possesses 
organisational structure and independent property, and which 
is able, in its own name, to participate in civil activities, 
to enjoy civil rights and bears civil liabilities, and to 
initiate and to defend legal proceedings in accordance with 
the law". See Yu and Yang, supra note 8. For the Soviet 
definition, see supra note 3. Also compare with supra note 7.
12 Adopted at the Fourth Session of the Sixth National 
People's Congress on Dec.13, 1981.
13 Ibid. Art.1. However, the GPCL does not contain any 
such condition. It is therefore possible for an economic 
contract to be concluded either between individuals or between 
a legal person and an individual. See Art.85 of the GPCL.
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to make contracts, there is little evidence to suggest that 
the legal person concept was used positively to authorise 
enterprises with significant independence and autonomy. 
Furthermore, due to the absence of comprehensive civil 
legislation, the definition and relevant requirements for a 
Chinese legal person were far from clear. In fact, the ECL14 
still tended to use the old "socialist" concept of danwei 
(unit), rather than faren, to refer to various economic 
organisations. This reflected the fact that, at that time, the 
term of "legal person" was not yet familiar to many Chinese 
legislators and lawyers. Indeed, the unpopularity of the 
concept of legal person was confirmed by the fact that neither 
the Civil Procedure Law (For Trial Implementation)1’ nor the 
1982 Constitution employed this concept. Instead, the 
Constitution employed terms such as "social groups", 
"enterprises and non-business organisations" to describe 
various entities,10 even though many of these entities would 
have qualified as "legal persons".
B. State enterprise reform and legal person system
In the early 1980s, the significance of the notion of 
legal personality for the economic reforms, especially for 
state enterprise reform, had not been fully grasped. For 
example, some of the published discussions described the 
primary purpose of adopting the faren concept as being control 
of the activities of various organisations in the new 
situation of increasing economic exchanges.17 Nevertheless, 
while one of the advantages for acquiring the faren status by 
collective enterprises was described as "enabling them to 
defend their legal rights and interests from government
14 For example, Art s. 4 and 5.
i:' Adopted on Mar. 8, 1982 and effective from Oct.l, 1982. 
This Law has been replaced by the Civil Procedure Law of 1991.
lf' For example, Art. 5 .
17 Liu and Bai, supra note 8.
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intervent ion1 ,1H other discussions began to realise that the
legal person system could be employed to help promote the
autonomy of state enterprises.19
By the mid-1980s, it was agreed among most Chinese
lawyers that the faren concept could be used for promoting
China's socialist modernisation^0 This was recognised in the
legislation which began to take constructive moves towards
establishing the faren system. On April 1, 1983, the State
Council issued the Provisional Regulations Concerning State
Industrial Enterprises {hereinafter "Enterprise
Regulations")21 which provided:
[State industrial] enterprises are legal persons of which 
directors are the representatives. Enterprises shall 
exercise, in accordance with the law, the right to 
possess, use, and dispose of the state assets which the 
state authorises them to operate and manage, shall 
independently engage in production and operation, shall 
bear the responsibility to which the state prescribes, 
and shall independently initiate and defend court 
proceedings .22
Therefore, the Enterprise Regulations not only recognised the 
legal person status of state enterprises, but also actually 
set out the privileges and consequences of enterprises as 
legal persons. In fact, until the promulgation of the GPCL, 
these consequences were widely regarded as basic requirements 
for a legal person in China.
The emergence of the faren concept in the early 1980s was 
partly due to the unprecedented drive to build a sound legal 
system in the PRC. However, more fundamentally, the promotion 
of the faren system reflected China's pressing need to speed 
up its economic reforms. In the beginning of the reforms, the 
Chinese leadership was concerned with finding suitable ways to
18 Ibid.
19 See Gao, supra note 8.
20 See Wang and Cui, supra note 9, p. 73.
21 For the text in Chinese, see Laws and Regulations of 
the PRC (1983), pp.383-99.
22 Art. 8 . Ibid.
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invigorate state enterprises. In this respect, legal scholars, 
like other professionals, were required to make contributions. 
One of their immediate reactions was to adopt the faren 
concept. Thus, in one authoritative textbook on civil law 
published in 1983,23 a faren was defined as "a form of social 
organisation that has self-operated property, and that can 
independently enjoy civil law rights and assume civil law 
duties".24 After explaining the roles played by the legal 
person institution in capitalist societies, this book 
continued to illustrate several potential functions of the 
faren concept in the Chinese socialist legal system. One of 
these functions was that this concept could be used as "a 
legal device to increase the vitality of enterprises".25 
Although state enterprises were not particularly singled out 
for this purpose, the independence of legal persons was 
stressed and was implied to be applicable to all types of 
enterprises, including state enterprises.26
Prior to the economic reforms, state enterprises were 
tightly controlled by the government. Every state enterprise, 
from its sources of materials to its production and 
distribution of products, from the appointment of its 
directors and managers to the arrangement of workers, had to 
follow strict state plans as well as government orders. 
Enterprises had little autonomy in making decisions regarding 
their own important matters. As a result, state enterprises 
were hardly concerned with making profits or suffering losses, 
because the government, as the owner, would bear all 
liabilities for their losses. It was obvious that state 
enterprises, being the "appendages" (fushuwu) of
23 Tong Rou and others, Minfa Yuanli (Civil Law Basic 
Principles), Law Press 1983, p.51. For an English translation 
of the 2nd edn. (1987) of this book, see, W. C. Jones (ed.), 
Basic Principles of Civil Law in China, M.E.Sharpe, Inc. 
1989, pp.61-78.
24 See Basic Principles of Civil Law in China, ibid, p. 65.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
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administrative authorities, had no freedom from government 
manipulation. This even constituted a significant contrast 
with the situation in the Soviet Union where state 
enterprises, as legal persons, could enjoy a great degree of 
autonomy and also were accountable for their own 
liabilities .21
The post-Mao reforms have attempted to confer upon
enterprises relative independence and to enhance the role of
material incentives to enterprises. Thus, the idea of
employing the faren concept to grant legal personality to
state enterprises was seen as a positive step and soon
accepted by the Chinese leadership. In 1984, the Central
Committee of the Communist Party adopted the Decision
Concerning Reforms of the Economic System {hereinafter "the
Party's Decision") which has been regarded as the most
important milestone in China's post-Mao urban economic
reforms. The Party's Decision expressly listed one of the
objectives of urban economic reforms as:
to make every enterprise become a truly relatively 
independent economic entity, and become a socialist 
commodity producer and manager which runs itself and 
assumes sole responsibility for its profits and losses, 
and has the capacity of reforming and developing itself, 
and becomes a legal person that enjoys its own rights and 
performs its own duties.28
Less than two years after this official recognition, the 
GPCL was adopted to provide detailed treatment for the faren 
concept. Article 36 of the GPCL states that a legal person 
shall be an organization that has capacity for civil rights 
and capacity for civil conducts and independently enjoys civil 
rights and assumes civil obligations in accordance with the 
law. This definition of the faren concept, though found in
27 In the Soviet Union, the policy towards state 
enterprises was partly based on the material incentives given 
to enterprises. For example, state enterprises could retain 
certain amount of their profits. But such material incentives 
were, except for a few years in the 1950s, not favoured by the 
Chinese authorities. For a discussion, see Chapter Five below.
28 RMRB, Oct.21, 1984, p.4.
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many academic discussions in the early 1980s, clearly 
reflected the perception held by the Chinese policy-makers of 
the faren concept. Without economic reforms, the faren concept 
would not have emerged so quickly in China. Although it was 
critical for China to accept the legal person concept as a 
prerequisite for the adoption of a comprehensive civil law, 
the acceptance of the legal person concept would have been 
neither possible nor meaningful if it had not been applied to 
state enterprises -- the dominant operators in the socialist 
economy of the PRC. In this context, the state policy to grant 
corporate personality to state enterprises played a decisive 
role in the reception of the legal person concept in Chinese 
civil law.
From the above description, it can be seen that the 
concept of legal personality was developed to a great extent 
in connection with state enterprises. Nevertheless, since this 
concept has appeared in the GPCL -- the basic document in the 
civil law area, it has had a broader application. In addition 
to state enterprises, other properly qualified enterprises are 
also eligible to become legal persons. These include 
collective enterprises,2'1 foreign investment enterprises,30 
and even some private enterprises.31 Moreover, government 
offices, institutions, and social organisations may also 
obtain legal person status in Chinese law.32
C. Requirements for a legal person
The GPCL states the legal requirements for a legal person
20 Art. 41, par . 1, GPCL.
U1 Art. 41, par. 2, GPCL.
31 Art.9, PRC Provisional Regulations Concerning Private 
Enterprises, adopted by the State Council on Jun.3, 1988.
Among the three types of private enterprises (sole trader, 
partnership, limited liability companies, only limited
liability companies are eligible to acquire the legal person 
status.
32 Art . 50 , GPCL .
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as :
(i) establishment in accordance with the law;
(ii) possession of the necessary property or funds;
(iii) possession of its own name, organization and 
premises, and
(iv) ability to independently bear civil liability.33
These four requirements must be satisfied before an enterprise 
or organisation qualifies as a legal person.34 Indeed, except 
for a few variations and certain stricter requirements, state 
enterprises are treated in the same manner as other types of 
enterprises, including collective enterprises and foreign 
investment enterprises.
1. Establishment in accordance with the law 
Unlike many government agencies which are set up in 
accordance with administrative orders, enterprises must be 
established through registration "in accordance with the law" . 
In this respect, many detailed legal rules are emerging.
In an attempt to unify the registration requirements of 
all enterprise legal persons, on June 3, 1988, the State
Council adopted the Regulations on the Administration of 
Enterprise Legal Persons' Registration ("Registration 
Regulations") . ir‘ Subsequently, on November 3, 1988, the State 
Administration Bureau for Industry and Commerce ("SABIC") 
promulgated the Implementing Rules for the Administration of
33 Art . 37 .
34 These requirements, however, were stated differently 
in the drafts prior to the GPCL. See Henry R. Zheng, "China's 
New Civil Law", in 34 American Journal of Comparative Law, 
1986, pp.669-704, at 678.
3'’ See the text in Bulletin of the State Council, June 
No.13, Jun.25, 1988, pp.420-26. Translated in 2 China Law and 
Practice, No.7, 1988, pp.33-41. The Registration Regulations
replaced the Measures Concerning the Administration of Sino- 
Foreign Equity Joint Ventures (adopted Jul.26, 1980),
Regulations Concerning the Administration of Registration of 
Industrial and Commercial Enterprises (adopted Aug.9, 1982), 
and the Interim Provisions Concerning the Administration of 
Registration of Companies (adopted by the State Council on 
Aug.14, 19 85 and promulgated by the SABIC on Aug.25, 1985) .
See Art.39, Registration Regulations.
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Enterprise Legal Person Registration Regulations 
("Registration Rules") . 3,1
According to the Registration Regulations and the 
Registration Rules, the Administrative Bureaux for Industry 
and Commerce ("ABIC") are authorized to charge enterprise 
registration.37 Generally speaking, the ABIC exists at four 
levels: state, province (including autonomous region and
centrally governed municipality), city, and county (or city 
district). The ABIC shall independently exercise their powers 
according to the principle of administering registration at 
different levels.18 Thus, the ABIC at the national level, that 
is the SABIC, is responsible for the administration of 
registration of the following enterprises: national companies 
and large-sized enterprises which are established upon 
approval by the State Council or a scientific and 
technological society upon examination and approval by the 
department in charge of their particular trade; large 
conglomerates which are established upon approval by the State 
Council or upon examination and approval by a department 
authorised by the State Council; and enterprises engaged in 
import, labour export, or contracting for foreign engineering 
projects which are established by any of the departments under 
the State Council upon examination and approval by a 
department authorised by the State Council.39 The ABIC at 
provincial level is responsible for administering the 
registration of companies and enterprises which are similar to 
these listed above but which are examined and approved under
30 See the English translation in 3 China Law and 
Practice, No.3, 1989, pp.29-53.
37 Art.4, Registration Regulations; Art.7, Registration 
Rules.
18 Art.7, Registration Rules. But foreign investment 
enterprises are in principle registered with the SABIC and
local ABIC authorised by the SABIC to register enterprises. 
See Art.5, Registration Regulations; Art.7, Registration 
Rules.
39 Art. 8 , Registration Rules.
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the power and jurisdiction of the provincial authority, and 
those enterprises or branches of which has been delegated by 
the SABIC to the provincial ABIC.40 All other enterprises and 
companies shall be registered with the ABIC at the level of 
city or county (district) .41
Basically, enterprise legal person registration involves 
three types of registration: business registration, alteration 
registration, and cancellation registration. In addition, some 
enterprises which need capital construction for a period of 
more than one year before establishment shall apply for 
preparation registration.43
According to the SEL, before an enterprise can be formed, 
an application must be filed for approval with the government 
or a government department in charge in accordance with the 
law and the State Council regulations.41 Thus, government 
approval is a prerequisite for the establishment of state 
enterprises. The contents of the application for such approval 
may range from the articles of association to the registered 
capital and even the nomination of the legal representatives 
of the proposed enterprises. Furthermore, the SEL lays down 
the conditions which must be satisfied for the establishment 
of an enterprise. These conditions include: products which are 
needed by the public; recurring supplies of production 
necessities such as energy, raw materials and transport 
facilities; its own name and premises for production and 
operation; its own organisational structure; definite scope of 
business; and "other conditions as required by legislation".44
40 Art. 9 , ibid.
41 Art . 10 , ibid .
42 Art.36, Registration Regulations; Art.60, Registration 
Rules .
43 Art . 16 .
44 Art . 17 .
Ill
2. Possession of its own name, organization, and premises
Every legal person must have its location of operation, 
its own name, and organization. In this respect, relevant laws 
and regulations have made many persuasive as well as 
prohibitive provisions. The term "premises" usually refers to 
the places suitable for the operation of enterprises. As for 
the names of enterprise legal persons, the Provisions 
Concerning the Administration of Registration of Enterprise 
Names have been promulgated by the SABIC.45 According to these 
Provisions, the ABIC at all levels are the authorities in 
charge of the registration of enterprise names.46 The name of 
an enterprise shall be preceded by the name of the 
administrative region in which the enterprise is located.47 
Moreover, in the absence of satisfactory reasons, the name of 
an enterprise should not be altered within a year of 
registration.48 In addition, the name of an enterprise may be 
transferred with the whole or part of the enterprise.49
The organizational requirement is met if enterprises 
which apply for registration have a number of workers and 
staff which is commensurate with the scale of production and 
business and business operation. No enterprise is permitted to 
be operated with less than eight full-time workers and 
staff.50 In addition, all enterprises are required to possess
45 Adopted by the State Council on May 6, 1991, and
promulgated by the SABIC on Jul. 22, 1991. For the text in
Chinese, see XHYB, No.8, 1991, pp.85-7. These Provisions
replaced the Interim Provisions Concerning the Administration 
of Registration of Names of Industrial and Commercial 
Enterprises, adopted by the State Council on May 23, 1985 and 
promulgated by the SABIC on Jun.15, 1985.
46 Art. 4 .
47 Art.7. There are exceptions for brand name enterprises, 
foreign investment enterprises, national companies, and some 
other enterprises covered by Art.13.
4K Art. 22, ibid .
49 Art. 23, ibid.
50 See Art.15 (5), Registration Rules.
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necessary business premises and facilities which are 
appropriate to the scope of business of such enterprises.51
3. Possession of necessary property and funds
Possession of necessary property or funds is a basic
requirement for the operation of all legal persons. Enterprise 
legal persons must possess an amount of registered capital 
which conforms to the prescribed amount and which is 
appropriate to the scope of business of such enterprises. For 
example, the registered capital of production companies may 
not be less than 300,000 Yuan; the registered capital of 
commercial companies which are mainly engaged in wholesaling 
may not be less than 500,000 Yuan; the registered companies 
which are mainly engaged in retailing may not be less than 
300,000 Yuan; the registered capital of consultancy companies 
may not be less than 100,000 Yuan; and the registered capital 
of other enterprises with legal person status may not be less 
than 30,000 Yuan. Where there are special state regulations 
concerning the amount of registered capital of an enterprise, 
such regulations shall be implemented.52
4. Independent liability
The GPCL employs the concept of "independent liability" 
to describe the liability feature of all Chinese legal 
persons. However, within Chinese legal circles, there is 
considerable confusion over the meaning of this term. In 
particular, this term has been misunderstood by some as an 
equivalent to "limited liability".53 In fact, "independent
51 See Art.15 (4), Registration Rules.
52 See Art .15 (7) , ibid.
50 An example can be found in the Regulations Concerning 
Foreign-Related Companies in the Special Economic Zones of the 
Guangdong Province (adopted on Sept.28, 1986, effective from
Jan.l, 1987). While Art.3, par.2 of the Regulations assumes 
that "all foreign-related companies in the Special Economic 
Zones are limited liability companies", Art.149 seems to 
impose unlimited liability on partners of cooperative joint
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liability" and "limited liability" differ in their meanings 
and substances.54 Fundamentally, "independent liability" is 
reserved for legal persons, whereas "limited liability" is 
meant for shareholders of companies. For example, an unlimited 
company as legal person bears "independent liability", but its 
shareholders have to face unlimited liability.55 Moreover, to 
hold that a company (legal person) bears limited liability is 
not only against the law,56 but also detrimental to the 
interests of the shareholders.57
In an attempt to clarify the meaning of "independent 
liability", the GPCL defines the scope of civil liability for 
several types of enterprise legal persons.58 Therefore,
ventures. For a brief discussion, see Edward J. Epstein, 
"China and Hong Kong: Law, Ideology and the Future Interaction 
of the Legal Systems", in Raymons Wacks (ed.), The Future of 
the Law in Hong Kong, Oxford University Press 1989, pp.37-75, 
at 73. Here if Art. 2 had been expressed as "all foreign- 
related companies... are companies assuming independent 
liability", then there would not have been such conceptual 
confusion.
54 See Farrar's Company Law, Butterworths 1988, pp.67-8.
55 Unlimited company does not yet exist in the PRC. 
Nevertheless, one standard textbook on company law, which 
recommends the recognition of this type of company in future 
PRC company legislation, states that "an unlimited liability 
company must also independently bear civil liability. What 
distinguishes unlimited companies is that unlimited liability 
shareholders themselves have to bear liability if the company 
cannot meet its liability in full with its own property." See 
Jiang Ping (ed.), Gongsifa Jiaocheng (Textbook on Company 
Law), Law Press 1987, p.25.
56 See Art.48, GPCL. Also see Art.106 of the Implementing 
Regulations of the Law on Equity Joint Venture, which states 
that an equity joint venture shall be liable with "all its 
assets".
57 See Boyle and Bird's Company Law, Jordans 1987, at 49 
("It is wrong to insert, as has been done, 'The Liability of 
the Company is Limited'. Such a variation, if passed by the 
Registrar, might produce results disastrous to the members."). 
Compare with the misleading expression that "a legal person 
has limited liability", in Zheng, China's Civil and Commercial 
Law, Butterworths 1988, p.310 .
58 See Art. 48, GPCL.
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collective enterprises and foreign investment enterprises 
which qualify as legal persons are responsible to the extent 
of all the property which they own. But in the case of state 
enterprises, the extent of their civil liability is the 
property which the state has authorised them to manage and 
administer. As such, despite the fact that the state is the 
sole owner of state enterprises, the state is no longer 
responsible for the debts of the latter. This limitation of 
the state's liability contrasts greatly with the situation 
before the economic reforms when the state actually bore 
unlimited liability for the activities of state enterprises.
The concept of independent liability is also significant 
in that organisations which do not have legal personality are 
ineligible to bear independent liability. For example, as 
indicated earlier, not all cooperative joint ventures may 
qualify as Chinese legal persons. For those that are not legal 
persons, liability has to be determined in accordance with 
relevant contracts or general law governing partnerships.59
The notion of independent liability has paved the way for 
the development of enterprise bankruptcy in Chinese law. For 
many years after 1949, the concept of bankruptcy was not 
applicable in the PRC. But just a few months after the 
adoption of the GPCL, the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (EBL) was 
promulgated for future application to state enterprises.60 
Furthermore, the newly-adopted Civil Procedure Law (1991) 
contains a chapter (Chapter Nineteen) regarding the 
"Procedures for the Repayment of Debts Owed by Bankrupt 
Enterprise Legal Persons". Although this chapter only consists 
of eight articles'"1 which contain provisions similar to those
59 The GPCL only makes stipulations concerning partnership 
between natural persons (see Arts.30-35). Therefore the 
partnership between enterprises may have to be decided by
reference to the rules concerning "economic associations 1 (see 
Arts.52-3, GPCL).
f,u Adopted on Dec . 2 , 1986 and effective from Nov.l, 1988.
For an analysis of this Law, see Chapter Eight below.
61 Arts . 193-198 .
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stipulated by the EBL,'’" it is applicable to all enterprises 
possessing legal personality other than state enterprises. The 
latter are still under the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
EBL.63
5. Summary
An examination of the four legal requirements of a legal 
person in the context of Chinese law must be approached in 
broad terms. On the one hand, the requirements for a legal 
person as prescribed in the GPCL actually differ from those of 
academic discussion in the early 1980s and indeed even from 
earlier GPCL drafts. For example, before the adoption of the 
GPCL, one of the widely mentioned characteristics was a legal 
person's ability to conduct activities, sue, and be sued in 
its own name. The GPCL dropped this element. And the recent 
Chinese legal practice has shown that a non-legal person 
organisation may also use its own name on various occasions, 
including initiating and defending court proceedings.64
A straigtforward explanation of the requirements of legal 
personality in the PRC, however, does not necessarily reveal 
the distinguishing and fundamental characteristics of state 
enterprises as legal persons. This is mainly because these 
requirements are meant for all legal persons, rather than 
state enterprises as a special type of legal person. An 
accurate appreciation of the features of state enterprises as
For example, apart from the absence of "due to poor 
management", the test for enterprise bankruptcy as adopted in 
the Civil Procedure Law (Art.199) is similar to that provided 
in the EBL (Art.3). In addition, the order for the repayment 
of debts as provided in the Civil Procedure Law (Art.204) is 
the same as that provided in the EBL (Art.37).
hi See Art.206, Civil Procedure Law (1991) .
64 For example, a workshop which does not have legal 
personality may rely on a Chengbao contract (discussed in 
Chapter Nine below) and bring legal action against the factory 
of which it is a workshop. For a discussion, see Gu Peidong, 
"Zhongguo Xianshi Jingji Chongtu Ji Qi Susong Jizhi de 
Wanshan" (Conflicts of Current Economic Interests and the 
Perfection of Litigation Mechanism in China), Zhongguo Shehui 
Kexue (Social Sciences in China), No.4, 1990, pp.211-23.
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legal persons, therefore, requires detailed exploration of the 
functions and difficulties existing in the application of this 
notion to state enterprises. In particular, the difficulty in 
defining property rights and other profound implications of 
legal personality have to be further examined in order to show 
the nature and limits of state enterprises as legal persons in 
Chinese law.
XX. Property Rights of State Enterprises as Legal Persons
A. Difficulties in defining property rights for state 
enterprises
As noted earlier, the amounts of the capital needed for 
the purpose of business registration are the same for all 
enterprises of the same industry. However, a notable 
distinction exists in the nature of property rights. A judge 
in the West can conclude without any hesitation that "the 
capital is the property of the corporation".05 Moreover, it 
is well-known in the West that the property of a company 
differs from the property of its members and that the company 
is the sole legal owner of its property.'’0
In the PRC, the issue of the property ownership is 
particularly sensitive and controversial.67 In particular, the 
public ownership has always been regarded as the very basis of 
the socialist system. Before the post-Mao programme of 
economic reforms, the state as the owner, represented by 
government departments, directly managed every state
6' See for example, per Lord Wrenbury, in Brandery v 
English Sewing Cotton Co. Ltd (1923) A.C. 744, p.767.
66 See Henn and Alexander, Laws of Corporations, West 
Publishing Co., 3rd edn., 1983, p.146.
67 For a general discussion, see Howard Chao and Yang 
Xiaoping, "The Reform of the Chinese System of Enterprise 
Ownership", in Stanford Journal of International Law, Vol.23, 
1987, pp. 365-97. Also see Wang Liming and Liu Zhaonian, "On 
the Property Rights System of the State Enterprises in China", 
in Law and Contemporary Problems, Summer 1989, pp.19-42,
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enterprise. In the wake of economic reforms, such practice was 
condemned as ineffective and was to be abandoned. However, in 
establishing a legal person system, the issue of property 
ownership has not been properly treated.
At the beginning of the reforms, Chinese economists and 
lawyers presented many theories concerning the property rights 
of state enterprises.08 But basically, ehose theories can be 
divided into two categories. One was concerned with the 
conferment upon state enterprises of the "property ownership 
rights" (caichan suoyouauan). Within this theoretical 
category, there existed two different approaches. The radical 
approach advocated that enterprises should possess complete 
ownership rights in respect of their property.09 However, this 
approach seemed to be rather unpopular,70 because there were 
worries that it might cause ideological confusion by 
undermining the public ownership. Another approach, which 
seemed to be less radical, advocated the authorization with 
state enterprises with "relative ownership rights" (xianqdui 
suoyouquan),71 This approach, though encouraging state 
enterprises to gain certain property rights in the property 
with which they operated, did emphasize the importance of 
keeping the state as the ultimate legal owner of state 
enterprises. Therefore, a two-tier system was to be applied.
However different these approaches were, the idea of
08 For a summary, see Wang and Cui, supra note 9. Also see 
the comments 011 various theories in Jiang Ping and others, 
"Guojia Yu Guoying Qiye Zhijian de Caichan Guanxi Ying Shi 
Suoyouzhe Yu Zhanyouzhe de Guanxi" (The Relationship Between 
the State and State Enterprises Should Be the Relationship 
Between the Owner and the Occupiers), in FXYJ, No.4, 1980,
pp.6-11.
09 See Jiang and others, ibid, pp. 74-5.
70 Some articles advocating this approach did find their 
way into appearing in the Chinese press. See the discussion in 
Wang and Liu, supra note 67, pp.31-2.
71 See Liang Huixing, "Lun Qiye Faren Yu Qiye Faren 
Suoyouquan" (On Enterprise Legal Person and its Ownership 
Right), FXYJ, No.1, 1981, pp.26-31. Also see Wang and Liu, 
supra note 67.
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granting state enterprises property ownership rights 
thereby undermining the concept of public ownership -- proved 
to be totally unacceptable to the Chinese authorities. Indeed, 
bearing in mind the overriding importance of the state 
ownership, many scholars attempted to look for compromise. On 
the one hand, state enterprises should be able to possess 
certain property rights. On the other hand, the state 
ownership had to be carefully preserved.
Such compromise was expressed in many different ideas. 
One theory7^ pointed out that the state should remain the sole 
and ultimate owner of the property of state enterprises, but
that state enterprises should be defined as the  1
(zhanyouzhe) of these properties. According to this theory, 
the state ownership was the material basis by which the state 
ultimately controlled the means of production, while
enterprises should be able to rely on "the right to ■__
(zhanvouquan), which derived from the ownership right, to 
pursue their self-management and their own independent 
interests .7i
Another theory, which has been more influential, centres 
on the management rights of enterprises. At first, this right 
was entitled "the right to manage and administer" (iingying 
guanli quan) -- a term borrowed from Soviet legislation.74 
Although use of this term in the late 1970s75 and early 1980s
12 See Jiang and others, supra note 68.
7~ Ibid, p . 8 .
74 This term was first suggested by a Soviet jurist, 
Wynijilatov, in the 1940s, and was then adopted into Soviet 
civil legislations in the 1960s. This term was later accepted 
by many eastern European countries, including Hungary and 
Checkslovakia. See Wang and Liu, supra note 67, p.28.
75 One of the earliest use of this term was in "Some 
Provisions Concerning Expanding State Industrial Enterprises' 
Autonomous Right to Manage and Administer", promulgated by the 
State Council on Jul.'13, 1979. See the text in Chinese, in 
Laws and Regulations of the PRC (1979), pp.249-52.
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met with criticism,10 it was nevertheless favoured by the 
government of the PRC for several reasons. First, this term 
was seen by many as being able to give enterprises sufficient 
legal rights to defend their independence and interests. 
Secondly, this term was more acceptable to economists. At 
least, this term appeared to be more comprehensible to 
economists than "the right to occupy", which was seen by many 
as a pure legal term. Thirdly, and most significantly, since 
this term did not affect the state ownership, it was 
acceptable to the Chinese authorities.
B. Management rights of state enterprises
Towards the mid-1980s, the rights of state enterprises to
manage and administer state property were gradually recognised
in Chinese legislation. The GPCL (1986) provides that state
enterprises shall lawfully enjoy the right of management over
the property that the state has authorised them to manage and
administer, and their rights shall be protected by law.77 The
SEL (1988) also contains a similar provision:
the property of a state enterprise is owned by the whole 
people, the state authorises the enterprise to manage 
according to the principle of the separation of ownership 
from management.78
The denial of property ownership rights to state 
enterprises has been justified by the wording of the GPCL 
regarding the legal requirements of a faren, which simply
7(1 See Jiang and others, supra note 68, p. 6. The main 
points of their criticism were: first, the term "administer" 
(quanli) was likely to be misunderstood as an administrative 
function; secondly, the right to manage and administer was not 
an independent right. Nor did it reflect the independent 
interests of enterprises; thirdly, "manage and administer" was 
an economic term, and not a legal term; finally, "manage and 
administer" was not only the right of enterprises, but the 
duty of enterprises.
77 Art . 82 .
78 Art. 2 .
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employs "necessary" (biyao de) , rather than "own" (suoyou 
de) .79 In other words, to be a Chinese legal person, a state 
enterprise does not have to own property. Instead, it is 
sufficient for it to have the right to manage certain 
property.
The denial of property ownership rights to state 
enterprises as legal persons contrasts with the legal 
treatment of the property rights of other enterprises. Let us 
take Sino-foreign joint ventures as an example. Direct foreign 
investment has been possible in China since 1979. At first, 
the Law on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures, apart from 
providing that a joint venture should take the form of a 
limited liability company,80 did not directly touch on the 
issue of property rights. However, some Chinese scholars 
quickly pointed out that the provision regarding this 
particular form of joint ventures implied that the property of 
these enterprises was owned by enterprises as legal persons.81 
They also argued that, since joint ventures which had received 
capital and other forms of property contribution by the state 
could enjoy ownership rights, and since collective enterprises 
as legal persons were eligible to possess property ownership 
rights, state enterprises as legal persons should have 
ownership rights in their property.8^
This view, however, was firmly rejected by the Chinese 
leadership. As a result, a demarcation has been made in the 
respect of property rights of different legal persons. On the 
one hand, the GPCL provides that foreign investment 
enterprises, together with collective enterprises, if 
qualified as legal persons, shall have rights of ownership in
79 Art . 37 .
80 Art . 8 .
81 See Liang Huixing, "Lun Qiye Faren Yu Qiye Faren 
Suoyouquan" (On Enterprise Legal Persons and the Ownership 
Rights of Legal Persons), in FXYJ, No.1, 1981, pp.26-31, at
30 .
8" Ibid.
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their property and funds.83 On the other hand, despite their 
possession of legal personality, state enterprises cannot 
enjoy property ownership rights. Instead, they are only 
granted rights of management.
What, then, is the "right to manage" (j inqyinqquan) ? It 
seems that this concept, though extensively discussed, is 
unclear both in theory and in practice. First, according to 
some scholars, the term of "management rights" specifically 
refers to granting state enterprises with sufficient rights to 
manage the property by resisting excessive state intervention. 
In particular, the late Professor Tong Rou, the chief founder 
of contemporary Chinese civil law, is quoted as suggesting 
that the term "management rights" has been deliberately used 
in Chinese legislation to replace that of "the right of 
management and administration".84 It is further explained that 
"management rights" may avoid negative implications of the 
term "rights of management and administration" which involved 
both the administrative functions of state enterprises and the 
unequal relations between state enterprises and government 
departments. This argument seems to be theoretically sound 
because, unlike government departments which are 
"administering" state property, state enterprises are merely 
"managing" their property. However, in practice, the 
distinction between these two terms tends to blur. These two 
terms are often used together, they are found in close 
association in many laws, including the GPCL8r> and the SEL.88 
It follows that if these two terms were incompatible, it would 
be unthinkable for an enterprise to simply "manage" the
83 Art. 48 of the GPCL. However, according to Art. 2 of the 
Sino-Foreign Cooperative Joint Venture Law, promulgated on 
April 13, 1988, not all cooperative joint ventures are 
eligible to become legal persons.
84 See Shi Jichun, "Tong Rou Xianshen de Jingyingquan
Sixiang" (The Right to Manage in the Mind of Professor Tong
Rou), in FZRB, Mar.4, 1991, p.3.
** Art . 82 .
88 Art . 2 , pars .2 & 3 .
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property with which the state has expressly authorised it to 
"manage and administer".
Secondly, in regard to the nature of "management rights", 
many scholars agree that such rights are "real rights" 
(wuquan), not "obligatory rights" (zhaiquan) or contractual 
obligations.87 In other words, the rights of management are 
granted to state enterprises by law, not by special agreements 
between state enterprises and government authorities. By 
holding the rights of management, state enterprises are 
entitled to resist illegal and excessive interventions from 
any "outsiders", including government authorities.
Thirdly, the nature of the contents of management rights 
is controversial. The SEL provides that "enterprises have 
rights of possession, use, and disposal in accordance with the 
law" in regard to state property.88 The rights to possess and 
to use the property are the same as those inherited in the 
ownership. H') However, compared with ownership rights, 
management rights do not contain the right to "benefit"
(shouyi) from the property. Moreover, the right to dispose of 
property, as defined in the right to management, is especially 
qualified by the wording "in accordance with the law".90 This 
restriction reflects the official concern over the 
authorization of management rights to state enterprises. By 
denying the right to profits, the law allows great government
87 See for example Tong Rou and Shi Jichun, "Woguo Quanmin 
Suoyouzhi 'Liangquan Fenli' de Caichanquan Jiegou" (The 
Property Right Structure Represented by the Separation of 
Ownership from Management in Our State Enterprises), in 
Zhongguo Shehui Kexue (Social Sciences in China), No.3, 1990, 
pp.159-74.
88 Art . 2 .
89 According to Art.71 of the GPCL, ownership means an 
owner's rights in accordance with law to possess, use, benefit 
from, and dispose of his own property.
90 Art. 71 of the GPCL (quoted in ibid. ) requires that each 
ownership right be exercised "in accordance with law", in the 
case of "management rights", but the SEL only attaches this 
requirement to 1 the right to disposal of property". Thus, the 
requirement does convey special message in this context.
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control over enterprises' right of the disposal of state 
property.91
Thus, according to the SEL, the absence of a right to
benefit and the special qualification imposed on the right to
dispose of property appear to be the crucial aspects where the
management rights differ from ownership rights. Nevertheless,
in practice, the contents of management rights are uncertain.
Even Professor Tong admitted that in the absence of detailed
legislative interpretation, management rights have been
understood quite differently. In his view,
Management rights are the rights that state enterprises 
have, within the limits of state authorization, to 
possess, use, benefit, and to dispose of state property. 
State enterprises represent the state in exercising the 
rights of ownership in their civil activities with non­
state enterprises. Management rights are not ownership 
rights, but they include all the rights which are 
essential for a commodity producer and manager.92
Thus, "management rights" in the view of Tong are a
broader concept than the "management rights" provided in the
SEL. As will be shown in Chapter Four, the contents of
"management rights" is variable, depending on relevant legal
provisions and state policies.
III. Constitutional Issues of State Enterprise Legal Persons
A. Business capacity
As noted earlier, in 1984, the Party's Decision set one
91 For a discussion on this right, see Chapter Four.
92 See the extract of the speech made by Professor Tong
Rou in the Seminar on China's Legal Reforms held in early
1989, as reported in FXYJ, No. 2, 1989, p.28. In order to
clarify the meaning of the term "management rights", Professor 
Tong further suggested that the state ownership rights in 
state enterprises should be defined as to include four 
aspects: deciding on the closing down, suspension of
operation, amalgamation with another enterprise, and change to 
the manufacture of other products; assigning compulsory plans 
without affecting enterprises' economic interests; collection 
of enterprises' net profits; and approving the legal
representatives of enterprises.
124
of the most important aims of economic reforms as to transform 
state enterprises into independent commodity producers. Prior 
to the post-Mao economic reforms, state enterprises did not 
have any important independent decision-making powers. But 
since the beginning of the programme of economic reforms, they 
have been given more powers so they can now engage in many 
activities which are not covered by state plans.93 As a
result, the issue of business capacity has become an urgent 
problem.
As indicated earlier, the business scope of state 
enterprises must be approved by relevant government or
government departments and then registered with the ABIC at an 
appropriate level.94 The notion of "business scope", or 
jingying fanwei, may embrace two different but connected
contents: "business item" (jingying xianqmu) and "business
pattern" (jingying fangshi). As for industrial enterprises, 
the registration of business scope usually means that of
business items. But for commercial enterprises and some other 
enterprises such as those engaged in public catering, material 
supply and sale, storage, and local services, the registration 
of the business scope must, in addition to business items, 
identify "business patterns" which may take one of many forms 
such as wholesaling, retailing, supplying, importing, and 
exporting .9~’
In many western jurisdictions, the business objectives 
may be exclusively decided by the promoters and shareholders 
of companies. But in the PRC, the ABICs, as the registration 
authority, are required by law to impose strict rules in 
examining and approving the registration of business scope of 
all enterprises. Among all basic principles which must be
93 See the discussion in Chapter Four of the thesis.
94 SEL, Art. 16.
95 See "Qiye Jingying Fanwei Heding Guifan" (Standards for 
Approving Enterprises' Business Scopes, promulgated by the 
Enterprise Registration Section, SABIC, in May 1987), in 
Jingji Shenpan Shouce (Handbook for Economic Adjudication), 
Vol.4, People's Court Press (Beijing), 1988, pp.81-251.
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followed by the ABICs in approving enterprises registration, 
the ABICs must be prepared to examine the business scope in 
terms of capital, premise, equipments, staffing of the 
applicant enterprises, and enterprises' ability to bear 
economic liability. In examining the application for 
business registration, the state business policy is a very 
important factor which the ABICs must consider. Both the 
Registration Regulations and the Registration Rules emphasize 
the role of the state policy as supplementary to formal laws 
and regulations of the state.97 This implies that an 
enterprise whose business objectives are not considered to be 
consistent with state policy of the time may have its 
application for registration rejected. Furthermore, as a rule, 
an enterprise can only pursue one business as its main 
objective, though it may concurrently engage in other 
businesses as well." But in any case, both the main objective 
and other businesses must be specified in clear term. Because 
the state intends to use the business scope to control the 
activities of enterprises, an enterprise whose objects are not 
clearly detailed is unlikely to be approved for registration. 
Nor is it easy for any party to persuade the ABIC or the court 
to adopt the liberal attitude in interpreting the provisions 
concerning the business scope in case of disputes."
In PRC law, the business scope has a wide range of legal 
implications. According to official explanations, the business 
scope approved by the ABIC represents an enterprise legal
96 Ibid. p. 82 .
97 Art.7, Registration Regulations; Art.15(8), 
Registration Rules.
98 See supra note 102, p. 82.
" Some Chinese scholars favour an approach which holds 
that, with certain qualifications, enterprises' business scope 
should be loosely interpreted to include all the "items which 
are necessary to carry out the objects as provided in the 
approved articles of association of enterprises and in the 
approved business scope." See Wang Baoshu and Cui Qingzhi, 
Oiyefa Lun (Enterprise Law), Workers' Press 1988, pp.117-18.
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person's capacity for civil rights and civil conduct.100 
Moreover, it also reflects both the management right enjoyed 
by the enterprise and the duty borne by the enterprise not to 
operate outside its business scope.101 All enterprises are 
required by law to operate within their own scope of approved 
business.102 Failure to operate within the approved business 
scope may give rise to civil, administrative and even criminal 
liability for both enterprises and their directors.101
B. Ultra vires rule
Operations which fall outside the approved business scope 
and main objectives of an enterprise are usually described as 
ultra vires activities. Traditionally, the strict application 
of the ultra vires doctrine would make all ultra vires 
activities invalid. Indeed, this doctrine has been effectively 
used in common law jurisdictions as a means for judicial 
supervision over government enterprises.104 However, in 
recent years, this doctrine has been gradually abolished.105 
In China, the ultra vires doctrine has always been 
consistently preserved in order to force enterprises to act
100 See "Standards for Approving Enterprises' Business 
Scopes", supra note 102, p.81.
101 Ibid.
102 Art. 42, GPCL; Art. 16, SEL .
101 Art. 49, GPCL.
104 For a discussion on the effect of this doctrine in 
many jurisdictions, see W. Freidmann and J.F. Garner (ed.), 
Government Enterprise: A Comparative Study, Stevens & Sons
(London) 197 0.
105 The substantial abolition of the ultra vires doctrine 
in English law took place in 1989. See Section 35 A of the 
1989 Companies Act. For a general account of the Western 
development towards abolishing the ultra vires doctrine, see 
Fu Tingmei, "Gongsifa Zhong de Yuequan Yuanze Jiqi Gaige" (On 
the Ultra Vires Doctrine in Company Law and its Reform) , FXYJ, 
No.4, 1991, pp.61-7.
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within their approved business scope.106 In this respect, the 
legal treatment of ultra vires contracts provides a good 
example for studying the functioning of the general ultra 
vires rule.
At first, the ECL (1981) did not expressly provide that 
the ultra vires economic contracts were necessarily void, 
though it may be argued that such an effect was actually 
implied.107 On July 21, 1987, the Supreme People's Court
issued an opinion concerning ultra vires contracts.108 
According to this opinion, economic contracts that are signed 
by an enterprise which have the effect of exceeding its 
business scope or infringing its business pattern should be 
regarded as void contracts. These include contracts which are 
concluded for dealing illegally in important means of 
production and rare and durable consumption goods; contracts 
signed by retailers for wholesale business; contracts signed 
by agents for their own retailing; and contracts for the sale 
of imported goods in unapproved areas.109 Moreover, a 
contract which is entirely or partly ultra vires the business 
scope or business pattern of the enterprise is entirely or 
partly void.110 Accordingly, when a contract is deemed to be 
void due to its ultra vires nature, the enterprises involved 
shall return to each other any property that they have
106 It must, however, be clarified that in China there is 
no generalised rule such as ultra vires, though in fact this 
rule does exist.
107 Art. 7 of the ECL reads: "the following contracts are
void: a, contracts which are contrary to law, state policy and 
plan, . . . " .
108 See "Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Zai Shenli Jingji Hetong 
Jiufen Anjian Zhong Juti Shiyong Jingji Hetongfa de Ruogan 
Wenti de Jieda" (The Supreme People's Court's Answers on 
Applying the Economic Contract Law When Hearing Cases 
Concerning Economic Contracts), in Jingji Hetong Fagui Shiyong 
Daquan (Practical Collection of Laws and Regulations 
Concerning Economic Contracts), China People's University
Press (Beijing) 1989, pp.26-33.
10" Ibid. p. 28.
110 Ibid . p. 28. Art . 7 , ECL.
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acquired pursuant to the contract.111 If one party is at 
fault, it shall compensate the other party for losses incurred 
as a result thereof. 11-1 If both parties are at fault, each 
party shall be commensurately liable.11'
As mentioned above, in the PRC, the main objective for 
implementing the strict rule of ultra vires is to enable the 
state to control the business activities of legal persons. 
This control is by no means restricted to state enterprises. 
Indeed, all types of enterprises must operate within their 
business capacity approved by the ABIC. However, this control 
does have special implications for state enterprises because 
state enterprises do not own their property. They are simply 
"managing" the property which the state has authorised them to 
operate. In other words, state enterprises are bound to carry 
out their business objectives in the manner required by the 
state and relevant government authorities. It is impossible 
for a state enterprise to alter its business scope without 
obtaining prior approval of its superior government or 
government departments, not to mention the approval of 
relevant ABIC. In this respect, state enterprises do not enjoy 
the same freedom as other types of enterprises which can 
change their business activities provided that they carry out 
the the appropriate registration formalities required by 
law.114 Therefore, the ultra vires rule which is strictly 
applied in Chinese civil law may operate as an important means 
of control over the operation of state enterprises. In many 
cases, such rigid control is carried out at the cost of third 
parties and creditors who are, for example, prevented from 
enforcing ultra vires contracts to which state enterprises are 
a party.
111 ECL, Art. 16.
112 Ibid.
11J Ibid.
114 See Art. 17, Registration Regulations.
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IV. Further Issues Relating to the Legal Personality of State 
Enterprises
A. Piercincr the corporate veil
In the West, in the early days after the recognition of 
corporate personality, it was taken for granted that the legal 
personality of corporations should be preserved in determining 
their civil liability. Shareholders should not be made 
accountable, in excess to their promised contribution, for the 
debt liability of corporations which possessed legal 
personality. From the early Twentieth Century, however, courts 
in many jurisdictions have followed the American approach in 
lifting corporate veils which were abused. "Piercing the veil" 
is both possible and desirable when, for example, the 
corporate personality is used for the purpose of fraud or as 
a means to avoiding legal obligations, or when a legal person 
is controlled by another legal person in the same group, with 
the latter being potentially made liable for the former's 
debts.115 For some observers, "piercing the veil 
jurisprudence" has been regarded as having initiated a new 
enterprise theory of corporate personality.11(1
In China, piercing the veil jurisprudence is still 
largely unknown. In fact, both the EBL and the SEL have in 
principle denied any civil liability owed by the state (or 
government) to a state enterprise in the case of the former's 
faulty interference leading to the latter's bankruptcy. In 
theory, therefore, enterprise legal persons should only be 
responsible for their debts to the extent of the property
115 For a summary of European Continental law on this 
issue, see E.J. Cohn and C. Simmitis, "'Lifting the Veil' in 
the Company Laws of the European Continent", 12 The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1963, pp.189-225. 
For an account of relevant English law, see Farrar's Company 
Law, supra note 54, pp.73-81.
11(1 See Phillip I. Blumberg, "The Corporate Personality in 
American Law: A Summary Review", American Journal of
Comparative Law. Supplementary Issue, 1990, pp.49-69.
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which they own or "manage".
In practice, however, corporate personality was once 
disregarded. In August 1987, the Supreme People's Court issued 
an "Opinion" (pifu) on the debt liability of enterprises and 
companies promoted by administrative organs or 
enterprises.117 According to this Opinion, the debts of 
"enterprises" or "companies" established by administrative 
units should be first paid out of the property of the 
enterprises or companies, and the part which they could not 
afford to pay had to be made up for by those administrative 
units which approved and established the enterprises or 
companies, or which reported the establishment of the 
enterprises or companies. On the other hand, when a "branch 
enterprise" (fenzhi giye) was established by an enterprise, if 
the branch enterprise was actually qualified as a legal 
person, its debt should be paid with its own independent 
assets; if the "branch enterprise" was not qualified as a 
legal person, the enterprise which established the branch 
enterprise should bear joint and several liability for the 
debts of the branch. But if the branch was a "company"
(gongs i) , "regardless of whether or not it is a legal person", 
the enterprise which promoted the branch company had to be 
responsible for making up the debts which the branch company 
could not afford to pay in full.11" As such, the Opinion of 
the Supreme People's Court actually lifted corporate 
personality by asking certain connected entities (including 
administrative units and "enterprises") that established the 
enterprises and companies in question to be responsible for 
the debts of bankrupt "enterprises" and "companies".
The move towards lifting the corporate veil immediately 
caused great concern and genuine shock among Chinese
117 See the text in Chinese, Bulletin of the Supreme 
People's Court, No.4, 1987, p.21.
118 Ibid.
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lawyers.11'* They strongly argued that since legal persons 
should bear 1 independent liability", their corporate veil 
should not be lifted.1,10 Thus, they resorted to the notion of 
independent liability in defending the corporate veil of legal 
persons.
In fact, one has to look at the general background 
underlying the move towards lifting the corporate veil. At the 
time when the Supreme People's Court issued its Opinion, the 
Chinese government had just begun to "consolidate" (zhengdun) 
enterprises, especially "companies" formed by administrative 
organs. This consolidation was a mass movement launched under 
the guidance of the Party and state policies. Indeed, the 
Supreme People's Court, in its Opinion, directly cited and 
referred to those policy documents jointly issued by the State 
Council and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party. Accordingly, these policy documents to a great extent 
formed the very basis of the Opinion issued by the Supreme 
People's Court. The Opinion also set out the unequal treatment 
between ordinary "enterprises" (give) and special "companies"
(gongsi) , 121 in the case of enterprises as their "promoters 
and sponsors" (kaiban ren). The fact that "enterprises" were 
indiscriminately held liable to pay the debts of the 
"companies" which they promoted in the first place, regardless 
of whether or not the companies were legal persons, can only 
be explained as a kind of penalty imposed on those enterprises 
keen to establish "companies" in order to make profits.
It is therefore clear that the decision to lift the 
corporate veil as instructed by the Opinion was taken less on 
the basis of legal reasoning than under the guidance of the
110 See, for example, Lin Rihua, "Guanyu Qiye Kaiban De 
Gongsi Daobi Hou Zhaiwu Qinchang Wenti de Jidian Sikao" (Some 
thoughts about the Payment of Debts Sustained by Bankrupt 
Companies Promoted by Enterprises), in FXPL, No.1, 1991,
pp.84-88 and 69.
120 Ibid.
121 The relationship between "enterprise" and "company" is 
very confusing in the Chinese context. For an analysis of the 
notion of "company", see Chapter One above.
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particular state policy. To a certain extent, the challenge 
made by Chinese lawyers against the move is understandable.
In response to the concerns over the lifting of the 
corporate veil, on December 21, 1990, the State Council issued 
a Circular concerning the settlement of debts of abolished or 
merged companies in the campaign to consolidate companies 
This Circular modified the position established by the Opinion 
of the Supreme People's Court. It required that companies 
which met the requirements of a legal person as provided by 
the GPCL and "which had dissociated themselves from the Party 
or government organisations as their promoters and sponsors", 
should as a rule pay their debts with the property which they 
were authorised by the state to manage or which they 
owned.123 As such, the difficulties caused by the Supreme 
Court's Opinion was partially redressed. Although it seems 
that the Circular continued to lift the veil of companies 
which failed to disconnect themselves from government or Party 
authorities, it is clear that many other companies whose veil 
would have been lifted in accordance with the Opinion were 
eventually relieved by the new state policy as recognised in 
this Circular.
Although the campaign to consolidate companies ended in 
late 1991, it served as a clear illustration that corporate 
personality in China is not so absolute as to be upheld in all 
circumstances. The corporate veil can be lifted as a matter of 
special state policy. Furthermore, it has also been suggested 
by some Chinese lawyers that the idea of holding persons (both 
natural and legal persons) behind the veil liable for the 
debts of legal persons may be relevant both in domestic civil 
law124 and in foreign investment enterprise law.12S However,
122 For the text in Chinese, see Collection of Company 
Laws and Regulations, p.316.
12J Ibid.
124 It may be necessary to ask holding companies to be
responsible for the debts of their subsidiaries. For a 
discussion of this problem, see Wang Baoshu, "Woguo Qiye 
Lianhe Zhong de Kangcaieng Xianxiang Jiqi Falu Duice" (On
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opposition to lifting the corporate veil cannot be
underestimated. This is not only because of the conceptual 
confusion over the notion of legal personality, but also 
because many Chinese lawyers still tend to overemphasize the 
"positive" function of legal personality in separating
enterprises and their investors (shareholders or owners) .12r’
Consequently, it remains to be seen whether the jurisprudence 
which advocates piercing the corporate veil will be introduced 
in Chinese law on legal grounds similar to those already
widely accepted in many western jurisdictions.
D. Enterprise conglomerates and dual legal persons
"Economic associations" (lianying qiye), also known as 
"enterprise conglomerates" (qiye iituan) have been emerging in 
China since the mid-1980s. Enterprises of different locations, 
different industries, and even different types of property 
ownership, may form economic associations or conglomerates. 
These entities are usually established for certain economic 
purposes, for example, to make use of productive or 
technological advantages. Recently, many conglomerates are 
formed under the auspices of government departments which seek
Newly Emerged Concern and Legal Disposition in China), in 
FXYJ, No.6, 1990, p.47.
The corporate veil may be lifted as a matter of 
"international practice". Consequently, foreign investors may 
be held liable for the debts of foreign investment enterprises 
established in China. For a brief comment on this, see Yao 
Meizhen (ed.), Waishang Touzi Qiyefa Jiaocheng (Textbook on 
Foreign Investment Enterprise Law), Law Press 1990, p .67.
iJ(' One Chinese scholar has this comment on the Western 
concept of piercing the corporate veil: "considering the (low) 
standard of our legal system and the (inadequate) professional 
knowledge of judges, the adoption of this theory or practice 
(i.e., piercing the corporate veil) is likely to produce 
considerable discretion and to reduce the positive function of 
the legal person system". See Shi Jichun, "Woguo Jiben Jiti 
Jingji Lifa Chuyi" (My Humble Opinion on Basic Legislation 
Concerning Collective Economy in China), ZGFX, No.2, 1992,
pp.33-41, at 3 9.
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to enhance the collective economic strength of state 
enterprises. Some tightly united conglomerates possess unified 
property and funds, and participate in civil activities under 
the conglomerates' own independent names. They also have 
elected directors and are registered in accordance with the 
law. Such conglomerates are treated as legal persons in 
accordance with the provisions of the GPCL.127 Other 
conglomerates, however, only exist nominally. They may have 
their own independent names and even common directors to 
coordinate their businesses, but they do not have joint funds 
and property, and therefore they cannot qualify to register as 
legal persons. Consequently, members or participants of such 
conglomerates shall bear liabilities respectively with the 
property that each owns or manages or otherwise in accordance 
with the agreement made between them.128
The most difficult problem, however, is whether "dual 
legal persons" (lianqji faren) can lawfully exist. That is to 
say, while a conglomerate is a "large" legal person, its 
members are also capable of being "small" legal persons 
operating under the "large" legal person. The concept of dual 
legal persons has been criticised by some commentators129 as 
being contrary to the qualifications of a legal person in the 
GPCL, especially in the respect of the requirements of 
independent property and liability. It has been argued that, 
if a conglomerate is to possess legal personality, its 
participants must not be legal persons. In other words, these 
participants must give up their legal personality before 
joining the conglomerate legal person because it is impossible 
for both the conglomerate and its members to be legal persons .
Many reasons may be put forward for the denying 
recognition of the concept of dual legal persons. Since many
127 Art. 51.
128 Arts. 52 and 53 of the GPCL.
129 See for example Hu Yinkang, "Qiye Jituan 'Liangji
Faren' Zhi Wojian" {My Opinion on Conglomerates and "Dual
Legal Persons"), FX, No.8, 1988, pp.40-1.
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government departments are unwilling to surrender their powers 
to enterprises, they attempt to control a number of 
enterprises by setting up "conglomerates" which in fact are 
"administrative companies".130 On the other hand, inadequate 
development of business organisational forms has prevented a 
reasonable understanding of the problem in question. In many 
western jurisdictions, a conglomerate may take the form of a 
company limited by shares (a holding company) with 
participants (also companies) becoming subsidiaries of the 
group. In this way both the conglomerate and its members are 
able to keep their own legal personality, and to be legal 
persons. However, China has so far failed to adopt a company 
law comparable to those found in many western jurisdictions. 
Nor is there any significant equity market. In the future, 
with the development of the limited companies, it might be 
possible to recognise dual legal persons. Moreover, the law 
may provide that a conglomerate may be made liable for the 
debts of its members if the conglomerate has abused its 
control over its member or indeed on other grounds. However, 
such a move has also to depend on the development of the 
theory and practice on "piercing the corporate veil" which, as 
analyzed above, is still uncertain in Chinese law.
V. Conclusion
In China, the concept of legal person, or faren, was 
conceived and adopted as an important element in the post-Mao 
programme of legal and economic reforms. The notion of legal 
personality, which is applicable to many enterprises and 
organisations, was perceived and employed as an essential 
means for transforming state enterprises into independent and 
self-governed entities.
To a great extent, the establishment of corporate 
personality must be viewed as a prelude to the overall legal 
regulation of state enterprises in China. It would hardly have
13,1 These companies perform both business and 
administrative functions.
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been possible to place state enterprises under the 
jurisdiction of law if their legal personality had not been 
officially recognised. Indeed, the legal personality of state 
enterprises had been widely emphasized in the economic reforms 
of the 1960s in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.131 In 
this respect, the post-Mao economic reforms, by recognising 
the legal person status of state enterprises, have served as 
a starting point in establishing a legal framework governing 
state enterprises.
The adoption of the legal person concept in Chinese law 
can facilitate the development of state enterprise reform. 
Theoretically speaking, by acquiring legal personality, state 
enterprises may act independently on many occasions and are 
also entitled to resist government intervention. In addition, 
since state enterprises may bear independent liability, the 
notion of legal personality may operate to make them solely 
liable for their own debts, thus shifting the burden of debt 
liability from the state to the enterprises themselves.
The adoption of the legal person concept, however, has 
failed to resolve many complicated problems in state 
enterprise reform. In particular, property rights of state 
enterprises have not been radically addressed. Unlike many 
other enterprises upon which property ownership rights have 
been conferred, state enterprises are prohibited by law from 
enjoying or even sharing ownership rights in the property with 
which they are operating. Instead, they are only granted "the 
right of management1 -- a term borrowed from the legislation 
of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
The faren concept in Chinese law is strongly policy-
131 For a discussion on, inter alia, the legal personality 
of the state enterprises in these countries, see Gyula Eorsi 
and Attila Harmathy (ed.), Law and Economic Reform in 
Socialist Countries, Akademiai Kiado (Budapest) 1971. Also see 
Lajos Ficzere, The Socialist State Enterprise, Akademiai Kiado 
1974. However, some scholars did not regard the legal 
personality as a constituent element of the notion of the 
state enterprise (see ibid. p. 34) . One of the reasons was that 
legal person as a civil law concept was not broad enough to 
contain various aspects of the complicated relations the state 
enterprise had to cope with (see ibid. p.48).
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oriented. For example, the denial of the property ownership 
reflects the deep concern of the Chinese government over the 
authorization of legal personality for state enterprises. 
Moreover, despite the emphasis on the "independent liability" 
of legal persons, the corporate veil may be lifted as a matter 
of government policy.
The notion of faren has been employed by Chinese 
reformers as something of a magic notion that would be able to 
fundamentally change the existing enterprise system. By 
overemphasizing its assumed "positive functions", many Chinese 
scholars have idealised the notion of legal personality. As a 
result, when state enterprises fail to obtain a significant 
degree of independence and autonomy, they tend to blame that 
failure on the fact that state enterprises are not "real legal 
persons" .1,J The underlying message is that "real legal 
persons" would automatically possess many significant 
characteristics such as absolute independence and autonomy.
It is, however, over optimistic to expect a legal concept 
such as faren to play a decisive role in transforming the 
chaotic enterprise system. Due to the complexity of enterprise 
reform, the function of corporate personality is very limited. 
In essence, as described in the Party Decision cited earlier, 
the aim of reforms is to authorise "relative autonomy" to 
state enterprises. The question is then how "relative" such 
autonomy is. The answers to this question, as will be 
suggested throughout this study, will provide further evidence 
for assessing the functions and limits of the notion of legal 
personality in the legal regulation of state enterprises in 
post-Mao China.
133 See, for example, the comment made by Professor Jiang 
Ping. "Qiye Ying Chengwei Zhenzheng de Faren" (Enterprises 
Should Become Real Legal Persons", ZGJJTZGG, No.4, 1992, p.27.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
LEGAL GUARANTEE OF ENTERPRISE AUTONOMY
This Chapter discusses the legal guarantee of enterprise 
autonomy. To a great extent, enterprise autonomy concerns the 
relationship between the state and state enterprises. Such 
relations in the Chinese context are so complex that two 
separate chapters must be devoted to explore such relations. 
While this chapter provides general observations, the 
following chapter will specifically examine the legal aspects 
of the financial autonomy of state enterprises.
This discussion starts with a review of the history in 
the respect of the relations between state enterprises and 
their superior government authorities. The discussion 
especially explains the changing relationship in the course of 
the post-Mao economic reforms. After examining the legal 
framework concerning the rights and duties of state 
enterprises, the discussion attempts to delineate the 
authority and powers of various government departments which 
are associated with the operation of Chinese state 
enterprises. Having explored the subject theoretically, a 
practical assessment of enterprise autonomy is provided. 
Finally, a conclusion is offered,
I. Government Departments and Enterprise Management
A. General background
It has been indicated in earlier chapters that prior to 
197 9, Chinese state enterprises were placed under extensive 
control and supervision of government departments. Such a 
general statement, however, needs further explanation.
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In March 1950, the Government Administration Council
(GAC) promulgated a Resolution Concerning Unifying National 
Financial and Economic Work ("Resolution").1 According to this 
Resolution, state-owned factories and enterprises were to be 
"managed" in one of three ways: first, those to be directly 
managed by ministries under the Central People's Government; 
secondly, those to be owned by the Central People's
Government, but to be temporarily managed by local peoples' 
government or military organs as trustees; and thirdly, those 
to be managed by local government or military organs (as 
owners).3
Accordingly, the managerial responsibility for every state 
enterprise was to be ascertained. Generally speaking, the 
control of a state enterprise was exercised by either a
Ministry at the central level or its corresponding agencies at 
a local (provincial, city or county) level. Some enterprises 
were, however, controlled by two or more government 
departments at the same level. In addition, a number of
enterprises were identified as under the dual leadership of 
both central and local government authorities, though in this 
case one department, either central or local, had to be 
identified as the principal supervising authority.3
From 1950 and until the present day, the department or 
departments granted with the authority to manage a state 
enterprise are usually described as "government departments 
(authorities) in charge of the enterprise" (give zhuguan
1 See the text in Chinese, in Laws and Regulations of the 
PRC Central Government (1949-1950), pp.239-44.
2 Ibid, p .242.
3 It is very difficult to describe the jurisdiction of 
each government department at the same level, as the criteria 
for dividing the authorities of different departments are 
frequently changeable. For an attempt to define the 
responsibility for the eight Ministries concerned Machine 
Building, see A. Donnithorne, China's Economic System (1967), 
George Allen and Unwin Ltd., Second Impression 1981, p.150.
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bumen) .4 The main authority and responsibility of give zhucruan 
bumen are: defining the product direction and production scale 
of enterprises, handing down planned quotas, examining their 
fulfilment, ensuring that enterprises produce and control the 
materials which must be supplied according to the national 
plan, arranging the marketing of products, and helping 
enterprises solve production and operation problems.5
In addition to give zhuquan bumen, many other government 
departments and agencies such as banks, accounting offices and 
tax bureaux are also empowered to supervise and control the 
operation of state enterprises. Moreover, local government 
departments possess significant powers to control enterprises 
which are not under their direct supervision but which are 
located in their territories. Under the unified national state 
planning system, an enterprise which is put under exclusive 
supervision of a central Ministry may nevertheless have to 
obtain its production material from relevant local government 
departments.
In fact, since the 1950s, a state enterprise has been put 
under both “production branch vertical" (tiaotiao) control and
4 The term give zhuquan bumen is a very loose concept in 
Chinese law. It may have quite different meanings in different 
legal contexts. For example, laws and regulations concerning 
foreign investment enterprises may employ this term to refer 
to either government departments in charge of the Chinese 
partner (see Art.6 of the Implementing Regulations Concerning 
the Law on the Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures), or 
government departments which are eligible to approve a project 
or production plan concerning the enterprise. This meaning is 
incompatible with the term used in this chapter, which simply 
has a stricter and narrower application.
Also, the term qiye zhuguan bumen should be translated 
properly as "government departments (authorities) in charge" 
and instead of "competent government departments". The latter 
term, by generally describing the relativity of certain 
government departments, can have a broader meaning to include 
relevant government authorities (such as the "ABIC") in 
addition to government departments in charge. Obviously, under 
no circumstances should the ABIC be a give zhuquan bumen.
5 For a general description in English, see Ma Hong 
(ed.), Modern China's Economy and Management, Foreign 
Languages Press (Beijing) 1990, pp.119-22.
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"local horizontal" (kuaikuai) control.1’ Usually, give zhuquan 
bumen, together with many other government departments that 
have the authority to supervise enterprises, are vividly 
called enterprises' "mothers-in-law" (popo) -- a term which, 
in the Chinese context, usually denotes excessive control.
This multiple control system, which continues today,7 has 
had (and still has) a number of negative effects. These 
effects were more obvious in the pre-reform era. For example, 
there was significant waste of labour and materials. It was 
common that the same product were made in different industries 
in the same region, or in the same industry of neighbouring 
regions. Under the strict planning system and tight government 
control, commodity exchange was not possible. As a result, 
neither economic efficiency nor the reasonable use of natural 
resources was realised. Furthermore, and most critically, 
enterprises were deprived of decision-making powers. All 
important management decisions were to be made by government 
departments in charge. Enterprises had to obey and implement 
the government's production and operation plans.
Under the rigid and multiple control system, materials 
needed for enterprise production were supplied by the 
government; products were purchased for sale by relevant 
government departments; profits were delivered in total to the 
national treasury; the additional fixed assets and working 
capital of enterprises were appropriated by government 
financial departments; enterprises' workers and staff members 
were assigned by the government, and their welfare and reward 
fund was drawn according to a fixed percentage of the wage 
payroll and was included in the cost. As a result, little 
material incentive was offered to enterprises, managers, and 
workers. Enterprises were totally dependent on government 
authorities.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the central government made
ri See Donnithorne, supra note 3, p. 152.
7 For an economic analysis, see David Granik, Chinese 
State Enterprise, University of Chicago Press 1990, pp.20-7.
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several attempts to reconstruct the relationships among 
enterprises, the central government, and local governments. 
However, except for occasional and insignificant move to grant 
enterprises certain autonomy by, for example, reducing the 
number of mandatary targets,8 those attempts were mainly 
concerned with the reallocation between central and local 
governments of the powers and control over enterprises. Little 
attention was paid to the fundamental issue of promoting 
enterprise autonomy. To a great extent, state enterprises 
remained as "appendages" of government departments.
B. Expansion of enterprise autonomy
The post-Mao economic reforms started with a new thinking 
about government -- enterprise relations. Like the Soviet 
Union and former East European countries which pioneered 
socialist economic reforms/' the PRC leadership began in the 
late 197 0s to confer upon state enterprises many decision­
making powers which used to be exercised by government 
departments. Formal legal provisions have also been employed 
to guarantee enterprise autonomy.
As early as July 197 9, the State Council issued "Some 
Provisions Concerning Expanding the Autonomous Powers 
Regarding Operation and Management of State Industrial 
Enterprises".10 The conferment of these "autonomous powers" 
{zizhuquan) marked the start of enterprise reforms. At that 
time, the autonomous powers were concerned with the partial
a See China's Economic System, supra note 3, p.152.
y For a discussion of the legal approaches to enterprise 
autonomy in these countries, see Gyula Eorsi and Attila 
Harmathy (ed. ) , Law and Economic Reform in Socialist 
Countries, Akademiai Kiado (Budapest) 1971. Also see Lajos 
Ficzere, The Socialist State Enterprise, Akademiai Kiado 1974, 
especially Chapter III, "The Legal Regulation of the 
Enterprise Autonomy".
10 See the text in Chinese, in Laws and Regulations of the 
PRC (1979), pp.249-52.
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relaxation in selected aspects including production plan, 
selling of products, retaining of profits, use of funds, 
disposal of fixed assets, retention of foreign exchange income 
and arrangement of labour and personnel. While authorised with 
these powers, enterprises had to carry out many obligations. 
These included, sincerely implementing the state's guidelines, 
policies and laws, guaranteeing the fulfilment of state plans, 
preventing state property from being infringed, paying taxes 
and profits to the state in accordance with requirements, 
strictly complying with financial discipline, and guaranteeing 
the performance of economic contracts. Thus, the main 
objective for expanding enterprise autonomy was, while the 
state had retained de facto authority, to partially relieve 
enterprises from the extensive state control which had existed 
hitherto.
The expansion of enterprise autonomy was at first 
experimented with in selected enterprises located in provinces 
such as Sichuan. This practice was then extended to most state 
enterprises across the country in late 1980 and early 1981. 
The scope of autonomous powers was also gradually enlarged. On 
September 2, 1980, the State Council approved and transmitted 
"the Report Submitted by the State Economic Commission on 
Working Situation and Opinion Concerning the Future of 
Experimentation of Expanding Enterprise Autonomous Powers".11 
According to this Report, state enterprises were to enjoy 
expanded powers in, ad hoc, production plan and pricing. 
Therefore, enterprises were given the power to make their own 
production plans under the guidance of state plans and in 
light of market needs and their own production capacity. In 
carrying out state plans which were found unfeasible, 
enterprises were entitled to adjust the plans, provided that 
they should inform, or get the approval from, superior 
competent authorities. Moreover, enterprises might, under the 
guidance of state pricing policy, set floating prices for 
their products.
11 See the text in Chinese, in Selected Enterprise Laws 
and Regulations, pp.128-39.
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One momentous step towards expanding enterprise autonomy 
came on May 10, 1984 when the State Council issued "the
Provisional Provisions on Further Expanding State Enterprise 
Autonomous Powers" (the "1984 Provisions", also widely known 
as the "Ten Articles") .12 Based on earlier developments, the 
1984 Provisions consolidated ten autonomous powers, namely, 
planing production and management, sales of products, product 
pricing, selection of material supplied by the state, use of 
funds, disposal of assets, organisational arrangement, labour 
and personnel, wages and bonus, and associated production.
The expansion of enterprise autonomy can be seen as a 
considerable retreat in extensive government control over 
state enterprises. Enterprises' autonomous powers concerned 
not only economic interests but also other issues such as 
labour and personnel. The financial autonomy of state 
enterprises is to be examined in Chapter Five. Also important 
for enterprise autonomy is the contracting system which 
attempts to adjust and fix through contractual means the 
relations between enterprises and the state.iJ
The SEL (1988) contains two special chapters on 
enterprise autonomy. While Chapter Three is concerned with the 
"Rights and Obligations of Enterprises", Chapter Six is 
related to the "Relationship Between Enterprises and the 
Government". In fact, while the former specifies the rights 
and duties of enterprises, the latter is more concerned with 
the powers and obligations of relevant government authorities, 
including local governments, and especially government 
departments in charge of enterprises. In addition, some 
articles in other chapters of the SEL also affect, directly or 
indirectly, the enterprise -- government relationship.14
12 See the text in Chinese, in Laws and Regulations of the 
PRC (1984) , pp.479-82 .
11 For an assessment of this system, see Chapter Nine of 
the thesis.
14 For example, Art.2 (forms of responsibility system), 
Art.16 (formations of enterprises), Art.18 (merger or division 
of enterprises), and Arts.59 and 61 (legal liability).
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The combination of enterprise rights and duties in 
Chapter Three of the SEL reflects the concept of mutuality of 
rights and duties, which prevails in Chinese law, especially 
constitutional and family laws.15 Of the twenty-two articles 
contained in Chapter Three, thirteen are dedicated to provide 
for the rights of enterprises, while the remaining nine are 
concerned with their duties.
Before proceeding into a detailed examination of 
enterprises' powers and rights, it is helpful to assess the 
nature of the relationship between state enterprises and the 
state. As shown in Chapter Three of this thesis, the Chinese 
leadership has refused to grant property ownership rights to 
state enterprises which are only allowed to enjoy the rights 
of management towards the state property. Thus, the
relationship between the state and state enterprises is 
essentially the relationship between the owner and the 
managers.
The autonomy of state enterprises can be analyzed from 
the following aspects: first, the powers and rights authorised
to state enterprises are the main contents of, or the 
concretization of, the "management rights" as provided by law. 
Secondly, the contents of management rights are not always 
fixed. They may be expanded, but they may also be subject to 
restrictions. Thirdly, enterprise autonomy is "granted" to 
state enterprises by the state which is represented by the 
governments and their departments. Thus, in essence, these 
powers and rights are not necessarily inalienable to state 
enterprises .1G
15 According to Art.33, Par.3 of the 1982 Constitution, 
every citizen enjoys the rights provided by the Constitution 
and the law, and at the same time must carry out the duties 
imposed by the Constitution and the law. For an illustration 
of the mutuality of rights and duties in Chinese family law, 
see Michael Palmer, "Some General Observation on Family Law in 
the People's Republic of China", in Michael Freeman (ed.), 
Annual Survey of Family Law. Vol.9, 1985, pp.41-68.
10 Some Chinese scholars questioned the expression of 
"expending enterprises' autonomous powers". They preferred to 
use the term of "returning enterprises' autonomous powers".
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II. Rights and Duties of Enterprises
A. Rights and powers
In terms of the rights of state enterprises, the 1984 
Provisions singled out ten aspects. The SEL, with thirteen 
articles in this respect, not only reiterates the main 
contents as pronounced by the 1984 Provisions, but also adds 
two additional rights to enterprises, namely, the right of 
foreign trade, and the right to refuse random appropriation. 
The following observation is based on the SEL provisions. 
Since the stipulations in the SEL are very general and 
abstract, other relevant regulations, especially the 1984 
Provisions, are frequently referred to.
a. planning for production: Under the guidance of state 
plans, enterprises are entitled to arrange by themselves for 
the production of products needed by the public or for the 
provision or services to the public.17 Moreover, enterprises 
are entitled to request the adjustment of mandatory plans 
which are not accompanied by planned supply of materials or by 
planned sale of products. In addition, enterprises may accept 
or reject production tasks arranged by any government 
department or unit outside the scope of mandatory plans.18
As a result of the post-Mao economic reforms, the state 
planning system has been relaxed. In the past, state plans
Their main argument was that the autonomous powers should 
belong to the state enterprises in the first place, though 
they were taken away in a highly centralised economy. See for 
example Wang Pengcheng, "Luelun Shehui Zhuyi Qiye Zizhuquan 
Jian Dui 'Kuoda Qiye Zizhuquan' Zhiyi" (A Brief Discussion on 
The Autonomous Powers of Socialist Enterprises and Questions 
Concerning 'Expending Enterprises' Autonomous Powers'), in 
Wang Haibo and others (ed.), Jingji Tizhi Gaiqe de Lilun Yu 
Shijian Yantaohui Lunwen Ji (Collection of Articles Submitted 
to the Symposium on the Theory and Practice of the Economic 
Reforms), China Economy Press (Beijing) 1987, pp.198-205.
17 Art .22, SEL.
18 Art. 23, SEL.
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invariably took the form of mandatory plans. Since the mid- 
1980s, the Chinese authorities have tended to classify state 
plans into mandatory and guidance plans. Moreover, it is the 
government policy to gradually reduce the scope for mandatory 
plans and to enlarge step by step the scope for guidance 
plans. Enterprises have the autonomy and freedom to decide 
whether or not to follow guidance plans. Before making 
decisions, enterprises may take into account the market 
situation and many other factors. Nevertheless, mandatory 
plans remain important. Enterprises have the legal duty to 
carry out fully mandatory plans.19 In addition, enterprises 
must perform contracts concluded in accordance with the law.20 
In China, as in other socialist countries, economic contracts 
are treated as an important means to implement state plans. 
Although the ECL (1981) authorises certain contractual freedom 
to enterprises, it is explicitly provided that the conclusion 
and the implementation of economic contracts must not conflict 
with state (mandatory) plans.21
b. product sales: According to the SEL, enterprises are 
entitled to sell their products independently unless otherwise 
provided by the State Council. Enterprises which undertake 
tasks provided for in mandatory plans are entitled to sell 
independently both their products which are in excess of sales 
plans and products allotted to them under plans.22 The 1984 
Provisions stipulates that, unless prohibited by the state, 
enterprises may sell such products as new products invented 
and produced by them, products which are not purchased by any 
state department, and overstocked products. In addition, the 
1984 Provisions also provides for guidance as to the "self- 
sale" (zixiao) of several important products. For example, as 
for steel products, enterprises were allowed to sell two per
19 Art. 35, SEL.
20 Ibid.
21 See Arts.4, 7, 27 and 29, ECL.
22 Art .24, SEL.
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cent of products which were produced under state plans, and 
all products produced over the state plans. In contrast, as to 
pig iron products, enterprises were not allowed to sell any 
products made within state plans, though they could sell such 
products made outside state plans. However, it is very 
difficult to tell accurately current situations by relying on 
regulations issued several years ago, because the quotes as 
provided in those regulations are frequently put under review 
and are subject to change.
c. selection of materials: Enterprises are entitled to 
select independently suppliers for the purchase of goods 
needed for their production.21 Moreover, government 
departments in charge of ordering for goods should take full 
account of the requests from production enterprises, make 
balance in accordance with resources and transportation 
conditions, and then make reasonable arrangements. Enterprises 
may conclude contracts and settle accounts directly with 
materials' suppliers.24
d. pricing: Except for products the prices for which the 
State Council has determined shall be controlled by government 
price control departments or relevant competent departments, 
enterprises are entitled to decide on the prices of their 
products and services.25 In this respect, the State Council, 
on September 11, 1987, promulgated the PRC Regulations
Concerning Price Administration ("Pricing Regulations"),26 
which replaced the earlier Provisional Regulations Regarding 
Price Administration of 1982 .27 The term "price" as used in 
the Pricing Regulations embraces both commodity prices and
21 Art. 25, SEL.
24 Ibid.
25 Art .26, SEL.
26 See the text in Chinese, in Laws and Regulations of the 
PRC (1987), pp.501-11.
27 Promulgated by the State Council on July 7, 1982. See 
the text in Chinese, in Bulletin of the State Council, No.13, 
1982, pp.566-675.
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business services fees.28
Product prices may take one of three forms. The first 
form is prices set jointly and exclusively by the state 
pricing departments at or above county level and government 
departments in charge of enterprises.29 Enterprises have no 
choice but to accept such prices. The second is state-guided 
prices. Enterprises may only determine prices within this 
category under the guidance set by the above mentioned 
government departments, by taking into consideration the 
standard price, range of fluctuation, difference of rate, 
profit level, and the maximum and minimum price limits so 
stipulated.-0 The third form is market-regulated prices. 
Enterprises as producers have full autonomy in determining 
this type of prices.41 In addition, enterprises may set the 
prices of quality products for which a price increase is 
permitted upon identification and affirmation by the 
department concerned and upon approval by the price control 
departments, provided that the increase is within the range 
permitted. They may also set, within the prescribed scope of 
authority, the bargain prices of worn-out or substandard 
goods.42 Finally, enterprises may decide, within the period 
prescribed by the state, the prices of new products for pilot 
sale.13
e. foreign trade: Enterprises are entitled to negotiate 
and enter into contracts with foreign business entities in 
accordance with the stipulations of the State Council. 
Enterprises are also entitled to withdraw and use their 
foreign exchange reserve in accordance with stipulations of
2 8 Art. 5, Prici
29 Ibid, Art.8,
30 Ibid, Art.8,
n Ibid, Art.8,
3 2 Ibid, Art.17
3 3 Ibid, Art.17
g Regulations, 
Par.1.
Par.2; Art.17, 
Par.3; Art.17, 
Par.3.
Par.4.
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supra note 26.
Par.1.
Par,2.
the State Council.34 In the past, foreign trade was carried 
out exclusively by special state-owned trading companies. 
Since the mid-1980s, some ordinary state enterprises have been 
authorised to carry out direct foreign trade.35
F. retained funds: Enterprises are entitled to dispose of 
and use their retained funds in accordance with the 
stipulations of the State Council.36 This feature is further 
analyzed in Chapter Five below.
g. disposal of assets: Enterprises are entitled to lease 
or assign for value, in accordance with stipulations of the 
State Council, fixed assets given to them by the state to 
operate and manage. Benefits derived from such assets must be 
used for renewing equipment or improving technology.37 
According to the 1984 Provisions, enterprises enjoy the right 
to lease or assign for value fixed assets which are deemed to 
be unnecessary or idle. But as to equipments which, because of 
their high-grade, precision, and advancement, are under the 
administration of government departments in charge, any lease 
or assignment must be approved by these government 
departments.
h. wages and bonus: Enterprises are entitled to determine 
suitable forms of wages and methods for bonus distribution.38 
However, the PRC government has set forth unified standards 
for wages which differ in terms of region. There is also a 
national subsidy system which is changeable from time to time. 
It is on the basis of these standards that enterprises may 
choose their own suitable forms of wages.39 Furthermore,
34 Art .21, SEL .
35 For a comprehensive discussion of China's foreign trade 
reforms, and state enterprises' rights of foreign trade, see 
Cheng Yuan, Changing Patterns in China's Foreign Trade Law and 
Institutions, Oceana Publications (New York) 1991,
36 Art .28, SEL.
37 Art . 29 , SEL.
38 Art . 30 , SEL .
19 Par . 3 , 1984 Provisions.
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enterprise directors are entitled to upgrade wages for staff 
and workers who have made significant contribution, providing 
that the scale of such upgrading shall not exceed the rate set 
by the state.40 In addition, enterprises have the autonomy to 
distribute the bonus fund drawn from their profits in 
accordance with relevant regulations.41
i. personnel management: Enterprises are entitled to
employ and dismiss workers and staff in accordance with State 
Council regulations.42 Several attempts have been made to 
ensure the realisation of this right. First, since the 
adoption of the director responsibility system, enterprise 
managers have been authorised with powers to appoint and 
remove enterprise managerial personnel.41 Secondly, more and 
more workers have been employed on a contractual basis. 
Enterprises have relative freedom to recruit, employ, and 
dismiss workers in accordance with relevant regulations.44 
Thirdly, on July 31, 1987, the State Council promulgated
Regulations Concerning Labour Disputes Settlement, which 
provide for procedures for dealing with disputes arising from 
sanctions and the dismissal of workers .4-
j. installation of organisational structure: Enterprises 
are entitled to decide on the establishment of their
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Art . 31, SEL .
42 See Par.8, 1984 Provisions; Art.45, Pars . 3, 4,& 6, SEL. 
For a discussion of this power and recent developments, see 
Chapter Six of the thesis.
44 In July 1986, the State Council promulgated four sets 
of Provisional Regulations, concerning respectively 
Implementing Labour Contract System, Recruiting Workers, 
Dismissing Workers Violating Disciplines, Insurance for 
Unemployed Workers. For an discussion and translation of these 
regulations, see H.K. Jopsephs, "Labour Law in the Workers' 
State: the Chinese Experience", Journal of Chinese Law, Vol.2 
1988, pp.201-63.
4r' For the translation and discussion, see ibid.
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organisational structure and staffing.46 The 1984 Provisions 
contain clearer stipulations: enterprises are entitled to,
within the limits on the setup and the fixed number of staff 
members approved by government departments in charge, decide 
on the installation of their organisational structure and 
staff allocation, in accordance with the features of their 
production and the actual needs. Relevant government 
departments may propose to enterprises on the establishment of 
their organisational structure and staffing according to the 
needs of their professional works. But no government 
department is allowed to make compulsory provisions as to 
establishment and staffing within enterprises,47
k. refusal of random appropriation: Enterprises are
entitled to reject any demand from any government authority or 
unit for the contribution of manpower, materials or financial 
resources. Unless otherwise provided for in legislation, any 
request in any manner, for the provision of manpower, 
materials or financial resources from any government authority 
or work unit shall be regarded as random appropriation.48 This 
aspect is further examined in later discussion,
1. economic association and issue of debentures: 
Enterprises are entitled to form associations with other 
enterprises or institutions in order to invest in other 
enterprises or institutions and to hold shares in other 
enterprises in accordance with the law and stipulations of the 
State Council.4'*
In addition, enterprises are entitled to issue debentures 
in accordance with stipulations of the State Council.50 In 
March 1987, the State Council promulgated Provisional 
Regulations Concerning the Administration of Enterprise
4G Art . 32 , SEL .
47 Par.7, 1984 Provisions. Also see Art.58, SEL.
48 Art . 33 , SEL .
49 Art. 34, SEL.
r,l) Ibid.
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Debentures/’1 Until 1992, the issue of debentures has been a 
privilege for state enterprises, since other enterprises 
including collective enterprises, with the exception of 
foreign investment enterprises, are prohibited from issuing 
debentures.52 The People's Bank of China is the government 
authority in charge of the issuing of enterprise debentures.53 
It has the power to approve the issuance of debentures, 
providing that the amount does not exceed the limit jointly 
controlled by the People's Bank of China, and state planning 
and financial departments.54 If enterprises intend to issue 
debentures for the purpose of investment in fixed assets, such 
investment items must be investigated and approved by relevant 
government authorities.55 Such requirements are set to control 
the random expansion of investment in fixed assets, and to 
ensure that priority for the issuance of debentures must be 
given to investment on key construction items covered by the 
state plan/’*’
The above review suggests that state enterprises have 
been authorised by law with extensive rights and powers. It 
should also be noted that these are not all the powers and 
rights which a state enterprise may enjoy. For example, 
enterprises as legal persons are permitted by law to enjoy 
many intellectual property rights ranging from trade mark to 
patent and copyright. However, what mainly concerns the SEL 
and the present discussion is enterprise autonomy as opposed
51 See the text in Chinese, in Laws and Regulations of the 
PRC (1987), pp.330-33.
52 See "Guowuyuan Guanyu Jiaqiang Gupiao Zhaiquan Guanli 
de Tongzhi" (State Council, Circular Concerning Strengthening 
the Administration of Shares and Debentures, March 28, 1987) . 
See the text in Chinese, in Laws and Regulations of the PRC 
(1987), pp.346-47.
53 Art.4, Provisional Regulations, supra note 51.
54 Ibid, Art. 12 .
55 Ibid, Art. 17 .
5,1 Ibid, Art. 17; Par. 6, Circular, supra note 52.
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to government control. In this sense, compared with the pre­
reform situation where enterprises were deprived of important 
decision-making powers, the legal provisions and combination 
of many enterprise powers are no doubt a very important step 
towards enterprise autonomy.
B. Duties and restrictions
The authorization of rights and power to state 
enterprises is not unconditional. Enterprise autonomy has been 
subject to many legal and non-legal restraints.
First, the authorization of powers is closely accompanied 
by a number of legal duties provided in the SEL. These duties 
relate to the implementation of compulsory plan,57 the 
preservation of fixed assets and the improvement and renewal 
of equipment,58 abidance of disciplines in regard to finance, 
audit, labour and wages, and price administration,59 
enterprises' social responsibility and consumer 
accountability,50 economic efficiency,61 security and 
protection of state property,62 labour protect ion,63 
ideological and political education, legal, defence, 
scientific and cultural education, and technological training 
for workers and staff,64 and research and development 
issues.65 Although these SEL stipulations appear to be 
abstract and superficial, they are nevertheless extremely
57 Art.35, SEL
58 Art.36, SEL
5<> Art.27, SEL
60 Art.38, SEL
61 Art.39, SEL
62 Art.40, SEL
62 Art.41, SEL
64 Art.43, SEL
65 Art.43, SEL
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important in that they reflect the state's deep concern over 
the grant of enterprise autonomy. Indeed, as will be discussed 
below, in one way or another, the duties of enterprises and 
the rights and responsibilities of government departments are 
just two sides of the same coin. Many government departments 
have the legitimate power to supervise, and interfere with, 
enterprise operation. To this extent, the loose and abstract 
provisions regarding enterprises' duties are nothing less than 
a wide open door to government intervention.
Secondly, many rights delegated to enterprises by the SEL 
have been cautiously qualified by the wording of either 1 in 
accordance with the provisions made by the State Council"66 
or "unless otherwise provided by the State Council".67 Such 
qualifications have restrained the effects of relevant legal 
provisions in the SEL, because the rights concerned may be 
"lawfully" deprived of or reduced by government authorities. 
Thus, many rights are put in an uncertain and unstable 
situation. Since the State Council and relevant Ministries may 
issue, and subsequently change, policy instructions, 
enterprise autonomy is likely to be severely affected from 
time to time. This characteristic is further revealed later in 
this chapter, as well as in many other chapters of the 
thesis .68
Thirdly, it is always implied that the performance of 
enterprise' rights has to be conditioned by local regulations. 
Provisions of local authorities may help to clarify the ways 
for the realisation of certain rights, and possibly provide 
more flexibility than those stipulated by the State Council. 
As a result, differences always exist in terms of region. 
Regions such as Special Economic Zones and coastal provinces 
and municipalities tend to command clearer and more flexible 
treatments than inland areas. For example, as far as the sale 
of property of state enterprises is concerned, in Shenzhen,
66 For example, Arts.27, 28, 29, 31 and 34, SEL.
67 Art s. 2 4 and 26, SEL.
68 For example, Chapters Five and Nine.
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according to the Tentative Provisions Concerning the Transfer 
of Interests in State Enterprises,f,l) it is legally possible 
for the whole or part of the property (including shares) of 
state enterprises to be transferred to entities in a different 
industry or region, including foreign investment enterprises 
and private enterprises. This is a very liberal way for the 
disposal of state property.
To sum up, the SEL provisions regarding enterprise rights 
are neither clear nor radical. In fact, enterprise autonomy is 
conditional and dependent in nature. As will be shown later, 
the practical implementation of enterprise autonomy is rather 
difficult.
Ill. Role of the Government and its Departments
As explained earlier, governments and relevant 
departments at all levels, especially those in charge of 
enterprises, that is, give zhuauan bumen, formally played a 
dominant role in managing state enterprises. Since economic 
reforms are designed to grant relative autonomy to 
enterprises, governments and relevant departments are 
instructed to shift their authority from direct to indirect 
control over enterprise management.
A. "Government departments in charge11, "relevant government 
departments" and "local governments"
In light of economic reforms, the SEL contains a special 
chapter -- Chapter Six -- for redefining the legal position of 
government authorities. In this Chapter, which consists of 
only four articles, the SEL employs three different concepts 
to refer to various authorities. The first is "governments or 
government departments in charge",70 the second is "relevant
*’s Promulgated by Shenzhen Municipal Government on Apr. 23,
1989. For an introduction, see China Law and Practice, Vol.3, 
No.6, July 10, 1989, pp.19-20.
70 Art . 55, SEL .
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government departments11,71 and the third "local governments 
at or above county level".72 Unfortunately, the SEL does not 
provide any definition or express guidance as to the meaning 
and coverage of these three concepts. As a result, 
considerable confusion is inevitable. Even if "governments or 
government departments in charge" may be interpreted as having 
a stricter meaning of referring to those governments or 
departments which may directly and administratively control 
enterprises by, for example, imposing compulsory plans, the 
coverage of "relevant government departments" is not certain. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to clarify the coverage of "local 
governments" as employed in the SEL. Since local governments 
may be the sole or joint owners of certain state enterprises, 
the relations among "local governments", "relevant government 
departments" and "governments or government departments", all 
used in the SEL, can be very controversial.
In order to understand the sophisticated regulatory 
framework through which various government authorities 
exercise control over enterprises, and the complicated 
relations between enterprises and relevant authorities, one 
has to ascertain the meaning and content of each of the above 
described concepts, and jurisdictions and the legal rights and 
responsibilities of the authorities concerned. In my view, the 
four articles (Articles 55-58) contained in Chapter Six of the 
SEL actually provide for not only exclusive but also to some 
extent inclusive relations among various government 
authorities. The meaning, jurisdictions, rights and duties of 
all relevant authorities are discussed and clarified as 
follows:
First, the term "government or government departments in 
charge" refers to those government authorities which, 
according to laws, regulations, or the constitutions of the 
enterprises, shall have the administrative power to exercise
71 Art . 56 , SEL .
72 Art . 57, SEL.
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direct control over enterprises,7’1 By relying on vertical and 
administrative relationships, these governments or government 
departments in charge have the closest link with enterprises. 
In terms of their levels, these authorities may be central or 
local (including provincial, municipal, or even county}, or 
both central and local.
The SEL stipulates that government or government 
departments in charge shall, in accordance with stipulations 
of the State Council, issue mandatory plans in a unified 
manner, ensure the planned supply of goods and materials 
required by enterprises to fulfil mandatory plans; examine and 
approve plans submitted by enterprises in respect of such 
matters as capital construction and important technological 
innovation; appoint, remove, reward and punish leading 
administrative cadres at the level of deputy factory director, 
and assess and train leading administrative cadres at the 
level of factory director.74
Detailed analysis of some of the legally recognised 
powers possessed by this category of government authorities, 
such as the appointment of directors, is provided in other 
chapters of the thesis.75 It is nevertheless sufficient to 
note that, having taken into hand so many important powers 
including control over planning and investment, governments 
and government departments in charge occupy an extremely 
important position in the overall supervision over the 
management of enterprises concerned. Except for possible 
quantitative improvements resulting from, for example, 
reduction of state mandatory plans for enterprises, the basic 
categories of powers exercisable by these authorities are
li See Art.5 of the Provisional Regulations Concerning 
State Industrial Enterprises (1983), which suggested that 
"units in charge of enterprises" (qiye zhuquan danwei) were 
those to whom enterprises were subordinate administratively. 
For the text in Chinese, see Laws and Regulations of the PRC 
(1983), pp.383-99 at 384.
74 Art. 55, SEL.
75 See Chapters Five and Six.
159
similar to those which used to be practised by them before 
economic reforms.
Secondly, the responsibilities of "relevant government 
departments" are provided in Article 56 of the SEL. These 
responsibilities concern: formulating and adjusting industrial 
policies and guiding enterprises in their preparation of 
development plans: providing advice and information with
respect to the business policies of enterprises; coordinating 
the relations between enterprises and other units; maintaining 
the normal production order in enterprises and protecting from 
violation the state property which enterprises operate and 
manage; and gradually perfecting public facilities related to 
enterprises.
The above provision is mainly concerned with services and 
responsibilities, rather than rights and control of government 
authorities. However, there are ambiguities and uncertainties 
in this provision. On the one hand, the term "relevant 
government departments1 is not defined. Most Chinese writers76 
take the view that this term is the same as "governments or 
government departments in charge", as explained above. 
Considering that the provision in Article 56 regarding the 
responsibilities of "relevant government departments" comes 
immediately after the provision in Article 55 concerning the 
rights and powers of the "governments or government 
departments in charge", the view taken by many Chinese writers 
seems indisputable.
The problem, however, remains as to whether "relevant 
government departments" may be interpreted more broadly to 
cover those government departments which are not supposed to 
charge an enterprise but which are, in one way or another, 
associated with enterprise operation. In my view, a broad 
interpretation would serve more properly the aim and intention 
of the SEL. As described earlier, what the SEL attempts to
76 See Wang Zongfei and others, Gongye Qiyefa Wenda 
(Questions and Answers Concerning the SEL) , China Agricultural 
Machinery Press (Beijing) 1988, p.303. Also see Gao Kemin and 
others, Qiye Zhi Hun (The Soul of Enterprises -- the SEL in 
the PRC), Sichuan People's Press 1988, pp.184-93.
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achieve is to relieve enterprises from the extensive control 
of all, not just some, government authorities. It is in this 
direction that Article 56 employs the term "relevant 
government departments" (voucruan bumen) , rather than that of 
"government departments in charge" (zhuquan bumen). 
Furthermore, Article 56 states that "relevant government 
departments" shall, "according to their respective 
responsibilities", control and supervise enterprises in 
accordance with laws and regulations. Here the wording 
"according to their respective responsibilities" implies that 
many "relevant government departments" are caught by this 
provision. However, as indicated earlier, it is possible for 
some enterprises to have just one "government department in 
charge". A logical interpretation, therefore, would be that 
the term "relevant government departments" may possess a 
broader meaning than just referring to "governments or 
government departments in charge". If this interpretation is 
correct, "relevant government departments", excluding 
"government departments in charge", may embrace in particular 
state planning departments, and "industrial departments in 
charge" (hangye zhuquan bumen) , such as Ministry of Light 
Industry, which are able to provide services and information 
to enterprises not under their direct supervision but of the 
same special trade.
Thirdly, "local governments at or above county level" 
("local governments") shall be construed as merely referring 
to governments or their departments under whose jurisdiction 
enterprises are located, but which are not "governments in 
charge" of enterprises concerned. In other words, unlike 
governments in charge, "local governments" referred to by the 
SEL are actually not in a position to exercise administrative 
leadership over enterprises.77 Nevertheless, because 
enterprises are seated in a given area, relevant "local 
governments" may play a significant role with regard to the 
operation of enterprises. The SEL provides that "local
77 For a supporting view, see Wang, ibid, p.306.
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governments" shall provide enterprises within their region 
with supplies subject to local planning control, coordinate 
the relations between enterprises and other local units, and 
endeavour properly to arrange for public welfare matters 
related to enterprises.78 Here "public welfare matters" 
include, inter alia, health, education and communication. 
"Coordination" may cover, for example, the use by enterprises 
of local land. But generally speaking, like "relevant 
government departments", local governments shall mainly 
provide various services for enterprises, and shall not 
exercise direct control over enterprise management.
Fourthly, according to Article 58 of the SEL, no 
government departments or units may encroach on the autonomy 
which shall be lawfully enjoyed by enterprises in respect of 
their operation and management; nor may they demand 
contributions of manpower, materials or financial resources 
from enterprises or demand that enterprisers establish 
specific organisations or determine the size of enterprises' 
organisations. Such provision is obviously reiterating 
enterprises' rights and powers as a whole as provided in 
Chapter Three of the SEL and as discussed above. Enterprises' 
right to refuse random appropriation and their autonomy in 
organisation establishment are particularly singled out and 
given special emphasis.
B. Other government departments
Of the four articles concerning government authorities 
discussed above, Article 58 is the broadest in coverage. This 
is because this article is concerned with all, not just some, 
government departments or units. It is apparent that such a 
general declaration effects broader implications than the 
combination of "governments or government departments in 
charge", "local governments", and "relevant government 
departments" -- even in a loose interpretation as I attempted
78 Art . 57 , SEL .
162
earlier. Government departments which are not explicitly 
referred to in Articles 55, 56 and 57, but which are
potentially caught by Article 58, may cover, ad hoc, the ABIC, 
taxation, accounting, auditing, banking, and pricing 
departments. Some of the powers and responsibilities for these 
authorities are provided or mentioned in the SEL, but many 
more are only to be found in other laws and regulations. Some 
aspects are further discussed in other chapters of the 
thesis.79 Here a brief discussion may serve to illustrate the 
important role played by these departments.
First, the ABIC at all levels may exercise supervision 
over enterprises . One important function for the ABIC in China 
is enterprise registration.80 The ABIC is also authorised to 
supervise enterprises' activities. Thus, an enterprise will be 
ordered by the ABIC to cease business operation if it has not 
been approved by government departments in charge, or has 
engaged in production and operation in its own name before 
being approved by and registered with competent ABIC.81 
Furthermore, an enterprise which provides the ABIC with false 
information in order to conceal their true position shall be 
warned or fined. In serious cases, the business licenses of 
such enterprises shall be revoked.8" Furthermore, the ABIC may 
ask people's court to enforce its decision which has not been 
appealed against within fifteen days after the receipt of the 
decision and which has not been implemented by the enterprise 
concerned.81 Finally, according to the ECL, the ABIC has the 
authority to supervise the implementation of domestic economic
79 See especially Chapters Three and Five.
8(1 Art. 16, SEL. See also the discussion in Chapter Three 
above.
81 Art. 59, SEL. In such cases, the illegal incomes of
enterprises will be confiscated.
81 Ibid.
81 Ibid. Also see Art. 66 of the Administrative Litigation
Law (1990) .
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contracts .84
Secondly, taxation authorities possess considerable 
powers in regulating enterprises' operation and incomes. The 
Chinese taxation policy and enterprises' financial autonomy 
are further elaborated in Chapter Four of the thesis. The 
authorities and powers of taxation departments are mainly 
represented in two aspects. On the one hand, there are rigid 
tax laws and regulations. In case of the violation of tax 
laws, the taxation authorities may decide whether or not to 
investigate an enterprise, and what kind of sanctions shall be 
imposed on an enterprise which has been found of misconduct or 
guilty. Obviously, in this respect, tax authorities hold 
considerable discretionary powers. On the other hand, 
provisions in some tax laws and regulations are not so rigid, 
and can be very flexible. Tax authorities may decide, 
independently or together with government departments in 
charge of enterprises, the rates, for example, of certain 
taxes. This is especially the case for the Adjustment Tax 
which is currently applicable to many state enterprises.
Thirdly, accounting supervision is meant to be a very 
important part of the state supervision over enterprises' 
operation. One of the central issues concerning the adoption 
of the Accounting Law,”5 which applies to, inter alia, state 
enterprises, is "to strengthen the supervision through
accounting over the legality, reasonableness and effectiveness 
of [enterprises'] economic activities".88 Accounting offices 
and accounting personnel of an enterprise shall exercise
84 Art . 51, ECL.
88 Adopted on Jan.21, 1985, effective from May 1, 1985.
See the text in Chinese, in Laws and Regulations of the PRC 
(1985), pp.67-73.
80 See "Caizhengbu Fuzeren Jiu Kuaijifa Youguan Wenti Da 
Jizhe Wen" (Answers by the Responsible Person from the 
Ministry of Finance to Correspondents' Questions Concerning 
the Accounting Law), in Institute of Law, Chinese Academy of 
Social Science, Zhongguo Jingji Guanli Fagui Wenjian Huibian 
(Collection of Chinese Legislation Concerning Economic 
Administration), Jilin People's Press (Changchun) 1985, 
pp.994-96 at 995.
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supervision over enterprises.87 They are required to perforin 
many duties. For example, they shall not accept any original 
documents that are unauthentic or illegitimate. Original 
documents which are inaccurately and incompletely recorded 
shall be returned for correction or supplementation.88 An 
accounting office and accounting personnel shall not handle 
receipt or disbursements that violate the stipulations of the 
state uniform system of public finance administration and 
system of financial management.89 However, in cases where an 
accounting office and accounting personnel believe that 
certain receipts and disbursements are in violation of the 
state uniform system of public administration and financial 
management, and where the unit's administrative head insists 
on their being handled, the said accounting offices and 
personnel may carry out the decision made by the 
administrative head, at the same time making a written report 
to the head of the superior administrative unit requesting 
action, and also to the auditing agency.90 And more, 
accounting office and accounting personnel shall cooperate 
with taxation and auditing departments to supervise 
enterprises' activities.91 Since each state enterprise must 
have either an accounting office or at least some accounting 
personnel, the supervision through accounting is very 
important in relation to enterprises' management. Finally, it 
must be born in mind that the chief accountant within an 
enterprise may sit in the enterprise management committee to 
assist the director in making decisions regarding important 
matters .91
87 Art.16, Accounting Law, supra note 85.
88 Art . 17 , ibid .
89 Art. 19 , ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Art. 20, ibid.
9~ See Art.47, SEL; Art.11, Regulations Concerning the 
Work of Directors (1986).
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Fourthly, auditing is also supposed to be a very 
important means by which the state supervises enterprise 
management. According to the Regulations Concerning 
Auditing,93 large and medium state enterprises may establish 
internal auditing offices and auditing personnel to supervise 
the financial expenditure and economic efficiency of these 
enterprises and their subordinate units.94 More importantly, 
state auditing organs are authorised with extensive powers to 
supervise enterprise' financial activities95 and to impose 
sanctions as appropriate.99
Fifthly, the banking system used to play a dominant role 
in supervising enterprises management. State banks not only 
performed their credit functions, but also were authorised to 
make direct debit and transfer of enterprise capital. Since 
economic reforms, state banks are urged to be 
commercialised.97 Enterprises have greater freedom in 
obtaining loans and deciding on their own financial matters. 
Nevertheless, bank supervision over the floatation of cash, 
financial expenditures, and management and operations of 
enterprises still remains. Many large and medium-sized state 
enterprises continue to have the presence of officials from 
state banks, who are there to supervise enterprise operation.
Sixthly, pricing administration is significant. 
Government pricing authorities are entitled to set mandatory 
prices for certain materials and products. They may also set
93 Adopted by the State Council on Oct. 21, 1988 and
effective from Jan.l, 1989. For the text in Chinese, see 
Bulletin of the State Council (1988), pp.840-46. Before this, 
the State Council, on Aug.29, 1985, once promulgated
Provisional Regulations Concerning Auditing. See the text in 
Chinese, in haws and Regulations of the PRC (1985), pp.253-48.
94 Art s. 2 7 and 28, ibid .
95 Art . 15 , ibid.
99 Art .16, ibid.
97 For an introduction of China's banking system and 
reforms, see Henry Zheng, China's Civil and Commercial Law, 
Chapter III, "Banking Law", pp.87-127.
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guidance prices for various goods. More importantly, they, 
together with masses organisations and consumer associations, 
may supervise enterprises in implementing state pricing 
policies.98 In case of illegal pricing activities," 
government pricing authorities may impose appropriate 
sanctions on enterprises.1"
C. Overall comment
The above discussions are just a bird's-eye view of the 
very complicated relations between enterprises and government 
authorities . It is neither possible nor necessary to list all 
government departments which enjoy some kind of authority 
towards enterprises, and their detailed functions. Government 
departments such as taxation, ABIC, banking, pricing and 
auditing are usually called 1 comprehensive functional 
departments" (zonghe zhineng bumen). These authorities, as a 
rule, are not "government departments in charge of specific 
enterprises" (give zhuguan bumen). Rather, they are put in a 
position to supervise all enterprises within their respective 
authority and jurisdiction.
Like government departments in charge of enterprises, 
functional departments used to perform a substantial 
administrative regulation over enterprises. But since the 
economic reforms, while government departments in charge, many 
other relevant government departments, and local governments 
are required to provide more services rather than to exercise 
administrative regulations, functional departments are guided 
to used economic levers and legal measures, rather than pure 
administrative methods, to regulate enterprises' activities.
As far as functional departments are concerned, reforms 
have produced mixed results. On the one hand, their role has
98 See Chapter Five, Price Administration Regulations, 
supra note 26.
" For a definition, see Art.29, ibid.
100 Art. 30, ibid.
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been severely cut back. On the other hand, despite the decline 
of their roles, these functional governments still, in one way 
or another, possess significant authority to influence 
enterprises. This aspect is further explored later.
With reference to the above comments regarding Article 58 
of the SEL, it may become clear that the declaration in this 
article certainly takes into consideration the supervisory 
role of functional departments. In fact, this provision might 
be more broadly interpreted to include many organs and units 
other than "governments or government departments in charge", 
"relevant government departments", "local governments" and 
"functional government departments".
IV. Enterprise Autonomy: Practical Problems
The use of laws and regulations to adjust and govern the 
complicated relations between state enterprises and government 
departments, must be seen as a positive move towards 
enterprise autonomy. However, given the ambiguities in the SEL 
provisions and the absence of clear guidance as regards the 
respective authority and powers of government departments, it 
is doubtful whether state enterprises, being administratively 
subordinate to government authorities, can rely on mere legal 
provisions to defend their autonomy.
A. Survey results
In 1990, the All-China Trade Union Association conducted 
a survey to examine the actual implementation of the SEL. In 
the published results, 101 enterprise rights were classified 
into eight large groups.103 Although such classification
101 See "Guanyu Qiyefa Luoshi Qingkuang de Diaocha Baogao"
(A Survey Report on the Implementation of the SEL) , JJGL, 
No.10, 1990, pp.24-7.
103 Ibid, p. 24. In particular, it is unknown why the 
eleven kinds of enterprise rights as provided in the SEL were 
simply consolidated into eight,
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seems to be chaotic, and to contradict SEL provisions, it is 
still possible to understand current practice by analyzing 
several interesting figures in the Survey result.
Of all surveyed enterprises, the percentages for the 
successful "basic implementation" (iiben luoshi) of enterprise 
rights were: seventy-six per cent of enterprises for both the 
right to use retained funds and the right to manage and run 
property; 7 0.3 per cent of enterprises for production 
autonomy; sixty-three per cent of enterprises for personnel 
arrangement and distribution of wages and bonus; sixty-one per 
cent of enterprises for management autonomy; and nine per cent 
of enterprises for the right to refuse random appropriation. 
None of the surveyed enterprises was found to be able to enjoy 
the right to share foreign exchange revenue, to participat in 
economic associations, and to invest in other enterprises.
According to another observation101 which was also based 
on a special survey, enterprises are able to enjoy only two 
and half of the ten aspects of enterprise autonomy specified 
in the 1984 Provisions. The "two" meant the right to establish 
internal organisation and to sale products. And the "half" 
referred to the right to set prices under the "supervision" of 
government pricing administration departments.
The reasons for such a depressing situation concerning 
the implementation of enterprise autonomy were classified by 
the above observers into three categories. The first category 
was that government departments simply took away certain 
enterprise rights, for the purpose of macroeconomic control 
and economic rectification. This was a kind of straightforward 
measure resulting from the needs for implementing tighter 
economic policy. The rights which were deprived of in this way 
included the right to use retained funds, that to decide the 
distribution of the wages and bonus, and that to manage 
personnel and labour. The second set of reasons held that
UM See Zhang Fujiang and others, "Qiye Zizhuquan Hai 
Sheng Duoshao?" (How Much Is Left for Enterprise Autonomy?), 
Qiye Guanli (Economic Management, Beijing), No.8, 1990, pp.42- 
3 .
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government authorities strengthened their control over 
enterprises in the name of "perfecting" (wanshan) enterprise 
autonomy policy. In other words, rather than genuinely 
promoting enterprise autonomy, government departments retained 
those rights which had been ordered by the central authorities 
to be devolved to enterprises. Such rights related to the 
rights to production plans, disposal of assets, selection of 
materials, and the determination of floating prices for 
certain products. The third category of reasons, according to 
that observation, was either because enterprises were unable 
to exercise their powers or because of certain irrational 
state regulations. For example, because many enterprises did 
not have sufficient retained funds, they could not exercise 
the right to invest in other enterprises.
B. Two examples
The above observations show that the general picture 
concerning the implementation of enterprise autonomy is far 
from satisfactory. In order to illustrate in more detail the 
difficulties facing enterprises, two of the enterprise rights 
as provided in the SEL deserve specific discussions. They are 
the right of horizontal association and the right to refuse 
random appropriation. The reasons for choosing them as 
examples are twofold. First, they are among those rights which 
have been implemented least satisfactorily. Secondly, while 
the former may be only concerned with governments or 
government departments in charge, and some relevant government 
departments, the latter involves miscellaneous government 
authorities and even many non-official units.
First, the right of "horizontal association" (hengxiang 
lianhe) first formally appeared in the 1984 Provisions and has 
been reiterated in the SEL.104 According to relevant 
provisions, state enterprises may choose as partners, in 
supply, production and sale, those enterprises of different
104 Art. 34, Par . 1, SEL.
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industries, of different types of ownership, and of different 
regions. For example, a state enterprise may associate with 
collective enterprises, and even private enterprises, to form 
an enterprise conglomerate which may coordinate the activities 
of, and even impose unified plans for, member enterprises. 
Therefore, such associations are mainly aimed at breaking up 
vertical and regional restrictions by encouraging enterprises 
to freely select their partners. However, the 1984 Provisions 
contain a significant obstacle which remains effective until 
today. In participating economic associations, enterprises may 
not change their property ownership, may not change the 
established administrative subordinate relationship to 
government authorities, and may not change the prescribed 
channels for their financial accountability. These limitations 
are widely known as the "Three Non-Changes" (san bubian).
The Three Non-Changes rule has severely restricted the 
freedom of enterprises in horizontal economic associations. 
Government departments may abuse their powers and prevent an 
enterprise in an association from making important decisions 
concerning its operations. In some cases, horizontal 
association takes place in the form of a merger between two or 
more enterprises, or a takeover of an enterprise by another. 
If the enterprises concerned involve different government 
departments in charge (either regional or vertical), the 
approval by these government authorities is essentially 
necessary. If enterprises of different property ownership are 
involved, a horizontal association could be more difficult. 
Moreover, for those enterprises which have already 
participated in an enterprise conglomerate, government 
departments, especially those in charge and with financial 
responsibilities, tend to intervene in the operation and 
decision-making of their subordinate enterprises. As a result, 
a smooth cooperation between member enterprises of a 
conglomerate can be extremely difficult. On the other hand, 
many government departments in charge may force enterprises 
under their supervision to form enterprise conglomerates, even 
though enterprises involved are not willing to participate in
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this kind of horizontal association. Thus, enterprises' right 
of economic association remains difficult to enforce.
Secondly, the right to refuse random "appropriation"
(tanpai), as mentioned earlier, is formally provided in the 
SEL. This right was particularly aimed at protecting 
enterprises from many unfounded and illegal requests made by 
government departments which as a result of the expansion of 
enterprise autonomy felt a shortage of resources. First, the 
SEL expressly authorises enterprises with this right.10S 
Secondly, all "organs and units" are required by the SEL not 
to appropriate.100 And thirdly, according to Article 61 of 
the SEL, enterprises suffered from illegal appropriation are 
entitled to certain remedies.
In an attempt to enforce enterprises' right to refuse 
appropriation, on April 28, 1988, the State Council
promulgated the Provisional Regulations Concerning Prohibiting 
Appropriations to Enterprises ("Appropriation 
Regulations) .107 The units which are forbidden to appropriate 
are listed broadly to include any state organs, people's 
groups, army units, enterprises, institutions, and any other 
social organisations.100 According to the Appropriation 
Regulations, "appropriation" means "any action which requires 
an enterprise to provide financial resources, materials or 
manpower, and which is not supported by any law or 
regulations" .109
The Appropriation Regulations even identify certain 
actions as potential appropriations. For example, Article 4 
lists thirteen types of fees, if not collected in accordance 
with law, as appropriations. These fees cover, inter alia,
los Art. 33, SEL.
100 Art . 58 , SEL .
107 See the text in Chinese, in Bulletin of the State 
Council (1988), pp.387-90.
108 Art . 3 , ibid .
100 Art. 2 , ibid.
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registration fees for children of enterprises' staff and 
workers, which are set by local education departments and 
schools themselves, social security administration fees, and 
health fees collected in various names. Even for those fees 
which can be collected in accordance with laws and 
regulations, any collection whose coverage, standard or way 
for collection has been changed constitutes appropriation.110 
Moreover, no unit may compel enterprises to contribute, 
subsidize or donate financial resources and materials.111 In 
addition, appropriation may take such forms as forcing 
enterprises to purchase negotiable securities,112 or 
compelling enterprises to take insurances against items other 
than those required by laws and regulations for compulsory 
insurance.113
The Appropriation Regulations also lay down procedures 
for enterprises to resist appropriations. For example, if an 
enterprise is not sure about the nature of a fee item 
requested by another unit, it shall report it to the financial 
department of the unit's next highest people's government.114 
The said financial department shall give an answer as to the 
payability of the fee within thirty days after receiving the 
report.110 If no answer is given within this period, it would 
be assumed that the financial department disagrees with the 
demand for the alleged fee.110 Only after the financial 
department has concluded that the fee can be paid may the 
enterprise pay.117 Moreover, if an enterprise does not agree
110 Art. 5 , ibid.
111 Art .6, ibid.
112 Art. 7 , ibid .
111 Art . 8 , ibid .
114 Art. 13, ibid.
115 Art. 14, Par.l, ibid.
u" Ibid.
117 Art. 13, ibid .
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with the decision of the said financial department, it can 
report to its next highest financial department.118
According to the Appropriation Regulations, state 
planning, financial, pricing, taxation, banking and other 
departments shall strengthen their supervision and check, and 
shall stop promptly any appropriation.119 However, it is the 
auditing department that shall, together with other relevant 
departments, carry out investigations into any alleged 
appropriation.120 The auditing departments are vested with 
extensive powers to handle inappropriate appropriations. For 
example, it can order any unit to return the appropriated 
financial resources or materials, which can be done through 
bank's direct debit, or other means.121 Finally, responsible 
persons of the units which did the appropriation may be 
investigated by various government departments, including 
supervision and judicial departments, with possible 
administrative and criminal liability.122
Despite these seemingly comprehensive legal provisions, 
the right to refuse random appropriation remain extremely 
difficult to enforce. The Appropriation Regulations are 
applicable to all enterprises registered with the ABIC,123 
but it is state enterprises that are suffering the most. This 
is mainly due to the fact that state enterprises are more 
vulnerable to government authorities. The above quoted Survey 
noticed that the units which appropriated money and materials 
from enterprises were principally those which could 
"condition" (zhiyue) in one way or another the enterprises in
118 Art. 14, Par . 2 , ibid .
119 Art, 17, ibid.
120 Arts. 15, 16 and 17, ibid.
121 Art.18, ibid.
122 Arts.19, 20 and 21, ibid.
121 Art . 25 , ibid .
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question.1^4 It also revealed that only nine per cent of the
surveyed enterprises were able to refuse illegal
appropriation. Although 21.5 per cent of surveyed enterprises 
did not face random appropriation, 11.7 per cent of the 
enterprises suffered seriously.
Indeed, random appropriation has become one of the most 
serious threats to enterprise autonomy. Requests and orders 
for various fees, contributions, subsidies, and donations 
constitute extremely heavy burdens for enterprises. In
practice, appropriations come from not only government
departments, but also enterprises and social organisations. In 
particular, government departments in charge, relevant 
government departments, functional departments, and many other 
departments such as public security organs, may frequently 
make demands for financial resources, materials and manpower 
from enterprises. Many enterprises cannot afford to refuse 
such appropriations. This is mainly because these government 
bodies have various powers and authorities to control 
enterprises. Good relations between enterprises and government 
authorities are always one of the dominating factors which 
enterprises have to consider. For example, since many 
government departments hold too many discretionary powers with 
regard to enterprises' fortune, even if an enterprise can 
insist upon its right to refuse random appropriation from such 
government authorities, the enterprise is very likely to 
suffer heavily in the coming months and years. The 
Appropriation Regulations states that any retaliation against 
enterprises which resists random appropriation shall be 
forbidden and no unit shall treat enterprises discriminately 
by taking advantage of its administrative and professional 
authority.^  But in practice, such provisions are not 
treated seriously. Enterprises have no option but to sacrifice 
their interests and autonomy, and give government authorities 
what they demand or order. As a result, the right to refuse
124 Supra note 101, p.25.
12R Art . 11 .
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random appropriation is largely ineffective.
The above discussions have demonstrated that immense 
difficulties have made it impossible for enterprises to defend 
their legal rights to participate in economic associations and 
to refuse random appropriation. In fact, such difficulties are 
also present for the enforcement of many other enterprise 
rights. For example, the SEL states that enterprises are 
entitled to establish, within the quotas set by the state, 
their internal organisations120 and no government organs and 
units shall ask enterprises to establish specific 
organisations or determine the size of enterprises' 
organisations.127 But in practice, enterprises have 
encountered difficulties in enforcing this right. Many 
enterprises have been forced to establish many internal 
offices corresponding to government bureaucracy. These offices 
relate to armed personnel, public security, auditing, 
statistic, judicial, supervision, energy, standard measure and 
many others,128 If an enterprise ignores order from 
government authorities and fails to establish relevant 
internal divisions, government officials will take every 
opportunity to retaliate and discredit enterprises. As a 
result, enterprises have to bear an expansion of unnecessary 
and unproductive personnel. Economic efficiency is sacrificed 
for the purpose of satisfying bureaucratic needs.
C. Limitation of administrative litigation
In order to fully understand the difficulties in 
enforcing enterprise autonomy, it is necessary to examine the 
availability of legal remedies when these rights are 
infringed. As mentioned earlier, Article 58 of the SEL
120 Art . 32 , SEL .
127 Art. 58, SEL.
128 See Peng Zhenmin and others, "Gaohuo Qiye de Zhengce 
Daodi Luoshi Le Duoshao?" (How Much of the Policy to 
Invigorate Enterprises Has Been Implemented?), in Jingji Gaige 
(Economic Reforms, Xi'an), No.l, 1991, pp.47-9 at 48.
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generally declares that no government departments or units may 
encroach on the autonomy which is lawfully enjoyed by 
enterprises in respect of their operation and management. It 
also reiterates enterprises' right to refuse random 
appropriation and that to establish internal organisations. 
According to Article 61, where decisions of the government or 
of government departments in charge violate Article 58, the 
affected enterprise is entitled to apply for the cancellation 
of such decisions to the department that made the decision. If 
the application is rejected, the enterprise is entitled to 
appeal to the government department at the next highest level 
or the government supervision department. Departments which 
receive appeals shall, within thirty days, give a ruling and 
notify the enterprise of the ruling. Thus, Article 61 offers 
enterprises with merely administrative, rather than legal, 
means to defend their rights and autonomy.
The PRC Administrative Litigation Law ("ALL")129 appears 
to provide a legal remedy for enterprises. According to 
Article 11 of the ALL, which defines the coverage of 
administrative litigations in the PRC, a legal person may take 
an administrative action if administrative organs have 
infringed on its "management autonomy" (iingying zizhuguan) 
provided by the law.lul Although no official explanation is 
available for explaining this "management autonomy", it has 
been suggested by some observers that "management autonomy" 
shall cover those rights as provided by the SEL.181 This 
suggestion seems to reflect the intention of the NPC as the 
state legislature. Thus, it is theoretically possible that 
enterprises may rely on the SEL provisions to defend their
129 Adopted on Apr. 4, 1989, and effective as of Oct.l,
1990. For the text in Chinese, in Bulletin of the State 
Council (1989), pp.297-307. For an English translation, see 
China Law and Practice, No.5, June 1989, pp.37-55.
130 Art. 11, Par. 3, ibid.
131 See Du Xiankong, "Woguo Xingbanbu de Xingzheng
Susongfa Jianxi" (Brief Analysis on the Newly Promulgated 
Administrative Litigation Law), in ZFLT, No.2, 1990, pp.35-40 
& p.78, at p.36.
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autonomy against the government intervention.
Up to the time of writing, I am not aware of any such 
case brought by an enterprise directly relying on the SEL and 
the ALL.133 Any such potential case should be distinguished 
from litigation merely brought by enterprises against 
administrative sanctions taken by a specific government 
department. The latter, which includes cases regarding, for 
example, fines imposed by a government authority specialised 
in maritime environment protection, had been possible even 
before the ALL came into force, and depended on the relevant 
provisions in the Civil Procedural Law (For Trial 
Implementation)133, as well as in various special laws.114
It fact, several important issues have to be addressed 
before administrative litigation can come into full play:
First, the authority and powers of various government 
departments and the autonomy of enterprises must be clearly 
and reasonably defined in laws and regulations. Otherwise, it 
is very difficult, if not impossible, for enterprises to 
charge relevant government authorities for having infringed 
enterprises' management autonomy. Unfortunately, as shown 
earlier, it is very difficult to draw a clear line between the 
respective authority of many government departments.
The existing legal treatment contains two major problems. 
One is that the law is far from comprehensive. Abstract legal 
provisions can only be understood and implemented by referring 
to policy instructions promulgated by government authorities. 
However, these policy instructions are so changeable that
liZ On my visit to China in early 1992, I was told by a 
number of government officials, law professors and judges that 
they never heard of the occurrence of such cases.
Art.3, par.2, The 1982 Civil Procedural Law (For Trial 
Implementation) has been replaced by a new Civil Procedural 
Law (1991) .
134 In this case, see Art. 41 of the Maritime Environment 
Protection Law of the PRC, adopted on Aug. 23, 1982 and
effective as from Mar.l, 1983. For the English-language text 
of this Law, see The Laws of the People's Republic of China, 
Foreign Language Press (Beijing) 1987, pp.296-304.
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enterprise autonomy is severely affected from time to time. 
The other problem deriving from the present legal treatment is 
that the SEL attempts to outline not only the autonomy and 
duties of enterprises but also the rights and responsibilities 
of government authorities. Accordingly, there are many 
ambiguities as well as areas which are not covered by these 
provisions. This approach leaves great room to be fulfilled, 
and a great role to be played, by government authorities, 
therefore jeopardizing enterprise autonomy.
It must be admitted that it is not an easy task to use 
law to define properly the rights of state enterprises and the 
authority of government departments. For example, legislation 
adopted in the 1960s in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
attempted to define the rights and responsibilities of state 
enterprises and government authorities by using either 
"positive" or "negative" methods, or indeed a combination of 
these two methods.iir' While the "positive" method referred to 
the way which expressly defined the rights and duties of 
enterprises, the "negative" or "exclusive" method was 
underlined by the principle that state enterprises were 
entitled to every right which did not encroach the enterprise 
autonomy. By comparing these two methods and by taking into 
account the difficulties in fully listing the rights for state 
enterprises, especially at a time of developing autonomy for 
enterprises, it was suggested that the second method, that was 
the exclusive method, was the better one.136
In China, however, the method adopted by the SEL to 
define the rights for state enterprises is similar to the 
"positive" method. Therefore, a radical way to reform the
13r> For a discussion, see The Socialist State Enterprise, 
supra note 9, pp.56-8.
13(1 Ibid. p. 57. It was also pointed out that, if the 
exclusive method was adopted, for the purpose of protecting 
national economic interests, statutory provisions should be 
used to limit or exclude certain rights for the state 
enterprise. On the other hand, certain rights should be 
regarded as inalienable to the enterprise, and they had to be 
respected by government authorities (see pp.57-8) .
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present legal treatment concerning the rights of the state 
enterprise would be that the law should, instead of trying to 
make all the inclusive stipulations, provide both inclusive 
and exclusive stipulations. Ideally, the law should only state 
clearly and definitely the authority that respective 
government departments may lawfully possess in relation to 
enterprise management, leaving all other functions, rights and 
autonomy to enterprises.U7 In this way, the respective 
rights and duties of government departments and enterprises 
would be made clear.
Secondly, even if express decisions made by government 
departments can be challenged at court, so long as government 
departments retain authority over enterprises' activities, the 
informal influence, which may nevertheless severely affect 
enterprise autonomy, can hardly be prevented by threatening to 
bring legal actions.
Thirdly, even if an enterprise can resist the 
intervention of relevant and local government authorities, it 
is largely questionable whether it can sue those government 
departments in charge of itself, that is, give zhuquan bumen. 
Given that such government departments possess many decisive 
powers, including that to appoint and remove enterprises 
directors, L(!i it is difficult for enterprises to insist its 
autonomy by merely relying on legal provisions.
Fourthly, it is at least worth considering the balance 
between the price of giving in to government departments and 
the potential huge cost which would result from a possible 
long process of litigation.
Last, but not least, even if an enterprise can succeed in
1,7 The Soviet Law on the State Enterprise (Association) 
of June 30, 1987 adopted the principle that "everything that 
is not prohibited is permitted (to the state enterprise)". For 
an introduction of this law, see Vladimir Laptev, "Legal 
Foundations of the Functioning of Enterprises and Associations 
in New Economic Conditions", in USSR Academy of Sciences 
(Institute of the State and Law), Perestroika and Law, Nauka 
Publishers (Moscow) 1989, pp.65-79, at p.70.
Arts. 44 and 55, SEL.
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administrative litigation against government authorities, such 
success may not be really worthwhile if the harmonious 
relationship between it and government departments is broken 
and if the enterprise is going to lose many future interests 
to government departments that possess great discretionary 
powers . 1-'!)
The combination of all the above factors, it seems, would 
be sufficient to prevent most, if not all, state enterprises 
from initiating administrative litigation in an attempt to 
reduce government interference in their management and 
autonomy.
V. Conclusion
In the post-Mao economic reforms, enterprise autonomy 
policy has gained formal legal recognition in the SEL and 
other laws and regulations. State enterprises have been 
granted a number of management rights. Government departments 
are instructed to apply indirect control and supervision, and 
to reduce direct intervention in enterprise operation.
These legal attempts reflect positive moves towards 
promoting enterprise autonomy. Enterprises have obtained a 
certain degree of autonomy which did not exist before the 
reforms. However, the present legal treatment contains 
critical shortcomings. The SEL provisions do not provide clear 
and radical provisions with regard to the rights and powers of 
enterprises. Enterprise autonomy are readily and necessarily 
subject to qualifications and restrictions imposed by central 
and local governments and their departments which used to 
directly manage state enterprises. Moreover, a number of 
declarative and abstract stipulations in the SEL regarding 
enterprise duties, together with other relevant laws and 
regulations, provide government authorities with easy access 
to interfere with enterprise management. As a result, the 
extent of government authority over enterprises is far from
ljy For a further discussion of this aspect, see Chapter 
Nine of the thesis.
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clear, leaving uncertainty to enterprise autonomy.
In practice, the implementation of enterprise autonomy is 
rather disappointing. Many rights and powers provided by the 
SEL for state enterprises are not only dependent on changeable 
state policies but also liable to excessive government 
control. The employment of legal mechanism to adjust and 
govern the legal relations between state enterprises and the 
state, therefore, falls short of the effectiveness and success 
that one might expect.
The PRC authorities are aware of the ineffective 
implementation of enterprise autonomy. In an attempt to 
revitalize large and medium-sized state enterprises, in May 
1991, the State Council issued a circular140 calling for new 
measures to be implemented. Thus, state enterprises will be 
allocated with less compulsory plans and may enjoy more 
autonomy in selling their products; some state enterprises may 
be authorised to carry out direct foreign trade. In 
particular, in order to reduce the burden on enterprises, 
government departments and other units have been told to stop 
illegal appropriation from enterprises. The new policy has 
been followed by many regional efforts to grant further 
autonomy to state enterprises.141
Since early 1992, state enterprises have been granted 
full autonomy in deciding on the wages for their workers and 
staff. In order to break "iron salaries", "iron bowls" (for 
workers and staff), and "iron chairs" (for cadres), government 
departments have been ordered to abolish all their previous 
rulings regarding the income distribution of enterprises under 
their jurisdiction. Enterprises will be allowed to, within the
140 For the text in Chinese, see RMRB, May 30, 1991. 
Reprinted in XHYB, No.5, 1991, pp.45-6.
141 For a report, see "Pilot Reforms to Revitalize State 
Enterprises", in BBC SWB, Oct.31, 1991, FE/1217, B2/4.
According to this report, for example, the Shanghai Municipal 
Government has granted a number of state enterprises with 
independent decision-making powers over many internal issues 
such as production planning, marketing, accounting, capital 
construction, technological upgrading, tax payment, 
employment, distribution and export.
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wage scale set by government authorities for urban workers, 
autonomously set their own salaries based on the success of 
their operation as well as the performance of individual 
workers.14i’
No doubt, these new measures will promote enterprise 
autonomy. But one has to bear in mind that the essential 
relationship between the state and government authorities on 
the one side and state enterprises on the other is the 
relationship between the owner and the manager of state 
property. The current reforms are merely concerned with the 
partial relaxation, not abolition, of extensive government 
control. It is the duty of government departments to keep a 
close eye on the management of state enterprises. Accordingly, 
under the present enterprise system, a difference can only be 
drawn between more or less government interference, rather 
than between existence or nonexistence of such interference.
Since the late 1980s, several more radical methods have 
been experimented with in pilot enterprises and selected 
areas. For example, the shareholding system attempts to limit 
the role and capacity of the state and government departments 
by defining them as shareholders in limited companies.143 
Concurrent with this reform is the attempt to replace existing 
government departments in charge with a new government 
department entitled "state assets administration bureau" 
(guovou zichan guanliju). The National State Assets 
Administration Bureau was formed in September 1988 and put 
under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance and the State 
Planning Commission. It is expected that this reform will 
relieve enterprises from the multiple controls currently 
exercised by many government departments. Enterprises will be 
held only responsible to the state assets administration 
bureau which shall make important policy decisions concerning 
enterprise administration. Other government departments will
141 For a report, see “China Gives Enterprises Autonomy
Over Wages", China Daily, Apr.14, 1992, p.l.
143 For an assessment and future prospect of this system, 
see Chapter Ten.
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be either abolished or kept away from supervising enterprises.
Since 1988, in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone of 
Guangdong Province, a "board of directors" (dongshihui) has 
been established in some state enterprises. According to 
relevant regulations.144 The board consists of managers, 
workers, entrepreneurs and economists selected from the 
society, as well as representatives from the government.145 
It shall represent the state as the owner of enterprise 
assets, and act as the highest decision-making body within an 
enterprise.14h The board is entitled to make important 
decisions including development strategy, appointment and 
removal of directors, approval of management targets, and 
other important financial and social issues.147
All these reforms have so far been carried out on a 
limited scale. Their effect is not yet clear. In terms of the 
relationship between enterprises and government departments, 
the abolition of various government departments in charge must 
be seen as a remarkable step forward. However, it remains to 
be seen how far these reforms would reduce government control 
as a whole, bearing in mind the new control by the state asset 
administration bureaux. The policy of "relative" autonomy, 
which has been declared as the fundamental aim of state 
enterprise reform, faces an uncertain future. So does the 
existing legal framework which is aimed at protecting 
enterprise autonomy.
144 See Provisional Provisions Concerning the Work of the 
Boards of Directors in State Enterprises Owned by Shenzhen 
City. For the text in Chinese, see Shenzhen Jingji Tequ 
Niani ian (Yearbook of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone) 
1989, Guangdong People's Press 1990, pp.500-2. Obviously, the 
experimentation is principally concerned with those state 
enterprises which are wholly owned by the Shenzhen Special 
Economic Zone, though other state enterprises (i.e. those 
owned by provincial and central governments) can "make 
reference" to these regulations, (see Art.28)
145 Ibid, Art. 5 .
14(> Ibid, Art. 2 .
147 Ibid, Art. 10 .
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CHAPTER FIVE
LEGAL ASPECTS OF FINANCIAL AUTONOMY
This chapter discusses the legal aspects of the financial 
autonomy of state enterprises.1 Part One reviews the Chinese 
socialist policies of profit distribution from the 1930s until 
1983. Part Two covers the primary reforms from 1983 to 1987, 
and concentrates on the system of taxation for enterprises. 
Part Three discusses the changes which the current contracting 
system has brought about and briefly looks at the possible 
future trends in this area. Part Four examines the legal 
nature of profits retained by state enterprises. The final 
part offers some concluding remarks.
I. Policies and Problems Before 1983
A. Taxation and profit distribution policies before 1978
The origin of the Chinese Communist taxation can be 
traced to a time as early as 1931 when the Provisional 
Taxation Rules were promulgated for the Chinese Soviet 
Republic.2 These Rules, on the one hand, abolished the
1 Tax laws and regulations are only discussed to the 
extent that they are directly related to the tax reform 
concerning state enterprises. For a general and detailed 
discussion on China's taxation system, see A.J. Easson and Li 
Jinyan, "The Evolution of the Tax System in the People's 
Republic of China", in R.H. Folsom and J.H. Minan (ed.), Law 
in the People's Republic of China, Martinns Nijhoff Publishers 
(Dordrecht) 1989, pp.830-51. Also see T .A . Gelatt and Ta-kuang 
Chang, Corporate and Individual Taxation in the People's 
Republic of China, Longman (Hong Kong), 2nd edn. 1987.
2 See "Zhonghua Suweiai Gongheguo Zanxing Shuize" 
(Provisional Rules of the Chinese Soviet Republic), 
promulgated on Nov.28, 1931 and effective from Dec.l, 1931.
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taxation system imposed by the Nationalist Government, and on 
the other hand, introduced new taxes on certain activities.1 
Although these Provisional Taxation Rules were fairly simple, 
they did to some extent reflect Chinese Communist attitudes 
towards taxation. Taxation was basically regarded as a 
necessary, but not a preferred, revenue source. It was 
necessary because money was needed to support the civil war 
against the Nationalists. In addition, because of the co­
existence of state-owned factories and cooperative and private 
industries in Communist-controlled areas, taxation had to be 
imposed, especially on private enterprises, in order to 
prevent them from "exploiting".
From the 1930s and until the end of the Socialist Reform 
of Bourgeois Industries and Commerce in 1956, different 
taxation policies were adopted for different types of 
enterprise. The Resolution for the Adoption of the Provisional 
Taxation Rules of 1931 expressly set forth class principles of 
taxation. It was decreed that the burden of taxation should be 
imposed upon "exploiting" classes and the duty to pay taxes be 
lifted for the exploited classes and poorest masses.4 
Accordingly, the Commercial and Industrial Taxes on 
consumption and productive cooperatives might be remitted if 
these cooperatives were approved by a county government and 
the approval subsequently reported to a superior provincial 
government.5
After the foundation of the PRC in 1949, the central 
government adopted various taxation policies to cope with 
enterprises of differing types of property ownership. In 1950,
For the text in Chinese, see Zhonghua Suweiai Falii Wenjian
Xuanbian (Selected Legal Documents of the Chinese Soviet 
Republic), Jiangxi People's Press 1984, pp.291-95.
3 There were only three types of taxes, namely, 
commercial taxes, industrial taxes and agricultural taxes.
4 Arts.6 and 19, ibid.
5 Arts.6 and 19, ibid.
186
the Government Administration Council (GAC) promulgated the 
Primary Rules for the Implementation of National Taxation 
Administration (hereinafter the "Primary Rules"),6 as an 
important step towards unifying national taxation policy. 
These Primary Rules provided for fourteen kinds of taxes.7 In 
principle, "public enterprises must pay taxes according to 
regulations" and "cooperatives must also pay taxes to the 
state".8 However, detailed regulations showed that 
discriminatory policies applied. For example, public 
enterprises, including state enterprises, were not to pay 
income tax, and cooperatives might get remittance or reduction 
to their income tax. Another example of inconsistent tax 
treatment occurred in the respect of Services Tax. From 1953, 
as to the same activity of wholesale, private enterprises were 
required to pay Services Taxes, but public enterprises were 
entitled to a remittance.
The varying policies described above reflected the 
Chinese government's dislike of taxation of public ownership 
enterprises. It is generally agreed that "profit" (1i run) 
differs from "taxation" (shuishou) on the ground that lirun is 
the income directly derived from investment while shuishou is 
levied by the state as the social administrator of enterprises 
and other entities. Accordingly, the state cannot directly 
benefit from private enterprises in the form of lirun, 
although it can impose shuishou on private enterprises. But as 
regards state enterprises, the situation can be confusing. The 
state is not only the social administrator but also the sole
r> For the text in Chinese, see Laws and Regulations of 
the PRC Central Government (1949-1950), pp.283-85.
7 These were: product tax, industrial and commercial tax 
(including services tax, income tax, street pedlar licence 
tax, temporary commercial tax) , salt tax, custom tax, wage 
income tax, deposit interest income tax, stamp tax, 
inheritance tax, transaction tax, animal slaughter tax, house 
property tax, land property tax, tax on special consumption 
activities, tax on license plate for the use of vehicles and 
boat. Some of them, including inheritance tax, were however 
never put into practice.
8 Art.8.
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investor in these enterprises. This dual status of the state 
has caused considerable policy confusion over the use of 
either taxation or direct profits payments in the case of 
state enterprises.
The treatment of "Income Tax" (suode shui) provides a 
good example for the present discussion. Income Tax is usually 
treated as the most important source of financial revenue in 
any jurisdiction. The Provisional Taxation Rules of 1931, 
being too simple, did not make clear the status of Income Tax. 
Nevertheless, before the establishment of the PRC in 1949, in 
some Communist-controlled areas, Income Tax on public 
enterprises was levied. For example, in 1948, the 
Administration of the Northeast China promulgated the 
Provisional Regulations on Commercial and Industrial Income 
Taxes in the Liberated Areas of Northeast China ("Provisional 
Regulations"). These Provisional Regulations, while 
authorising relief for certain public ownership industries, 
did require all enterprises, whatever their ownership form, to 
pay Income Taxes.9 However, the Provisional Regulations 
Concerning Industrial and Commercial Taxation of the PRC10 of 
1950 cancelled income taxation on public enterprises. Instead, 
direct profit payments became the main source of state revenue 
from these enterprises .11
9 For a detailed description of the rates of taxes, see 
Zhu Jianhua, Donqbei Jiefancrqu Caizhenq Jinqji Shicrao 
(Financial and Economic History of the Liberated Areas in 
Northeast China), Heilongjiang People's Press 1987, pp.454-56. 
It is noteworthy that the rates for income taxes did vary for 
different types of enterprises.
10 See the text in Chinese, in Laws and Regulations of the 
PRC Central Government (1949-50), pp.298-316.
11 Ibid. Art.5 provided: "Of the industrial and commercial 
taxes payable by public enterprises, the service taxes out of 
their turnover should be paid locally; and the income taxes 
should be replaced by the direct profit payments which shall 
be made in accordance with special measures." On Mar.3, 1950, 
the Government Administration Council adopted the Provisional 
Measures Concerning the Collection From Public Enterprises of 
the Industrial and Commercial Taxes. For the text, see ibid. 
pp.32 0-21.
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From 1950 and until 1983, potential income taxpayers were 
mainly collective and private enterprises as well as 
individual businesses. In fact, private and individual 
businesses almost disappeared after 1956 and did not reemerge 
until the early 1980s. The tax reforms, launched respectively 
in 1952, 1958, 1963 and 1972, were clearly moving towards the 
simplification of the tax regime, especially in the number of 
the categories of taxes. As a result, after 1973, no more than 
ten kinds of industrial and commercial taxes survived.12 While 
conducting these reforms, the government made clear its 
intention that taxation should be mainly aimed at 
discriminating between different types of enterprise. For 
example, according to the Tentative Measures Concerning 
Adjusting the Burden of Industrial and Commercial Income Taxes 
and Improving Taxation Administration of 1963,13 in .order to 
restrict individual economy and to strengthen collective 
economy, individual businesses were required to pay more 
Income Taxes than collectives. On the other hand, especially 
after the Socialist Reform of Bourgeois Industries and 
Commerce, which was concluded in 1956, the confusion about the 
taxability of state enterprises deepened. An extreme example 
was the experimentation in 1959 when some enterprises in seven 
industrial cities including Nanjing and Wuhan were chosen to 
test a new system under which no tax, whatsoever, was to be 
collected from state enterprises. Instead, state enterprises 
were required to hand in profits, in accordance with state 
plans, to the government. The amount to be handed over was the 
combined annual total of their previously paid taxes and 
profits. That experimentation caused so many problems14 that
12 The PRC Regulations on Industrial and Commercial Tax 
(Draft) were adopted by the State Council in March 1972 and 
effect from January 1973. See the text in Chinese, in Selected 
Enterprise haws and Regulations, pp.730-32.
13 Promulgated by the State Council on Apr.13, 1963. For 
the text in Chinese, see ibid., pp.726-30.
14 Those problems included random price reduction by 
enterprises previously paying high rate taxes, inequality in 
the distribution of profits between industries and commerce,
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it was soon cancelled. However, such failure did little to 
change the government's dislike of taxation on state 
enterprises. The confusion over the taxability of state 
enterprises remained for a long time until the late 1970s.
The idea that state enterprises should pay profits rather 
than taxes to the government was not found only in the 
thinking of the PRC government. For example, the Soviet Union 
had practised such a system and therefore provided a model for 
the Chinese government. However, the practical implementation 
of this idea differed considerably in these two countries.15 
In the Soviet Union, profits made by an enterprise were, in 
principle, kept by the enterprise and its supervising 
government department for the purpose of expanding future 
production. Thus, the amount of profits which went into the 
state's pocket actually consisted of two parts: the first was 
just ten per cent of the amount of the profits which the 
enterprise was required by the state plan to fulfil; and the 
second part was the amount of profits which were deemed to be 
excessive to the needs of the enterprise and its supervising 
government department. In contrast, the Chinese government 
ordered every state enterprise to pass all profits to the 
state. The funds were then repaid from the state budget to 
the enterprises in terms of the needs of the enterprises and 
of the possibilities for the distribution of financial 
resources in an area or industry as a whole. Therefore, the 
differences between China and the Soviet Union lay in both the 
process of profit distribution and the amount of profits being 
distributed. But in terms of productivity and economic 
efficiency, the Chinese system simply failed to provide proper 
incentives to enterprises. It failed because it removed the 
direct link between profits which an enterprise had made and
inefficiency and loss of state revenue. See Education 
Department of the Ministry of Finance, Zhongguo de Caizhenq 
Gaiqe (China's Financial Reform), Beijing University Press 
19 88, pp.66-7.
15 For a comparison, see Li Cha, Zhonggong Shuishou Zhidu 
(Taxation System in Communist China), Youlian Institute Press 
(Hong Kong) 1969, pp.174-78.
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the amount it could expect to retain for its own use. And even 
more unfortunately, in the late 1950s, after the breakdown of 
the Sino-Soviet relations, the Chinese government sought to 
justify its policy by openly criticising the Soviet style on 
the ground that the later was excessively concerned with 
material incentives, thus following the erroneous 
"revisionist"16 way.
The system for the distribution of enterprise profits 
between the 1950s and 1977 in China is usually described as 
tonqshou tongzhi, literally "unified income and unified 
expenditure". Under such a system, a state enterprise first 
paid industrial and commercial taxes. Income tax was not 
applicable to state enterprises which had to transfer their 
total profits to the state budget. The state would compensate 
for losses any enterprise had sustained. And the capital which 
an enterprise needed for expanding production could only come 
from the state budget.
It must, however, be mentioned that, in order to provide 
certain material incentives for the enterprise, during the
periods of 1952-1957 and 1962-1968, the Chinese government
tested an enterprise bonus system. Under this system, an
enterprise could expect to receive a limited bonus if it
overfulfilled profit quotas prescribed in the state plan. 
However, what seems to be more close to the idea of enterprise 
financial autonomy is the profit-sharing system that operated 
between 1958 and 1961. At that time, a government department 
might, according to the quotas fixed by its superior 
government offices, set the rate by which an enterprise under 
its supervision could share out all profits that the 
enterprise made. It was estimated that the average rate for 
the profit-sharing by enterprises during those four years was 
10.2 per cent of the total profits made by relevant
16 The term "revisionist" was used to refer to a way which 
was condemned to be against traditional Marxist theory.
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enterprises.17 Nevertheless, these tests were only exceptions 
to the general principle of tongshou tongzhi.
The above brief review of the distribution of enterprise 
profits in the PRC shows that before 1977, state enterprises 
did not have any significant degree of financial autonomy. The 
highly centralised distribution system was very convenient for 
the state and government authorities. This was because that 
the government authorities, by simply requiring state 
enterprises to hand over all their profits to the state, did 
not have to worry about making detailed rules for the 
collection of enterprises' income. In making decisions for 
allocating funds to enterprises, government authorities 
enjoyed great and arbitrary powers. However, this centralised 
distribution system failed to recognise the distinction 
between taxation and direct profit payments. The state 
remained both the owner and the direct manager of all state 
enterprises. Moreover, the role of enterprise' financial 
autonomy was ignored. Accordingly, the centralised system 
provided little incentive for enterprises to pursue economic 
efficiency. On the other hand, enterprises did not have to 
take financial responsibility since the government would 
always make good all the losses suffered by enterprises. As 
such, responsibility system did not exist.
From the legal point of view, the rigid regime simply 
ruled out any possibility for bargaining between an enterprise 
and its supervising government department or departments 
(except between 1958 and 1961 when a profit-sharing system was 
applied, as explained above). Unfortunately, the national 
economy sacrificed economic efficiency as the cost of this 
rigid regime. A more attractive system of profit distribution 
therefore had to be designed to combine rigid tax laws and 
rules, and yet provide flexible material incentives for 
enterprises. The Chinese economic reforms initiated in 1978 
have been exploring ways to create such a regime.
17 See China's Financial Reform, supra note 14, p.95.
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B . Enterprise fund and profit-sharing systems: 1978-1983
The reforms concerning the financial autonomy of state 
enterprises has been made one of the top priorities in China's 
post-Mao economic policies. In 1978, some state enterprises 
were allowed to withdraw "enterprise fund" (give ii jin)18 out 
of their annual profits. To qualify for a withdrawal of 
enterprise fund, an enterprise had to realise certain targets 
and indexes prescribed in the state plans. Initially, these 
targets and indexes included: annual output; types and
specifications of products; quality of products; consumption 
of raw and processed materials, fuel and power; labour 
productivity; costs; profits (including realised profits and 
profits turned over to higher authorities); turnover of 
working capital and fulfilment of supply contracts.19 However, 
in 197 9, the number of targets and indexes was reduced to just 
four, namely, annual output; quality of products; profits; and 
fulfilment of supply contracts. An enterprise which had 
accomplished all four targets would be entitled to collect as 
enterprise fund up to as much as five per cent of its total 
annual wages bill for workers. An enterprise which failed to 
fulfil all the four targets but nevertheless succeeded in 
realising profits quotas imposed by state plans, could still 
collect enterprise fund of 1.25 per cent of its total annual 
wage bill for workers, for each of the four targets it had 
actually carried out. An enterprise which failed to fulfil 
profits quota set by state plans was deprived of the right to
18 See "Guowuyuan Pizhuan Caizhengbu Guanyu Guoying Qiye 
Shixing Qiye Jijin de Guiding" (Ministry of Finance, as 
approved by the State Council, Regulations Regarding the 
Experimentation of Enterprise Fund System in State 
Enterprises, Nov.25, 1978), in Selected Enterprise Laws and
Regulations, pp. 319-21. The Regulations were later amended by 
the Ministry of Finance on Oct.17, 1979 in "Guanyu Gaijin
Guoying Qiye Tiqu Qiye Jijin Banfa de Tongzhi" (Circular 
Concerning Improving Measures Used by State Enterprises to 
Draw Enterprise Fund), ibid, pp.337-41.
19 The fulfilment of supply contracts was important 
because it was one of the major ways to implement state 
economic plans.
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withdraw enterprise fund. Moreover, enterprise fund had to be 
invested in the construction of workers' welfare equipment 
such as housing facilities. In addition, enterprises might 
also collect enterprise fund out of the profits exceeding the 
previous year's total profits. This part of the enterprise 
fund could only be used in production and technology 
innovation.
The enterprise fund system was, however, short-lived and 
only applied for approximately two years. Even in 1979 when 
this system was widely applied, some enterprises were selected 
to experiment with a new profit-sharing system,"0 which was 
similar to -- and given the same name as -- the system that 
operated between 1958 and 1961. The objective of this reform 
was to provide enterprises with opportunities to participate 
in greater profit-sharing. Until 1981, at least five different 
measures were employed for different enterprises. One was to 
share out profits exceeding the base amount as well as those 
exceeding the previous year's amount. The second was to share 
out all the profits which an enterprise had made. The third 
was to share out the profits exceeding those set by the state. 
The fourth was to share out profits exceeding those which had 
to be turned over to the state budget. The fifth applied to 
deficit enterprises only and involved sharing out the amount 
of loss-reduction.
In some respects, the profit-sharing system was similar 
to the enterprise fund system. In order to qualify for sharing 
profits, an enterprise had to realize four targets: annual
output, product quality, annual profits, and the fulfilment of 
supply contracts. The profits retained by enterprises had to 
be used for special purposes, including production 
development, workers' welfare, and workers' bonus.
The most difficult and controversial issue facing the 
profit-sharing system was the way by which profit-sharing
20 "Guanyu Guoying Qiye Shixing Lirun Liucheng de Guiding" 
(Provisions Concerning the Implementation of Profit-Sharing 
System by State Enterprises), promulgated by the State Council 
on July 13, 1979. See the text in Chinese, in Laws and
Regulations of the PRC (1979), pp.253-55.
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rates were determined. Generally speaking, the rates were to 
be set through gradation. In practice, such gradation took two 
steps:
The profit sharing rate for each province, municipality, 
autonomous region and central government department shall 
be set by the Ministry of Finance; and then within the 
set rates, each province, municipality, autonomous region 
and central people's government department shall 
respectively decide the profit-sharing rate for every 
enterprise under its supervision.21
Accordingly, the profit-sharing rate, which would in principle
be applied for at least three years, could vary considerably
in terms of region, department and indeed enterprise. The main
consideration for such flexibility was that each enterprise
was confronted with its own particular set circumstances
because of the irrationalities in the supply of materials, in
pricing policies and in many other factors. And for this
reason, it would be grossly unfair if all enterprises were put
under a single rate for profit sharing. In fact, at that time,
and indeed even at present, external environment and internal
circumstances vary considerably from enterprise to enterprise.
Some enterprises have little difficulty in making huge
profits, but others are never profitable.
In an attempt to equalise profitability among
enterprises, the government implemented a discriminatory rate
policy which operated to lower profit margins for highly
profitable enterprises and to increase profit margins for
struggling enterprises. However, the outcome deriving from
such discrimination, as well as variable base profit figures,
proved to be highly unacceptable. First, due to the existence
of the above mentioned irrational factors, some enterprises
could benefit greatly even if the rate for their share of
profits was set at a low level. But others had to suffer
despite endeavouring to enhance efficiency. Consequently,
complaints were inevitable. Secondly, the possibility of
negotiating for favourable profit-sharing rates blocked,
rather than helped, the implementation of the policy of
21 Ibid. par . 3 .
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separating government administration from enterprise 
management in financial matters. Instead of providing 
enterprises with financial autonomy, the profit sharing system 
operated to strengthen the position of government departments 
in charge of enterprises. An enterprise which had better 
relations and succeeded in its negotiations with government 
departments could expect to hand over less, and to retain 
more, of its profits. In addition, enterprises were again put 
under tight control from regional and departmental governments 
which were allowed to retain some of the profits handed over 
by enterprises under their supervision. Finally, and very 
importantly, one of the original purposes for implementing the 
profit-sharing system was to encourage the efficiency of 
enterprises by breaking up the so-called "big rice bowl" 
system in which inefficient enterprises received favourable 
protection. Although some enterprises did sincerely pursue 
this objective, many were able to escape from liability for 
inefficiency and bad management since the base profit figure 
could always be lowered by supervising government departments. 
Even worse, no liability was incurred for those enterprises 
which even failed to fulfil lowered base figures.
II. Tax Reform: 1983-198722
The enterprise fund and the profit sharing systems to 
some extent shook the old regime of tongshou tongzhi. In 
particular, the independent economic interests of enterprises 
were given recognition. However, as analyzed above, the 
profit-sharing system did not eliminate the adverse 
interdependent relationships between enterprises and their 
supervising government departments. The great flexibility of 
the system not only permitted the manipulation of base profit 
figures but also encouraged enterprises' dependence on
2i For a description and assessment of this period of the
tax reform, see Yang Xiaoping, "Progress and Problems in the 
Development of a New Income Tax System for State-Owned 
Enterprises in China", in Journal of Chinese law, Vol.3, 
Summer No.1 1989, pp.95-115.
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government authorities. Moreover, the reliance on direct 
profit payments, rather than taxation, was a continuation of 
the previous and defective practice. Therefore, further reform 
was needed.
A. Initial period
In 1980, almost at the same time as the profit-sharing 
system was initiated, the State Council decided to choose some 
five hundred state industrial enterprises located in eighteen 
provinces and municipalities to experiment with a new system 
in which profits payments were replaced by tax payments.22 
Those selected enterprises were instructed to pay to the state 
not only occupation fees for both fixed and working capital 
but also taxes -- including industrial and commercial tax, 
adjustment tax, income tax and city construction tax. The 
profits after the payments of these taxes and fees would be 
retained by enterprises for the purposes of production 
expansion and workers' collective welfare facilities as well 
as workers' bonuses which should be restricted to be less than 
twenty per cent of the total retained profits. As such, the 
experimentation paid considerable attention to taxation. 
Income Tax was reintroduced and applied to state enterprises. 
In addition, an "Adjustment Tax" (tiaojie shui) was introduced 
for the first time in the history of the PRC. This type of tax 
was intended to adjust the inequality existed between 
enterprises, mainly caused by external economic and 
administrative forces beyond enterprise control, such as the 
irrational state pricing system. The rate of Adjustment Tax 
for an enterprise was determined in accordance with a 
proportion between the profits to be retained by the 
enterprise after payment of City Construction Tax and Income 
tax, and the total income of the enterprise concerned. As a
2J On Sept. 10, 1980, the Income Tax Law of the PRC
Concerning Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures was adopted. For 
the text in English, see China's Foreign Economic Legislation, 
Vol.l, Foreign Language Press (Beijing) 1982, pp.36-40.
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result, the Adjustment Tax rate varied from enterprise to 
enterprise. And this characteristic made this type of tax 
unique among the various taxes.
In 1983, an important decision was made to "convert 
profit payments into tax payment" (li crai shui, hereafter the 
"Conversion"). The ultimate objectives of the Conversion can 
be described as: enterprises would pay taxes, and only taxes, 
to the state; all the profits after taxes would be retained by 
enterprises which would be entitled to use the retained 
profits autonomously. The Conversion was arranged into two 
steps. The first stage, between January 1983 and September 
1984, was a period of coexistence of profit payments and 
taxation. Although enterprises were asked to pay taxes, direct 
profit payments from enterprises continued to be an important 
source for the state revenue. The second step started in 
October 1984 and was aimed at radical conversion by which the 
state would only levy taxes from state enterprises.
On April 29, 1983, the Ministry of Finance promulgated
the Trial Measures Concerning the Conversion of Profits to 
Taxes in State Enterprises.24 This document set forth a basic 
framework for the first stage of the Conversion, An Income 
Tax, as a significant part of the financial contribution from 
enterprises to the state, was firmly established. All large 
and medium-sized profitable enterprises had to pay Income Tax 
at a single rate: fifty-five per cent of all their incomes.
The profits after the payments of Income Tax should be 
redistributed between the state and enterprises. Enterprises 
could retain a certain amount of profits in accordance with 
the quotas arranged by the state. The remaining part of the 
profits would be turned over to the state in four different 
ways -- depending on the specific situation, especially the 
profitability of an enterprise in question. These ways were: 
(1) increased progressive payments: (2) payments at a fixed
rate: (3) payments in the form of Adjustment Tax; and (4)
payments in a fixed amount (only applied to mining
24 See the text in Chinese, in Bulletin of the State 
Council (1983), pp.584-88.
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enterprises). In contrast, for small profitable state 
enterprises, Income Tax was based on eight graduated rates 
ranging from seven per cent on the first 1,000 RMB Yuan of 
taxable income to a maximum rate of fifty-five per cent over 
the portion of taxable incomes exceeding 200,000 Yuan. After 
the payment of taxes, all enterprises had to be responsible 
for their own financial affairs and the state would no longer 
allocate funds to them. But for those enterprises whose 
profits after taxation were still significant, the state could 
collect either contracting fees or a fixed amount of profits 
from enterprises.
B. Second period
The second step for the Conversion started in late 1984,
the same year as the Chinese urban economic reforms commenced.
After 1984, state enterprises would no longer directly make
direct profit payments to the state. Instead, the imposition
of eleven types of taxes was proposed.
The present industrial and commercial tax shall be 
divided, in terms of taxpayers, into Product Tax, Value 
Added Tax, Salt Tax and Services Tax. Both Income Tax and 
Adjustment Tax which have already been established in the 
first step of the Conversion shall be improved. And 
Resource Tax, City Preservation and Construction Tax and 
Vehicle and Boat Use Tax shall be introduced.25
In September 1984, the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress adopted a Decision which authorised the
State Council to issue relevant draft tax regulations for
trial application.2'1 This showed that the Chinese authorities
25 "Guoying Qiye Dierbu Li Gai Shui Shixing Banfa" (Trial 
Measures Concerning the Second Step of the Conversion by the 
State Enterprises), drafted by the Ministry of Finance, 
approved by the State Council on Sept.18, 1984. See the text 
in Chinese, in Laws and Regulations of the PRC (1984), pp.224- 
31, par.1.
20 See "Decision of the Standing Committee of the NPC on 
Authorising the State Council to Reform the System of 
Industrial and Commercial Taxes and Issue Relevant Draft Tax 
Regulations for Trial Application", in The Laws of the 
People's Republic of China (1983-86), Foreign Language Press
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had begun to pay serious attention to the large scale legal 
regulation over the tax reforms. Many regulations and draft 
regulations have since been promulgated by the State Council 
as a guidance for implementing the Conversion. The proposed 
eleven types of taxes and their application are briefly 
discussed below.
First, Income Tax is significant.27 As at the first stage 
of the Conversion, all large and medium-sized profitable state 
enterprises pay fifty-five per cent of their incomes to the 
state revenue. However, the eight graduated rates which 
formally applied to small profitable enterprises28 were 
amended. The present range is from ten per cent to fifty-five 
per cent. Moreover, the amounts of taxable incomes for small 
enterprises were also significantly increased.
Secondly, there were minor changes to Adjustment Tax. In 
order to determine an Adjustment Tax rate for an enterprise, 
a base figure has to be settled. This base figure is 
calculated on the basis of the enterprise's realised profits 
in 1983, after balancing any possible changes following the 
varied rates concerning Product Tax, Value Added Tax and 
Service Tax, and after the introduction of Resources Tax. The 
formula for determining the Adjustment Tax base rates is: Base 
Rate = {Base Profits in 1983 - (imputed Income Tax + Retained 
Profits as approved in 1983)} / Base Profits.29 In addition, 
an enterprise's incremental profits are only subject to
(Beijing) 1987, p.150.
27 See 1 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guoying Qiye Suodeshui 
Tiaoli Caoan" (the PRC Draft Regulations on the Income Tax of 
State Enterprises), promulgated by the State Council on 
Sept.18, 1984, effective from Oct.l, 1984, in Ministry of
Finance, Caizheng Fagui Gongzuo Shouce (Work Handbook on 
Financial Laws and Statutes, hereafter "Handbook"), China 
Financial and Economic Press (Beijing) 1988, pp.126-30.
28 The criteria for judging a small enterprise were also 
relaxed. Many previously labelled large or medium-sized 
enterprises were degraded into small enterprises and as a 
result they might pay less taxes.
29 See Yang Xiaoping, supra note 22.
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reduced Adjustment Tax rate. The formula applied is: 
Incremental Rate = Base Rate x (1-7 0%) .80
Thirdly, until the time of the writing, Household 
Property Tax, Land Use Tax and Vehicle and Boat Use Tax have 
not been put under any formal regulations. Actually they only 
exist nominally. There, however, have been detailed 
regulations on Product Tax,81 Value Added Tax,22 Service 
Tax,33 Salt Tax,34 Resources Tax39, and City Preservation and 
Construction Tax.3(1
It is noteworthy that the above-mentioned taxes do not 
contain all the taxes which enterprises have to pay. In fact, 
Animal Slaughter Tax, Special Oil-Consuming Tax, Agricultural 
and Animal Husbandry Tax, Bonus Tax, and Adjustment Taxes for
30 "Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guoying Qiye Tiaojieshui
Zhenshou Banfa" (PRC Measures for the Collection of State 
Enterprises Adjustment Tax), State Council, Sept.18, 1984,
effective from Oct.1, 1984 (Art.7), in Handbook, supra note
27, pp.131-4.
31 1 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chanpingshui Liaoli Caoan" 
(The PRC Draft Regulations on the Product Tax), in Handbook, 
supra note 27, pp.79-100.
32 1 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zengzhishui Liaoli Caoan"
(The PRC Draft Regulations on Value Added Tax), in Handbook, 
supra note 27, pp.103-7.
33 "Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Yingyeshui Liaoli Caoan" 
(The PRC Draft Regulations on Services Tax) , in Handbook, 
supra note 27, pp.109-13.
34 "Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Yanshui Liaoli Caoan" (The 
PRC Draft Regulations on the Salt Tax), in Handbook, supra 
note 27, pp.115-9.
39 "Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Ziyuanshui Tiaoli Caoan"
(The PRC Draft Regulations on Resources Tax), in Handbook,
supra note 27, pp.121-24.
3<> "Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengshi Weihu Jianshe Shui
Zanxing Tiaoli" (PRC Provisional Regulations on City 
Preservation and Construction Tax), promulgated by the State 
Council on Feb.8, 1985, in Handbook, supra note 27, pp.182-83.
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the Orientation of Investment on Fixed Property37 are also 
collected in accordance with existing legislation. In 
addition, since January 1, 1983, state enterprises, together 
with other entities, have been required to make contributions 
to key energy and transportation projects.38
The combination of all these types of taxes have made the 
taxation for state enterprises a very complex system. For the 
purpose of this discussion, it is neither possible nor 
necessary to describe this complex system in great detail. It 
is, however, interesting to compare the tax treatment for 
state enterprises with that for other types of enterprises. 
Such a comparison will serve both to explore the official 
objectives of the tax reforms and to explain the difficulties 
facing the reforms. Indeed, it was these difficulties that led 
to a decisive policy shift in 1987.
First, most taxes, except a few, such as Income Tax, 
Adjustment Tax and Bonus Tax, provide equal treatment for all 
types of enterprises. State, collective, private, and foreign 
investment enterprises have to pay at the same rate on the 
Product Tax, Value Added Tax and many other taxes. This tax 
equalisation between different enterprises regardless of their 
property ownership demonstrated the somewhat determination of 
the Chinese government to unify taxation of all enterprises 
within the territory of the PRC.
Secondly, significant differences exist in the treatment 
of Income Tax between different enterprises. All large and 
medium-sized state enterprises have to pay fifty-five per cent 
of their taxable incomes. In contrast, the Income Tax rates
37 Promulgated by the State Council on Apr.16, 1991 and 
effective as of 1991. For the main text in Chinese, see XHYB, 
No. 5, 19 91, pp. 64-5. This type of tax which replaced the 
previously applied Construction Tax is aimed to implement the 
state's "industrial policy" (chanye zhenqce) which from time 
to time puts emphasis on some industries and discriminates 
against others,
38 "Guojia Nenyuan Jiaotong Zhongdian Jianshe Jijin Zhenji 
Banfa" (Measures Concerning the Collection of Key State Energy 
and Transportation Projects). Issued by the State Council on 
Dec.15, 1982, in Handbook, supra note 27, pp.21-5.
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for collective enterprises3'1 are calculated at graduated bases 
ranging from ten per cent to fifty-five per cent. These rates 
are exactly the same as those for small state enterprises. 
Therefore, a demarcation exists not only between state 
enterprises and collective enterprises, but also between large 
and medium-sized state enterprises and small state 
enterprises. The fact that large and medium-sized enterprises 
have to pay more to the state reflects a deep concern of the 
Chinese government over the role that they should play. The 
underlying formula has been described as that "the state gets 
the most, enterprises get less, and individuals get the 
least". The primary aim of this socialist formula is to enable 
the state to obtain a steady and guaranteed amount of incomes 
from large and medium-sized state enterprises. But the 
discriminatory treatment of income taxes for different 
enterprises has caused concern over state enterprises' ability 
to compete with other types of business entities in a 
socialist economy which purports to combine both market forces 
and state planning. Large and medium-sized state enterprises 
have to bear the unreasonably heavy burden of Income Tax. 
Moreover, discriminatory treatments are based on the size of 
state enterprises, rather than the amount of taxable income or 
other criteria. Although the Chinese government in 1984 
relaxed the criteria for defining "small enterprises", thus 
characterising more state enterprises as "small" ones for the 
purpose of income taxation, the discrimination of Income Tax 
appears not to be helpful in encouraging all enterprises to 
make as much profits as possible. An enterprise which has made 
more profits is not necessarily entitled to retain more. In 
addition, the difference is also apparent in the income 
taxation between state enterprises and foreign investment 
enterprises. For example, Sino-foreign equity joint ventures 
must pay only thirty per cent of taxable incomes, plus three
39 "Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiti Qiye Soude shui Zanxing 
Tiaoli" (PRC, Provisional Regulations on the Income Tax of 
Collective Enterprises). Promulgated by the State Council on 
Apr.11, 1985, in Handbook, supra note 27, pp.136-39.
203
per cent of local tax.40 Consequently, there have been calls 
for the unification of income taxation for all enterprises 
within the PRC, whatever their property ownership.
Thirdly, Adjustment Tax is unique to state enterprises. 
It was thought that this kind of tax would balance the 
financial inequalities between enterprises by taking more from 
the more profitable enterprises. But the result have not been 
as good as one might have expected. Although the state has set 
certain rules for determining the Adjustment Tax rate for each 
enterprise, the fact that each enterprise has its own special 
rate has caused problems. Most notably, the Adjustment Tax 
gives government authorities great discretionary power. The 
Measures for Collecting Adjustment Tax41 provide that the rate 
shall be settled through negotiations between competent 
government financial and taxation departments and the 
government departments in charge of the enterprise concerned. 
Such a process means not only flexibility but also 
uncertainty. Moreover, enterprises continue to be dependent on 
government authorities which are free to determine the rates 
of the Adjustment Tax.
When the Conversion was proposed in 1983, the Ministry of 
Finance singled out five advantages for this Conversion.42 
These included, incentive for enterprises to retain more by 
making more profits; fixed rate for the distribution of
40 The taxation on all foreign investment enterprises, 
including equity and cooperative joint ventures, and wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises, has been unified by the PRC Income 
Tax Law on Foreign Investment Enterprises which was adopted by 
the NPC on Apr.9, 1991 and effective from Jul.l, 1991. For an 
English translation, see China Law and Practice, No.3, Apr.15, 
1991, pp.25-35. See Art.3.
41 Supra note 30, Art. 5 .
42 "Guowuyuan Pizhuan Caizhengbu Guanyu Quanguo Ligaishui 
Gongzhuo Huiyi De Baogao He Guanyu Guoying Qiye Ligaishui 
Shixing Banfa De Tongzhi" (The Ministry of Finance's Report, 
as approved and noticed by the State Council, on the National 
Work Conference on the Conversion and the Trial Measures 
Concerning the Conversion of State Enterprises), Apr.24, 1983. 
See the text in Chinese, in Laws and Regulations of the PRC 
(1983), pp.137-47, at p.139.
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profits between the state and enterprises; breaking up of the 
limitations imposed by various government departments and 
regions; the use of economic leverage; and proper financial 
income for state enterprises and individuals. These hopes, 
however, have proved to have been partially realised. For
example, the flexible Adjustment Tax has undermined the
rigidity of tax laws and affected the incentive for
enterprises which must pay more if they make more profits. 
Again, the simplified and high Income Tax rate for large and 
medium-sized state enterprises has threatened the functioning 
of taxation as a kind of economic leverage. Thus, the tax 
reform starting from 1983 has met difficulties in achieving 
the aims set out by original designers.
Significant credit must, however, be given to the tax 
reforms. At least, taxation is no longer reserved for non­
state enterprises. Like other enterprises, state enterprises 
are now subject to many types of taxes, including income taxes 
Nevertheless, this reform has overemphasized the role of
taxation on state enterprises. It was thought that state 
enterprises, like other enterprises, would pay only taxes to 
the state which would no longer collect profits from 
enterprises in any other way. Accordingly, a high Income Tax 
rate was set for large and medium-sized state enterprises. 
Even if one disregards the above described negative effects of 
such a high rate, this treatment is not without question. A 
fundamental and theoretical issue is that "tax" (shui) and 
"profits" (li.) are again being confused. As far as state 
enterprises are concerned, levying taxation and direct profit 
payments in the single form of extremely high rate for Income 
Tax fails to take into account the differences between shui 
and l_i. The state, as the social administrator, can levy 
various taxes on state enterprises. But the exclusion of any 
direct profit payments after taxation shows an ignorance of 
the state's status as the sole investor of state enterprises. 
In this sense, the tax reforms represent an unsuccessful move 
towards fixing a fair formula for the distribution of 
enterprise profits between the state and enterprises.
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III. Tax Reform After 1987
A. Impact of the contacting system
Since 1987, the most significant policy change has been 
the large scale implementation of the "contracting" (chenqbao) 
system -- a subject to be examined in detail in Chapter Nine. 
Under this system, a state enterprise is required to sign with 
government authorities a chenqbao contract which assigns many 
targets to the enterprise. According to the Provisional 
Regulations Concerning the Contracting Management 
Responsibility System in State Industrial Enterprises 
("Chengbao Regulations"),42 financial turnover from 
enterprises to the state is one of the three main contents of 
the chengbao contract.44 The profits which an enterprise must 
hand over to the state are called "profit target" (shangj iao 
mubiao renwu or chengbao mubiao). This target must be settled 
before a chengbao contract is concluded. In fact, a chengbao 
contract does not take effect until the superior financial 
authorities have given their consent to the profits target.45
The main components of the profit target have been 
subject to several changes. In 1987, the required targets
41 For the text in Chinese, see Law and Regulations of the
PRC (1988), pp.735-44.
44 Ibid. Art.8. The other two contents are the completion
of technological transformation tasks and the linkup of the 
payroll with economic effectiveness.
45 See "Caizhengbu Guanyu Guoying Dazhongxing Gongye Qiye 
Tuixing Chengbao Jingying Zerenzhi Youguan Caiwu Wenti de 
Zanxing Guiding" (The Ministry of Finance, Interim Provisions 
on the Implementation of the Chengbao System in Large and 
Medium Sized State Industrial Enterprises, Aug.21 1987, 
hereafter "Interim Provisions"), par.4. See the text in 
Chinese, in Laws and Regulations of the PRC (1987), pp.344-47. 
Also see "Quanmin Suoyouzhi Gongye Qiye Tuixing Chengbao 
Jingying Zerenzhi Youguan Caiwu Wenti de Guiding" (Provisions 
on the Implementation of Chengbao System in State Industrial 
Enterprises, Apr.27, 1988, hereafter "Provisions"), par.5. See 
the text in Chinese, in Bulletin of the State Council (1988), 
pp.852-55.
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referred to Income and Adjustment Taxes only.45 But since 
1988, the target has been extended to include also a certain 
amount of profits.47 For those enterprises which have chosen 
to pay Income Tax separately, the target may only include 
Adjustment Tax and profits. But this type of situation is not 
significant and therefore is not the main subject of the 
present discussion.
It has been repeatedly emphasized that the profit target 
must in no way include taxes other than Income and Adjustment 
Taxes.48 Therefore every enterprise must pay Product Tax, 
Value Added Tax, Service Tax and many other taxes in 
accordance with relevant laws. In fact, an enterprise has to 
pay not only these taxes but also Income and Adjustment Taxes 
as well. Although profit target may include, inter alia, 
Income and Adjustment Taxes, a difference in the amount of 
taxes always exists between the figure written in a contract 
and the sum that an enterprise finally pays to the state at 
the end of a financial year and in accordance with tax laws. 
Both Income and Adjustment Taxes figure as fixed in a chengbao 
contract is just a basis which an enterprise must pay. An 
enterprise may have to pay, according to tax laws, either more 
or less than the figure arranged in a chengbao contract, 
depending on the productivity, economic efficiency, market, 
and many other factors.
The profit target varies from enterprise to enterprise 
and even from year to year for an industrial enterprise. 
According to the Chengbao Regulations,49 the main forms of 
enterprise profit payment include: (1) progressive increases
in profit payments to the state; (2) fixed amount of payment 
to the state, with the excessive part being shared by both the 
state and enterprises; (3) fixed payments to the state; and
46 Interim Provisions, ibid, par.3.
47 Provisions, supra note 45, par. 2 .
48 Interim Provisions, par.3; Provisions, par.2. Both in
supra note 45.
49 Art. 9 . Supra note 43.
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(4) loss reduction. Of these four forms, "loss reduction" is 
the only one which applies to deficit enterprises. The target 
of these deficit enterprises is to reduce every year a certain 
proportion of the losses . The amount of profits which is above 
the target amount belong to the enterprises rather than the 
state. However, enterprises which have relatively small profit 
margins may choose to pay a fixed proportion of its profits to 
the state. As a result, these enterprises are allowed to 
retain the profits exceeding this fixed amount.
In contrast, forms (1) and (2) are more complicated 
because the payment amount is relatively uncertain. The 
starting point is to settle a base payment figure. In 1989, 
this figure was fixed at no less than the total amount of 
Income and Adjustment Taxes which an enterprise was supposed 
to pay in 1986.50 Subsequent to the change made in 1988, the 
base figure should now be no less than the total of Income and 
Adjustment Taxes and certain amount of the profits. For some 
enterprises, these base figures are fixed. And profits which 
are above these base figures will be shared by both the state 
and enterprises themselves on a proportionalV basis. For 
others, the base figures may only be their profits target for 
the first year of the contractual term. The profit target for 
the consecutive years within a chengbao term will be increased 
progressively.
The profits target, whether fixed or not, is 'relatively 
easy to define. As indicated above, these figures are merely 
reference bases. Whatever the profit target or base figure (as 
the case may be) is, every enterprise has to pay taxes to the 
state in accordance with the law. By the end of a financial 
year, if the total amount of taxes to be paid by an 
enterprises Income and Adjustment Taxes exceeds the profit 
target prescribed in a contract, then the government financial 
department will return the above-target part to the
50 Some enterprises may choose an average figure of the 
previous years' payment as the base figure. See Provisions, 
supra note 45, par.4.
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enterprise/'1 For example, if the profit target for an 
enterprise in 1991 set in a contract is five million Yuan, and 
if the enterprise has actually paid six million Yuan in Income 
and Adjustment Taxes in 19 91 in accordance with the law, the 
enterprise would be eligible to withdraw from relevant 
government financial departments one million Yuan, that is, 
the above-base figure amount. On the other hand, if an 
enterprise fails to turn over the exact amount of the profit 
target as settled in a chengbao contract in the form of Income 
and Adjustment Taxes, the enterprise, according to the law, is 
obliged to make up for the deficit from its own capital. In 
the above example, if the enterprise actually paid 4.5 million 
Yuan in taxes, then it had to pay to the state 0.5 million 
Yuan out of its own financial reserves.
As a result, the overall effect which the current 
chengbao system has made on the post-1983 tax reforms is 
something of a compromise between the radical approach (ie. 
taxation or shuishou) and the traditional approach (ie. profit 
payment or lirun shangjiao) . On the one hand, the profit 
target as settled in advance in a chengbao contract is in 
essence the amount of the profits paid by an enterprise to the 
state. Although the target appears to include in most cases 
both Income and Adjustment Taxes, these taxes are symbolic 
rather than essential and compulsory. This is mainly because 
the taxes included in a contract represent just the record and 
amount of the previous year(s). Moreover, an enterprise may 
actually pay an amount in taxes which is either more or less 
than the amount recognised in a contract. Since 1988, the 
symbolic nature of the profit target in a chengbao contract 
has been made more obvious as for most enterprises a certain 
amount of the profits in addition to original taxes must be 
included in the profit targets.
Taxation rules established in the tax reform have been
51 Actually the account is settled every three months, and 
eight per cent of the above-target part will be returned 
immediately to the enterprises. See Provisions, Supra note 45, 
par.6,
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maintained. Enterprises continue to pay many taxes, including 
Income and Adjustment Taxes. However, because the amount of 
the profit target is always fixed, taxation under the chengbao 
system has been distorted. An enterprise must pay taxes to the 
state, but it is entitled to retain the amount of taxes which 
is above the profits target as provided in a contract. 
Therefore the "gratis nature" (wuchangxing) of taxation is no 
longer true under the chengbao system. Moreover, since the 
profits target may include profits as well as taxes, and since 
an enterprise usually pays only Income and Adjustment Taxes to 
cover the profit target, lirun (profit payment) and shuishou 
(taxation) have again been mixed. In fact, the Chinese 
authorities have deliberately used the term "profit target" 
(lirun zhibiao) rather than "tax target" (shuishou zhibiao) in 
contracts. Furthermore, the high rate (55%) of Income Tax for 
large and medium-sized state enterprises originally set in the 
tax reforms between 1983 and 1987 has made the confusion 
between taxation and profits both possible and necessary. The 
state has paid more attention to its income than to the way 
through which its revenues are collected. As a result, the 
present practice does not differ significantly from the old 
system in which direct profit payments were regarded as a more 
important means for settling the financial relationship 
between the state and state enterprises.
B. A new system
Since 1988, the Chinese government has decided to 
experiment with in pilot areas a new system described as shui 
li fenliu, shuihou huandai, shuihou chengbao, literally 
"separating taxes and profits payments, repaying enterprise 
loans after taxation, and contracting after taxation."52 The
52 For a report on this new system, see "China Tries Out 
Reform in Payment of Taxes", China Daily, Jul.22, 1991, p. 3.
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new system will bring some changes to the existing practice.53 
First, taxation and profit payments are separated. The profit 
target in a chenqbao contract includes only profit payments 
after income taxation. Rather like the practice concerning 
government enterprises in the West, Chinese state enterprises 
under the new trial system first pay many types of taxes to 
the state in accordance with relevant laws. These taxes 
include Income Tax. After the payment of tax, the profits made 
by state enterprises are divided into two parts. One part is 
to pay the profit target as settled in advance in a chengbao 
contract. The remainder is retained by the enterprise.
Secondly, the new system requires a substantial lowering 
of the Income Tax rate. All profitable state enterprises will 
pay income tax at a unified rate of thirty-three per cent of 
their total taxable income.54
Thirdly, Adjustment Tax will be abolished.55 The balance 
of profit margin between enterprises of different 
profitability will be maintained through the chengbao after 
taxation. The ways to realise such chengbao targets may be the 
same as those provided by the Chengbao Regulations. But the 
amount of profit targets may be significantly smaller as tax 
payments have been excluded from this amount.
Fourthly, enterprises which are experimented with the new 
system may only use their after-tax profits to repay bank 
loans used for fixed assets investment.55 In contrast with the 
popular practice whereby enterprises may repay bank loans with 
their gross profits, this measure under the new trial system
53 On Aug. 14, 19 91, The Ministry of Finance and the State 
Commission for Economic System Reform jointly promulgated the 
"Measures for Experimenting with the shui li fenqliu, shuihou 
huandai, shuihou chenqbao in State Enterprises". For the text, 
see Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xinfagui Huibian (Collection of 
New Legislation of the PRC), China Legal System Press 
(Beijing), No,3, 1991, pp.118-24.
54 Section 1, par . 2 , ibid .
55 Section 1, par. 4, ibid.
5b Section 1, par. 3, ibid.
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is mainly aimed both at making enterprises themselves solely 
responsible for their loan repayment and at increasing the 
income for the state revenue.
The practical implementation of the new system can be as 
complex as the previous chengbao system implemented since 
1987. However, under the new system the distinctions between 
taxation and direct profit payments will be made clear. The 
state, as the social administrator, can levy taxes in 
accordance with tax laws. Being the owner and investor of the 
state enterprises, the state is also entitled to be paid 
"dividends" by enterprises. Such dividends and new chengbao 
targets are the components of the profit target currently 
included in most chengbao contracts.
This new system is still controversial. Even if this new 
system is eventually extended to all large and medium-sized 
state enterprises, it remains to be seen whether it will 
provide the appropriate mechanism for guaranteeing the 
financial autonomy for state enterprises. The manner in which 
the ratio for the distribution between the state and state 
enterprises of after-tax profits made by enterprises will be 
decided and properly fixed is very uncertain, and may not 
leave enterprises with full financial autonomy.
IV. Enterprise Capital and its Legal Nature
One of the most important results of the recognition of 
enterprises' independent interests has been the existence of 
enterprises' retained profits. These retained profits, 
however, have taken many forms. As described above, in 1978, 
it was permitted to withdraw enterprise fund. Although the 
subsequent profit-sharing system abandoned the term of 
"enterprise fund", it nevertheless recognised that enterprises 
could retain some profits from their contribution to the 
state. The current chengbao system again has made it possible 
that efficient enterprises may keep their own reserves up to 
a significant amount. From 1988, according to the Chengbao
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Regulations,57 enterprises which implement the chengbao system 
shall conduct the trial system of opening separate capital 
accounts. This involves separating the state capital and 
enterprise capital and entering them into different accounts. 
Therefore a division between state capital and enterprise 
capital must be made.
It is interesting to note that here the concept of
"capital" (zijin), as distinct from "fund" (iiiin), is used. 
Traditionally, "fund" refers to money reserved and employed 
for special purposes, while "capital" has a more general 
meaning so that it includes not only "fund" but also the value 
of assets and property. Therefore, under the enterprise fund 
system implemented in 1978 and 1979, the fund had to be
invested and used for special purposes. But as far as
accounting is concerned, neither the enterprise fund system
nor the profit-sharing system required enterprises to open a 
separate account for the profits they retained. And it was not 
clear what was the difference, if any, between state capital 
and enterprises' retained capital. Apart from the rules 
governing the employment of the retained profits, there were 
no detailed regulations on the mixed use of the two. Thus, 
enterprises' retained profits were sometimes employed in the 
same way as state capital, or they were even absorbed into 
state capital.
The Chengbao Regulations seem to initiate a new regime on
the accounting treatment. They set out the practical
approaches for dividing state and enterprise capital:
All fixed assets and cash flow possessed by an enterprise 
before a contract comes into force shall be listed as 
state capital.
The portion of profits retained during a contract period 
as well as any fixed assets and supplementary cash flow 
brought in by such retained profits shall be listed as 
enterprise capital.
Fixed assets bought with borrowed funds during the 
contract period which are repaid with retained profits, 
shall be listed as enterprise capital. If the loan is 
repaid before tax, the capital shall be converted into 
state capital and enterprise capital, in accordance with
57 Art. 34. Supra note 43.
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the proportion of profit distribution between the state 
and the enterprise before the contract comes into 
effects.
The depreciated funds of fixed assets withdrawn during 
the contract period shall be listed separately as state 
capital or enterprise capital in accordance with the 
proportion of fixed assets in respect of state capital 
and enterprise capital.58
These complex rules to some extent reflect the Chinese
government's concern over the introduction of the new separate
accounts system. On the one hand, enterprise capital account
shall have its sources of incomes. On the other hand, the
state does not permit the state capital and assets to be
transferred into enterprise capital account. Furthermore, the
state's reluctance over the opening of the enterprise capital
account has also been confirmed by the Chengbao Regulations in
its assertion that enterprise capital is "owned by the whole
people (quanmin suoyou)".59 However, this assertion raises
questions as to the status as well as the function of the
enterprise capital.
The most important function of the enterprise capital is
represented by their status as "risk funds" (fenqxian jijin). ■
The Chengbao Regulations provided:
Enterprise capital shall be treated as risk funds for any 
losses incurred by a contractual operation. When the 
contract is over, the capital shall be injected into the 
enterprise capital of the next phase of chengbao.
If an enterprise does not have enough profits to turn 
over the required amount to the state, it may make up the 
shortfall by using the profits that it retained that 
year,- if this is not enough, it may use the enterprise 
capital.50
The risk funds nature of the enterprise capital is deeply 
associated with the chengbao system. As explained in earlier 
discussion, when an enterprise overfulfils the profit target 
as fixed in a chengbao contract, it can retain a certain 
amount of the profits . These profits then enter into the
58 Art. 34. Supra note 43.
5y See Art.34. Ibid. Quanmin suoyou is usually understood 
as quoiia suoyou (state-owned).
60 Art. 35. Ibid.
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enterprise capital account. However, some enterprises may fail 
to carry out their profit targets, and they must then pay the 
defaulting amount with their enterprise capital {if any), 
rather than with state capital. In such circumstances, the 
state requires enterprises to keep enterprise capital as a 
kind of security for chenqbao contracts. Moreover, if an 
enterprise does not possess enough enterprise capital to 
satisfy the defaulting amount in comparison with the profit 
target, it must not use the state capital to make good the 
defaulting part. If the superior government departments do not 
relieve a defaulting enterprise of such deficit, the 
enterprise has to keep the record of the deficit and make good 
such deficit in the coming years.
In addition to its risk funds nature, the enterprise 
capital can also be seen as a reward for efficient 
enterprises. The enterprise capital may be used for 
production, welfare, bonus and many other purposes. Thus, 
enterprises and their workers, rather than the state, may 
directly benefit from the enterprise capital.
The legal nature of the enterprise capital is, however, 
controversial when enterprises' right to this sum of capital 
is discussed. As already analyzed in Chapter Three, according 
to the GPCL and the SEL, state enterprises enjoy the right of 
"management", rather than that of ownership, towards the 
assets and capital under their control. Nevertheless, the 
right of a state enterprise towards its enterprise fund is not 
clear.
Both the GPCL and the SEL were promulgated before the 
enterprise capital system was introduced. They could not 
foresee a division in the whole assets and capital of a state 
enterprise. Indeed, the GPCL and the SEL merely claim that a 
state enterprise has the right of management in respect of the 
property which the state has authorised it to manage. A 
problem arising from such a statement is whether "the property 
which the state has authorised an enterprise to manage" 
includes the enterprise capital. Here the major difference is, 
while the state capital existed before a chengbao contract
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comes into effect, the enterprise capital does not take its 
form until an enterprise has successfully exploited "the 
property which the state has authorised it to manage".
The state, of course, can extend the concept of
"authorised property" to include the "enterprise capital", 
therefore allowing an enterprise to have merely the management 
right to the whole property possessed by the enterprise. As 
indicated above, the state has shown a timid attitude towards
the enterprise capital. On the other hand, enterprises
themselves have been reluctant to draw a clear distinction
between the state capital and the enterprise capital. For 
example, the Chengbao Regulations provide: "any loans obtained 
after a contract comes into force shall in principle be paid 
back with the enterprise capital. "c'1 But in practice, it has 
been complained02 that many enterprises simply repay loans out 
of pre-tax profits. Since the majority of enterprise profits 
should, according to the law, be paid to the state revenue, 
the immediate result from the violation of the above described 
principle as prescribed in the Chengbao Regulations is a sharp 
decrease in the amount of state incomes. Enterprises, in doing 
this, have gained more than if they would have to repay loans 
out of their enterprise capital. This is mainly because the 
enterprise capital is merely a part of their after-tax 
profits, and enterprises would try to increase the enterprise 
capital at the cost of the state capital . This practice 
certainly threatens the interests of the state.
The ambiguous nature of enterprises' retained profits has 
casts a shadow on any reform in the profit distribution 
mechanism. The government faces a dilemma in the reforms. It 
allows enterprises to keep certain amount of profits but, at 
the same time, claims that these retained profits are owned by
01 Art. 37. Supra note 43.
1,2 See Fu Fengfu and Chen Xingdong, "Shuili Fengliu, 
Shuihou Chengbao Shi Dui Chengbaozhi de Wanshan He Fazhan" 
(Separating Tax From Profits and Implementing Chenqbao After 
Tax Are the Perfection and Development of the Chenqbao 
System), in ZGJJTZGG, No.6, 1990, pp.7-9.
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the state. In order to give material incentives to
enterprises, the state may allow enterprises to use retained
profits more flexibly, but it is deeply concerned with both
the lack of growth in the state revenue and the increase of
the value of the property from state investment.
The use by enterprises of their retained profits has been
placed under strict state guidance. For example, in 1984, the
Trial Measures Concerning the Second Step of the Conversion by
State Enterprises provided:
The retained profits must be used and distributed 
properly by state enterprises. Enterprises must establish 
new product trial funds, production development funds, 
reserve funds, workers welfare funds and workers bonus 
funds. The proportion between workers bonus funds and the 
total retained profits shall be decided through 
negotiation between the Ministry of Finance and each 
province, municipality, autonomous region of (central 
government) department in charge of enterprises, which 
shall then set the proportional rate for enterprises at 
each level. Of all retained profits, fifty-five per cent 
must be invested for production development, twenty per 
cent for workers welfare and thirty per cent for workers 
bonus .03
The Chengbao Regulations of 1988 did not provide a
specific rate for the employment of retained profits. Instead,
policy guidance was provided:
A chengbao enterprise shall examine and rectify the 
proportion of retained profits distributed to production 
development funds, welfare funds and bonus funds. It 
shall also channel certain sum of money from the welfare 
and bonus funds into housing system reform. Profits 
retained during the chengbao term shall principally be 
invested as production development funds .154
As such, retained profits must in all circumstances be
used first for production development, rather than welfare and
bonus for workers. It is nevertheless true that under the new
policy, efficient enterprises may be allowed to spend more on
welfare and bonus than they did in the past. Moreover,
enterprises may enjoy the autonomy, for example, in deciding
the orientation and other important matters concerning
Supra note 25, par. 10.
04 Art. 36. Supra note 43.
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production and development. However, from the standpoint of 
enterprises, the opening of state capital account appears to 
be less attractive than one might expect. Whatever amount of 
the enterprise capital, they are owned by the state. Efficient 
production is not very relevant for the interests of 
enterprises. Furthermore, because of the state ownership of 
the enterprise capital, enterprises can hardly defend 
themselves against excessive government intervention. On the 
other hand, the fact that the enterprise capital is not owned 
by an enterprise usually results in a situation in which such 
capital is illegally employed and exploited by the enterprise. 
In practice, this abuse may be reflected by enterprises' over­
expenditure on welfare and on bonuses other than production 
and development. Despite the requirement that the enterprise 
capital must be reserved as risk funds for chengbao contracts, 
the capital is still state-owned. It does not make much 
difference whether the debts and liabilities of the 
enterprises are repaid with the enterprise capital or the 
state capital. Therefore, a mere division of the state 
enterprise capital has failed to promote the full financial 
autonomy of state enterprises. Nor has it operated to make 
enterprises themselves financially responsible for their 
management.
V. Conclusion
The financial autonomy of state enterprises is one of the 
key issues which the Chinese government has to consider very 
carefully in unfolding economic reforms. Indeed, frequent 
changes in the policies concerning the financial autonomy of 
state enterprises have underlined the objective difficulties 
in dealing properly with this issue as well as the subjective 
confusion existing within the minds of Chinese decision­
makers .
In the financial reform of state enterprises, two 
questions must be answered very clearly. One is whether or not 
the state permits efficient enterprises to retain profits. And
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the other is the ways in which the actual financial 
distribution between state enterprises and the state is put 
into effect.
As to the first question, the Post-Mao economic reforms 
have given affirmative answers. For most of the years prior to 
1978, state enterprises were deprived of the right to retain 
any of the profits they made. But since 1978, successful 
enterprises are entitled to share profits with the state.
The answer to the second question is not satisfactory. 
The primary difficulty lies in the determination of the 
criteria for enterprises to participate in the profit-sharing. 
On the one hand, improvements have been made. The employment 
of taxation and tax laws represents a significant departure 
from the traditional dislike of imposing taxation on state 
enterprises. In particular, the introduction of Income Tax and 
many other taxes for state enterprises in 1983 and later years 
must be seen to some extent as an attempt by the Chinese 
authorities to resort to economic and legal, rather than 
administrative, methods in regulating financial affairs.
On the other hand, the use of law has met setbacks and 
challenges. Given the distinctive nature that the state stands 
as both the social administrator and the sole investor in 
state enterprises, the confusion over 1 taxation" (shuishou) 
and "profit payment" (lirun shangjiao) has so far not been 
properly resolved. The post-1983 tax reforms attempted to 
replace direct profit payments with taxation. However, this 
attempt was neither feasible nor radical. Consequently, 
instead of making general rules applicable to all enterprises, 
concessions and special treatments were made. In order to 
guarantee state incomes, a high Income Tax rate (55%) was 
imposed on large and medium-sized state enterprises. Moreover, 
in order to reduce the inequality of profitability between 
enterprises mainly due to irrational and unequal external 
conditions, the Chinese government has applied an Adjustment 
Tax which is negotiable and adjustable for each enterprise.
The current chengbao system is a significant setback for 
the tax reforms . Although enterprises continue to pay taxes in
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accordance with tax laws, it is the profit target settled in
a chengbao contract, not the tax payment, that decides the
financial distribution between state enterprises and the
state. Direct profit payments and taxation have again been
confused. Moreover, both the negotiable Adjustment Tax and
changeable profit targetor' have operated to make enterprises
more dependent on government authorities. Such dependence and
flexibility are precisely what the tax reforms starting in
1983 sought to overcome.
The consideration of economic interests is the most
important factor which has forced the Chinese government to
adjust its policies towards profit distribution between the
state and state enterprises. The economic incentive that the
state gives to enterprises by encouraging successful
enterprises to share profits, however, usually accompanies the
decrease of state revenue. As one commentator put it in 1984,
given the inherent problems such as outdated machinery,
equipment and products, and the low level of technical and
managerial skill,
unless the malaise in the industrial system is 
eliminated, attempts to improve enterprise performance 
and put them to modernisation by material incentives such 
as profit sharing will be in vain.,r’
The changing policies and underlying problems since 1984 has
again proved this judgment does coincide with the Chinese
practice. The ultimate incomes of the state are considered to
be more important than the means through which this result is
actually achieved {either direct profit payments or taxation).
An examination of the nature of enterprises' retained
profits has cast shadow on the policy of enterprises'
financial autonomy. Enterprises may have their own capital
account, but like the state capital, the enterprise capital is
05 This is partly due to the Adjustment Tax and partly due 
to the inclusion in the profit target of direct profit 
payments in addition to taxes.
06 Sukhan Jackson, "Profit Sharing, State Revenue and 
Enterprise Performance in the PRC", in Australian Journal of 
Chinese Affairs. No.12, 1984, pp.97-112 at p.112.
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also owned by the state. Despite the requirement that the 
enterprise capital to be used as risk funds for chengbao 
contracts, enterprises which have no property of their own 
bear little liability.
Taxation is an area in which considerable reforms have 
taken place since the commencement in 1984 of the urban 
economic reforms. It is also an area that will experience 
great changes in the future. Of the changes that are expected, 
the Chinese authorities have been committed to unify the tax 
treatment for all enterprises established in China/7
In order to both protect state property and secure the 
financial interests of state enterprises, it has again been 
suggested -- even by some government officials -- that while 
the state should remain as the sole owner of the property 
operated by state enterprises, the latter shall be permitted 
to have the ownership rights in their retained profits.68 This 
proposal, if implemented, would be a great progress towards 
guaranteeing the legal and financial interests of state 
enterprises. However, as explained in this chapter and in 
Chapter Three above, a division in the existing exclusive 
state ownership of the property operated by state enterprises 
is unlikely to be officially sanctioned in the foreseeable 
future.
67 For a report, see "Woguo Gongshang Shuizhi Jiangzuo 
Zhongda Gaige" (The System for Industrial and Commercial 
Taxation in China Will Experience Important Changes), RMRB 
(Overseas edn.), Oct.26, 1991, p.l.
68 See Chen Yuan (Vice-Governor of the People's Bank of 
China), "Woguo Jingji de Shenceng Wenti He Xuanze" (Profound 
Problems and Choices of the Chinese Economy), Jingji Yaniiu 
(Studies in Economics, Beijing), No.4, 1991, pp.18-26, at 22.
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CHAPTER SIX
LEGAL STATUS OF DIRECTORS
This chapter examines the legal status of directors (managers) 
in Chinese state enterprises. This discussion is divided into 
three parts. The first part examines the legal authority and 
powers of directors. The discussion seeks to show the 
complexity and difficulties in reforming the leadership system 
in state enterprises. The second part of this chapter 
discusses directors' duties. The discussion attempts to 
explain the deficiencies in existing laws and to make 
suggestions for the improvement of the existing law concerning 
the legal duties of directors. This Chapter concludes with 
comments on the overall treatment of directors' authority and 
duties in Chinese law.
I. Director's Authority: Legal and Political Dimensions
A. Introduction
In China, the legal regulation of the ruling Communist 
Party ("CCP" or "Party") has only been theoretically possible 
since the beginning of the post-Mao legal and economic 
reforms.1 The 1982 Constitution, though attempting to preserve 
the leadership of the CCP, requires that all political parties 
be bound by the Constitution and law.2 Such requirement can
1 For a general introduction and survey of such 
developments, see Robert Heuser, The Legal Status of the 
Chinese Communist Party, reprinted paper, initially published 
in D . A . Loeber (ed.), Ruling Communist Parties and Their 
Status Under the Law, Dordrecht Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
1986, University of Maryland School of Law.
2 Art.5 of the 1982 Constitution.
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be interpreted as denoting that the CCP must also be subject 
to the law.-*
Like many other Chinese units, state enterprises are 
regarded as "basic-level units" (iicencr danwei) for the 
purpose of establishing Party organisations. Every enterprise 
that has three or more regular Party members shall form a 
grassroots Communist Party organisation.4 Such an organisation 
may, depending on the number of its Party members, take one of 
three forms: "basic-level Party committee" (dancr de j icencr
weivuanhui) . known as "Party committee" (dan crwe i) ; "general 
branch committee" (zoncr zhibu weivuanhui) ; and "branch 
committee" (zhibu weivuanhui). Thus, although all the heads of 
the grassroots Party organisations are called shui i 
(secretaries), their status varies significantly. While a 
Party committee consists of members elected by the assembly or 
the congress of Party members, the general branch committee 
and the branch committee is elected directly by the assembly 
of all Party members.- In the present discussion, "Party 
committees" shall, as usually understood, embrace "basic level 
Party committees", "general branch committees" and "branch 
committees"; and "Party secretaries" shall refer to the heads 
of all these three types of Party organisations.
In order to carry out its overall leadership, the Party's 
political and ideological control over enterprises is regarded 
by the Chinese leadership as very important. However, the 
necessary presence of grassroots Party organisations leads to 
the problems in defining their status in state enterprises. 
This problem is particularly evident due to potential clashes 
between enterprise directors and Party secretaries with regard 
to enterprise management.
It must be made clear here that a substantial majority of
J See Heuser, supra note 1, p.3.
4 Art. 30, the Constitution of the CCP, adopted by the 
Twelfth National Congress of the CCP on Sept.6, 1982, as
amended by the Thirteenth National Congress of the CCP in 
1989 .
5 Ibid.
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state enterprise directors are Party members because of the 
political qualification required for their appointment. 
Indeed, regardless of whether or not a director is a Party 
member, he or she, just like a Party secretary, must carry out 
policies and guidelines of the state and the Party. Thus, it 
is to some extent more appropriate to view the relationship 
between directors and Party secretaries as a mere division of 
labour, rather than irreconcilable contradiction. 
Nevertheless, as will be shown below, it is one thing to hold 
that directors and Party secretaries should cooperate on the 
ground that they are all implementing policies and guidelines 
of the Party and the state, but it is another to judge how the 
power and authority concerning enterprise management is 
actually to be distributed between them/1
B. Relationship between enterprise directors and Party 
secretaries: a historical review
As indicated in preceding chapters, the existence of 
socialist state enterprises in China can be traced back to the 
1930s. The Regulations Concerning the Work of Soviet State- 
Owned Factories ("Regulations"),7 issued by the People's 
Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic on April 10, 1934,
granted enterprise directors supreme authority. For example, 
directors who were as a rule appointed by superior Soviet 
organs held the power to make final decisions regarding all 
the matters within enterprises, and also bore "absolute 
responsibility" towards the Soviet government.8 It was 
stipulated that within a factory management committee, which 
usually consisted of five to seven members from relevant
G For a general account of this historical development, 
see G. Tidrick and Chen Jiyuan, China's Industrial Reform, 
Oxford 1987, pp.297-312.
7 See the text in Chinese, in Zhonghua Suweiai Gongheguo 
Fulii Wenjian Xuanbian (Selected Legal Documents of the Chinese 
Soviet Republic), Jiangxi People's Press 1984, pp.289-90.
8 Ibid, Art.1.
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sections within the factory, a "three-man group" (sanrentuan) 
consisting of the director, a representative from the Party 
branch committee, and a representative from the branch 
committee of the trade union was to be formed to assist the 
director to handle the day-to-day management of the factory.9 
The persons and foremen responsible for production departments 
should carry out orders from factory directors, and resolve 
independently all the issues of their own departments -- 
except for the sanction on and dismissal of workers, which had 
to be approved by the directors.10 Thus, directors and 
managers were put in a position to take full charge of state 
enterprises. Party organisations only played a minor role in 
enterprise administration.
Between 1949 and 1955, the Soviet style of "one-man- 
authority-and-responsibility" system (edinonachalie)11 was 
followed in China under the name of "one-man system"
(yizhangzhi) .12 On August 10, 1949, the People's Government
of North-East China promulgated the Implementing Regulations 
Concerning Establishing the Factory Management Committee and 
the Workers' Representative Conference in State-Owned and 
Public-Owned Factories and Enterprises ("Implementing
9 Ibid, Art.3.
10 Ibid, Art. 4 .
11 Established in the USSR in the 1930s, its chief aims 
were generally to help carry out politically centralised 
control and economically centralised planning. But this 
edinonachalie proved to be difficult to implement in practice, 
especially in the area of Party's supervision work and 
possible conflict with director's authority. For a description 
of this troubled system in its early stages, see David 
Granick, Management of Industrial Firm in the USSR, Columbia 
University Press 1954.
12 For a detailed study of the one-man system in China and 
the subsequent changes made since mid-1950s, see Franz 
Schurmann, Ideology and Organisation in Communist China, 
University of California Press 1966, especially Chapter Four: 
"Management", pp.220-308.
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Regulations") .1J These were later recommended by the Central 
People's Government as a model to be applied to enterprises 
across the country.14
According to the Implementing Regulations, every state 
enterprise was to organise a factory management committee 
consisting of the director (manager), deputy directors (deputy 
managers), chief engineer (or main engineer), other persons 
responsible for production, as well as an equal number of 
representatives from workers and staff.15 The management 
committee was authorised to "discuss and decide" important 
management issues, including production plans, business 
management, personnel, wages and welfare.16 A director was 
empowered to halt the implementation of any resolution adopted 
by the management committee, if he believed that such a 
resolution conflicted with the interests of the factory, 
provided that he should report to superior authorities for 
instruction.17 Should emergent problems arise, a director 
could make his own decisions, though he should report to the 
management committee for subsequent confirmation.18
Since these Implementing Regulations were mainly 
concerned with the so-called "democratic management" in state 
enterprises,19 the powers of enterprise directors were not 
clearly defined. Nevertheless, under the one-man system, 
compared to Party secretaries, directors were given more 
powers and also more responsibilities in enterprise 
management. In addition to the command of enterprise
11 See the text in Chinese, in Selected Enterprise Laws 
and Regulations, pp.11-5.
14 See ibid, pp.10-11.
15 Art . 2 .
16 Art . 7 .
17 Art . 8 .
18 Art. 10 .
19 Art.1, For a discussion on this "democratic 
management", see Chapter Seven of the thesis.
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production, directors held the power to decide personnel
issues, such as the selection, training, reward and punishment 
of staff and workers.20 Although enterprise directors were
asked to rely on the working masses, enterprise Party 
organisations were put in a minor position and were
responsible only for enterprises' political and ideological 
work. Their main tasks were vaguely defined as supervising and 
guaranteeing the implementation in enterprises of guidelines 
and policies of the Party and the state. In effect, they were 
kept away from both decision-making and routine operation of 
enterprises.
In the early 1950s, the one-man system was promoted as a 
necessary means for implementing the centralised economic 
planning system. Directors, having taken charge of 
enterprises, were able to carry out instructions and targets 
prescribed by relevant superior Ministries and local
governments. Nonetheless, the one-man system was not
effectively applied to state enterprises across the country. 
Some evidence suggests that in the early 1950s, factories in 
Eastern China, including Shanghai, implemented the system of 
plant manager responsibility under the collective leadership 
of the Party Committee.21 The main excuse for such regional 
variation was the shortage of qualified technical personnel 
who could take up the post of directors and assume absolute 
responsibility for decision-making. Moreover, although the 
one-man system was soon afterwards ordered by the central 
authorities to be implemented in all state enterprises,
reservation and resentment regarding this radical system were
common in many areas, especially in inland areas.22 In
addition to some objective reasons such as the large absence 
of technologically capable personnel to act as directors, the 
one-man system was criticised for ignoring both ideological 
and political work and democratic management in enterprises.
20 Supra note 12, pp.253-62.
21 Ibid, p . 263 .
22 Ibid, pp.263-67.
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As early as 1954, the one-man system came under intense 
criticism, and from 1955, it was in decline. The movement to 
strengthen the central leadership indicated that political 
incentives were also involved. In particular, the political 
campaign against "localism" contributed to the attack on the 
one-man system.23
The Eighth National Party Congress held in September 1956 
officially brought an end to the one-man system and replaced 
it with "the system of factory manager (director) 
responsibility under the leadership of the Party Committee in 
enterprises" (dangwei linqdao xia de changzhang fuzezhi). The 
old one-man system was dismissed as producing bureaucratism 
and subjectivism,24 since it allegedly not only neglected the 
collective leadership of the Party, but also ignored the 
"enthusiasm" of the working masses.
The newly-introduced system laid great stress on 
collective leadership. Although managers were still held 
responsible for enterprise operation, all important management 
decisions were to be taken by Party committees. Theoretically, 
a distinction between policy matters and technical issues was 
made first. While policy matters were to be decided by Party 
committees, purely technical matters should be commanded by 
managers. But in the atmosphere of strengthening collective 
Party leadership, such a distinction made little practical 
sense. In many cases, managers were too frightened to make 
their own decisions. They would rather choose to put forward 
trifle things for Party committees to decide.2' Although 
directors in some enterprises might sit as deputy secretaries 
in Party committees, it was Party secretaries, together with 
other Party committee members, who played a decisive role in 
the administration of enterprises.
23 This campaign was especially aimed at Gao Gang, who was 
in charge of North-East China where the one-man system was 
most thoroughly implemented.
Supra note 12, pp.284-87.
Ibid, pp. 2 87-93.
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Despite the significant erosion of directors' authority, 
for several years after the introduction of the new system, at 
least nominally, they still held certain authority towards 
enterprise operation. But during the Great Leap Forward (1958- 
1960), Party committees took over not only policy decision­
making but also the operational control of enterprises. With 
managers being put aside, workers were mobilized to assume a 
growing role in enterprise management. The practice of so- 
called "Two-Participations, One Reform and Three Integrations1 
(liangcan yigai sanjiehe)2G stressed, inter alia, both cadres' 
participation in manual labour and workers' participation in 
enterprise management. The division of labour between managers 
and workers was made obscure, not to mention the authority of 
managerial personnel.
With the passing of the Great Leap Forward in 1960, 
enterprise managers seemed to regain certain "independent 
operational au thority27 On September 16, 1961, the Central
Committee of the CCP issued Regulations Concerning the Work of 
State Industrial Enterprises (Draft),28 which declared 
enterprise Party organisations to be the "leading core" of 
enterprise operation.2'* Enterprises were to practise the 
system of director's administrative and operational 
responsibility under the leadership of the Party committee;30 
this Party committee was to exercise overall and unified 
leadership over, inter alia, administrative and operational,
2,1 "One Reform" referred to reform of irrational rules and 
regulations; "Three Integrations1 referred to the integration 
of management cadres, technicians and workers. Obviously, 
these slogans were aimed at mobilizing the working mass to 
fight against expert and managerial personnel.
27 See Ideology and Organisation in Communist China, supra 
note 12, pp.2 97-3 07.
28 See the text in Chinese, in Selected Enterprise Laws 
and Regulations, pp.45-72.
29 Ibid, Art . 6 .
30 Ibid.
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and ideological and political work within enterprises.31 The 
coverage of important issues which were to be discussed and 
decided by the Party committee included: annual, seasonal, and 
monthly plans, and main measures to implement these plans, 
wage and welfare issues, and personnel.32 Thus, although 
directors nominally held administrative and operational 
powers, their powers were restrained by Party committees which 
acted as the real source of authority within enterprises.
In 1966, China witnessed the beginning of the Cultural 
Revolution which lasted for ten years and brought tremendous 
damage to the Chinese economy, including the organisational 
structure of enterprises. It is very difficult to give an 
accurate account of the situation throughout the Cultural 
Revolution, as the actual picture differed in terms of time, 
region and indeed individual enterprise. To summarize,
enterprises were politically motivated rather than
economically orientated; the popular mass movement enabled 
revolutionary workers to ignore the managerial functions of 
directors, and even the leadership of the Party committee. For 
example, from the late 1960s until early 1970s, the Beijing 
General Knitwear Factory experienced three kinds of mass 
organisations -- workers' management teams, the Red Guards, 
and Revolutionary Committee.33 Although each type of
organisation had a different composition and played a
different role, all of them provided workers with direct 
access to manage the factory. However, beginning in the mid- 
1970s, the Revolutionary Committee and workers' management 
team were gradually dismantled and then finally disappeared.34
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid, Art. 55 .
33 See Charles Bettelheim, (translated from French by 
Alfred Ehrenfeld) Cultural Revolution and Industrial 
Organisation in China, Monthly Review Press (New York and 
London) 197 2, pp.21-43.
34 See Martin Locket, Cultural Revolution and Industrial 
Organisation in a Chinese Enterprise: the Beijing General 
Knitwear Mill 1966-1981, Management Research Paper, the Oxford
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It is even more interesting to see that in that Beijing 
factory, during the period between 1966 and 1969, the Party 
committee was completely put aside and kept away from 
management. As a result, the mass participation and the 
leadership of the working class in enterprises during the 
Cultural Revolution disrupted production order and brought 
disastrous results to the operation of enterprises.
The above brief review shows that for many years prior to 
economic reforms the leadership systems in Chinese state 
enterprises were a very sensitive issue continually undergoing 
reversals. The main difficulty underlying enterprise 
leadership systems was the mechanism for the allocation of 
powers and authority between directors and Party secretaries. 
This allocation of powers reflected the uneasy marriage of 
economic goals to the Party's political and ideological 
control over state enterprises. Although workers' 
participation was stressed from time to time, the power 
struggle within state enterprises mainly developed between the 
directors on the one side and Party committees and their 
secretaries on the other. Frequent policy changes illustrated 
that it was difficult to achieve and maintain a proper balance 
between directors and Party secretaries in enterprises.
It should also be noted that, before the economic 
reforms, except for occasional provisional regulations and 
administrative orders, the issue of enterprise leadership 
systems were not really governed by law. The relationship 
betweeen directors and Party secretaries was essentially a 
political rather than a legal subject. The inactivity of law 
provided great flexibility for changes to occur.
C. Director responsibility system Under the SEL
1. Reforms and change of enterprise leadership system
In the late 197 0s, China began to experiment with state 
enterprise reform. As a first step towards establishing
Centre for Management Studies, 1985.
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operational order in enterprises, the system of director 
responsibility under the leadership of the Party Committee 
which was once practised before the Cultural Revolution was 
restored and applied to state enterprises.
The reforms soon brought to light many fateful 
shortcomings of the old system of director responsibility 
under the leadership of the Party committee.3S First, under 
the old system, every important management matter, whether 
political or economic, had to be decided by the Party 
Committee. Such procedural requirement was bound to cause 
inefficiency in enterprise management and operation. Secondly, 
since a large number of Party secretaries had been promoted as 
professional political and ideological cadres, they might be 
unfamiliar with management. Decision-making by laymen could 
bring about serious losses. Ant thirdly, collective leadership 
did not help establish management responsibility. On the 
contrary, collective leadership actually enabled enterprise 
leaders, including both Party secretaries and directors, to 
escape from liability arising from wrong and careless 
decisions. As a rule, collective leadership means little 
responsibility for individuals.
It was soon recognised that the only way to invigorate 
enterprises was to give enterprises relative independence and 
their directors full authority while at the same time be fully 
responsible for losses that their enterprises sustained. For 
example, the contracting system by which enterprises promised 
to fulfil certain targets would have been impossible if 
directors had not possessed real power and authority.30
As a result, in 1984, "the director responsibility
3’‘ For an early discussion, see Jiang Yiwei, "Lun 
Shehuizhuyi Qiye de Lingdao Zhidu" (On the Leadership System 
of Socialist Enterprises", Hongqi (Red Flag), No,21, 1980,
pp.9-13 and p.19.
30 For a general background, see Beijing Review, Vol.29, 
1986: "Enterprises Demands More Powers", No.24, p. 6; "More
Power to Factory Directors", No. 37, p. 26; "In the Wake of 
Director's New Power", No.32, p.17. For a legal analysis of 
the contracting system, see Chapter Nine of the thesis.
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system" (changzhang fuzezhi) was introduced at pilot factories 
in selected industrial cities including Beijing, Tianjin and 
Shenyang. Meanwhile, rapid progress was made to pave the way 
for the implementation of the director responsibility 
system.37 Most significantly, in economic areas, separation 
of ownership from management was widely accepted. And in the 
political realm, the separation of the Party from managerial 
functions was at least theoretically given credit.
On January 2, 1982, the Central Committee of the CCP and 
the State Council jointly issued Provisional Regulations 
Concerning the Work of the Directors in State Enterprises.38 
These Regulations provided that factories should implement the 
system of director responsibility under the leadership of the 
Party committee. Directors should "conscientiously" (zijue 
de) accept and preserve the leadership of the Party 
committees, and should regularly report their work to the 
Party committees.40 The issues which should be discussed and 
decided by Party committees, or deliberated by Party 
committees and then reported to the superior authorities for 
approval included: policy decisions, long term plans, annual 
plans, important technological innovation plans, 
organisational changes, important personnel matters and some 
other issues.
To some extent, the revived system of director 
responsibility under the leadership of the Party committee 
differed from the same system practised in the late 1950s and 
early 19 60s. First, as shown above, the coverage of issues
37 See Beijing Review, "Economic Theory: Changes in
Ownership Forms: Problems and Possibilities", Vol.29, 1986,
No.19, p.17; "Breakthroughs in Traditional Economic Theory", 
Vol.30, 1987, No.36, p.15; ""Reform Needs New Theories",
Vol.31, 1988, No.49, p.6.
38 See the text in Chinese, in Bulletin of the State
Council, No.2, 1982, pp.36-40.
J l Ibid, Art . 2 .
40 Ibid, Art. 10 .
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controlled by the Party committee was reduced. Secondly, it 
was expressly provided that issues which were not clearly 
listed under the control of Party committees should be decided 
by the directors.41 Thirdly, for those issues controlled by 
the Party committee, if a director did not agree with 
decisions made by the Party committee, he could challenge the 
decisions .43
This relaxation of Party committees' control over 
enterprise management reflected certain progress towards 
promoting director's authority in the reforms. On April 1, 
1983, the State Council promulgated Provisional Regulations 
Concerning State Industrial Enterprises.43 Although it was 
reiterated that the system of director responsibility under 
the leadership of the Party committee should be practised in 
state enterprises,44 directors were nevertheless declared to 
be the persons responsible for the administration of 
enterprises and should exercise unified command over 
enterprise production and administration.45 However, no 
further attempt was made to clarify the respective authority 
of directors and Party committees.
The gradual growth of directors' authority finally made 
a breakthrough. On September 15, 1986, the Central Committee 
of the CCP and the State Council jointly issued three sets of 
"Working Regulations"40 concerning directors, grassroots Party
41 Ibid, Art . 2 .
42 Ibid, Art.10. The director could first ask the Party 
committee for reconsideration. If he still disagreed with the 
result of the reconsideration, he could report the issue to 
the superior authority which should render a judgement 
promptly.
43 See the text in Chinese, in haws and Regulations of the 
PRC (1983), pp.383-99.
44 Ibid, Art. 4 .
45 Ibid, Art. 8 .
40 See the text in Chinese, Bulletin of the State Council, 
No. 1, 1987, pp.3-21. Also see an English translation in
Statutes And Regulations of the People's Republic of China,
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organizations and workers/staff's congress respectively. These 
regulations were promulgated as guidance for the 
implementation of the director responsibility system. Most 
significantly, Party committees were confined to exercise 
ideological and political leadership which was defined in 
principle as guaranteeing and supervising the implementation 
in enterprises of various Party and state guidelines and 
policies.47 Theoretically, except those conflicting with the 
provisions of the SEL and new Party policies, most provisions 
of these three sets of regulations remain effective until 
today. Some of them will be referred to in later discussion.
By 1986, the orientation of state enterprise reform had 
become clear. In particular, it was settled that state 
enterprises should be vested with the right of management.48 
Subsequently, the drafting of the SEL was soon in full swing.
One problem, however, remained difficult to address. Most 
previous documents concerning enterprise leadership structures 
were promulgated by the CCP or jointly by the CCP and the 
State Council, and were therefore informal in nature. As the 
SEL was prepared as the formal law of the state, how should it 
deal with enterprise Party organisations? In other words, 
should the law make stipulations concerning the legal status 
of Party organisations? And, if so, in what way should the law 
make these stipulations?
As to the first question, early drafts of the SEL did not 
mention Party organisations,49 perhaps leaving it to be dealt 
with exclusively by the Party Constitution.50 However, the
Vol III, UEA Press (Hong Kong).
47 1 Regulations Concerning the Work of Grassroots Party 
Organisations in State Enterprises", ibid, Art.3.
48 For an explanation, see Chapter Three of the thesis.
49 See Yuan Baohua, "Jiu Quanmin Suoyouzhi Gongye Qiyefa 
Zuo Shuoming" (Explanations Concerning the Draft Law on State 
Industrial Enterprises), RMRB, Nov.16, 1986, p.l.
50 This, for example, was the practice in the Soviet Union 
where the status of Party organisations was not provided in 
the State Enterprise Law, but in the Party's Constitution. See
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draft SEL which was published in January 1988 for national 
solicitation contained a provision about Party committees' 
role of "supervision and guarantee".51 This draft provision 
soon attracted open criticism.52
To some extent, critics of this provision attempted to 
distinguish the law of the state from the Constitution of the 
Party. They insisted that it was improper for formal laws to 
make stipulations on Party committees as political 
organisations.51 Moreover, they argued, if the law did provide 
for the function of Party organisations, it would be difficult 
to define and enforce the legal liability for Party 
organisations which failed to perform their function of 
"supervision and guarantee".54 In addition, in the view of 
critics, if the law did unconditionally provide for the role 
of Party committees, it would be ridiculous if a small 
enterprise which did not have a Party committee because of the 
shortage of Party members would have to establish a Party 
organisation by recruiting Party members from the outside.55
Whatever the causes and implications of these challenges 
were, the Chinese central leadership was determined to use the 
law to reflect the role of Party committees in state
Wang Baoshu, "Shilun Gaige Zhongde Sulian Dongou Guojia 
Guoying Qiyefa" (On the State Enterprise Laws in the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe in the Era of Reforms), FXPL, No.5, 
1988, pp.78-83.
51 Art.7. For the text of this draft, see RMRB, Jan.12, 
1988, p.2.
52 See for example Professor Xie Huaishi, "Qiyefa Mouxie 
Tiaowen Zhi Wojian" (My Opinions Concerning Several Articles 
of the Draft SEL), in GMRB, Feb.4, 1988, p.3.
51 Ibid. They argued that the status of the Communist 
Party was not provided in the text of the 1982 Constitution 
(although it appeared in the Preamble of the Constitution). 
Moreover, some important laws such as the Organisational Law 
of the State Council did not include Provisions as to the 
leading role of the Communist Party, but such absence had not 
affected the leadership of the Party.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
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enterprises. On April 13, 1988, the SEL was adopted. The SEL 
confirmed the director responsibility system, but retained the 
provision concerning enterprise Party committees. As a result 
of this provision, the director-Party secretary relationship 
has become a legal issue in addition to a political and 
historical phenomenon.
2. "Central" position of enterprise directors 
The SEL declared that enterprises should implement the 
director (manager) responsibility system.56 Factory directors 
should exercise their powers according to law and should be 
protected by law.57 Moreover, enterprises were to establish 
a system for the management of production and operation, which 
were headed by directors.58 Directors were to occupy the 
"central position" in enterprise management and to be fully 
responsible for the construction of material wealth and morale 
of enterprises.59 In 1988, these provisions reflected a 
magnificent achievement of economic reforms, since they 
expressly declared that it was the director, not the Party 
secretary, who was to be the "centre" within an enterprise.
The SEL authorised directors to command the management of 
production and operation of enterprises, and to exercise a 
number of powers.60 These powers included:
a. deciding on or submitting for approval various plans 
of the enterprise in accordance with the law and State 
Council regulations;
b. deciding on the establishment of the administrative 
structure of the enterprise;
c. submitting to competent government departments 
requests for appointing and removing or engaging and 
dismissing leading administrative cadres at the level of 
deputy factory directors, with the exception of those for 
whom the law and State Council stipulations provide
56 Art. 7 .
57 Ibid.
58 Art. 4 5
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
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otherwise;
d. appointing and removing or engaging and dismissing 
administrative cadres at the intermediate level, with the 
exception of those for which the law provides otherwise;
e. submitting wage adjustment plans, bonus distribution 
plans and important rules and regulations to workers' 
congress for approval and submitting to worker -- staff 
congress for approval plans for the application of 
welfare funds and proposals concerning other major issues 
in respect of the welfare of workers;
f. awarding and punishing workers according to the law, 
submitting to the competent government departments 
requests for rewarding or punishing leading 
administrative cadres at the level of deputy factory 
director.
What is somewhat puzzling, however, is directors' 
responsibility in the aspect of morale construction. In the 
Chinese context, "morale” (jingshen wenminq, or "spiritual 
civilisation") is similar to the so-called political and 
ideological work which used to be charged by Party committees. 
This morale work is not directly relevant to the economic 
operation of enterprises, but it is very important for the 
realisation of the political pursuits of socialist 
enterprises. Moreover, in the mid-1980s, for directors who 
attempted to occupy a "central" position in enterprise 
management, the responsibility for enterprises' morale work 
was necessary. The underlying reason is that the assumption of 
this responsibility would not only enable directors to take 
effective command of enterprises, but also put them in a 
superior position than Party secretaries.61
3. Minor role of Party organisations
The SEL provided that enterprise Party committees shall 
guarantee and supervise the implementation in enterprises of
61 In the early days of reform, there existed a system 
called "fengong fuzezhi" (division of responsibilities), with 
directors responsible for administrative direction, and Party 
secretaries for political and ideological work. It was 
nevertheless later seen as an obstacle to the full director 
responsibility system. For a basic description of this 
situation, see Heath B. Chamberlain, "Party Management 
Relations in Chinese Industries: Some Political Dimensions of 
Economic Reform", China Quarterly. December 1987, No.112, 
pp.631-61, especially pp.639-44.
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guidelines and policies of the Party and the state.62 
Notwithstanding the considerable confusion over the term of 
"supervision and guarantee" displayed during previous years,CJ 
the SEL failed to clarify the meaning and contents of, and the 
ways for realising, such "guarantee and supervision". This 
treatment appeared to be a compromise between no legal 
provision at all and too many legal provisions, concerning 
Party committees.64 However, such ambiguous treatment would 
seem to bring chaos and confusion to the operation of the new 
enterprise leadership system. Given the traditional "leading 
core" position65 of the Party committees in enterprise 
management, if the roles of Party committees had been left 
unclear, the unilateral authorization with enterprise 
directors of the "central" position would have been difficult 
to understand and implement properly.
The Chinese leadership clearly realised this shortcoming. 
In order to rescue the situation, on April 28, 1988, the
Central Committee of the CCP issued a Circular66 which dealt 
in detail with the role and function of Party organisations. 
In addition, many provisions of the above mentioned 
Regulations Concerning the Work of Grassroots Party 
Organisations in State Enterprises ("Party Regulations")67 are 
very useful for reference purposes.
62 Art . 8 .
GJ For. a description of such confusion, see Chamberlain, 
supra note 61, pp.651-54.
64 See "Jiang Ping Jiaoshou Tan Qiyefa Caoan" (Professor 
Jiang Ping on the Draft SEL), RMRB, Apr.6, 1988, p.2. 
Professor Jiang suggested that the SEL should concentrate on 
the operation and management as the main activities of 
enterprises, and detailed regulations concerning the Party 
committees should be left for the Constitution of the Party to 
provide.
65 This position was first formally confirmed in the 
Regulations Concerning the Work of State Industrial 
Enterprises (Draft) (1961). See supra note 28.
66 See the text in RMRB, May 9, 1988, p.l.
67 Supra note 46.
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The Party Regulations listed the following as the main 
contents of "guarantee and supervision":
a. the socialist direction of enterprises' operation and 
management;
b. the overall enjoyment of democratic rights by the 
staff and workers of the enterprise;
c. the correct treatment of the relation of interests 
among the state, the enterprise and the staff and 
workers;
d. observance of discipline and law by the enterprise, 
and protection of the legal interests of the state and 
the enterprise;
e. the correct implementation of the guidelines and 
policies of the Party by the enterprise and the 
director .68
The Party Regulations also continued to lay down the main ways 
for the realisation of such guarantee and supervision:
a. Organising Party members and cadres of the enterprises 
to conscientiously study the guidelines, policies, laws 
and regulations of the Party and the State, and bringing 
into full play the exemplary vanguard role of the 
Communists ;
b. listening regularly to the work report of the 
directors, and providing opinions and suggestions;
c. strengthening the work of inspecting discipline;
d. amplifying the regular activity of the Party 
organisations, and carrying out criticism and self- 
criticism;
e. supervising cadres in many ways.69
Just as many of these provisions tended to be very vague
and politicised, the Circular took a similar approach. It
required that enterprise Party organisations mainly pay
attention to Party construction, bring into full play the
roles of both "fighting fortress" (zhandou baolei) and
"vanguard" (xianfengdui) of Party members, carry out
>
ideological and political work, support directors to fully 
exercise their powers in accordance with the SEL, and provide 
opinions and suggestions concerning important issues.70
68 Ibid . Art . 16 .
69 Ibid, Art. 17 .
70 Supra note 66. It is interesting to see that the Draft 
SEL did contain provisions requiring Party committees to 
support directors in exercising their powers in accordance 
with the law. But this provision was later dropped in the 
approved SEL and instead, came out in the Party Circular.
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Consequently, the role of Party committees was substantially 
restricted to political and ideological spheres.
The SEL simply put Party secretaries in a position to 
assist directors. As for enterprise management, a Party 
secretary might only sit in the enterprise committee to help 
the director make important decisions.71 Even in the political 
field, because of the "full responsibility" of directors, 
Party secretaries had to confine their work to Party 
committees and Party members only. The Circular particularly 
instructed that, because the Party was not a "power organ" 
(quanli jigou), it should perform its work through 
"persuasion, illustration and attraction".72
In a further attempt to reduce the role of Party 
organisations, the Circular ordered a cut in the number of 
professional Party and political workers in enterprises.73 
Professional personnel and working bodies of Party committees 
should be "fewer in the number of people but better in their 
quality" (shao er jing). Moreover, while large enterprises 
could set up full-time secretaries, deputy secretaries, and 
professional bodies which were small in number but highly
71 Art.47, SEL. This article, which merely employed the 
term "persons in charge of various functions of enterprise", 
implied that Party secretaries might participate in the 
enterprise management committees. Here "important issues" were 
limited to those regarding business policies, long term and 
annual plans, capital construction plans, plans for major 
technical reforms, training programmes for workers, wage 
adjustment plans, plans for distributing and applying retained 
funds and plans in respect of the management responsibility 
system, staffing and organisational matters, etc. The 
proposals for these matters should be presented by the 
director who should also make final decisions.
12 Supra note 66.
73 There is evidence to show that in isolated experiments 
approved and guided by some local Party committees, enterprise 
Party organisations were abolished and, instead Party 
committees were reorganised at the local and street level to 
take up the political and ideological works which used to be 
done by Party organisations within enterprises affected by the 
reform. For the information, see Zhang Zhanbing, Xin Zhonqquo 
Oive Linqdao Zhidu (Enterprise Leadership Systems in New 
China), Spring and Autumn Press (Beijing) 1988, pp.262-63.
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trained, small enterprises should in principle only have part- 
time Party personnel. Whether or not medium-sized enterprises 
should have full-time personnel and working bodies was a 
choice to be made by enterprises concerned. In addition, the 
Circular pointed out that a large number of professional Party 
personnel should be transferred to engage in production, 
technological, management and operational work. The Circular 
even ordered that members and secretaries of enterprises Party 
committees should be elected from more candidates.
Thus, despite the fact that the SEL itself did not 
clarify the roles and functions of Party organisations, 
relevant policy documents had made it fairly clear that Party 
organisations should be restricted to play a minor role in 
enterprise management.
4. Practice before June 1989
During the transitional period from the system of 
director responsibility under the leadership of the Party 
committee to the director responsibility system, considerable 
confusion and uncertainty remained. Generally speaking, four 
types of relationships between directors and Party secretaries 
were reported to be present.74 The most ideal was tacit 
cooperation in which directors and especially Party 
secretaries behaved in the same way as the Working Rules and 
the SEL required them to. A second type of relationship was 
that Party secretaries remained passive. They played a minor 
role and did very little. This was basically in line with the 
reform, but could be criticised by the leadership since Party 
secretaries even failed to perform their functions of 
"guarantee and supervision". In the third kind, Party 
secretaries _ "held court from behind a screen" (chuilian 
tingzhenq). This could happen when, for example, directors 
were significantly junior, in age or/and in political
74 See the report by Xie Haoran, "Mingque Mubiao, 
Zhuanbian Guannian -- Shanghai Shixing Changzhang (Jingli) 
Fuzezhi Caifang Zhaji" (Clarifying Aims and Changing Ideas -- 
Notes on the Implementation in Shanghai of the Director
(Manager) Responsibility System), JJRB, Sept.27, 1986, p.2.
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experience, to Party secretaries. The transition of the power 
centre from Party secretaries to directors had clearly made 
many Party secretaries unhappy. In order to save their face, 
they sought to regain control over enterprises by making 
difficulties for directors.
The fourth type of relationship reflected the extreme 
attitudes taken by both directors and Party secretaries 
towards the establishment of the new system. That was the 
collision between the 1 two bigs". Despite the SEL provisions, 
some Party secretaries continued to see themselves as the 
"centre" of enterprise management. The People's Daily 
reported75 that in one factory in Henan Province, Party 
secretaries disagreed with the director's decision to dismiss 
a deputy director and neither side wanted to compromise. Then 
the Party Committee decided to annul the status of the 
director as a probationary Party member.76 Soon after, the 
director responded radically by taking a series of 
administrative actions, including dismissing the Party 
secretary from the factory. Obviously, both sides were 
criticised by the official paper on the grounds that they had 
used their powers "improperly" and brought serious losses to 
the factory by declaring "civil war" against each other.
It is impossible to tell the exact proportion for each of 
the above described four types of situations. Discontent from 
both directors and Party secretaries was frequently reported 
in the Chinese press. Directors complained that they did not 
have sufficient authority to make and subsequently carry out 
their decisions while Party secretaries grumbled that they had 
been completely despised by enterprises and workers.77 The 
significant reduction of the powers for Party secretaries 
meant the immediate collapse of their authority within
7-’ See RMRB, May 21, 1988, p.l.
7,1 Such status could be very important for a director who 
wanted to be promoted in the future.
77 In the Chinese term, this was called shiluogan (feeling 
of losing or alienation).
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enterprises. Even their function of "guarantee and 
supervision" could survive only nominally. The dominant Party 
policy at that time clearly and strongly favoured the radical 
implementation of directors' authority; any complaint from 
Party secretaries against directors was likely to be labelled 
as either contradicting Party lines or the SEL which had 
reflected Party's policy. Nevertheless, popular discontent 
among Party and political personnel remained. And finally the 
mass protest which resulted in the "Tiananmen Event" in June 
1989 provided an opportunity for these frustrations to erupt.
D. Director responsibility system after June 1989
1. Policy changes since June 1989
The events of June 1989 immediately reminded the Chinese 
leadership of the great importance of upholding the Party's 
leading role, especially in grassroots organisations. As far 
as state enterprises were concerned, the director 
responsibility system soon came under severe attack. The 
practice that enterprise Party organisations were simply put 
at a subordinate position to assist directors could no longer 
be tolerated.78
In order to strengthen the leadership of the Party, a 
series of measures were taken. Only two months after June 
1989, grass root Party organisations were urged and authorised 
to take up more work and to occupy the position of "political
78 There are also many conceptual as well as theoretical 
disagreements over the former Party General Secretary Zhao 
Ziyang's policy. See especially Fan Ping, "Shixing Dangzheng 
Fenkai Yu Jianchi He Jiaqiang Dang de Lingdao" (Implementing 
the Separation of the Party From Managerial Functions and 
Upholding and Strengthening the leadership of the Party), 
BJRB, Nov.11, 1989, p.3. One aspect is that the reform of the 
political structure is "to separate the Party from managerial 
functions, not to break up the Party and the administration" 
(shixing dangzheng fenkai, bushi dangzheng fenjia). Another 
aspect is that "the Party must discipline its members, but its 
function is not limited to only this" (dang yao guandang, dan 
bushi dang zhi guandang). In other words, Party committees 
must participate in the important decision-making of 
enterprises.
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core".79 But this move immediately caused considerable 
confusion since it became controversial who, directors or 
Party secretaries, should be more important and more central 
in enterprise management.80 In order to "clarify" the 
confusion among cadres and the people, on December 24, 1989,
the Organisation Department of the Central Committee of the 
CCP attempted to explain several issues regarding the 
"political core" position of enterprise Party organisations.81
According to the official explanations, the "political 
core" position is mainly concerned with ideological and 
political work of enterprises, while the "central position" of 
directors, as provided in the SEL, should be interpreted as 
principally related to enterprise operation and management.88 
Consequently, both "political core" and "central position" can 
be "united and unified organically" in spite of their 
different functions.81
The reasons for restoring the political core position of
79 The term "political core" was first raised by the Party 
General Secretary in an informal discussion with the heads of 
the Organisational Departments of the CCP across the country. 
For a report, see RMRB, Aug. 22, 1989, p.l. The text of his 
speech was later published in Qiushi (Seeking the Truth, 
Beijing), No.20, 1989, pp.2-6. A few days later, the Politburo 
of the Central Committee of the CCP adopted a Circular 
Concerning Strengthening Party's Construction, which formally 
called for reinforcing the role of the grassroots Party 
organisations. For a report, see RMRB, Aug.29, 1989, p.l.
80 The Chinese usually take the view that "core" (hexing) 
is far more important than "centre" (zhongxing). For example, 
it has always been the saying that the CCP is the leading 
"core" of China. It seems improper to replace "core" in this 
sentence with "centre".
81 "Jiu Qiye Dang De Gongzuo de Jige Wenti, Zhongzubu
Fuzeren Da Xinhuashe Jizhe Wen" (Responsible Person From the
Organisational Department of the Central Committee of the CCP
Answers Several Questions Raised by the Correspondent From
Xinhua News Agency and Concerning the Work of Enterprise
Party Organisations, hereinafter "Answers"). See the text in
Chinese, in JJRB, Dec.25, 1989, p.l.
88 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
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Party committees were stated in three aspects.84 First, the 
CCP is the "vanguard" (xianfengdui) of the working class. 
Secondly, the CCP is the ruling Party. And thirdly, socialist 
enterprises are not only economic organisations, but also bear 
certain social administration functions. Therefore, it is an 
important task of enterprise Party committee to take up 
ideological and political work and to equip people with ideal, 
morale, education, and disciplines.85
The responsibilities and tasks of the enterprise Party 
organisation were reinterpreted and specified in six areas:
a. guaranteeing and supervising the implementation in the 
enterprise of a variety of guidelines and policies of the 
Party and the state, and preserving the socialist 
orientation of the enterprise;
b. leading the ideological and political work and morale 
construction;
c. according to the principle that the 1 Party should 
administer cadres" (dang guan qanbu), strengthening the 
education, training, examination and supervision of 
cadres, especially leading cadres, examining and 
recommending middle level administrative cadres, and 
providing opinions and suggestions concerning middle 
level cadres nominated by the director;
d. exercising leadership over the worker -- staff 
congress, the trade union, the Communist Youth League and 
other mass organisations, supporting these organisations 
to launch their activities independently and responsibly 
in accordance with the law and their articles of 
associations;
e. providing opinions and suggestions as to important 
enterprise issues, participating in the decision-making, 
supporting directors (managers) to exercise their powers 
in accordance with the law, and coordinating the 
relations between the directors and the worker -- staff 
congress and other mass organisations;
f. improving the ideological, organisational and style 
construction, and bringing into full play the role of the 
Party organisation as the fighting fortress and the 
exemplary vanguard role of the CCP members.
Thus, compared to the provisions of the Party Regulations
(as quoted earlier), Party organisations' role of guarantee
and supervision has not only been explained in more detail but
also been significantly enhanced. In order to understand the
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
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major changes, it is necessary to make several comparisons 
between the situation before and after June 1989.
First, enterprises' political and ideological work has 
been partly shifted. Before June 1989, directors were held 
responsible for enterprises' construction in not only material 
but also "morale" aspects. Party secretaries were required to 
help and support directors in exercising their powers.85 After 
June 1989, enterprises' ideological and political work has 
been put under the unified leadership of Party organisations, 
despite that directors still bear "important responsibility" 
for the ideological and political work and morale construction 
within enterprises,87 they must support Party secretaries in 
this respect. Thus, directors should report promptly every 
season to the Party organisations and all the workers and 
staff the aims, tasks, situations and problems of the 
operation and management; they should carry out the 
ideological and political work in the production, operation, 
distribution and administration of enterprises; they should 
also ensure and improve the working conditions for the 
ideological and political work and the morale construction.88
Moreover, in order to strengthen Party organisations' 
political and ideological work, the number of professional 
cadres engaging in this aspect has been increased. As 
mentioned earlier, in the mid-1980s, many such cadres were 
ordered to change their profession and to work on production, 
technology or management.89 But after June 1989, most 
enterprises have been required to staff full-time political 
and ideological cadres.90 In principle, the number of cadres 
who are engaged in the Party, ideological and political work
85 See CCP Circular, supra note 66.
87 See Answers, supra note 81.
148 Ibid.
89 See CCP Circular, supra note 66.
90 See a report, in RMRB, Jul. 21, 19 89, p.l. The 
proportion was set between one to two per cent.
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should not exceed one per cent of the total number of workers 
and staff in the enterprises concerned.91 But enterprises 
whose workers are scattered, and whose production activities 
are mobile may set up political personnel whose numbers exceed 
one per cent of their workers and staff.92 Large and medium­
sized enterprises should set up full-time Party secretaries, 
deputy secretaries (in case of the directors concurrently 
acting as Party secretaries), and certain functional 
departments such as discipline and propaganda.93 Within large 
and medium-sized enterprises, branch factories and large 
workshops may also set up full-time secretaries and deputy 
secretaries.94 Party secretaries in small enterprises may be 
either full or part-time. Although small enterprises may not 
set up political working bodies, they must have a certain 
number of persons responsible for ideological and political 
work.9?'
Secondly, Party committees have gained more access to 
enterprise management. Before June 1989, Party secretaries 
were asked not to interfere with enterprise management which 
should be charged by directors. They could only make 
suggestions and provide opinions concerning "important 
management issues.9,> Even for these issues, it was the 
directors who should make final decisions.97 As indicated 
earlier, the inactive involvement of Party organisations in 
enterprise management directly led to the collapse of their 
authority. And this aspect was picked up by some commentators 
who argued for more positive participation by the Party
91 See Answers, supra note 81.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
90 See CCP Circular, supra note 66. For a definition of 
"important issues", see Art.47, SEL.
97 See Arts. 45 and 47, SEL.
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committee in enterprise decision-making.
Since June 1989, enterprise Party organisations have been 
expressly authorised to participate in enterprise management 
decision-making, including many important operations and 
management activities, long term development schemes, annual 
operation plans, important technological innovation items, 
distribution principles of wages and bonus, and arrangement 
about important work for a certain period." Before making 
important decisions, directors "shall put proposals and plans 
for Party Committees to discuss, and sincerely listen to the 
latter's opinions. "100 Therefore not only has the scope of 
"important issues" been enlarged, but also Party organisations 
has been authorised to participate in management more 
actively.
One distinction may, however, be made.101 While grass 
root Party organisations in those units102 which apply the 
system of administrative head responsibility under the 
leadership of the Party Committee shall "make" decisions, 
Party organisations in enterprises shall only "participate" in 
the decision-making. They shall only make checks on political 
principles, political orientations and important lines and 
policies, and may not interfere with the routine 
administration of directors.101
Thirdly, Party secretaries have been authorised with 
significant power to decide personnel issues. The SEL 
authorised directors with the powers to appoint and remove
98 See Fan, supra note 78.
99 See Li Ximin (Party secretary of Beijing Municipality), 
"Bixu Mingque Dang Zhuzhi de Zhengzhi Hexin Diwei" (The 
Political Core Position of Party Organisations Must Be Firmly 
Established), BJRB, Oct.12, p.l.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 For example, universities, city street communities, 
communes in rural areas.
101 See Li, supra note 99.
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deputy directors and administrative cadres at intermediate 
level except otherwise provided by law and regulations.104 
After June 1989, these powers have been nominally reserved for 
directors. But before any personnel appointment is made, 
appointees must be investigated by personnel departments of 
both the Party Committee and the administration. They must 
also be examined collectively by the Party Committee and 
directors.105 If there is disagreement between them, the case 
must be reported to and then decided by a higher Party and 
government authority. Party organisations shall check the 
political and ideological quality of appointees, though they 
are required to respect directors' opinion in other aspects of 
appointees.10!' As a result of the necessary involvement by 
the Party committees, directors' personnel power has been 
substantially undermined,
2. Brief assessment of the present system
The above examination of the changes which have taken 
place since June 1989 reveals that the present system 
represents a different vision from the one that was meant by 
the SEL in 1988. Although directors are still described as 
occupying a "central" position, Party secretaries have been 
authorised to participate economically and dominate 
politically in the operation and management of enterprises. In 
fact, the present system is no less than a conciliatory 
retreat from the director responsibility system as practised 
before June 1989.
On the other hand, the current system should also be 
distinguished from the previous system of director 
responsibility under the leadership of the Party committee. 
Most significantly, the Party committee has not assumed 
overall leadership over enterprise management. In fact, the 
strengthening of the Party leadership over enterprises has
104 Art. 45.
10-‘ Ibid.
10(1 Ibid.
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been realised largely in the name of "participation, guarantee 
and supervision". Directors still at least nominally and 
"legally" occupy a "central" position in enterprise 
management.
3. Practice: cooperation and problems
The dramatic policy changes since June 1989 have created 
problems. As indicated above, considerable confusion exists as 
to the relative importance of the "centre" (director) and the 
"core" (Party secretary). The Chinese leadership is aware of 
the problem. It has repeatedly made the call that the director 
and the Party secretary should "cooperate" with each 
other.107 It has also been emphasized that "'centre' and 
'core' should be merged into 'one mind'" (liangxin bian 
yixin) .108 However, in practice, this ideal cooperation is 
very difficult to realise.
First, it is difficult to distinguish enterprise 
management from ideological and political work. The respective 
authority, functions, and responsibilities for directors and 
Party secretaries are not completely clear. For example, Party 
secretaries are required to participate in enterprises' 
important decision-making, but in case that a Party secretary 
disagrees with a director in management matters, the 
consequences are unclear. This uncertainty may cause serious 
problems when a proposal or business opportunity needs an 
urgent decision in a situation of increasing economic 
competition.
Secondly, some areas, notably personnel powers, are still 
unclear. An appointee who is a technical expert but 
nevertheless regarded by a Party secretary as politically 
inactive may lose the opportunity to be appointed and
107 See Jiang's speech at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 
Thirteenth Party's Congress, RMRB, Nov.22, 1989, pp.1 and 4.
108 See, for example, the speech delivered by Premier Li 
Peng in the National Planning Conference held in late 1990, 
Qiushi (Seeking the Truth), No.1, 1991, pp.8-17 and p.44, at 
13 .
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promoted. This may adversely affect management and production 
efficiency. Likewise, one who is politically and ideologically 
suitable may depend heavily on personal relations and other 
aspects which may be not only uncertain but also irrelevant to 
the professional qualifications of the person concerned.
Thirdly, because of these ambiguities, it is very 
difficult for either the director or the Party secretary to 
comprehend correctly and implement properly the law and the 
Party policy. Theoretically, they should support each other. 
But in case of disagreement, compromise can be very difficult. 
A director who does not give in to the Party secretary may be 
blamed as not respecting the leadership of the Party. 
Similarly, a Party secretary who insists on his own opinions 
may also be charged as "contrary to the Party policy".
In the end, the effects in the implementation of the 
present system vary from enterprise to enterprise. In one 
enterprise, 100 as a first step towards cooperation, director 
and the Party secretary recognised that they were aiming at 
the "same destination". Then they sought to "respect, trust, 
understand, link up and support" each other. In practice, the 
director "never considered himself to be the centre"; he took 
the initiative to report important issues to the Party 
committee, and thus helped the Party committee realise 
"guarantee and supervision". As for personnel matters, the 
director took only the wages of cadres under his jurisdiction, 
thereby leaving the Party committee to examine, appraise, and 
review enterprise cadres. And every Saturday, the director 
reported important issues concerning production and management 
of the previous week to the joint meeting of the Party 
committee, the administration, and the mass organisations. 
Before making final decisions concerning important issues, the 
director widely consulted opinions from others, including the 
Party committee. On the other hand, as a concession, the Party
lu') See Xia Chuandi and Zhou Yanxue, " 'Zhongxin' 'Hexin' 
Yi Tiaoxin, 'Zhuren' 'Puren' Yi Jiaren" ('Centre' and 'Core'
Are One mind, 'Master' and 'Servant' Are Within One Family), 
in Jingji Tizhi Gaiqe (Economic System Reform, Sichuan), No.2, 
1991, pp.97-101.
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committee did not present itself as the "core". Rather, it 
supported the central position of the director by emphasizing 
that the main task for the enterprise was to improve economic 
efficiency. Therefore, in the area of management and 
production, the Party committee sought to act as a good 
advisor to the director. In order to strengthen ideological 
and political work, both the director and the Party committee 
agreed to take various measures. For example, the number of 
ideological and political cadres was secured and they were 
also given the opportunity to obtain professional titles and 
enjoy the same treatment in their incomes and other aspects as 
staff engaging in management and production. The Party 
secretary did not have any administrative position and 
therefore was able to "dedicate himself to ideological and 
political work."
In another enterprise,110 the "central position" of 
directors has been deliberately played down. The term 
"director" (changzhang) was understood to be a "collective 
concept" (qunti gainian) which referred not only to the 
manager, but also to the Party committee and even the 
workers'/staff's congress. Therefore, before decisions were 
taken, the director always obtained the majority consent among 
cadres within the enterprise.
Of course, these are just model cases. Cooperation 
between directors and Party committees was based on the modest 
declination of both sides and the mutual "respect" between 
them. It may therefore be the case that neither the director 
nor the Party secretary was able to make resolute decisions on 
his own. This situation contrasts with the radical policy in 
1988 when the SEL was adopted.
In practice, the implementation of the present system is 
far from satisfactory. The overall practice can be described
110 See Chen Qingtai and Ma Yue, "Jianchi 'Chuche Yuren' , 
Zengqiang Qiye Huoli" (Adhering to 'Educating Workers While 
Making Vehicles', Increasing the Vitality of Enterprises), 
GRRB, Mar.13, 1992, pp.1 and 2. This was a report written by 
the director and the Party secretary of the No. 2 Vehicles- 
Making Factory in Hubei Province.
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as fairly bleak. For example, a survey conducted by the All 
China Federation of Trade Unions concluded that the present 
system was "difficult to be operated in practice".111 Of all 
Party committees in the surveyed enterprises, only forty-five 
per cent were praised as being able to effectively play the 
role of guarantee and supervision.11" According to an 
official report,111 an analysis based on 27,000 state 
enterprises across the country revealed that in 40.2 per cent 
of these enterprises, directors and the Party committees had 
"smooth cooperation"; in 49.4 per cent of these enterprises, 
such cooperation was just "on the way"; but in 10.4 per cent 
of these enterprises, the relationship between the directors 
and the Party committees was "not satisfactory" due to the 
existence of "many contradictions".
In addition to the uncertainties cited earlier, one 
problem deals particularly with the confusion over the proper 
way to resolve conflicts between directors and Party 
secretaries. This is because both directors and Party 
secretaries tend to report problems to their own superior 
authorities.114 Directors usually seek help from government 
departments in charge of their enterprises, whereas Party 
secretaries would normally obtain the opinions from their 
superior Party committees. In the end, problems become more 
complicated, and contradictions remained unresolved.
E. Law versus policy: some aspects
It is interesting to observe the way that the law copes 
with new situations resulting from drastic policy changes. In 
China, law has been widely recognised as the reflection of
111 See "Guanyu Qiye Fa Guance Luoshi Qingkuang de Diaocha 
Baogao" (A Survey Report on the Implementation of the SEL), in 
JJGL, No.10, 1990, pp.24-7, at 26.
llA Ibid.
111 RMRB (Overseas edn. ) , Jun.6, 1991, p.l.
114 Supra note 111, p.26.
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Party policies.lir' This judgment appears to imply that law 
should be amended in order to keep in line with new and 
changed Party policies. Indeed, the above mentioned survey 
found that the present policies are "incompatible with the 
provisions of the SEL", and further suggested that the SEL 
should be revised to make clearer and detailed stipulations 
concerning the role of Party committees.llf'
Immediately after June 1989, one problem addressed to the 
Chinese leadership was whether the SEL should be amended to 
fit the new political climate. In view of the dramatic 
changes, an amendment of the SEL seemed necessary. 
Nevertheless, not long after June 1989, some Chinese officials 
began to down play speculation regarding the amendment of the 
SEL by emphasizing that the director responsibility system 
would continue. Interestingly, in Chinese official view, one 
of the reasons for not changing this system was singled out to 
be that this system had been enacted in the SEL adopted by the 
NPC and the "seriousness" (yansuxinq) of the law should be 
respected.117
It would, however, be unrealistic to believe that the 
respect for law was the most important reason for not amending 
the SEL. In my view, the fundamental reasons for maintaining 
the SEL are more profound than the mere confidence in, and the 
alleged highest authority of, the SEL. First, the director 
responsibility system is necessary since it is a basis for the 
contracting system which has been practised in more than 
ninety per cent of large and medium-sized state
lir' See Robert Heuser, supra note 1, especially pp. 1-3. 
Also see Henry Zheng, China's Civil and Commercial Law, 
Butterworths, 1987, pp.9-10.
11(1 Supra note 111, pp. 26 and 27.
117 See for example Premier Li Peng, "Sizhong Quanhui Qian 
Gaige Kaifang Chuoshi" "Yao Jixu Zhixing" {Measures of Reform 
and Open Door Decided Before the Fourth Plenary Session of the 
Thirteenth Party Congress Must Continue To be Implemented), 
RMRB (Overseas edn.), Sept.2, 1989, p.l.
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enterprises.118 It would be impossible to carry out the 
contracting system if the director responsibility system would 
be abandoned.
Secondly, it is to some extent possible for the SEL to 
bear, without any change in the written law, the political 
changes since June 1989. The underlying reason is that the 
SEL, like many other Chinese laws, was enacted in a way which 
is so flexible and so vague that it could remain unchanged 
despite vast social, economic and political changes. For 
example, as mentioned earlier, the SEL does not provide the 
meanings of, and the ways for, the "supervision and guarantee" 
of the Party committee. Such loose provisions can be 
understood and implemented in a variety of ways adaptable to 
different situations. Thus, "supervision and guarantee" can be 
carried out either actively or passively, depending on the 
Party policies of the time and individual cases. Similarly, 
Party organisations' participation in management decision­
making can either be labelled as "interfering with directors" 
or be interpreted as faithfully exercising the function of 
"supervision and guarantee". In this way, the written 
provisions of the SEL can survive dramatic policy changes. 
Furthermore, as the SEL makes clear, "supervision and 
guarantee" are aimed at the implementation of "the guidelines 
and policies of the Party and the state". It follows that if 
Party policies change, the contents of, and the ways for, 
"supervision and guarantee" should also be changed. Indeed, 
the role of enterprise Party organisations, like that of 
directors, is provided in the "General Provisions" of the SEL, 
such provisions have the authority to override other more 
detailed provisions of this Law. Accordingly, because of 
mouldable legal provisions, the changes in Party policies are 
not necessarily followed by changes in the legal provisions. 
Rather, it is the interpretation of the law which varies.
Another way of getting around formal legal provisions is 
to take advantage of the "exception" provisions. For example,
118 For a discussion, see Chapter Nine below.
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as far as the director's personnel power is concerned, the SEL 
merely provides that directors may submit to the government 
departments in charge requests for appointing and removing or 
engaging and dismissing leading administrative cadres at the 
level of deputy director, with the exception of those for whom 
the law and State Council stipulations provide otherwise.119 
Such "exception" provisions allow government departments to 
restrict director's use of this power and to authorise Party 
secretaries to participate in personnel matters.
It would be an exaggeration to suggest that all the 
provisions of the SEL can be easily reconciled in one way or 
another with policy changes. In fact, some SEL provisions 
remain uncertain. For example, Article 45 of the SEL provides 
that directors shall be "fully responsible" for the 
construction of material wealth and morale of the enterprise. 
But after June 1989, even if directors can dominate enterprise 
operation, it is doubtful whether they are held "fully 
responsible" for morale construction. As mentioned earlier, 
enterprise Party organisations have been authorised to "lead"
(lingdao) ideological and political work, though directors 
still bear "important responsibility" for this work.120 
Interestingly, in one enterprise whose experience was praised 
after June 1989, the director was described as "fully 
responsible" for the ideological and political work.121 Such 
description is consistent with the SEL provisions, but appears 
to contradict prevailing policies. There exists a considerable 
difficulty in achieving the aim of both upholding the law and 
preserving new policies.
One additional legal problem concerns legal liability in 
the event of wrong or illegal decisions and management of 
enterprises. Party secretaries are called on to participate in
il<! Art. 45.
120 See Answers, supra note 81.
121 See Liu Bao, "Buguan Dongnan Xibei Feng, Dang de 
Lingdao Bu Fangsong" (Regardless of the Orientation of the 
Wind, the Leadership of the Party Should Not Be Relaxed), in 
RMRB, Aug.28, 1989, p.5.
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management, to direct political and ideological work, and to 
exercise the function of supervision and guarantee, but their 
liability for such activities is not defined by law. Under the 
old system of director responsibility under the leadership of 
the Party Committee, there was no responsibility for either 
directors or Party secretaries. As the responsibility system 
has been widely implemented in the economic reforms, Party 
secretaries' involvement may cause tremendous difficulties in 
the implementation of any management responsibility system. In 
this sense, policy changes have not only made the law 
uncertain, but also added difficulties to the proper 
implementation of the law.
F. Summary and future prospects
The role of Party committees in state enterprises is a 
very important issue which has frequently caused difficulties 
and uncertainties in enterprise management. This is also an 
issue which reflects the controversial nature of law and 
politics in contemporary China.
The essential problem appears to be the allocation 
between enterprise directors and enterprise Party committees 
of powers and functions with regard to enterprise management. 
However, the fundamental issue mainly concerns the achievement 
of socialist aims. State enterprises are not purely economic 
entities, but fulfil social, and particularly political and 
ideological responsibilities. The pursuit of economic 
efficiency may be, if necessary, sacrificed for the sake of 
political ends.
In this complicated realm, law performs a limited 
function. On the one hand, the SEL has been employed to 
establish and defend the authority of enterprise directors. On 
the other hand, the SEL has not been able to effectively 
prevent policy changes. This is partly because the SEL is so 
flexible and loose as to accommodate different 
interpretations. But more importantly, Party policies, which 
are described as the "soul" of law, possess overriding force
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in the interpretation and implementation of the law. If Party 
policies change, law has to be understood differently even if 
its written provisions remain unamended.
The frequent changes concerning enterprise leadership 
structures largely reflect the concern and indeed the struggle 
over the balance of powers between directors and Party 
secretaries, and especially between economic efficiency and 
political aims of enterprise activities. When economic pursuit 
is given priority, directors must be authorised with more 
powers. Conversely, when the political function of enterprises 
is given emphasis, Party organisations are authorised to play 
an important role in enterprise management.
As demonstrated in the discussion, it is difficult to 
achieve a proper balance between directors and Party 
committees, and between the economic and political pursuits of 
enterprises. Even if such balance makes sense in theory, it is 
unlikely to operate reasonably in practice. The enormous 
policy changes since June 1989 have produced considerable 
uncertainty and confusion over the status of both directors 
and Party committees in state enterprises. Such uncertainty 
has effected the operation of state enterprises.
The issue of Party committees' involvement in enterprise 
management is not peculiar to Chinese state enterprises. In 
practice, such involvement may take different forms in 
different types of enterprises. For example, in collective 
enterprises, the role of the Party committee is central.122 
This is mainly because of the public ownership nature of these
122 The Regulations Concerning Collective Enterprises in 
Cities and Towns (1991) provide that the grassroots Party 
organisations shall be the political leading core of 
collective enterprises, shall lead the ideological and 
political work of enterprises, and shall supervise the 
implementation in the enterprises of the guidelines and 
policies of the Party and state." (see Art.10). The 
Regulations Concerning Collective Enterprises in Rural Areas 
(1990) do not contain such provisions. Nevertheless, from the 
past experience and in practice, Party committees in rural 
collective enterprises perform similar functions to their 
counterparts established within collective enterprises in 
cities and towns.
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enterprises. In Sino-foreign joint ventures, Party committees 
can only indirectly control enterprise management. Sometimes 
this takes the form of participation in the management of 
directors as Party members who should implement decisions and
suggestions made in advance by the Party committees
established within joint ventures.121 However, there is no 
evidence to suggest that the Party committees in private
enterprises can influence the management of these enterprises.
Since the mid-1980s, in an attempt to promote economic 
efficiency, the shareholding system, symbolized by the
establishment of limited companies, has been experimented 
with. It was once reported that almost all such limited 
companies had set up Party committees .12<i Nevertheless, due 
to the absence of formal legal provisions, it is difficult to 
assess the role of Party committees in the management of 
limited companies. It is likely that, in those newly formed 
limited companies which are exclusively owned or controlled by 
public ownership shareholders, Party committees can and will 
play a notable role in enterprise management. This will, of 
course, be a major issue for the legislators preparing company 
regulations, though this might turn out to be more complex due 
to the potential involvement of private shareholders.
II. Director's Duties: A Legal Analysis
A. Existing law
The above analysis of the legal status of enterprise 
directors has ben carried out from the perspective of the
121 For an example, see Xu Feng, "Yige You Zuowei de Hezi 
Qiye Dangwei" (A Capable Party Secretary in a Joint Venture),
in Jingji Cankao {Economic Reference, Beijing), Nov.6, 1989, 
p.l. For a general explanation of the role of the Party 
organisations in Sino-foreign joint ventures, see Chu Baotai 
and Dong Weiyuan, Waishanq Zai Zhongguo Touzi de Falu Wenti
(Legal Issues Concerning Foreign Investment in China), 
Enterprise Management Press (Beijing) 1988, pp.141-43.
124 See Cheng Yang, "Chinese Share Companies", Business 
Law Brief (London, Financial Times), June 1989, p.5.
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relationship between directors and Party secretaries. If one 
would disregard this important perspective, then the starting 
point for analyzing the legal status of enterprise directors 
would be the concept of "legal representative" (fading 
daibiaoren). This concept, which first formally appeared in 
the ECL (1981),ur' was developed from a similar term, fuzeren 
(responsible person) , that had been used in relevant legal 
documents since the early 1950s.120 An alternative term for 
fading daibiaoren is faren daibiao, which literally means 
"representatives of legal persons".127 The GPCL provides that 
the legal representative of a legal person is the person with 
management responsibility who, in accordance with law or the 
provisions of its articles of association, exercise authority 
on behalf of a legal person.128
The primary purpose for adopting the concept of fading 
daibiaoren is to provide directors or their equivalents with 
the authority to carry out certain activities on behalf of 
enterprise legal persons. Although the GPCL does not continue 
to provide for the coverage of such authority, it is believed
12? ECL, Art . 31 .
120 For example, Article 1 of the Measures Concerning the 
Conclusion of Contracts Between State Organs, State
Enterprises and Cooperatives (1950), which for the first time
in the history of the PRC used the "legal person" concept,
employed the term of "responsible persons". See the text of
this document in Chinese, in Laws and Regulations of the PRC 
Central Government (1949-1950), pp.696-98. The Civil
Procedural Law (For Trial Implementation) of 1982, though not
recognising the concept of legal person, equated "responsible 
persons" with "legal representatives". See Art.44.
127 See Art. 8 of the Provisional Regulations Concerning 
State Industrial Enterprises (1983) .
128 GPCL, Art. 38. Before this, on Sept. 17, 1984, the
Supreme Court defined fading daibiaoren as including: (1)
chief executives such as the president, manager or chairman of 
the board of directors; (2) where the chief executive's 
position is vacant, the vice president or vice chairman or 
vice manager as the case may be who is actually responsible 
for the administrative work of the company; where the above 
positions are all vacant, the persons that are actually in 
charge of a legal person. See Henry Zheng, China's Civil and 
Commercial Law, p.312.
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that the authority of directors as fading daibiaoren usually 
exists in three aspects.129 First, only the director can sign 
a contract on behalf of an enterprise of which he is a 
director. In this respect, unless and until a Party secretary 
is expressly authorised to act as an agent of the enterprises, 
he is prohibited from signing a contract on behalf of his 
enterprise. Secondly, only directors can represent the 
enterprises in its external relations with its superior 
government authorities and other entities. Thirdly, only 
directors can represent enterprises to initiate and defend 
legal proceedings in people's court.
The implications of the concept of fading daibiaoren on 
the legal duties of directors are, however, unclear. First, 
the GPCL definition for this concept itself, which simply 
provides authority to directors, does not automatically assume 
any duty for enterprise directors. Indeed, the GPCL, apart 
from providing that fading daibiaoren may be subject to 
administrative and criminal liabilities in certain cases,130 
is silent as to the civil liabilities of enterprise directors. 
Secondly, even the SEL does not attempt to impose any civil 
legal duties on directors of state enterprises. As a matter of 
fact, the SEL was strongly motivated by the idea of increasing 
the authority of enterprise directors. Accordingly, it lists 
clearly the authority and powers of directors,131 but pays 
little attention to the imposition on directors of civil legal 
duties. And thirdly, directors' civil legal duties are also 
neglected by many Chinese legal scholars who are not aware of 
the existence of this type of duties.133
129 See Wang Baoshu and Cui Qingzhi, "Lun Guoying Qiye 
Changzhang de Falu Diwei" (On the Legal Status of the 
Directors of State Enterprises), FXYJ, No.5, 1984, pp.49-56, 
at 53 .
130 Art . 49 , GPCL .
131 Art . 45, SEL .
132 See Lin Xiangquan and Liu Jianwen, "Xi Qiyefa Guanyu
Falu Zeren de Guiding" (On the SEL provisions about Legal 
Liability), FXPL, No.3, 1989, pp.14-8.
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By "civil legal duties", I mean the type of general 
civil duties which are unconditionally and unilaterally 
imposed by law, and which are not the result of special civil 
legal acts such as contracts. Although contractual duty is a 
type of civil obligation, the occurrence of such obligation 
must be due to the existence of specific legal relationships 
between specific persons. In Western company law, the concept 
of directors' duties is adequately developed, though in 
practice the contents of this concept may not always be easy 
to ascertain. For example, in English company law, in addition 
to statutory provisions, directors' duties are divided 
basically into two types: one concerns their fiduciary duty, 
the other concerns their duty of care and skill. It is the 
fiduciary duty that plays a more important role in controlling 
the activities of directors. As far as the fiduciary duty is 
concerned, company directors may be blamed on the basis of 
either being agents or being trustees of companies.133 Under 
these types of duties, for example, company directors are 
legally liable to account to the companies for all secret 
profits which they made in connection with their capacity as 
companies directors.131 Furthermore, a director is forbidden 
to engage in business that compete with the company of which 
he is a director. Company directors may even be made 
accountable to the companies for the "business opportunities" 
which they once negotiated on behalf of the companies but 
which were later rejected by the companies.13f'
In Chinese law, the law of trust is undeveloped and plays 
an insignificant role in regulating the legal relations 
between persons that do not have a formal relationship of
3 See Robert R. Pennington, Directors' Personal 
Liability, BSP Professional Books (London), 1987, pp.33-58. 
Also see Farrar's Company Law. Butterworths (London) , 2nd edn. 
1988, pp.324-43; Boyle and Bird's Company Law, Jordans 
(London), 2nd edn. 1987, pp.589-90.
134 One classical case is Regal (Hastings) v. Gulliver 
(1967) 2 AC 134 (HL).
1,r’ See Farrar's Company Law, supra note 133.
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trust. In no way can an enterprise director be regarded as a 
trustee of the enterprise. He is therefore not liable to the 
enterprise in the capacity of a trustee.
It would seem desirable if Chinese law would recognise 
fading daibiaoren of an enterprise as its agent for the 
purpose of holding him responsible in certain circumstances. 
Some scholars make positive assumptions in this respect. For 
example, Henry Zheng asserts that "the legal representative" 
is an agent of an enterprise, though "agent" is broader than 
"legal representative".136 However, this assertion is 
unfounded. First, in the Chinese context, "daili" (agency) 
differs from 1 daibiao1 (representation) ,137 Secondly, Chinese 
law recognises only three types of agency relations: 
"appointment" (weituo), "statutory" (fading), and 
"designation" (zhiding) .138 The possibility that fading 
daibiaoren may fall into the categories of "appointment" and 
"designation" can be easily excluded because enterprise 
directors as legal representatives is created neither by 
appointment nor by designation, but by law. Nevertheless, 
legal authorization to the effect that directors are the legal 
representatives of enterprises does not necessarily make 
fading daibiaoren a type of "statutory agent". This is because 
Chinese law regards "statutory agency" as the type of 
relationship resulting from express legal provisions. One 
example of the statutory agency is the relationship between an 
incompetent person and his guardian, which is clearly
■(l See Henry Zheng, China's Civil and Commercial Law,
p.312 .
137 Some writers seem to make no difference between 
"agency" and "representation". For example, Basic Principles 
of Civil Law in China (ed. William Jones, M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 
1989) translated daili as "representation" (pp.113-23). In 
addition to the reasons which I shall give in the following 
discussion, I believe that daili, as a legal term, should be 
strictly translated as "agency".
138 GPCL, Art. 64.
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identified by the GPCL.1JlJ However, neither the GPCL nor the 
SEL expressly provides that under any circumstances is fadincr 
daibiaoren the agent of his enterprise.
Thirdly, the difference between fading daibiaoren and 
agent is specifically acknowledged by many Chinese lawyers. 
Fundamentally, in Chinese law (as well as in many other civil 
jurisdictions), the legal representative is the "organ"
(i iguan) which performs civil acts directly on behalf of a 
legal person. As a result, the legal person's organ 
constitutes "a unified subject of rights" together with the 
legal person.140 The difference between the agent of a legal 
person and the "organ" of a legal person can be described as: 
the acts of agents, though having direct legal effects on his 
principal, are not the acts of the latter; in contrast, the 
acts of a legal representative are the very acts of an 
enterprise or institution of which he is the legal 
representative.141 In other words, fading daibiaoren is not 
an independent subject of legal relations, but is actually a 
part of the enterprise as legal person.14-1 Consequently, 
legal representatives and agents represent two different ways 
by which a legal person carries out its civil activities.141
Thus, Chinese law provides no express guidance for 
establishing agency relations between state enterprises and 
their directors. Accordingly, it is almost impossible for
1151 Art . 14 of the GPCL provides: "the statutory agent of 
an incompetent person or a person with limited competence is 
his guardian."
140 See Basic Principles of Civil Law in China, supra note 
137, p.72.
141 Editorial Committee, Faxue Cidian (Law Dictionary) , 
Shanghai Dictionary Press 1985, p.625.
14/1 See Zhu Xisheng and others, Gongye Qiyefa Shiyong 
Duben (Practical Book on the SEL), Water Conservancy and 
Electrical Publishing House (Beijing), 1988, pp.193-194.
141 For a description of these two different ways, see 
Basic Principles of Civil Law in China, supra note 137, pp.72- 
3 (though, as indicated earlier, there are some inaccuracies 
in the translation).
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state enterprises to impose, as a matter of general law, any 
civil legal duty on their directors. Despite the fact that 
they are singled out as legal representatives on some 
occasions, directors are in nature an integral part of state 
enterprises. Indeed, the difficulties in defining the legal 
duties of directors of state enterprises are further
demonstrated by the ambiguity of the interests which they are 
obliged to represent. This is also an issue to which the 
previous discussion on director-Party secretary relations must 
be referred.
B. Interests of the enterprise
The issue of the interests which an enterprise director 
should represent has been debated but not yet convincingly 
settled in Chinese enterprise law. Despite the general
acknowledge that there are potential conflicts of interests
among the state, the enterprises, and the individuals,
including workers and directors themselves. In fact, four 
kinds of views were aired by Chinese scholars in the mid-1980s 
in their attempts to tackle such conflicts of interests.144
The most traditional view was that directors should 
represent the interests of the state. The main ground for this 
theory was that directors were appointed by government 
departments to manage state enterprises. This view was 
supported by the practice before, and even during the first 
years of, economic reforms. At that time, state enterprises 
were merely executors of orders from the government 
departments which represented the state to supervise 
enterprises. Because enterprises could not pursue their own 
interests, it was inevitable that directors should represent 
only the interests of the state, not of anyone else.
With the progress of state enterprise reform in the mid- 
1980s, especially after the official authorization of legal
144 For a summery of different views, see Wang Baoshu & 
Cui Qingzhi, Jingji Faxue Yaniiu Zonqshu (Summery of Research 
on Economic Law), Tianjin Peoples' Press 1989, pp.76-9.
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personality to state enterprises, the issue of directors' 
accountability immediately came under close attention by many 
scholars. Most of them were determined to abandon the above 
described traditional view. Nevertheless they could not agree 
on the identity of the person or persons whose interests 
enterprise directors should represent.
Inspired by the government policy on enterprise autonomy, 
some scholars concluded that enterprise directors should 
represent the interests of enterprises as independent legal 
persons.145 On the one hand, this view originated in the 
official recognition that directors were the legal 
representatives of enterprise legal persons. On the other 
hand, this theory was also strongly motivated by the attempt 
to separate the interests of the state from those of 
enterprises. Many scholars who supported this view seemed to 
hold that there always existed irreconcilable conflict of 
interests between state enterprises and the state.146 As 
such, they argued that directors should represent only 
enterprises, and not the state.
Some scholars, however, disagreed with this radical view. 
They raised the possibility that directors should represent 
the interests of both the state and the enterprises.147 Many 
of these scholars were worried about the exclusion of the 
interests of the state from any practical consideration of 
directors. Furthermore, they maintained that, despite the fact 
that enterprises were legal persons, they enjoyed only the 
right to manage the property. As long as the state remained 
the sole legal owner of state enterprises, it would be 
unthinkable for directors to represent only the interests of 
the enterprises, and not the state. In case of conflict of
145 See, for example, Huang Zhuozu, "Changzhang (Jingli) 
Ying Shi Qiye Faren de Daibiao" (Directors (Managers) should 
be the Representatives of Enterprises), ZGFX, No.2, 1985, 
pp.10-15.
146 Wang and Cui, Summery of Research on Economic Law, 
supra note 144, pp.77-8.
147 See ibid. p.77.
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interests, the interests of the state should be superior to 
the interests of the enterprises.
Still, some scholars were not convinced by either of 
these contesting views. They sought to advocate pragmatic ways 
to deal with this complicated issue. These ways included ideas 
to adopt different formulas for different enterprises. For 
example, one author suggested that the legal status of 
directors should be determined by the size and the economic 
significance of the enterprises of which they were 
directors.148 Thus, directors of enterprises that were 
crucial to the national economy should only be responsible to 
the state; directors in small enterprises should only be 
responsible to the enterprises; and directors in other medium­
sized enterprises should be responsible to both the state and 
the enterprises. In addition, some scholars also suggested 
that the status of enterprise directors should be decided in 
light of the leadership system and "the management pattern" 
(jinqyinq fangshi) which relevant enterprises actually 
applied. For example, in terms of the management patterns, 
directors of enterprises which adopted the director 
responsibility system should represent the interests of both 
the state and the enterprises, but those which were managed on 
the basis of the contracting (chenqbao) system should only 
represent the interests of the enterprises.149
These different views reflected the confusion which 
existed among Chinese scholars with respect to the legal 
status of enterprise directors. Fundamentally, such confusion 
can be seen as a result of the growing contradictions between 
the interests of the state, enterprises and individuals in
148 Su Wanjue, "Quanmin Suoyouzhi Qiye Changzhang (Jingli) 
Shengfeng Zhi Wojian" (My Opinion on the Status of Directors 
and Managers of State Enterprises), FXJK, No.4, 1985, pp.32-3.
149 For a description of this view, see Wang & Cui, 
Summary of Research on Economic Law, supra note 144, pp.78-9. 
This view is apparently wrong in that the director 
responsibility and the chenqbao systems have been separated. 
In practice, as shown in Chapter Nine, these two systems are 
implemented together.
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economic reforms. Since enterprises were granted more autonomy- 
over their management, enterprises, their directors, and 
workers sought to take advantage of this new policy to protect 
and expand the newly recognised interests of their own. In 
many cases, this undermined the interests of the state, 
therefore causing tensions between the state and government 
departments on the one side and enterprises and their workers 
and managers on the other. »{■
Even in the West, the : ' . ■ \ interests involving
limited companies is not an issue that can always be easily 
resolved. For example, English company law, by referring to 
company directors as either agents or trustees of companies, 
requires them to act bona fide in the interest of the company. 
However, in practice, "the interest of company" eludes simple 
def inition. 15'1 In most cases, it means the interests of the 
shareholders;151 in some cases, it extends to the interests 
of the creditors;152 still at least as recognised by law,153 
the interests of the company shall also embrace those of the 
employees.154 In some cases, the interest of the company may 
be construed as to include that of the customers, the state 
and the general public.155
As discussed earlier, some Chinese scholars did suggest 
that enterprise directors should represent the "interests of
150 See Farrar's Company Law, supra note 133, pp. 325-29; 
Boyle and Bird's Company Law, supra note 133, pp.592-94.
151 Farrar's Company Law, ibid . pp. 32 9-3 2.
152 Ibid.
153 Companies Act 1985, S. 309.
154 English case law has not developed to a significant 
degree as to protect the interests of employees, though such 
interests are widely protected in continental Europe such as 
France and Germany. For an analysis of the difficulties with 
regard to the protection of employees' interests in English 
law, see Pennington's Company Law, 6th edn., Butterworths 
1990, pp.584-85.
155 See Boyle and Bird's Company Law, supra note 133, 
p.592 .
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the enterprises". This idea appeared similar to English law 
concerning the "interest of the company" in the respect of 
directors' duty. However, clarification and development of 
this idea was hardly possible because many scholars were 
determined to assume the irreconcilable contradiction of 
interests between enterprises and the state. Consequently, the 
"interest of the enterprise", as comprehended by many Chinese 
scholars, did not consider the interest of the state as a 
constituent part of the "interest of the enterprise" as a 
whole. In other words, significant differences still existed 
between the Chinese perception of the "interest of the 
enterprise" and the English approach of the concept of the 
"interest of the company" . On the other hand, even if the 
Chinese authorities were persuaded to accept the approach of 
English law towards directors' duty, the law would not work 
if, as the case is, directors were not legally identified as 
the agents or trustees of the enterprises.
It seems that the only way out of this confusion would 
be, first, to recognise through express legal provisions the 
status of directors as either agents, appointees, or trustees 
of state enterprises.15(1 This would require a new explanation 
of the existing concept of fading daibiaoren. Indeed, the 
threat to impose administrative and criminal liability on
fading daibiaoren, as provided in the SEL, suggests no more 
than the "duty of care and skill" as recognised throughout 
Western company law. Moreover, the present explanation of the 
concept of fading daibiaoren does not indicate any fiduciary
duty on directors, which has been used in the West as the most
effective weapon in preventing and correcting the improper 
activities of directors. As a second step, the law should 
expressly provide that an enterprise director shall represent 
the interests of the enterprise as a whole, that is, the
interests of the state, workers, creditors and even directors.
15fl Art. 192, par. 3 of the Company Law (Taiwan) provides 
that the relationship between the company and its directors 
shall apply the civil law relationship of "appointment" 
(weiren) except where otherwise provided by the law.
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The law should also provide that, in case of disputes 
concerning the alleged improper treatment of different 
interests, it is the court that shall make a final judgment on 
relevant issues.
Many problems, however, would still have to be addressed 
before the above suggestion could be attempted. The most 
important is, of course, the proper treatment of Party 
secretaries in enterprises. If they continue to hold 
significant powers in relation to enterprise management, the 
imposition on enterprise directors of legal duties as strict 
as those existing in the West would never be fair. One way 
which might be helpful is to treat Party secretaries as 
"shadow directors" of the enterprises, a concept which has 
been widely employed in, for example, the English Companies 
Act.157 In this way, Party secretaries would be made 
accountable to enterprises if they were found to be wholly or 
partly responsible for the illegal or improper activities and 
decision-making in managing enterprises.
Secondly, the aims and purposes of the enterprises' 
activities must be further clarified. Fundamentally, 
enterprises are not legally recognised as entities which 
should always pursue economic profits. Political or other 
tasks may still be very important in assessing the performance 
of state enterprises. In addition, government intervention, 
state economic plans, and many other factors make it more 
difficult to achieve a proper balance between the interests of 
the state and those of the enterprise. Indeed, any 
consideration of the interests of the enterprises should take 
into account the vertical administrative relations existing 
between state enterprises and the government departments in 
charge. As a matter of fact, the administrative responsibility 
of enterprise directors towards the government, as provided by
157 Companies Act 1985, S. 741 (2) provides: "in relation
to a company, 'shadow director' means a person in accordance 
with whose directions or instructions the directors of the 
company are accustomed to act. However, a person is not deemed 
a shadow director by reason only that the directors act on 
advice given by him in a professional capacity."
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the GPCL108 and the SEL, ir,!i is so persuasive as to put the 
interests of the state above those of others. In the end, the 
difficulties in treating properly various interests are very 
likely to continue if the state remains the sole legal owner 
of state enterprises.
Thirdly, the political accountability of directors 
towards enterprises' superior authorities remains a difficult 
problem. Until this issue is addressed, directors' political 
accountability may override the legal treatment and technical 
evaluation of conflicting interests involved in state 
enterprises as legal entities.
Finally, the law must also indicate which persons are 
entitled to challenge the actions taken by enterprise 
directors. Presumably, such persons should include the state 
as the owner, creditors of the enterprises, and workers. 
Obviously, the person (or government department) who is to 
represent the state in legal actions against the directors 
must be properly defined in order to avoid the immense 
administrative pressure currently resulting from the 
involvement of many government department s . ir,° At least, the 
law which provides that directors of state enterprises may be 
appointed by the government departments in charge101 should 
be amended or repealed. Instead, enterprises should be given 
more power to elect their directors or veto the decision made 
by relevant government departments for the appointment of 
directors.
Whatever the problems, the urgency to solving the 
confusion concerning the legal duty of directors is present as 
ever. Since 1987, the most popular method used for holding 
enterprise directors responsible has been carried out by the 
contracting (chenqbao) system. Detailed analysis of this
158 Art . 49 .
iSi' Arts. 62 and 63.
100 For an analysis, see Chapter Four of the thesis. 
161 SEL, Art. 44.
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system is provided in Chapter Nine of this thesis. It suffices 
here to point out the fundamental shortcomings existing in the 
legal duties of enterprise directors which contribute to the 
failure of the chenqbao system.
Under the current chenqbao system, enterprise directors 
are bound only by the flexible criteria provided in the 
chenqbao contracts that are signed between relevant government 
departments in most cases and the enterprises represented by 
their directors. Under relevant regulations,152 if 
enterprises fail to carry out the targets as provided in 
chenqbao contracts, they, together with enterprises, have to 
bear the responsibility. In some cases, an enterprise director 
may be compelled to hand over to the government the amount of 
the property or fund which was defined by relevant contracts 
as compensation for failing to fulfil the contracts. In 
addition, enterprise directors may be asked to transfer to the 
state the property they undertook as security for their 
leading role in negotiating and carrying out chenqbao 
contracts. However, even if these remedies against directors 
may be reasonably expected, directors are still not yet put 
under a general legal duty to act bona fide in the best 
interests of the enterprises as a whole. For example, wary of 
the threat that the government may amend the contract to 
increase the settled target figure in the chenqbao contract, 
directors tend to just meet such targets. This means that in 
many cases, directors do not pursue the best possible results 
for their enterprises.
On the other hand, directors are not likely to be made 
accountable to the enterprises for secret profits which they 
make in connection with their capacity as enterprise 
directors. Most significantly, the issue of corruption can be 
partly attributed to the lack of effective legal control on 
the activities of enterprise directors. In some cases, 
directors' growing authority may lead to directors' seriously
152 See Provisional Regulations Concerning the Contracting 
Management Responsibility System of State Industrial 
Enterprises (1988).
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abusing their powers granted by law. In the campaign to 
crackdown on corruption, many directors who are found guilty 
of corruption are prosecuted and punished, and their 
illegally-obtained profits confiscated. However, criminal 
penalties are only applicable to cases of serious abuses. 
Furthermore, in criminal proceedings, the profits which 
directors made by illegally using their powers and influence 
are handed over to the state, and not to the enterprises which 
are the direct victims. At least in this sense, the interests 
of the state are again privileged, making the "interests of 
enterprises" more uncertain.
It is therefore necessary for Chinese reformers to 
establish the concept of the interests of the enterprises as 
a whole in order to combat the corruption and abuse of power 
by enterprise directors. Such a concept would contribute to a 
proper clarification and treatment of different interests 
involving state enterprises. In the future, the establishment 
and clarification of this concept, together with the proper 
definition of the directors' legal status, would help the 
development of all aspects of China's company law.
III. Conclusion
This chapter has examined the complex issue of the legal 
status of enterprise directors. It has been demonstrated that 
this issue has not been satisfactorily resolved in the post- 
Mao reforms. On the one hand, despite that directors were 
accorded by the SEL of 1988 the "central" position in 
enterprise management, their position has been less secure as 
a result of policy changes since June 1989. On the other hand, 
the legal duties of enterprise directors are unsettled. 
Directors are hardly accountable to enterprises for their 
improper or illegal activities. The state tends to place its 
interests as a priority in the treatment of different and 
often conflicting interests among the state, enterprises, 
creditors, workers, and directors.
In fact, the legal status of enterprise directors is
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controversial and uncertain. A director has neither been given 
sufficient power to manage the enterprises, nor been put under 
a proper legal duty to act in the best interest of the 
enterprise as a whole. To a certain extent, it is due to the 
unsecured position of enterprise directors in respect of 
management that a proper development of directors' duties has 
not been possible in PRC law.
State and Party policies have played a dominant role in 
shaping and developing the legal status of enterprise 
directors. The SEL confirmed the then prevailing policy of the 
director responsibility system. But policies remained 
important in the interpretation and implementation of legal 
provisions. Furthermore, the written law has been unable to 
effectively withstand subsequent policy changes which have 
taken place since June 1989.
The political leadership of Party committees over 
enterprise management and the preferential treatment of the 
interests of the state cause considerable difficulties in 
transforming the enterprise leadership system. These areas 
also feature as the most sensitive and difficult aspects in 
the comprehensive legal regulation of state enterprises in the 
era of economic reforms. Unless there are fundamental 
political and policy changes, these problems will continue to 
frustrate Chinese reformers.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
WORKERS7 PARTICIPATION IN ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT
This chapter examines workers' participation in the management 
of Chinese state enterprises. After an introduction of basic 
concepts and the history of workers' participation in 
socialist China, the discussion examines the role currently 
played by the institution of the worker -- staff congress (the 
"WSC") in enterprise management. The role of the WSC is then 
evaluated, and comparisons made with workers' participation as 
practised in Germany. Finally, a conclusion is offered.
I. Introducti on
A. Basic concepts
According to socialist theory, workers in socialist 
public ownership enterprises are not mere employees. From an 
orthodox socialist viewpoint, the term "employee" implies 
exploitation which should be eliminated in socialist public 
ownership enterprises. The PRC leadership has inherited such 
a distinction and used various terms very cautiously. Thus 
workers and staff in all enterprises, whatever types of 
ownership they operate under, can be called zhiqong, and 
"workers" may also be narrowly described as qonqren. But it is 
only in private enterprises and foreign investment enterprises 
such as Sino-foreign joint ventures that workers may be called 
"employees" (quqonq or guvuan).1
1 See, for example, the Provisional Regulations on 
Private Enterprises (1988): quqonq (Art.2) and zhiqong
(Art.4). In fact, workers in joint ventures are usually called
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Despite the considerable growth of private and foreign 
investment enterprises in the last decade/ Chinese socialist 
views on labour appear to have experienced little change. 
Labour is not officially regarded as a commodity, at least as 
far as state and collective enterprises are concerned. Until 
the early 1980s, state enterprises had little autonomy in 
selecting workers but had their workforce assigned to them by 
government authorities in accordance with state plans. 
Immovability of workers from one unit to another, or from one 
area to another, was so marked that inefficient production 
became inevitable.
In late 1986, the Chinese government introduced the 
labour contract system in an attempt to promote economic 
efficiency as well as flexibility on relations between state 
enterprises and their workers.2 But the new labour contract 
system has encountered many social, economic and ideological 
challenges and has not been effectively implemented.3 Until 
1990, only 12.2 per cent of workers and staff in all state 
enterprises had been employed on the basis of labour 
contracts.4 Moreover, despite their contractual relationship 
with enterprises, workers must not be treated as mere 
employees as those in private companies. In fact, it is 
difficult for labour contracts to play a decisive role in
zhigong instead of gugong.
J See four Provisional Regulations, on Implementing 
Labour Contract System, on Recruiting Workers, on Dismissing 
Workers Violating Disciplines, and on Insurance for Unemployed 
Workers. All were promulgated by the State Council on Jul.12, 
1986 and effective as of Oct.l, 1986. See the text in Chinese, 
in Laws and Regulations of the PRC (1986), pp.775-93.
3 For a discussion of these difficulties, see G. White, 
"The Politics of Economic Reform in Chinese Industry: the 
Introduction of the Labour Contract System", China Quarterly, 
No.Ill, 1987, pp.365-89. Also see Hilary K. Josephs, "Labour 
Law in the Workers' State: The Chinese Experience", Journal of 
Chinese Law, 1988, pp.201-63.
4 RMRB, Dec.17, 1990, p.3. The number was 12.36 million. 
This number increased to 15.34 million by the end of 1991. See 
RMRB, Apr.25, 1992.
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transforming the previous enterprise system under which 
workers felt little pressure from enterprises. This is not 
only because of the apparent ideological concern over the 
officially alleged "master" or "owner" (zhuren) status of 
workers, but also due to many other objective difficulties in 
enforcing the labour contract system. One of the most notable 
difficulties has been the lack of an appropriate social 
security system which can provide for unemployed workers and 
therefore prevent social unrest.
Since 1991, in order to enhance economic efficiency and 
productivity, a new drive has been launched to further the 
implementation of the labour contract system in all state 
enterprises. However, given the notable opposition from 
workers, it remains to be seen whether the new campaign will 
be successfully carried out and whether the new system would 
bring fundamental changes to the old enterprise employment 
system.
The legal status of state enterprise workers is 
officially founded on two basic factors. On the one hand, 
workers are labourers. It follows that they are in a position 
similar to workers of non-state enterprises. On the other 
hand, since every state enterprise is officially termed as "an 
enterprise owned by the whole people", every citizen, 
including a worker, is nominally deemed to be an owner of a 
state enterprise. It follows that workers are automatically 
entitled to participate in enterprise management. But the dual 
status of workers in state enterprises also brings 
difficulties and confusion. For example, the claim that 
workers are owners of state enterprises has contributed to the 
job security system in which workers have little worries about 
their future employment. And this job security system has in 
turn blocked current labour reforms and the introduction of a 
labour contract system. On the other hand, the dual status of 
workers, particularly their "owner" status, has affected in 
many ways the issue of workers' participation in enterprise 
management.
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B. Workers' participation: a brief history
In China, workers' participation is usually described as 
"democratic management of enterprises" (criye minzhu guanli) , 
Throughout the history of the CCP, workers' participation has 
been implemented in many different ways with different 
emphases and, of course, different results. It has also 
experienced ups and downs.
As shown in Chapter Six, for many years after the 1930s, 
directors had overall control of socialist state-owned 
factories. Although party secretaries and presidents of the 
trade unions in state enterprises had the access to 
participate in enterprise management, they were largely 
excluded from making final decisions concerning enterprise 
management. Furthermore, there was no fixed organisation 
besides the trade union in state enterprises to channel the 
exchange of opinions between directors and workers.
In August 1948, the Sixth National Labour Congress, held 
in Harbin, Heilongjiang Province, in its "Resolution on 
Current Tasks of Chinese Workers' Movement", for the first 
time proposed the establishment of "the worker -- staff 
representative conference" (zhiqong daibiao huiyi, hereinafter 
"Conference") in enterprises. This Congress also revived the 
All-China Federation of Trade Unions which formerly appeared 
in the 1920s. One year later, on August 10, 1949, the People's 
Government of Northeast China promulgated the Implementing 
Regulations Concerning Establishing the Factory Management 
Committee and the Conference in State-Owned and Public-Owned 
Factories and Enterprises.5 These Implementing Regulations, 
which were later recommended by the Central People's 
Government as a model to be extended to the whole country, 
provided that
every state-owned or public-owned factory which has more 
than 2 00 workers must organise workers' representative 
conference. A factory which has less than 200 workers 
shall not organise the Conference, but the assembly of
5 See the text in Chinese, in Selected Enterprise Laws 
and Regulations, pp.11-5.
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all workers must be convened by the president of the
trade union once or twice every month.6
Moreover, representatives to the Conference were to be elected 
from grass-root production units, to which representatives 
were responsible.7 To some extent, the Conference operated as 
a check on the factory management committee. For example, it 
could listen to and discuss reports made by this committee, 
examine the committee's operation and management and its 
"leading style" (linqdao zuofeng),8 criticise the committee, 
and make suggestions to the committee. On the other hand, 
however, no resolution made by the Conference concerning the 
administration of the factory (or enterprise) was effective 
unless it was endorsed by the management committee and 
promulgated as an order by the director.9 Thus, the Conference 
only operated as a supervisory body. It was put under the 
control of the factory management committee chaired by the 
director.
The Implementing Regulations also closely linked the 
Conference with the trade union organisation. Basically, the 
Conference was regarded as a meeting of representatives from 
the trade unions of the factory.10 All resolutions adopted by 
the Conference and concerning the affairs of the trade union 
had to be fully implemented by the trade union committee of 
the factory. Such a committee could not alter any resolution 
adopted by the Conference without a decision to such effect 
from a superior trade union committee.
The close link established between the Conference and the 
trade union appears to be the necessary result from the idea
6 Art.14.
7 Art.15.
8 In the Chinese context, lingdao zuofeng is usually 
understood to refer to both the ways which the leaders of the 
factories treat their workers and the ways through which they 
make their decisions.
9 Art.20.
10 Art. 21.
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that workers were labourers as well as owners of state and 
public enterprises. Such a link was meant to ensure that 
workers had the opportunity to participate in factory 
management. But this link also had serious implications. The 
most obvious implication was the confusion over the powers and 
authority of the two institutions. According to the PRC Trade 
Union Law of 1950,11 the trade unions in state and cooperative 
enterprises were entitled to represent workers and staff to 
participate in the operation and management of the 
enterprises.12 This unavoidably led to the confusion regarding 
the function of the Conference. Furthermore, as will be 
revealed later, the link between the Conference and the trade 
union had also provided an opportunity for the trade union to 
control and even to supersede the formal organisations 
facilitating workers' participation.
The early practice of workers' participation was not very 
successful. A detailed examination of Chinese industrial 
enterprises during the period of 1948-1953 suggested a 
"pessimistic" view.12 This was underlined by the fact that in 
many enterprises the Conference was not convened regularly. 
Moreover, the Conference did not possess significant decision­
making power. Nor did the Conference even discuss management 
issues in a serious way. It was also revealed that the lack of 
success in the democratisation of enterprise management was 
due less to the political and structural aspects of 
participatory organisations than to the management forms of 
enterprises.14 The reason for this was that it was difficult 
to reconcile workers' participation with the Stalinist one-man
11 Adopted on Jun.28, 1950. See the text in Chinese, in 
Laws and Regulations of the PRC Central Government (1949- 
1950), pp.41-7, at p.42.
12 Art . 5 , ibid .
11 William Brugger, Democracy and Organisation in the
Chinese Industrial Enterprises (1948-1953), Cambridge 
University Press (London) 1976, p.254.
14 Ibid. p .250 .
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management system.15 Under the one-man system, even the 
management committee, being effectively controlled by the 
director, could not play a full role. Treated even worse by 
enterprise directors was the Conference which, if functioned 
actively, could often bring much embarrassment to 
themselves .1(1
In 1956, the Eighth National Congress of the CCP proposed 
the establishment in enterprises of the workers'/ staff's 
congress (zhigong daibiao dahui, "WSC"), which was actually an 
evolution from the previous Conference. This WSC system was 
subsequently confirmed in the Regulations Concerning the Work 
of State Industrial Enterprises (Draft) promulgated by the 
Central Committee of the CCP on September 16, 1961.17
Nominally, the WSC was defined as an important institution for 
attracting workers and staff to take part in enterprise 
management and to supervise enterprise administration. In 
addition to the power to discuss and resolve important issues 
concerning enterprise management and other issues of workers' 
concern, the WSC was given a number of powers. These included 
the powers
to criticise any enterprise leader, to make suggestions 
to the superior authorities to sanction, dismiss and 
change enterprise's leading cadres who are delinquent and 
whose working style is bad; and even to complain to 
higher levels by bypassing the immediate leadership.18
Thus, except for that provisions were more concrete, the
powers of the WSC remained similar to those given to the
Conference. Of course, there were some procedural changes.
While the Conference was required to meet twice a month, and
no meeting was to last for longer than half a day, the WSC
should meet at least four times a year, but no maximum time
15 Ibid. For a discussion of this system, see Chapter Six 
of the thesis.
16 Ibid. , pp. 232-33 .
17 See the text in Chinese, in Selected Enterprise Laws 
and Regulations, pp.45-72. See Art.60.
18 Art. 60, par . 3 , ibid.
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limit for one meeting was imposed. When the WSC was not in 
session, representative groups should be formed on the basis 
of production or working units in order to report frequently 
the opinions of workers and the masses and to supervise and 
examine the implementation of resolutions adopted by the WSC. 
The most fundamental change, however, was that the trade union 
was expressly authorized to preside over the day-to-day work 
when the WSC was not in session. The implication was that, 
from then on, the trade union took full control over the WSC 
and workers' assembly.
The WSC system was introduced after the completion in 
1956 of the "reform of bourgeois industry and commerce." As 
discussed in Chapter Six, the Eighth National Congress of the 
CCP held in 1956 also ended the one-man system which had been 
practised since the late 1940s, and replaced it with the 
system of director responsibility under the leadership of the 
Party Committee. The immediate result was that the Party 
Committee in enterprises took unified control over 
enterprise's management. The Working Regulations on State 
Industrial Enterprises (Draft) of 1961, which formally 
confirmed all the changes that had taken place within state 
enterprises since 1956, also expressly put enterprise trade 
unions under the leadership of the Party Committee.19 
Consequently, the role of the trade union had to go through 
changes. Although the trade union was still regarded as a mass 
organisation designed to attract workers to participate in 
enterprise management, its ideological functions were 
strengthened. The main tasks for the trade union were set as 
mobilising and organising workers to enhance production; 
promoting workers' ideological and political "consciousness"
19 Art.59. For most of the years since 1949, in addition 
to the leadership of the Party, Chinese trade unions have been 
put under both vertical (national) and regional (local) 
control of the trade union trade union organisations. On the 
whole, Chinese trade unions within enterprises have played a 
minor role in enterprise management. For a comprehensive study 
of the policy and practices concerning Chinese trade unions, 
see Lee Lai Tao, Trade Unions in China, Singapore University 
Press 1986.
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(iuewu) as well as cultural and technical knowledge; reporting 
as quickly as possible opinions and requests of workers; 
preserving workers' democratic rights and improving workers' 
living welfare.20
On the other hand, some provisions of the 1950 Trade 
Union Law21 were made practically obsolete. For example, trade 
unions no longer represented workers in their bargaining with 
enterprise administration. Nor did it have the power to raise 
any objection against the dismissal of workers, though in fact 
dismissal did not happen often at that time. In a word, the 
trade union was put in a position to promote harmony and 
mobilise workers rather than to disrupt the order and 
authority in an enterprise. In addition, the trade union was 
also required to become a "strong assistant to the Party in 
contacting the masses in enterprises".22 As a result, the 
trade union committee received orders from the Party 
committee, and carried out such functions as worker 
mobilisation and motivation, dissemination of information, 
slogans, wall posters and after-hour study sessions.22
The implementation of the WSC system appeared to have 
made some progress at an early stage. During the Great Leap 
Forward of the late 1950s, the Chinese authorities introduced 
a new idea known as "two participation" (cadre participation 
in manual labour and workers' participation in management), 
"one reform" (reform of irrational rules and regulations) and 
"three integrations" (integrations of management cadres, 
technicians and workers) . This system put emphasis on the 
ability of workers and did to some extent boost workers' 
enthusiasm for participating in management. According to a
20 Art. 58 .
21 A new Trade Union Law has been adopted by the NPC on 
Apr.3, 1992. For the text of this Law in Chinese, see GRRB, 
Apr.8, 1992, p.l.
22 Art.58, supra note 10, p.68.
22 Barry Richman, Industrial Society in Communist China, 
Random House (New York) 19 69, p.763.
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survey conducted in 1966, despite the decline of the role of 
the trade unions, workers' participation in China was seen as 
"rather effective",24 at least in terms of economic or 
technical results. Workers' participation was actually more 
active and effective in informal meetings of both workers and 
enterprise cadres rather than in formal meeting of the WSC 
which was only accessible to selected representatives.25 
Workers discussed many matters including the issue of bonus 
distribution. Although it was rare for the WSC to ask 
government authorities to dismiss enterprise directors, it was 
not impossible for workers to elect their directors. Of 
course, like many other activities of workers, every election 
was arranged and subject to approval by the Party committee in 
the enterprise, not to mention superior government and Party 
organisations.26 After all, workers' participation in 
management was seen as having some favourable effects with 
respect to economic and technical performance as well as 
political and ideological aspects.27
The enormous social changes that took place in China from 
the late 1950s to the late 1970s were in their nature waves of 
mass movement. Although workers participation in management 
was hardly doubted by anyone at any time, it is difficult to 
give a detailed account of the forms for realising such 
participation. This is mainly because such forms actually 
varied from enterprise to enterprise, and from time to time. 
For example, during the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the 
Beijing General Knitwear Factory experienced three kinds of 
mass organisations -- the Workers' Management Teams, the Red 
Guards, and the Revolutionary Committees.28 Although each type
24 Supra note 13, p.257.
25 Ibid . , p . 254 .
26 Ibid. , pp. 255-56 .
27 Ibid. , pp .256-57 .
28 Charles Bettelheim, (translated from French by Alfred 
Ehrenfeld) Cultural Revolution and Industrial Organisation in
China, Monthly Review Press (New York and London) 1972, pp.21-
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of organisation had a different composition and played a 
different role, all three provided opportunities for workers' 
direct participation in enterprise management. However, since 
the mid 197 0s, the Revolutionary Committees and Workers' 
Management Teams began to be dismantled and then finally 
disappeared, though some work teams remained important.29 As 
a whole, the mass movement and workers' participation in this 
period accompanied turmoil and destruction of organisations in 
Chinese enterprises. The WSC totally disappeared from the 
scene of enterprises. Even the Party committee was put aside 
between 1966 and 1969. Since managerial and professional 
authority was disrupted seriously during the cultural 
revolution, this kind of workers' participation can hardly be 
judged in terms of economic efficiency.
II. Workers' Participation in the Era of the Economic Reforms
A. Revival of the WSC system
The revival of the WSC system in Chinese state 
enterprises did not take place until 1979. At first, when 
some enterprises were chosen to experiment with the directors 
responsibility system, most enterprises were simply ordered to 
restore the system of director responsibility under the 
leadership of the Party committee. Concurrent with this 
development was the restoration of the system of WSC under the 
leadership of the Party committee.
When China's modernisation drive was launched in the late 
197 0s, it was believed by the Chinese leadership that workers' 
cooperation could play a decisive role in industrial reforms. 
The only problem was how to mobilise workers and to bring into 
play their enthusiasm. On the other hand, from the outset,
43 .
29 Martin Locket, Cultural Revolution and Industrial 
Organisation in a Chinese Enterprise: the Beijing General
Knitwear Mill 1966-1981, Management Research Paper, the Oxford 
Centre for Management Studies, 1985.
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state enterprise reform gradually reduced government control
over enterprises. Since enterprises were to be steadily
endowed with more powers, the Chinese leadership was very
concerned about the possible misuse of these newly-allocated
powers. An immediate step was to find a mechanism ensuring the
proper exercise of these powers. In this respect, the
authorization of more powers to the WSC was seen as not only
a legitimate but also a less controversial way to ensure the
proper functioning of enterprise autonomy policy.
In October 197 8, when addressing the Ninth National Trade
Union Congress on behalf of the Central Committee of the CCP
and the State Council, Deng Xiaoping said:
To bring about the four modernisation, all our 
enterprises must, without exception, practise democratic 
management and combine centralised leadership with 
democratic management. From now on, workshop director, 
section chiefs and group heads in every enterprise must 
be elected by the workers in the unit concerned. All 
major issues of the enterprise must be discussed by the 
WSC or workers' general assembly.20
Unlike its predecessors, the WSC in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s seemed to reemerge as an organ of real power. On 
July 13, 1981, the Central Committee of the CCP and the State 
Council transmitted the Provisional Regulations on Worker -- 
Staff Congresses in State Industrial Enterprises31 (hereafter 
"Provisional Regulations"). These Provisional Regulations, 
which were jointly drafted by the All-China Federation of 
Trade Unions, the State Economic Commission, and the 
Department of Organisation of the CCP, were the first formal 
document exclusively dealing with the WSC. The promulgation of 
these Provisional Regulations also revealed that, compared 
with the Party committee and the director, the WSC was the 
first important institution within a state enterprise to 
receive formal and systematic treatment after the commencement 
of post-Mao economic reforms.
Article 5 of the 1981 Provisional Regulations provided:
30 RMRB, Oct.12, 1978, p.2
31 See the text in Chinese, in Bulletin of the State 
Council, No.16, Sept.25, 1981, pp.489-93.
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The WSC shall exercise the following functions in 
accordance with state policy, decree, and the 
requirements of plans:
(1) discuss, examine and adopt resolutions on the 
work report submitted by the factory director, the 
production and construction plans, the budgets and final 
accounts, and major issues concerning important technical 
innovations and management;
(2) discuss and decide on the issue of the funds for 
labour protection, the welfare funds for the workers and 
staff, and the funds for bonus, as well as other issues 
of vital interests to the workers and staff, such as the 
regulations for awarding and punishing workers and staff 
members and the allocation of housing facilities for 
workers and staff;
(3) discuss and adopt resolutions on matters related 
to the plans for the enterprise organisational reform, 
plans for wage adjustment, plans for the training of 
workers and staff, and major rules and regulations to be 
applied throughout the enterprise;
(4) supervise leading cadres and staff at all levels 
in the enterprise. The WSC may recommend those cadres 
who work hard and have a record of success to the higher 
authority for recommendation or, in the case of 
outstanding achievements, promotion of administrative 
position and salary. The WSC may also propose to the 
higher authority to criticise, punish or dismiss cadres 
who cause losses as a result of negligence of duty; it 
may propose to the Party discipline inspection organs and 
state judicial organs actions against cadres who are 
guilty of dereliction or serious violation of law or 
discipline;
(5) elect enterprise administrators in accordance 
with guidance set by the higher authority, subject to 
approval and appointment by the government authorities in 
charge of the enterprise concerned.
Thus, the powers of the WSC as provided in the 
Provisional Regulations were very comprehensive and broad. A 
full implementation of these powers would have suggested that 
the WSC was the principal source of power and authority within 
a state enterprise. In practice, however, these powers were 
executed to varying degrees in different enterprises. The WSCs 
in some enterprises fully implemented their powers. But in 
many enterprises, the WSC did not enjoy the powers as provided 
by the Provisional Regulations. Harry Harding in 1987 
described the Chinese WSC as merely an advisory or
consultative organ.42 David Granick,33 on the basis of case 
studies conducted between 1982 and 1985, also reached a 
similar conclusion. He suggested that the normal pattern was 
that the WSC only had “the right to discuss problems of prime 
importance to the enterprise and to decide matters having to 
do with the allocation of welfare benefits and of special 
individual awards".34 The WSCs could hardly make decisions of 
their own on such other matters as enterprise production and 
management.
B. Reasons for the inactivity of the WSC
Many reasons contributed to the inactivity of the WSCs.
In fact, many of these reasons are still present and affect
the proper functioning of the WSC system in contemporary
Chinese state enterprises.
First, the relationship between the WSC and government
authorities was not clear. For example, Deng's speech in 1978,
cited earlier, seemed to suggest that the WSC should be
granted the power to elect directors and other administrators
of an enterprise. But the Provisional Regulations imposed
restrictions on this power and, as a result, the election of
directors had to be subject to government approval. As far as
the relationship between the WSCs and government departments
is concerned, the Provisional Regulations provided that:
the WSC may express its opinion if it disagrees with any 
decisions or directives of a higher authority. But if 
the higher authority upholds its original decision or 
directive after deliberation, the WSC must implement 
it.
Thus, government departments had ultimate control over the
32 Harry Harding, China's Second Revolution, The Brookings 
Institution (Washington) 1987, p.181.
33 David Granick, Chinese State Enterprises, University 
of Chicago Press 1990, p.239.
34 Ibid. p . 181.
35 Art .7 .
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WSCs. In an attempt to explain such tight government control
and the relative independence of the WSCs in state
enterprises, a Chinese economist observed
democratic management must combine both national and 
local interests. On the one hand, the power of the 
workers' congress is limited in that it comes under the 
guidance of state plans and must be subordinate to the 
need to uphold the ownership of the whole people. On the 
other hand, national interests and unified planning must 
be based on worker enthusiasm and the democratic power of 
independent management in that enterprise.''6
According to this explanation, the WSC which tends to
represent an enterprise's own interests should always be
subject to the control of government departments which have to
take into account broad national and regional interests. As
explained in Chapter Six, a director in a state enterprise
must not overemphasize the interests of the enterprises.
Instead, he must represent the interests of the state as a
priority. Accordingly, the election by the WSC of enterprise
managers has to be approved by government departments. In
contrast, "as for each collectively owned enterprise, the
workers' congress or general assembly should be the highest
agency of power".17
Secondly, the institutionalisation of the WSC did not
make much progress. Compared with the WSC system practised
before the Cultural Revolution, the 1981 Provisional
Regulations made several changes. A presidium was introduced
to preside the meetings of the WSC. This presidium should
comprise workers, technicians, management staff and major
leading cadres from the Party committee, the management, the
trade union and the Communist Youth League organisation. And
in most circumstances, the number of members selected from
workers should be more than half. The WSC should meet at least
once every six months. Every meeting should be attended by
more than two thirds of all representatives. When important
36 Xiao Liang, "Changing the Leadership System in State 
Enterprises", in Wei and Chao (ed.), China's Economic Reforms, 
University of Pennsylvania Press 1982, pp.147-58 at 154.
37 Ibid.
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issues had to be discussed, a temporary meeting might be held 
at the request of one third of all representatives. Elections 
and resolutions were only effective if they were made with the 
approval of more than half of all representatives.
Despite these provisions, the WSCs were not properly 
institutionalised. It was explicitly provided that "normally 
the WSC shall not set up any standing organ".38 As in the 
situation which prevailed before the Cultural Revolution, a 
grassroots trade union committee was to act as the working 
body for the WSC. And the committee should prepare, organise 
the meeting of the WSC, and carry out the day-to-day 
organisational work when the WSC was not in session. Moreover, 
the committee might also carry out jobs assigned by the WSC or 
its presidium.39
Thirdly, the WSC was explicitly put under the direct 
leadership of the Party Committee.40 The Provisional 
Regulations did not provide for the method by means of which 
the Party Committee was going to "lead" the WSC, except that 
it authorised leading cadres from the Party committee to sit 
as members of the WSC's presidium.41 In practice, the control 
by the Party committee could be seen in two aspects . The first 
was that the Party committee was entitled to control the trade 
union committee which was the working body of the WSC. And the 
second aspect was more fundamental as the Party committee 
might intervene directly into the operation of the whole WSC 
system, from the election of representatives to the 
arrangement of agenda for the meeting of the WSC.
Last, but not least, the WSC was in a difficult position 
in dealing with enterprise directors. The Provisional 
Regulations provided that:
The director shall report his work regularly to the WSC,
and shall be responsible for implementing and handling
38 Art . 11 .
39 Art. 16.
40 Arts . 1 and 3 .
41 Art . 11 .
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the resolutions and "suggestions" (t i ' an) made by the 
WSC in relation to enterprise production and
administration, and shall accept the examination and 
supervision by the WSC. The WSC shall support the
director in exercising his powers and shall preserve his 
high authority in production management system, and
educate workers to improve their sense of being the 
owners of the state, to voluntarily comply with labour 
discipline and to strictly implement all production or 
technology responsibility system.42
Despite this broad declaration, a clear way to implement 
these ideas was not really worked out. In fact, legal 
provisions themselves were far from clear.43 Many questions 
were not answered. For example, the meaning of "examination" 
and "supervision" was not clear. The differences, if any,
between "discuss and deliberate" and "discuss and decide" is 
unknown. In addition, the coverage of matters on which the WSC 
might adopt binding resolutions was not clarified. In 
practice, these issues were very confusing. For example, as 
one observer found,44 although the WSC might discuss and raise 
suggestions on some matters put forward by the director or by 
the Party committee, it was common that the WSC had no other 
option but to agree to the original proposals.
The Provisional Regulations were applicable only to those 
enterprises which restored the system of director 
responsibility under the leadership of the Party committee. 
Since the early 1980s, however, a number of enterprises were 
chosen to experiment with new leadership systems. In some 
enterprises, the overall leadership by the Party committee was 
replaced by "the system of director responsibility under the 
leadership of the WSC" (zhiqong daibiao dahui lingdao xia de 
chanqzhanq fuzezhi). This system represented an attempt to 
combine "democratic management" with the establishment of a 
new leadership system. Under this system, the WSC was 
described as the highest authority in an enterprise. And the 
Party committee was no longer a primary source of power in
42 Art. 6 .
43 Especially Arts. 5 and 6.
44 Granick, supra note 23.
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enterprise management. Even the director had to follow the 
instructions from and implement the decisions of the WSC. But 
a review of the trial implementation of that system 
suggested4:' that, worried about its potential negative effect, 
the central leadership did not encourage the large scale 
application of this system to many enterprises. In fact, this 
system quickly faded after 1985, though some enterprises, such 
as Shoudu Iron and Steel Company (as examined in our later 
discussion) have continued to apply this system.
C. The WSC system under the SEL
On September 15, 1986, in order to set up a new order
following the introduction of the director responsibility 
system, the Central Committee of the CCP and the State Council 
jointly promulgated three sets of regulations respectively 
concerning directors, Party committees, and WSCs. Compared 
with the 1981 Provisional Regulations, the Regulations on the 
WSC in State Industrial Enterprises (hereafter "WSC 
Regulations") are more comprehensive. The WSC Regulations, 
which contain twenty nine articles and introduce several 
nominal and substantial changes, is still applicable today. 
Nevertheless, the SEL (1988) is more authoritative, and where 
the WSC Regulations do not conform to the SEL, the SEL shall 
prevail.40
The SEL embodies a special chapter -- Chapter Five -- 
dealing with workers and the WSC. Six articles are included in
45 Heath B. Chamberlain, 1 Party Management Relations in 
Chinese Industry: Some Political Dimensions of Economic 
Reform", China Quarterly 1987, pp.631-61, at 654-58.
46 This is because the SEL is the formal law of the state, 
and the Regulations were promulgated as a policy document 
which has provisional nature. On Apr.28, 1988, the Central 
Committee of the CCP issued an Circular concerning the 
Implementation of the SEL. This Circular stated that the SEL 
and the Circular should be superior to all the previously 
promulgated documents which were not consistent with the SEL 
and the Circular. See the text of the Circular, in RMRB, May 
11, 1988, pp.1 and 2. Also see Chapter Six of the thesis.
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this chapter. Moreover, some other provisions of the SEL are 
also relevant.47 In addition, Articles 49 and 50 concern the 
rights and duties of individual workers. Such provisions did 
not appear in either the 1981 Provisional Regulations or the 
1986 WSC Regulations. They were not even included in the draft 
SEL published for the solicitation of opinions in January 
1988. The rights of individual workers as provided in Article 
49 are very widespread, ranging from participating in 
democratic management to labour protection, from suggestions 
on production to supervision of leaders. At the same time, 
Article 50 requires workers to work "with an attitude of being 
masters of the state" (zhurenwenq de taidu), to observe labour 
discipline and enterprise rules and regulations. However, 
except for making the SEL more declarative, these provisions 
do not have much substantive influence on the functioning of 
the present enterprise leadership system. After all, the 
exercise of individual rights largely rests on the proper 
operation of the trade union and the WSC.
The SEL has downgraded the status of the WSC. The 1981 
Provisional Regulations described the WSC as an "organ of 
power" (quanli jigou).48 Such a declaration echoed the call 
for more powers to be accorded to the WSC. But, in fact, it 
also reflected the confusion about the role of the WSC in the 
years after the end of the Cultural Revolution. As discussed 
above, even under the trial system of director responsibility 
under the leadership of the WSC, only in exceptional cases was 
the supremacy of the WSC realised. Since 1985, in many 
enterprises, the WSC was no longer portrayed as the highest 
authority within an enterprise. Subsequently, a down-to-earth 
approach was taken in the 1986 WSC Regulations which describe 
the WSC as "the organ for the exercise of democratic 
management power by the workers" (zhigong xinqshi minzhu 
guanli quanli de jigou) .49 This has also been confirmed by the
47 Arts .8, 9, 10 and 46.
48 Art . 2 .
49 Art. 3 .
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SEL . 50
The close link established in the 1950s between the WSC 
and the trade union has been maintained. The SEL provides that 
the working body of the WSC shall be the enterprise trade 
union committee.&1 The WSC Regulations contain more detailed 
provisions on the work of the trade union committee. Article 
23 lists a number of functions for the committee to perform. 
These include: to organise workers to elect workers' 
representatives; to propose subjects for the WSC to discuss; 
to preside at the joint meeting of heads of workers of 
workers' representative groups and heads of special groups to
50 Art.51 provides: "the WSC is the basic form to realise 
the democratic management of enterprises, and is the organ for 
workers and staff to exercise their power of enterprise 
democratic management." It should be noted that in the SEL 
draft published for the solicitation of opinions, the word 
"right" rather than "power" was employed (see the text of that 
draft in Chinese, FZRB, Jan. 11, 1988. d .2) . "Ricrht"
a n d  “p o w e r "   ^ have t h e  s a m e  M a n d a r i n  p r o n u n c i a t i o n
(quanli) and sometimes are confusing. But each word has a 
different meaning and different implications. For example, the 
National People's Congress is named as the highest organ of 
state "power" (Art.57 of the 1982 Constitution). Here in no 
way may "right" be used.
According to a law professor who suggested the change in 
the provisions of the draft SEL, democratic management is not 
a right, but a power. See Guan Huai, "Bixu Mingque Zhigong Zai 
Qiye Zhong de Zhurenweng Diwei -- Duiyu Wanshan Qiyefa de 
Yixie Jianyi" (The Master Status of Workers and Staff Must Be 
Clarified -- Some Suggestions Concerning the Draft SEL), GRRB, 
Jan. 26, 1988, p. 3. However, his argument for this is not
convincing as he claimed that democratic management had little 
to do with the "interests" of workers and staff.
In fact, the distinctions between "right" and "power" in 
the Chinese context are far from easy to tell in many 
circumstances. As far as "democratic management" is concerned, 
the SEL uses both "right" (Art. 49) and "power" (Art. 51) to 
describe its legal nature. Moreover, the new Trade Union Law 
(supra note 21) also uses both "right" (Art. 16) and "power" 
(Art.30) to describe the nature of the democratic management. 
For an interesting attempt to examine the nature of, and 
distinctions among "right", "power", and "functions and 
powers" (zhiquan), see Professor Shen Zongling, "Dui Hohfeld 
Falu Gainian de Bijiao Yanjiu" (Comparative Studies on 
Hohfold's Theory of legal Concepts), Zhongquo Shehui Kexue 
(Social Sciences in China),. No.1, 1990, pp.67-77.
51 Art. 51 .
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conduct investigations and to do research, for the purpose of 
making suggestions to the WSC, examining and supervising the 
implementation of resolutions made by the WSC; to conduct 
propaganda and education on democratic management to workers; 
to organise workers' representatives to study policies, 
professional and management knowledge in order to improve 
their quality; to accept and handles complaints and 
suggestions made by workers' representatives; to protect legal 
rights and interests of workers' representatives; and to 
organise other work relating to enterprise democratic 
management. Thus, the enterprise trade union committee 
actually has the full control of the WSC.52 Moreover, the WSC 
Regulations provided that the superior trade union has the 
duty to "supervise, support and protect the WSC in correctly 
exercising its powers".53 In addition, both the SEL54 and the 
WSC Regulations55 provide that workers' general assembly or 
workers' representative group may be organised at the level of 
workshop, to bring about democratic management. In such cases, 
appropriate meetings shall be organised by the trade union 
committees of the workshops.
What, then, are the "functions and powers" (zhiquan, 
hereinafter "powers") of the WSC? Article 52 of the SEL 
enumerates five categories of powers exercisable by the WSC:
(1) listening to and deliberating the factory 
director's report on the business policies of the 
enterprise, long term plans, annual plans, capital 
construction plans, plans for major technological 
reforms, training programmes for workers, plans for 
distributing and applying retained funds and plans in 
respect of the management responsibility system on a
52 Such control has also been confirmed by the Trade Union 
Law of 1992 (supra note 21). This new law, in Art.30, provides 
that a trade union committee is a working organ for the WSC; 
it is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the WSC, and 
shall check and supervise the implementation of resolutions 
adopted by the WSC.
53 Art. 24.
54 Art. 53 .
55 Art.. 25.
296
contractual or leasing basis and putting forward their 
opinions and proposals;
(2) approving or rejecting after examination 
enterprises wage adjustment plans, bonus distribution 
plans, labour protection measures, measures for awards 
and punishment and other major rules and regulations;
(3) examining and deciding on plans for the 
application of welfare funds for workers and for the
distribution of house facilities to workers and other 
major issues concerning the welfare of workers;
(4) evaluating through discussion and supervising 
leading administrative cadres at all levels of the 
enterprise and putting forward proposals regarding their 
awards, punishment, appointment and removal;
(5) on the basis of decisions made by government 
departments in charge of the enterprise, electing factory 
director, and report the factory director-elect to the 
above departments for approval.
A comparison with the treatment in the 1981 Provisional 
Regulations^’ suggests that the basic structure of the powers 
of the WSC is similar in both the SEL and the Provisional 
Regulations, with the exception that the positions for 
categories two and three have been mutually exchanged.
The evolution from the 1981 Provisional Regulations to 
the 1988 SEL also indicates certain changes in the detailed 
powers enjoyed by the WSC. The contents in category one power 
of Article 52 of the SEL are powers exercised in the form of 
"listening to and deliberate" (tinqqu he shenvi). Most objects 
of these powers had already appeared in the 1986 WSC 
Regulations. One additional object is concerned with the 
proposals on contracting or leasing responsibility system 
under which the enterprise is going to be operated. This was 
actually provided in category two (that is, the power to 
"deliberate and approve", shenyi tonqyi) of the 1986 WSC 
Regulations. It was even contained in category two in the 
draft SEL published for the solicitation of opinions. However, 
by removing the above object from category two to one, the SEL 
alters the previous category two power by adding "or 
rejecting" (huozhe fouiue) to the original "approving after 
examination" (shencha tonqyi).
Despite the above noticed nominal degradation of the
See Art . 5 .
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power nature of the WSC, it is difficult to make any 
suggestion as to whether the SEL actually intends to reinforce 
or devaluate the WSC. According to the 1981 Provisional 
Regulations, the WSC was entitled to "discuss and deliberate" 
and then "adopt relevant resolutions1 on matters regarding 
enterprise management.57 This provision would imply that, if 
such resolutions were to be binding, the WSC would possess 
real authority in relation to enterprise management. However, 
qualification was imposed in the 1986 WSC Regulations whereby 
any such resolution might only be adopted in the way "as to 
the implementation of the proposal considered". In contrast, 
as to the same matter, the SEL only authorises the WSC to 
"discuss and deliberate", and then "raise its opinions and 
make suggestions".58 The wording regarding the effects of 
"adopting relevant resolutions" was completely dropped. Such 
an amendment might be best accounted for in two explanations. 
First, with the introduction of the director responsibility 
system, the power to command enterprise management had been 
gradually consolidated into the hands of the directors. The 
WSC may participate in discussions on enterprise management, 
but it is excluded from making any final decisions in this 
respect. Secondly, after the WSC was restored in 1979, it had 
been unable to fully carry out the powers relating to 
enterprise management as provided in 1981 Provisional 
Regulations. This was even the case, as discussed above, in 
those enterprises which experimented with the system of 
director responsibility under the leadership of the WSC. 
Therefore it would be more realistic for the law to adopt a 
down-to-earth approach in this regard. Actually, this category 
one power seems very similar to the right of consultation and 
information which is widely used in many Western countries.
Category two powers are those for the WSC to "approve or 
reject (veto)" matters on wage adjustment plans, bonus 
distribution plans, labour protection measures, measures for
57 Art. 5, par . 1.
58 Art. 52 , par . 1.
298
awards and punishment, and other major rules and regulations.
Obviously, these matters are all directly concerned with the
interests of the workers.
As far as workers' welfare is concerned, the WSC is
authorized to "decide" (iueding) after examination. This is
the category three power. The power to decide living welfare
matters is deliberately distinguished from the power to
"approve or reject" matters regarding other interests of the
workers. However, the SEL itself does not provide for the
distinction in nature between these two powers. One textbook
on the SEL seeks to explain such difference. It states:
the decisions made by the WSC after examination in 
relation to welfare matters are immediately effective, no 
reconsideration by the WSC or arbitration by higher 
government authority shall take place even if the 
director is not satisfied; but in the case of veto by the 
WSC, if the director disagrees, he may ask the WSC to 
reconsider its veto or report the case to higher 
authority for arbitration.59
This explanation appears in line with the intention of 
the legislators. However, this book does not go further to 
explain the consequences of an arbitration award made by a 
higher authority against the veto decision made by the WSC. It 
is thus unknown whether or not the WSC shall have the right to 
reconsider an arbitration award. It may be presumed that any 
decision made by a higher authority is final and binding. This 
presumption is primarily based on the intentional 
differentiation between the power to decide and that to veto 
or approve. Furthermore, Article 20 of the 1986 WSC 
Regulations provides that any intra vires decision made by the 
WSC shall not be amended without the approval of the WSC. This 
article only applies to the case where the WSC uses its power 
to "decide", rather than the power to "approve or veto after 
examination". In addition, Article 46 of the SEL also suggests 
that the director must carry out only those decisions legally 
made by the WSC.
59 Gao Kemin, Chen Yonghua and Xiao Ping, Qiye Zhi Hun-- 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guoving Goncrve Oiye Fa (The Soul of 
Enterprises -- the SEL in the PRC), Sichuan People's Press 
1988, p.168.
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The powers of categories three and four are rather weak 
indeed. The WSC may "evaluate through discussion" (pingyi) and 
"supervise" (i iandu) leading administrative cadres at all 
levels of the enterprise and then put forward proposals 
regarding their rewards, punishment, appointment and removal, 
but a decision can only be made by the government departments 
in charge of the enterprise. Moreover, like the case in the 
1981 Provisional Regulations, only under the arrangement of 
the government departments in charge of the enterprise may the 
WSC elect the enterprise director, and no election result is 
effective unless and until it is approved by the government/'0 
Indeed, it is doubtful whether the election of a director, 
that has to be exercised under so many restrictions, may be 
called a legal "power" at all.
A word-by-word examination of the powers enjoyed by the 
WSC suggests nothing but pure legal provisions. In order to 
have a comprehensive view of the actual application of these 
legal powers, one has to look at how and to what extent these 
powers are carried out in individual enterprises. But before 
any practical examination can proceed, two general comments 
should be considered.
First, the five categories of power as provided for in 
Article 52 of the SEL represent varying degrees of authority. 
As a whole, these powers may be seen as a circle. The centre 
of this circle is the power to decide matters concerning the 
welfare interests of workers. The further from the centre 
point the power is, the weaker the weight of the power is. The 
hierarchy for relevant powers from relatively strong to 
relatively weak is: the power to approve or veto proposals on 
workers' interests other than living welfare; the power to 
listen to and deliberate proposals on enterprise management; 
the power to evaluate and supervise enterprise cadres. The 
weakest power, of course, is that to elect enterprise 
directors. This is because the WSC may be "legally" deprived 
of this power by the government departments in charge of the
G0 Art .52, par . 5
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enterprise.
Secondly, while the 1981 Provisional Regulations put the
WSC under the leadership of the Party committee, the 1986 WSC
Regulations claims that the WSC shall accept the ideological 
and political leadership of the Party committee/'1 This SEL
provision may imply that the Party committee shall no longer
intervene with the daily administration of the WSC. In the 
mid-1980s, such provision not only reflected the decreased 
authority of the Party committee in enterprise, but also
accorded with the full application of the director
responsibility system. In fact, both the WSC Regulations02 and 
the SEL0J stress that the WSC shall support the director in 
exercising his power. The SEL even goes further by requiring 
the WSC to "educate workers to carry out the duties as
provided in the SEL" /4 Indeed, after the director has
commanded the full legal authority to manage the enterprise,
as the above discussion (that is, category one power) shows,
the WSC is kept further away from enterprise management.
III. Evaluation of the WSC System
A. Practical implementation
First, we should note that the WSC has not been
established in every state enterprise. Neither the 1986 WSC 
Regulations nor the SEL explicitly provides for the enterprise 
scale required for the compulsory establishment of the WSC. It 
may therefore be presumed that every state enterprise must 
have its own WSC. In large enterprises, even workshops are 
required to set up workers' general assembly or other forms of 
meeting to realise "democratic management". But according to
61 Art. 4 .
02 Art. 5 .
02 Art . 54 .
64 Nevertheless, except Article 50 (mentioned earlier),
it is unclear what duties the SEL has expressly provided.
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a survey carried out by the Gaungzhou Federation of Trade 
Unions,GS in 1986, 90.2 percent of "enterprise and
institutional units" (qishive danwei) in Guangzhou City, 
Guangdong Province, had set up the WSC. Until July 1989, more 
than three hundred units did not establish their WSCs.
Secondly, more problematic is the actual implementation 
of the powers provided in Article 52 of the SEL. In 1989, the 
All China Federation of Trade Unions conducted a comprehensive 
Survey based on paper questionnaire, seminars and an analysis 
of enterprise's economic activities. This Survey concerned 855 
enterprises -- 146 large enterprises, 397 medium and 312 small 
enterprises. The results of the Survey were published in late 
1990,GG -- two years after the initial application of the SEL.
As far as the WSC is concerned, the five categories of 
powers were decomposed in the Survey into eighteen items. The 
result shows that the actual implementation of these eighteen 
items varies considerably from one to one. Of those eighteen
items, eight were category one power, that is, the power "to
listen to and deliberate". The implementation of these items 
is relatively reasonable. Of all the WSCs in surveyed
enterprises, eighty-three per cent exercised such power on 
enterprise's business policy, eight-two per cent on 
enterprise's annual plans, seventy-three per cent on long term 
plan, sixty per cent on contracting or leasing plans, 57.8 per 
cent on capital construction plans, fifty-six per cent on 
major technical innovation, fifty-five per cent on workers' 
training programmes, and forty-five per cent on plans for 
distributing and applying enterprise's retained funds.
As for the power "to approve or veto", seven items were 
listed in the Survey. Of all the WSCs in the surveyed
enterprises, seventy-two per cent had such power on their
65 For the result of this survey, see Zhang Xihong, "Dui 
Weihu Zhigong Hefa Quanyi Qingkuang de Diaocha" {A Survey on 
the Situation of Protecting Workers' Legal Interests), JJGL, 
No.8, 1990, pp.43-4.
GG "Guanyu Qiye Fa Guanche Luoshi Qingkuang de Diaocha 
Baogao" (A Survey Report on the Implementation of the SEL) , 
JJGL, No.10, 1990, pp.24-7.
302
enterprise's major rules and regulations; seventy per cent 
over their enterprises' wage adjustment plans; 69,4 per cent 
over their enterprises' housing facilities distribution plans,
58.4 per cent over their enterprises' measures for awards and 
punishment; 57.5 per cent over their enterprises' welfare 
issues; 57.4 per cent over their enterprises' bonus plans;
45.4 per cent over their enterprise's labour protection 
measures.
In the Survey, only one item was included in the WSC' s 
power to resolve and decide. This was concerned with the 
application of workers' welfare funds. But according to the 
SEL,67 the WSC should also have the power to resolve and 
decide the issues of plans for the distribution of workers' 
housing facilities and other welfare issues. As already shown, 
these two matters were put in the Survey under the power to 
approve or veto rather than that to resolve and decide. The 
published results of the Survey did not mention the reasons 
for such change. The change might have been based on an inside 
document which simply ignored the legal provision of the SEL. 
The reason for this policy adjustment might also lie in the 
intentions of further reducing the WSC's powers to decide 
issues and of avoiding possible embarrassment in relation to 
such sensitive issues as the distribution of workers' housing 
facilities. Nevertheless, even after the removal of two items, 
the picture for the implementation of the power to resolute 
and decide is still gloomy. Only in forty-seven per cent of 
enterprises surveyed did the WSCs have the opportunity to 
decide the issue of application of enterprise welfare fund, 
and in another thirty-one enterprises, the WSCs had partially 
exercised such power.
The Survey also revealed that only in about half (53.4 
per cent) of all enterprises were the WSCs able to use the 
power of evaluating and supervising leading cadres of their 
own enterprises. Even worse, however, is that the WSCs in only
16.5 per cent of surveyed enterprises had exercised the power
67 Art. 52 , par . 3
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to elect directors. Among all 855 enterprises surveyed, the 
directors of only forty-nine enterprises were selected by the 
WSCs. Although no further details are reported, the Survey 
does raise the question that no rules are available to be 
followed when a superior government department does not 
approve such election results. Furthermore, the overall 
picture is that an overwhelming majority of enterprise 
directors were either directly appointed (653 enterprises) or 
recruited after the process of selection (129 enterprises) by 
government authorities in charge of the enterprises concerned. 
According to the SEL,(,a before any such appointment or 
recruitment is made, government departments must consult with 
the representatives of workers. But the Survey showed that, in 
most cases, such consultation did not take place. Even if 
there was prior consultation, the opinions raised by workers' 
representatives' were not seriously considered.
Given that the central and official position of those in 
charge of this Survey and the relatively large scale of 
involvement, the Survey may be regarded as authoritative. Of 
course, the results would have been more valuable if the 
Survey had been conducted in a more accurate way. For example, 
we are not told about the criteria which were adopted for 
judging "application" or "implementation" (luoshi) of a 
concrete power? Or more precisely, in what way or ways was a 
specific power exercised? Different understandings of these 
issues would certainly present different answers to Survey 
questions. For example, as far as the power "to listen to and 
deliberate" enterprise director's report is concerned, a 
director may, as the law requires, report relevant issues to 
the WSC, but the result could be very different whether or not 
the WSC discusses the report in a serious way and then raises 
its opinions and suggestions to the director. It may also be 
very different whether or not the director pays due attention 
to the suggestions made by the WSC. Moreover, in relation to 
the power "to approve or veto", and indeed the power "to
68 Art . 44 .
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decide", the answers regarding the exercise by the WSC of 
these powers may differ considerably, depending on whether the 
WSC votes with its own will or simply acts as a robber stamp 
by completely endorsing all the proposals presented before 
them by their directors.
Despite the Survey's inaccuracies, one can still grasp 
some basic points on the basis of the Survey. Generally 
speaking, on the one hand, the situation seems to be better as 
regards to powers to "listen to and deliberate" directors'
report, "to approve or reject", and "to evaluate and
supervise" administrative cadres of the enterprises. In other 
words, it is in the areas where no final decision-making power 
falls with the WSC that the WSC may have the opportunity to 
execute its powers. On the other hand, other powers are in 
serious trouble. As far as the power "to resolve and decide" 
is concerned, the objects for the exercise of this power has
been reduced in practice, if not in law. And with only one
object left, the power is not exercised satisfactorily. In 
addition, the Survey showed that WSC's power to elect 
directors was rarely used. This power has been worsened by the 
compulsory procedure that the result of any such election must 
be approved by relevant government departments.
The Survey results showed a high degree of unanimity with 
earlier analysis of the role played by the WSCs in the years 
up to the mid 1980s . It is disappointing to notice that not 
all the WSCs in the surveyed enterprises had the opportunity 
to exercise even one of their weakest powers, that being the 
power to "listen to and deliberate". Yet, the power "to 
approve or veto" has been subject to more difficulties.
There are, of course, reports which suggest that the WSC 
may play a significant role. For example, according to one
report, when a director submitted the draft measures for the
adoption of "advanced labour composition" (laodong youhua
zuhe)69 to a meeting of group heads of workers'
69 Advanced labour composition usually means that within 
an enterprise, workers and foremen are given the flexibility 
and freedom to reorganise themselves in order to have the best
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representatives, those group heads thought that the conditions 
for the introduction of such measures were not yet mature, and 
suggested to postpone the proposed measures. Later, "the 
director accepted their opinions and as a result complaints
from the masses were calmed down".70 In another enterprise,
the director claimed that he had persistently supported the 
WSC in fully exercising its functions and powers . For example, 
he accepted WSC's suggestions and opinions which were 
concerned with the protection of female workers, with his 
decision regarding loans, and with the allocation of housing 
facilities .71
These model cases suggest that the WSC may occasionally 
play its role. In fact, in China, the WSC has a long history
of being described as a "welfare organisation". Indeed, the
SEL authorises the WSC to resolute and decide three welfare 
issues: plans for the application of workers' welfare funds, 
plans for the distribution of workers', housing facilities, 
and other issues concerning workers' living welfare. But the 
survey moved two of the three objects into the weaker power to 
"approve or reject", therefore leaving just one object -- 
plans for the application of workers' welfare funds to be 
subject to the WSC's deliberation and decision. But the survey 
showed that only half of the WSCs had the opportunity to 
"resolve and decide" this single issue. The WSCs in a 
significant number of enterprises may be described as only an 
"affiliated organ to assist enterprise administrative 
departments to handle the issues of workers' welfare".72 In
teams to carry out work targets.
70 Fan Guoxing, "Quanxin Quanyi Yikao Gongren JieJi, Shi 
'Erqi' Laochang Yong Bao Qingchun" (Relying Whole Heartedly on 
Working Class, and Making an Old 'Erqi' Factory Ever Young) , 
JJGL, No.8, 1990, pp.44-6, at 45.
71 Hou Baoting, "Changzhang Yao Zuo Qiye Minzhu Guanli de 
Tuijingzhe He Shijianzhe" (A Director Should Become the 
Promoter and Practitioner of Enterprise Democratic 
Management), RMRB, May 29, 1992, p.5.
11 Zhang, supra note 65, p. 43.
306
other words, the WSCs in many enterprises may not even act as 
independent welfare-deciding organs.
Welfare and other connected matters have for a long time 
been seen as the most important job assigned for the WSC. The 
main consideration for this particular kind of workers' 
participation lies in that the proper treatment of welfare 
matters will ease and dissolve potential conflicts and 
complaints among workers. Discussions by workers, and 
decisions made by the WSC on welfare issues will serve to add 
not only more fairness but also more authority for the 
implementation of welfare issues. However, it is one thing to 
acknowledge that workers must be invited to deliberate on 
welfare issues, and it is another whether the WSC may be 
further allowed to decide any such matter.
Despite the fact that the number of items which are 
listed into the agenda of the WSC has increased drastically 
during economic reforms, a distinction exists between issues 
which are directly connected with the workers' interests such 
as welfare, and those which are not. It is on the issues of 
the former category that the WSC can be more active. Concerns, 
however, may also be expressed by the WSC over the issues 
which are not or used to be regarded as not directly connected 
with workers' interests. In the light of new management 
responsibility system, particularly that on the basis of 
"contracting" (chengbao) -- a subject to be examined in
Chapter Nine of the thesis, complaints arise that the WSC is 
often excluded from airing its views on both the way in which 
the new system is carried out and the way by which an 
enterprise director is selected. On the one hand, in practice, 
when a director is appointed or recruited by government 
departments, few WSCs are consulted with by the latter. The 
WSC is therefore effectively prevented from taking part in any 
such consultation process.
On the other hand, connected with this problem is whether 
or not workers may join their directors in taking the risk of 
contracting with the government. One of the current practice 
is the system of "contracting by all members of the
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enterprise" (quanvuan chengbao). Strictly speaking, this 
system does not change the legal relationship between the 
government and state enterprises. This is because, according 
to the law,72 the chengbao contract is in nature concluded 
between the state represented by government departments and 
relevant state enterprises as the contractors. However, some 
differences may still exist between quanvuan chengbao and 
changzhang chengbao (contracting by the director) in case of 
the failure by the enterprise to fulfil a contract. As for 
changzhang chengbao, it is the director, in addition to the 
enterprise concerned, who will be liable, administratively and 
financially, to government departments for such failure. But 
under quanvuan chengbao, all workers and staff personally 
share the risk together with their director as well as the 
enterprise. If the enterprise fails to carry out the contract, 
workers will usually have to pay to government departments the 
amount of money that was used in the first place as a kind of 
guarantee for concluding the chengbao contract.
In Chinese official view, quanyuan chengbao is a better 
system in that workers will play a more active role in 
carrying out enterprises' objectives. This is because this 
system can make workers to work harder by forcing them to 
realise that they share the risks with their directors. But a 
further question must be asked: given that workers take
greater risks in this new system, are they (through the WSC) 
allowed the real powers, for example, to freely select their 
directors and to participate more in management? Clearly, no 
clear and definite answer can be drawn from the statements 
made by the government. While theoretically speaking workers 
should be assigned with a more important role in managing 
their enterprises, given the generally disappointing 
performance by the WSC system, it is still far from true that 
workers' participation in enterprise management has been given 
serious consideration in the new situation.
73 Art.14 of the Chengbao Regulations. Also see Chapter 
Nine of the thesis..
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B. An untypical case
Having described in general terms the disappointing 
implementation of the WSC system, it is helpful to pursue a 
case study for a deeper insight into the actual functioning of 
the WSC in individual enterprises. The following discussion 
focuses on worker's participation in Shoudu Iron and Steel 
Company (Shoudu Gangtie Gongsi, hereafter "SISC") . This study 
is based on the materials I collected both in the libraries 
and during my study visit to China in early 1992 . The 
selection of this case does not mean that it is typical. On 
the contrary, practices of this company are far from 
representative. Nevertheless, it is due to its exceptional 
success as measured by Chinese official standards that this 
case has received the broadest publicity.74 In my view, the 
study of this untypical case may not only enhance a general 
and critical understanding of the so-called "good" or 
"successful" functioning of workers' participation in
enterprise management, but also help observers to detect the
trend in the development of workers' participation in Chinese 
state enterprises in broader spectrum when these much 
celebrated and well publicized experiences are extended to and 
"learnt by" many other Chinese state enterprises in the 
future.
The SISC, located in the suburbs of Beijing, is a leading 
large-sized state enterprise with a workforce of more than 
180,000 workers. In addition to its extraordinary size and 
strategic importance, the SISC has also made its name by
successfully carrying out the contracting system which has
contributed to significant improvements in its economic 
efficiency and profit turnover.75
74 For a report, see RMRB (overseas edn.), Dec.2, 1991, 
p. 4. See a series of reports in GRRB, starting on Mar. 16, 
1992, p.l. Also see a series of reports in Beijing Review, 
issues of early 1992, especially the issue of Mar.16-22, 1992, 
pp.24-7 .
75 See the discussion of the contracting system in Chapter 
Nine of this thesis.
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In implementing the WSC system, the SISC seems to be more 
radical than the existing framework established by the SEL. 
Notably, unlike the general and weak declaration in the 1986 
WSC Regulations that the WSC is "the organ for the exercise of 
democratic management power by the workers",76 the SISC has 
chosen to explicitly acknowledge that the WSC is the "supreme 
organ of power" within the enterprise. This position of the 
WSC is more in line with the provision in the 1981 Provisional 
Regulations as discussed earlier.
One of the most successful achievements for the WSC at 
the SISC is described as the full realisation of its decision­
making power. The WSC which is held once a year is praised as 
being able to make final decisions on SISC's annual plans 
regarding production operation, technical innovation and new 
construction projects, personnel training, wages and bonus and 
social facilities.77 Decisions are also taken by the WSC in 
relation to long-term plans, the plans for the contracting 
management, and many other matters. Moreover, the WSC in the 
SISC is authorised to elect a general manager who should 
implement the decisions made by the WSC, report his work to 
the WSC, and respond to inquires made by the WSC. When the WSC 
is not in session, the general manager is required to perform 
his duties and functions under the supervision of the Factory 
Committee which, being elected by the WSC, is authorised to 
exercise the authority of the WSC. In addition, the WSC also 
elects an administration committee responsible for matters of 
well-being. This committee which is accountable to the WSC is 
entitled to discuss and decide issues concerning the 
livelihood and welfare of workers and staff of the SISC.
Workers at the SISC are regularly kept informed about the 
detailed operation of the company. The most important channel 
has been the company's weekly "Bulletin" (qingkuang tongbao),
76 Art.3. Also see similar provision in Art.10, SEL.
77 For a report of the long process (four months) of 
consultation and discussion concerning one annual plan before 
the final and formal meeting of the WSC, see Beijing Review, 
March.16-22, 1992, p.25.
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which is dispatched to the workshop level and passed on to all 
workers. The contents of the Bulletin range from management 
and production to workers' welfare issues. On the other hand, 
workers may make suggestions to the management. Such 
suggestions must be expressly answered within five days. If a 
worker who made a suggestion does not agree to the reply he 
has received, he may have a discussion with the person who is 
responsible for that reply.
One unique feature concerning the "democratic management" 
at the SISC is reflected by the establishment of supervision 
committees at levels in the company and its subsidiaries . Such 
supervision committees are elected by the WSC at the
corresponding levels. The responsibilities and authority of 
these supervision committees include the protection of 
workers' rights and interests as well as supervision over the 
performance of administrative cadres and the management of the 
company. Supervision committees also publish monthly 
Supervision Bulletins which contain reports regarding the
detailed activities of the supervision committees and even 
sanctions taken by the supervision committees against specific 
factories or personnel.
In general, worker's participation at the SISC seems to 
suggest a somewhat vague idea of the so-called five types of
rights of workers: right of decision-making, the right of
information, the right to elect, the right of supervision, and 
"the right of autonomy in well-being" (shenqhuo zizhiquan). 
Compared with the loose and unclear framework established by 
the SEL concerning workers' participation, the practices at 
the SISC reflect certain signs of progress. The most notable 
improvement is the formation of several important institutions 
and channels designed to facilitate the "democratic management 
of enterprise". The establishment of factory committee and 
supervision committees, and the publication of bulletins may 
contribute significantly to the realisation of worker's 
participation.
As indicated earlier, worker's participation at the SISC 
is not typical in the sense that the above generalised
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practices are not popular among Chinese state enterprises. 
Indeed, the information available seems to put too much praise 
and too little criticism on the actual functioning of the 
system. Nevertheless, this untypical case may at least 
demonstrate that the realisation of workers' participation 
varies from enterprise to enterprise, depending on many 
factors such as institutional designs, and the openness of the 
management, and the cooperation between different 
institutions.78 Furthermore, it is certainly true that under 
the general endorsement of so-called "democratic management", 
worker's participation can be better carried out. The bold 
assertion by the SISC that the WSC is "the supreme organ of 
power", whether or not it is fully realised, is an example of 
the possibilities that practices in individual enterprises may 
build on and even deviate from the law which, being too 
declarative and loose, has failed to clearly define the status 
and role of the WSC and to properly address the issues 
affecting the realisation of workers' participation in 
enterprise management. In fact, supervision committees have 
been formed by the WSC without any explicit support from 
relevant law. In this sense, relevant legal provisions are not 
binding norms, but mere guidance that can be surpassed and 
ignored.
C. Comparative analysis
As a rule, certain forms of workers' participation were 
and are legally guaranteed in almost every socialist 
country.7’1 In some Western countries including the United
78 The Party secretary and president of the factory 
management committee of the SISC, Mr Zhou Guanwu, is a famous 
figure in Chinese industrial circle. In particular, he has 
been praised by the authorities for his openness and close 
connection with workers.
19 For a brief and comparative discussion of workers' 
participation in the USSR and Eastern European countries, see 
Hubert Izdebski, "Legal Aspects of Economic Reforms in 
Socialist Countries", in American Journal of Comparative Law, 
1989, pp.703-52, at 723-26.
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Kingdom, workers' participation has not been legally accepted 
as necessary. Nevertheless, many Western countries have 
adopted different mechanisms to facilitate workers' 
participation. For example, in France, an enterprise committee 
is required by law to be set up in any enterprise that employs 
more than fifty workers.
The German system for workers' participation and
codetermination in enterprise management is perhaps the most 
ac(v<?LAced.
.... This is not only because this system has a long 
history, but also because it is more detailed in procedural 
provisions. In addition, the legal literature on the German 
system is easily available. The following is a brief 
comparison of the Chinese and the German systems in regard to 
workers' participation.
In Germany, there are two kinds of workers' 
participation.80 One is through the works council, and the 
other is workers' representation to the supervisory board.
According to German company law, in addition to a 
management board, a supervisory board must be established in 
every company. Employees can have elected representatives to 
sit in the supervisory board. The supervisory board has two 
basic functions: to elect the members of the management board 
and to supervise the management board's activities. As a 
result of special law.81 Workers are even given access to join 
the management board in the industries of the mining and the 
iron and steel. But in Chinese state enterprises, there is no 
supervisory board to ensure workers representation. In 
addition, although Chinese law provides that workers' 
representatives may become members of the enterprise 
management committee, such provision makes little difference 
since the committee only acts as an organ to "assist the
80 Manfred Weiss, Labour Law and Industrial Relations in 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Kluwer 1987, pp.149-83.
81 The Act on Workers' Representation in the Mining and 
the Iron and Steel Industries of 1951. See ibid. p.175.
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director to decide important matters",82
As far as German enterprises in the private sector are 
concerned, the Works Constitution Act of 1952 (amended in 
1972) requires every plant which employs more than five 
workers to set up a works council to realise worker's 
participation and codetermination in enterprise management. A 
comparison between the works council in Germany and the WSC in 
China suggests at least the following points:
First, German Law provides more detailed treatment on the 
institution of the works council. The Works Constitution Act 
alone has more than one hundred articles. This act is also 
reinforced by many other important items of legislation, 
including the Election Regulations of the Works Council (1972) 
and the Workers Codetermination Act (1976). But in China, as 
mentioned above, the 1986 Regulations are neither detailed nor 
up to date. And the SEL only contains a few articles on the 
WSC. Although the Federations of Trade Unions at all levels 
and enterprises themselves may promulgate more detailed 
regulations for the operation of the WSC, many procedural and 
substantial matters are unclear.
Secondly, as far as the right of participation is 
concerned, there are many similarities between the German and 
Chinese systems. In Germany, the rights of the works councils 
cover social, personnel and economic matters.83 The works 
council can expect information and consultation on many 
matters. It may also make decisions on some important matters. 
Under certain circumstances, enterprise management is required 
by law to reach a so-called "compromise of interests" with the 
works council.84 The works council is also entitled to enforce 
"social plans" asking for compensation to be given to the 
workers affected by the decisions made by the management. 
However, in addition to those powers arising from the special 
situations of the country concerned (for example, in China,
82 Art . 47, SEL .
83 Supra note 80, p.167.
84 Ibid.
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the distribution of housing facilities), it is rather 
difficult to make any conclusion on which organ, the works 
council or the WSC, possesses more powers. It is even more 
difficult to compare the actual functioning of each 
organisation.
Thirdly, it is interesting to see that both the WSC and 
the works council are asked to cooperate in good faith with 
the management. In Germany, the law prohibits the Works 
Council from resorting to industrial action.85 In China, the 
WSC is required by the SEL to support the director. Moreover, 
the Party committee, which is an important source of power 
within state enterprises, is able to exercise its influence 
over the activities of the WSC.
In addition, there is a close link between the organs for 
realising the workers' participation and the trade unions both 
in China and in Germany.afl Despite their division of labour, 
the two organisations have great influence upon each other. 
However, the relationship between the WSC and the trade union 
is obviously closer. It is not only because the two are 
supposed to have similar interests, but also because the trade 
union is assigned as the working body for the WSC.
Finally, and most interestingly, German law provides in 
detail for the settlement of dispute between the works council 
and the management. The most important body is the arbitration 
committee. This consists of an equal number of members 
appointed by both the employer and the works council, and a 
neutral president who chairs the committee.87 The committee 
can not only recommend proposals but also make binding 
decisions in some circumstances.88 In contrast, Chinese law 
does not contain any express provision concerning dispute 
settlement. According to Article 8 of the 1986 WSC
85 Ibid . p . 160 .
86 Ibid . , p . 150 .
87 Ibid . , p . 162 .
88 Ibid. , pp.167-68.
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Regulations, when the WSC has different opinions as to the 
decision made by the director within his authority, the WSC 
can raise its opinions to the director, or it can report to 
the superior trade union. The SEL makes no reference to the 
settlement of any disputes. As discussed above, in the case of 
a veto decision made by the WSC (category two power) , the 
director may ask a superior government authority to arbitrate. 
Whatever the practical solutions for disputes are, at least 
there is no neutral dispute settlement body at enterprise 
level which may expedite the realisation of worker's 
participation. After all, the whole area is still 
controversial. No doubt, the lack of proper body and procedure 
for the settlement of disputes may circumscribe the proper and 
continuous operation of the WSC system in China.
IV. Conclusion
The worker -- staff Congress (WSC) is regarded in China 
as an important institution in state enterprises. Indeed, this 
institution is also important for collective enterprises.89 
The primary significance of the WSC is its ideological and
89 The importance of the WSC in state enterprises is more 
obvious when compared with the organisational treatment in 
other types of enterprises. For example, in a private 
enterprise, neither a WSC nor a workers' general assembly is 
required by law to be formed, though a trade union may play 
such a role as negotiating collective contracts (see Art.33 of 
the Provisional Regulations Concerning Private Enterprises). 
This is also the case for foreign investment enterprises in 
China.
In a rural collective enterprise, a WSC or a workers' 
general assembly may be organised "to raise opinions and make 
suggestions regarding enterprise management and operation, to 
evaluate and supervise the director and other managerial 
staff, and to protect legal interests of workers" (See Art.26, 
the Regulations Concerning Collective Enterprise in Rural 
Areas). But apart from this declaration, the workers' 
organisation in rural collective enterprises receives no more 
detailed legal provisions. However, for urban collective 
enterprises, either a worker -- staff assembly or a WSC should 
be established to exercise functions and powers similar to 
those assigned to the WSC in state enterprises. (See Arts.27- 
30, the Regulations Concerning Collective Enterprises in 
Cities and Towns).
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political implications. The WSC is employed to ensure that 
workers -- "the owners of the state"90 -- can participate in 
"democratic management" of state enterprises. It is mainly due 
to this ideological and political position that workers' 
participation in state enterprises, as a political phenomenon 
and legal issue, is not allowed to be challenged. Moreover, 
workers' participation is also seen as an important means for 
enhancing economic efficiency through workers' active and 
positive involvement in enterprise management.
What has not been made clear by existing law, however, is 
the extent and degree of authority which the WSC can enjoy. 
Despite many legal and policy declarations authorizing the WSC 
with a number of powers, the WSC has not gained any decisive 
authority in the management of Chinese state enterprises.
Still less clear is government's determination to let the 
WSC properly exercise its powers. First, various restrictions 
are imposed. This is particularly evident for the power of the 
WSC to elect enterprise directors. Secondly, neither dispute
90 It should be noted that since the beginning of the 
economic reforms, workers' status in state enterprises has 
been facing a crisis. The overall trend is that fewer workers 
now feel that they are the "masters" of the state and state 
enterprises. According to a survey carried out by the All- 
China Trade Union Association in 1988, of the 210,000 workers 
involved in the survey, 36.6 per cent felt that they were not 
masters; 51.5 per cent felt that their master status in 
enterprises was not high; and only 11.9 per cent felt that 
they were the masters. According to another survey carried out 
in 1990 by the Shanghai Political Consultative Conference, of 
the workers in thirty-one state enterprises in Shanghai, only 
2.82 per cent agreed that they were fully treated as masters;
29.06 per cent thought that they were from time to time 
treated as masters; in contrast, 25.04 percent did not feel 
any they were masters; 35.99 per cent felt that they were 
merely labourers in enterprises; and 6.27 per cent did not 
know what to say. For the information, see Shidai (Times), 
No.1, 1992, pp.2-3. To some extent, the decline of the status 
of workers in enterprises has been due to the implementation 
of the Contracting system which puts emphasis on the 
performance of enterprise managers. For a discussion on the 
contracting system, see Chapter Nine of the thesis. Workers' 
feeling about their status in state enterprises is likely to 
continue to decline with the further implementation of the 
labour reform which seeks to put workers at a more vulnerable 
positions for dismissal and sanctions.
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settlement bodies nor proper procedures for dispute settlement 
are provided for in the law. Thirdly, in practice, a large 
number of the WSCs have failed to exercise the powers as 
provided by the law. Some enterprises have not yet set up 
their WSCs. Thus, the so-called "powers" would be better 
described as "targets" or "objectives" rather than actual 
powers and authority. The WSC may be forced to waive its 
"powers", or be restrained from exercising its "powers".
Throughout the history of the PRC, state enterprises have 
been controlled either by Party committees, or by the 
directors, or indeed by both of them. Except in very few 
circumstances, the overall control of enterprise management 
has never rested with the WSC. Nor has the WSC been able to 
operate as an effective check on enterprise management.
Many difficulties would, of course, have been present if 
the law had conferred upon the WSC many decisive powers 
regarding enterprise management. These difficulties would 
include the poor quality of workers and the possible delay in 
enterprise decision-making process. Moreover, the WSCs might 
misuse their powers. These negative aspects of the WSC system 
would have to be considered if the leadership would move to 
authorise the WSC with real powers. But it is doubtful whether 
these difficulties are the real threats to the proper 
operation of state enterprises.
As a matter of fact, several policy factors have in one 
way or another, affected the actual functioning of the WSC 
system. First, during post-Mao economic reforms, the shift of 
responsibility and authority within an enterprise has 
presented a problem for the WSC. Although the government and 
the Party have repeatedly promised to guarantee workers with 
the right of participation and have called upon them to take 
a positive part in the reforms, many people feel that it is 
difficult to reconcile the director responsibility system with 
the active role of the WSC. Indeed, the legal provision that 
the WSC should support the director in exercising his powers 
and authorities may be understood as implying the necessity 
for reducing the role of the WSC. It seems that this
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difficulty is similar to that facing workers' representative 
conference which prevailed in the early 1950s.
Secondly, the unchallengeable socialist tenet that the 
state, the enterprises and the workers have unanimous 
interests may prevent the WSC from actively pursuing workers' 
own interests.91 If the exercise by the WSC of its powers is 
deemed to be uneconomic and contrary to the overriding policy 
of the state and government departments, then the operation of 
the WSC is put into questionable.92
Thirdly, the WSCs in most enterprises are not properly 
institutionalised. As the WSC in an enterprise is usually held
only once a year, it can perform very limited functions. In
the absence of express legal requirement, the establishment by 
the WSC of special institutions enabling the realisation of 
workers' participation varies from enterprise to enterprise, 
adding uncertainty to workers' participation in individual 
cases.
Fourthly, the WSC does not have significant
organisational independence. Both the WSC and its working 
body, that is, the enterprise trade union committee, are 
subject to close supervision by enterprise Party committee and 
the superior trade union organisations. Moreover, the WSC is 
overlooked by superior government authorities which, for 
example, may impede the resolutions made by the WSC. In
addition, as a rule, the WSC is restrained by the director in
91 For a discussion of this aspect and the related 
difficulty in defining by law the "interest of enterprises", 
see Chapter Six of the thesis.
92 In fact, the Trade Union Law of 1992 explicitly 
provides that the trade union should protect at the same time 
both the interests of the whole nation and those of workers 
and staff. It follows that the interests of workers and staff 
may have to be sacrificed if they conflict with the national 
interests. Indeed, such conflicts are very common during 
economic reforms which necessarily affect the interests of 
enterprise workers.
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financial, personnel arrangement and many other aspects.93 
Thus, the multiple control system makes the WSC a passive and 
purely responding organisation. Few WSCs are interested in 
seeking to defend their legitimate powers and to play a 
vigorous role in supervising enterprise management and 
administration.
Of course, lack of legal, detailed and systematic 
treatment of the WSC also causes confusion over the practical 
operations of the WSC. In fact, the existing SEL provisions 
concerning workers' participation are more a political and 
moral targets than legal obligations. Despite the repeated 
call for clear and concrete guidance, and some actions, to 
enforce workers' participation,94 it seems that unless there 
are substantial policy changes and detailed guidance, the 
confusion concerning the WSC system is bound to continue.
93 Although the SEL provides, in Art.62, that leading 
cadres of enterprises who abuse their powers and violate the 
lawful interests of workers may be subject to administrative 
sanctions, it is unlikely that a director can be sanctioned 
merely on the grounds that he has failed to promote worker's 
participation in enterprise management.
94 There have been some local actions to enforce the 
powers of the WSCs. For example, the government of Xi'an City 
in Shanxi Province of Northwest China approved a Proposal 
Concerning the Strengthening of Enterprise Democratic 
Management, which was made by the City Trade Union 
Association. This Proposal provides that, responsible persons 
who reject correct criticism from workers' representatives, 
and retaliate these representatives, and who impede the 
performance by the WSCs of their functions shall be ordered by 
the government departments in charge of relevant enterprises 
to correct their behaviour within a fixed term. If they fail 
to do so, they shall, depend on the seriousness of their 
actions, be warned, circulated a notice of criticism, or 
dismissed from their administrative positions. In addition, 
government departments must not approve those proposals made 
unilaterally by enterprise directors which should have been 
deliberated by the WSCs, such as proposals concerning wages 
distribution and the implementation of the contracting system. 
For a report, see GRRB, Aug.6, 19 92, p.l. Similar actions have 
also been taken in other cities including Beijing. 
Nevertheless, the effects of these actions should not be 
overestimated.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
ENTERPRISE BANKRUPTCY LAW AND POLICY
This chapter discusses the liquidation, bankruptcy and 
reorganisation1 of Chinese state enterprises. The Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law of the PRC (hereafter the "EBL") was adopted on 
December 2, 1986 and came into effect on October 1, 1988.
Immediately after its adoption, the EBL received much 
attention from many scholars throughout the world.2 However, 
most of their discussions tend to explain the EBL as it is 
stipulated, and therefore fail to pay sufficient attention to 
the complicated social, economic and political background that 
had informed this law.
This chapter does not intend to detail all aspects of the 
EBL. Instead, it attempts to explore and explain broader and 
more substantial issues relating to the methods by which 
Chinese authorities deal with the liquidation and the 
reorganisation of enterprises. Indeed, it is impossible to
1 "Reorganisation" in this discussion is used as a term 
possessing a broader meaning than just referring to the 
reorganisation or reconstruction procedure usually occurring 
as a part of company insolvency or bankruptcy in the West. It 
embraces not only legal bankruptcy procedures but also 
administrative consolidation and reorganisation of companies, 
including mergers, which may have no connection with any legal 
liquidation or bankruptcy procedure.
2 See, for example, Henry R. Zheng, "Bankruptcy Law of 
the People's Republic of China -- Principle, Procedure and 
Practice", Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol.19, 
1986, pp.683-732; Ta-Kuang Chang, "The Making of the Chinese 
Bankruptcy Law: A Study in the Chinese Legislative Process", 
Harvard International Law Journal, Vol.28, 1987, pp.333-72; M. 
Minor & K. Steven-Minor, "China's Emerging Bankruptcy Law", 
International Lawyer, 1988, pp.1217-26; Xiao Zhiyue, "China's 
Bankruptcy Law: Socialist in Characteristics, Capitalist in
Methods?", Company Lawyer (London), No.3, 1989, pp.58-65.
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understand the EBL without a proper comprehension of the past, 
as well as present-day, policies and practices in the 
liquidation and reorganisation of state enterprises.
This discussion begins with a review of the policies and 
practices regarding enterprise bankruptcy, liquidation and 
reorganisation between 1949 and the adoption of the EBL in 
1986. The discussion then seeks to analyze the reasons for, 
and difficulties with, the introduction of the EBL. In 
addition, the basic principles and characteristics of the EBL 
are examined. The discussion then progresses to an assessment 
of the impact of and the limitations in the EBL, with 
particular reference to the consolidation of companies between 
1988 and 1991. This chapter concludes with a general comment 
of the current policies concerning, and future prospects for, 
bankruptcy, liquidation and the reorganisation of PRC state 
enterprises.
I. Policies of Enterprise Bankruptcy and Reorganisation Before 
the Economic Reforms
China's first Bankruptcy Law was adopted by the Qing 
government on April 25, 1906. With sixty-nine articles, that 
Bankruptcy Law contained nine sections, namely, report of 
bankruptcy, election of directors, creditors' meeting, 
clearing of accounts, disposal of property, deliberate fraud, 
extension of liquidation period, request for cancelling a 
case, and supplementary provisions. However, as Mitrano 
explains, that law, which was repealed on December 2, 19 07,
"was not effective as technique, and not enforced as 
legislation".3 The most fundamental reason for such failure 
was that "both officials and businessmen alike were
3 Thomas Matrano, The Chinese Bankruptcy Law of 1906- 
1907: A Legislative Case History, paper reprinted from
Monumenta Serica 1972-1973, Vol.XXX, Harvard Law School, 
Studies in East Asian Law: China No.25, pp.259-195, at 295.
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insufficiently prepared to utilize it".4 In 1935, the 
Nationalist government promulgated a comprehensive Bankruptcy 
Law which, after amendments, is still applied in Taiwan.
A. Bankruptcy policies in the 1950s
The socialist bankruptcy policies and legislation in pre- 
1949 China are virtually untraceable. Even in the early period 
of the PRC, bankruptcy issues received only limited treatment. 
For example, both the Provisional Regulations on Private 
Enterprises of 1950 {"Provisional Regulations")5 and the 
subsequent Implementing Rules Concerning the Provisional 
Regulations ("Implementing Rules")6 merely gave some clues as 
to liquidation and bankruptcy of private enterprises. First, 
the legal definition of private enterprises indicated the 
extent of investors' liability in the event of enterprise 
insolvency and bankruptcy. For example, a shareholder of a 
company limited by shares was liable to the extent of the par 
value of shares he or she held.7 Secondly, the law allowed 
flexibility for all parties. For example, the winding up, 
liquidation and other items not provided in laws and 
regulations "shall be dealt with in accordance with 'usual 
practice' (tonqli) and upon negotiations between relevant 
parties, providing that any such resolution does not conflict 
with state policies".8 Moreover, "the separate and unlimited 
liability of an unlimited liability shareholder only occurs
4 Ibid.
5 See the text in Chinese, in Siyinq Gonqshancrve de 
Shehui Zhuyi Gaizao Zhengce Faling Xuanbian {Selection of 
Policies, Laws and Regulations Concerning the Socialist Reform 
of Bourgeois Industries and Commerce), Vol.1 (1949-1952), 
Finance and Economy Press (Beijing) 1957, pp.66-71.
6 Promulgated in January 1951, by the Committee of 
Finance and Economy under the GAC. See the text in Chinese, 
ibid, pp.72-93.
7 Art.3, the Provisional Regulations, supra note 5.
8 Art.30, ibid.
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when the property of his enterprise is not enough to pay all 
the debts of the enterprise."9 Thirdly, the Implementing Rules 
contained rules for the "closing down" (xieye) or "winding up"
(qinqsuan) of an enterprise.10 Although the listed grounds for 
the closing down or winding up of enterprises appear not to 
have included bankruptcy,11 it was nevertheless provided that, 
in the process of liquidation caused by any of the stated 
grounds, when a liquidator found that the assets of an 
enterprise were not enough to pay all the debts, he should 
apply to the court which should then handle the case.12
In addition to these provisions, there were some 
administrative orders or judicial opinions. For example, on 
October 10, 1955, the Supreme Peoples' Court and the Ministry 
of Justice jointly issued an Opinion Concerning Two Problems 
in the Process of Paying Debts of Bankrupt Private 
Enterprises. The Opinion stated that workers' salaries were to 
be paid as a priority.11 However, in general, the legal 
treatment of bankruptcy or liquidation was far from sufficient 
to cope with various problems. In particular, few provisions 
were made to protect the interests of creditors.
In 1950, the Chinese authorities made it clear that the 
Provisional Regulations should be understood in the light of 
the official policy of encouraging and protecting private
9 Ibid.
10 Arts. 15-22, supra note 6.
11 Art.15, ibid. The three such grounds were: (1) the
cause of the enterprise had accomplished or had not been able 
to be achieved; (2) the intention of a sole trader, the
agreement of all partners, or the resolution of shareholders 
meeting; (3) the merger with another enterprise.
12 Art. 21 of the Implementing Rules, ibid.
11 Mentioned in Ke Shanfang and Pan Zhiheng, Pochanfa
Gailun (Introduction to the Bankruptcy Law), Guangdong Higher
Education Press 1988, p.23.
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investment,14 Accordingly, any shift in government policies 
would signify changes in the legal treatment of private 
investors. From the mid-1950s, many private enterprises were 
ordered to be merged with state-funded enterprises to form 
"state-capitalist enterprises" (gongsi heyincr qiye) .15 Before 
setting up such enterprises, the assets of private enterprises 
had to be evaluated and its debts had to be cleared up.
Due to the lack of detailed legal provisions, the debts 
issue of private enterprises was settled mostly under the 
guidance of state policies. On March 30, 1956, the State
Council issued an Order Concerning the Principles for the 
Handling of Debts and Other Issues of Private Enterprises 
Participating in State-Capitalist Enterprises ("Order").16 The 
Order clearly stated that the debts between a private 
enterprise and public bodies, and between workers and private 
enterprise owners, should be "dealt with in a lenient way" 
(congkuan chuli). The purposes for doing so were officially 
described as to ensure that a former private enterprise owner 
would be able to hold certain amount of shares in a state- 
capitalist enterprise and, to avoid massive bankruptcy owing 
to heavy debts sustained by private enterprises.17 Therefore, 
for example, in regard to bank loans, a former private 
enterprise's loan which was not due at the time of entering a 
state-capitalist enterprise should be transferred as the loan 
of the new enterprise, though the loan which was due or 
overdue should be repaid by the private enterprise before it
14 See Xue Muqiao, "Siying Qiye Zanxing Tiaoli Qicao 
Jingguo Jiqi Shuomin", (Drafting Process of and Explanations 
Regarding the Provisional Regulations Concerning Private 
Enterprises, Dec.29, 1950), in supra note 5, pp.93-102 at 95. 
Also see Art.1 of the Provisional Regulations (supra note 5) .
15 The State Administration Council, on Sept.2, 1954, 
promulgated "the Provisional Regulations Concerning State- 
Capitalist Industrial Enterprises". See the text in Chinese, 
ibid, Vol.2, pp.231-36.
16 See the text in Chinese, in Laws and Regulations of the 
PRC (Jan, - Jun. 1956), pp.287-89.
17 Ibid. , p.287 .
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entered a state-capitalist enterprise. Moreover, the loan
which a private enterprise had difficulties in repaying might
be transferred to the state-capitalist enterprise to repay, or
be transformed as shares held by the state in the newly
established state-capitalist enterprise. In addition, any 
p<2na.lfives
. : imposed on a private enterprise for overdue loan might,
if necessary, be reduced.18
These administrative policies constituted the basis for 
handling debt issues of private enterprises in the mid-1950s. 
By allowing flexibility and discretion, the government clearly 
aimed at avoiding bankruptcy problems. There were some 
indications that, in the mid-1950s, the courts were involved 
in hearing bankruptcy cases.19 But administrative orders 
proved to be more effective as many bankruptcy cases were only 
found in the process of enterprise administrative 
reorganisation. Many such cases were solved "privately" and 
without resorting to the court. Indeed, the court, given the 
lack of detailed legal guidance, might only decide cases by 
relying on state policies and government administrative 
orders.
In the 1950s, while private enterprises received limited 
legal treatment, state and public enterprises were hardly 
subject to any formal legal regulation. Instead, 
administrative measures played an active role in dealing with 
bankruptcy and reorganisation of state and public enterprises. 
After 1956, private enterprises ceased to operate in the PRC. 
From then on and until the early 1980s, little attempt was 
made in the legal regulation of bankruptcy and reorganisation 
of state enterprises. For example, the draft Working
18 Par . 4 , ibid .
19 On Jan.17, 1957, the Supreme Peoples' Court issued
Replies Concerning Several Problems in the Payment of Debts in 
Bankruptcy Cases. Mentioned in Ke and Pan, supra note 13, 
p. 23. Also see Art,21 of the Provisional Regulations, supra 
note 5.
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Regulations on State Industrial Enterprises (1961)20 
concentrated on enterprise administration and operation, 
leaving alone the reorganisation of enterprises.
The complete absence of legal regulation, however, does 
not mean that enterprises were never insolvent. Nor does it 
imply that enterprises were never subject to reorganisation. 
As a matter of fact, many enterprises continued to operate in 
deficit. From time to time, some enterprises were ordered by 
government departments to be reorganised. The most popular 
forms of industrial reorganisation were guan (closing down), 
ting (suspension of operation), bing (amalgamation with 
another enterprise), and zhuan (change to the manufacture of 
other products). Such reorganisation could take place at any 
time, depending on government decisions.
B. Administrative reorganisations
In September 1961, the Central Committee of the CCP 
decided to "adjust, consolidate, enrich and improve"
(tiaozheng, zhengdun, chongshi, tigao) the national economy.21 
One of the main themes of this campaign was to implement the 
policy of guan, ting, bing and zhuan. Economic efficiency, 
production orientation and size of enterprises were listed as 
the main considerations explaining reasons for the adoption of 
different measures for different enterprises. For example, 
enterprises which were supposed to be closed down were mainly 
those which consumed large amounts of raw materials, which had 
high costs and made low quality products, which still 
sustained losses after adjustment, and which did not possess 
normal production conditions. Enterprises whose products were 
needed by the society, but nevertheless whose raw materials
20 See the text in Chinese, in Selected Enterprise Laws 
and Regulations, pp.45-73.
21 See the Editor Committee of the Current China Series, 
Dangdai Zhongguo de Jingji Guanli (Economic Administration in 
Current China), Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Press 
(Beijing) 1985, pp.61-6.
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were temporarily short of supply, and whose production tasks 
were not full should amalgamate with other enterprises or 
reduce their production scale. Light industry enterprises 
which changed their production orientation during the Great 
Leap Forward (1958-1960) and such change had affected the 
supply of production or consumption goods should revive their 
previous production within a limited time. Enterprises whose 
production tasks were not full and which might be able to make 
products to help the agriculture, products of day-to-day 
consumption or machinery parts and spare parts should adjust 
the existing production orientation in view of the needs and 
possibilities. Furthermore, large-sized and key enterprises 
should be kept, with reduction and amalgamation made on medium 
and small-sized enterprises.22
This massive industrial reorganisation must be examined 
from two aspects. First, it was aimed at adjusting the 
industrial structure. During the Great Leap Forward, a large 
number of factories were established without proper production 
facilities and conditions. Many of them were based on heavy 
industries, especially iron and steel. The production of many 
enterprises was neither practical nor necessary for the 
Chinese situation at that time. As such, the industrial 
reorganisation in the early 1960s served as a necessary 
measure for the adjustment of the national economy. According 
to the statistics published by the State Planning Commission, 
from 1961 to October 1962, as a result of the reorganisation, 
the number of industrial enterprises above the county level 
was reduced by 44,000. And the number of workers was reduced 
by 9,660,000.2< Secondly, the industrial reorganisation was 
in essence a type of purely administrative measure. In spite 
of the absence of legal provisions, government documents
22 For a listing of these concrete criteria, see Tang 
Guodong, Gongye Oivefa Gailun (Introduction to Industrial 
Enterprise Law), Chinese People's University Press (Beijing) 
1987, p.180.
23 See ibid. Most of the reduced workers were previously 
farmers.
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provided little guidance for solving issues including 
bankruptcy. In fact, since virtually all enterprises were 
state-owned, the government might easily cancel or reduce the 
debts of an enterprise, or order the transfer of debts from 
one enterprise to another. Workers of enterprises being closed 
down were assigned with new jobs. In the case of a merger, 
workers were automatically transferred to a new enterprise. 
Consequently, there was no room, and little demand, for legal 
provisions regarding bankruptcy.
In 197 9, in order to "adjust, reform, consolidate and 
improve" (tiaozheng, gaige, zhencrdun, tiqao) the national 
economy, the Chinese government decided to launch another 
massive reorganisation of industries. From 1981 to 1983, the 
main targets of the campaign were small enterprises, 
especially those whose products were not popular with 
customers, which competed with large enterprises for raw 
materials, and which were economically inefficient.24 In 
October 1982, the State Council ordered relevant central and 
local government departments to make plans and carry out 
enterprise reorganisation. Among the first enterprises subject 
to guan, ting, bing and zhuan were, enterprise which consumed 
large amounts of raw materials, made low quality products, and 
sustained losses for a long time because of poor management; 
enterprises which produced more products than the society 
needed and, as a result, had overstocking of products; and 
backward enterprises which competed with advanced enterprises 
for energy, raw materials, transportation facilities and the 
market. In addition, enterprises which had sustained serious 
losses because of poor management had to make profits within 
a fixed term. Otherwise, they had to suspend their production 
and go through consolidation.25
24 See Zhonqguo Qiye Guanli Baike Ouanshu (Encyclopedia 
on Enterprise Administration in China), Enterprise 
Administration Press (Beijing) 1984, Vol.l, p.198.
25 See Zhao Ziyang, Guanyu Diliuge Wunian Jihua de Baogao 
(Report on the Sixth Five-Year Plan), Peoples' Press (Beijing) 
1982, p.38.
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This industrial reorganisation took place on the eve of 
the Chinese urban economic reforms which formally started in 
1984 . The aims of that reorganisation were described as to 
change the unreasonable industrial structure and to improve 
backward enterprise management.26 The inappropriateness of the 
enterprise structure was mainly judged by the unreasonably 
large number of industrial enterprises, which almost doubled 
in the decade from 1971 to 1980.27 Since many of these 
enterprises were formed by various government authorities 
which paid little attention to either the need of the society 
or the production capability of enterprises, high costs and 
low product quality were common. Moreover, a large number of 
enterprises suffered serious losses because of low economic 
efficiency and defective management. Some even did not have 
independent accounting. About thirty per cent of state 
industrial enterprises which had independent accounting were 
actually operating at losses.28
Like the previous industrial reorganisation of the early 
1960s, this adjustment was also a kind of exclusively 
administrative measure. The State Council required every 
region and every government department to make two-year 
adjustment plans. These plans should include the lists of 
enterprises to be subject to guan, ting, bing and zhuan, as 
well as the implementing steps for the adjustment.
On April 1, 1983, the State Council promulgated
Provisional Regulations Concerning State Industrial 
Enterprises ("Enterprise Regulat ions").251 According to the 
Enterprise Regulations,20 enterprise reorganisation could take 
six forms which included fen (separation of operation) and
26 Ibid. p . 37 .
27 Ibid. p.36. In 1970, there were 195,000 industrial 
enterprises. But in 1980, the number was 377,000.
28 Ibid . p . 37 .
29 See the text in Chinese, in Laws and Regulations of the
PRC (Jan. - Dec. 1983), pp.383-99.
30 Art. 20 .
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qian (migration of operation) in addition to guan, ting, bing 
and zhuan. Any decision regarding the reorganisation of an 
enterprise was to be either made by the government department 
or departments which formerly approved the formation of the 
enterprise, or approved by these governments at the request of 
the enterprise. The Enterprise Regulations also expressly 
singled out seven grounds upon which decisions could be taken 
to reorganise enterprises. These included: where an
enterprise's products could not be sold out for a long time; 
where an enterprise, because of its backward technology and 
low economic efficiency, did not have a prosperous future; and 
where an enterprise under poor management could not make 
obvious progress and suffered losses for two consecutive 
years. In addition, a decision to the effects of guan, ting, 
bing, fen, zhuan, and qian might be made "if the state 
considers it to be necessary."31 In any event, the state 
property in enterprises should be properly protected. 
Responsible government departments should supervise and check 
the disposal of such property. Workers of enterprises affected 
by government decisions should be allocated new jobs under the 
auspices of responsible government departments and local 
labour and personnel bureaux. In particular, whether to 
preserve, alter, or rescind contracts concerning, and debts on 
the part of, an enterprise being closed down was a question to 
be decided by the government departments in charge of the 
enterprise in accordance with relevant state provisions.32 
Finally, the results of the reorganisation should be reported 
to the ABIC and other relevant government departments.33
These formal legal provisions, however, were still too 
elementary to resolve the various issues arising from the 
reorganisation of enterprises. They were in fact no more than 
a pure recognition and formalisation of the then existing 
administrative practices. Government departments were
31 Art. 20 , par . 8 .
32 Art. 21.
33 Art . 22 .
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authorised with exclusive powers to make decisions on and 
supervise the reorganisation of enterprises.
Among the various grounds which might trigger guan, ting, 
bing, fen, zhuan, or qian, many were directed at, or implied, 
the actual insolvency of enterprises, These included 
particularly where an enterprise suffered "losses" (kuisun) 
for a long time, and where an enterprise underwent low
economic efficiency. Nevertheless, neither "insolvency" nor 
"bankruptcy" was expressly employed in the provisions of the 
Enterprise Regulations of 1983 as conditions for enterprise 
reorganisation. Indeed, such intentional avoidance reflected 
the traditional socialist hostility towards bankruptcy.
In the orthodox socialist view, bankruptcy could only 
take place in a capitalist society. Many official explanations 
were given for this "special" phenomenon. For example, in a 
capitalist economy, bankruptcy was a necessary result from 
"blind" (manqmu) market competition. Since the socialist
system was a planned economy, enterprise production should be 
carried out under the guidance of state plans, and the 
relationship between enterprises should be cooperation rather 
than competition. Moreover, bankruptcy in capitalist countries 
may cause massive unemployment and therefore jeopardize the 
interests of workers. In contrast, a socialist state should 
guarantee the living of workers by securing their employment. 
Consequently, bankruptcy was seen as a phenomenon alien to the 
socialist economy.
It is true, however, that the adoption of the bankruptcy
policy was not excluded by all socialist countries. For
example, as early as 19 65, Yugoslavia introduced the Law on 
Compulsory Clearing Up and Bankruptcy. And in Poland, a law 
relating to the bankruptcy of state enterprises was adopted in 
1983. But generally speaking, until the mid-1980s, in 
socialist states, the bankruptcy policy was not commonly 
favoured and was only cautiously implemented in a few 
countries -- eventually on only a limited scale.
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II. Introduction of the EBL
A. Reforms and legal development in the early and mid-1980s
The deficiencies of dealing with enterprise 
reorganisation in exclusively administrative methods became 
apparent immediately after the commencement of the post-Mao 
reforms. In 1982, about a quarter of Chinese state industrial 
enterprises were operating at losses.34 Many of them were 
actually insolvent. This alarming fact posed at least two 
serious issues. First, since it was the government that 
finally bore the financial liabilities for all enterprises, 
such liabilities were obviously a heavy burden for the 
government. Every year, government financial departments had 
to provide a large amount of subsidies to enterprises making 
losses. When an enterprise was closed down because of heavy 
losses, the government had to either transfer or cancel all 
outstanding debts of the enterprise. As such, the government 
was actually bearing unlimited liability for all state 
enterprises. Secondly, and more importantly, enterprises faced 
little pressure and as a result had no incentive in pursuing 
economic efficiency. Enterprises making losses could obtain 
subsidies from the government. Workers of an enterprise being 
closed due to poor management could get salaries as usual35 
and could expect new jobs. Managers of such enterprises were 
usually transferred to other units to take administrative 
positions comparable to the previous one, or might even be 
promoted. Little responsibility might be invoked for loss- 
making enterprises and their managers.
The economic and legal developments since 197 8 provided 
good opportunities for the introduction of a bankruptcy law in 
China. First, competition between enterprises was no longer 
forbidden. In October 1980, the State Council promulgated
34 See Zhao, supra note 26.
35 In order to pay normal salaries to workers, some closed 
enterprises were forced to sell out their property.
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Interim Provisions Concerning Promoting and Protecting 
Socialist Competition.311 As a result, inefficient enterprises 
were likely to be eliminated through competition. Secondly, 
various forms of responsibility system were introduced and 
applied to state enterprises in order to make them operate 
more efficiently. The state would in principle cease to give 
subsidies to enterprises making losses. In particular, the new 
taxation system launched since 1983 required all state 
enterprises to be subject to compulsory taxation.37 As for an 
enterprise which made losses due to defective management, 
government departments should instruct it to reconstruct 
within a fixed term. During this term, government financial 
departments might offer to provide certain amount of subsidy. 
But once the term expired, no subsidy should be made to the 
enterprise.38 Thirdly, and most significantly from the legal 
point of view, the development of the legal person system made 
it possible for a bankruptcy law to be introduced.39 As a 
legal person, a state enterprise can and should bear 
independent civil liability. The state is no longer 
responsible for the debts of a state enterprise which shall be 
financially responsible to the extent of the total assets 
authorised by the state to manage.
B. Difficulties in adopting the EBL
The process of introducing the EBL, however, turned out
30 See the text in Chinese, in Laws and Regulations of the 
PRC (1980), pp.35-8.
37 For a discussion of the tax reform, see Chapter Five 
of this thesis.
38 See "Caizhengbu Guanyu Guoying Qiye Ligaishui Shixing 
Banfa" (The Ministry of Finance, as approved by the State 
Council on Apr.24, 1983, Trial Measures Concerning The 
Conversion of Profit Payments into Taxation in State 
Enterprises) . See the text in Chinese, in Laws and Regulations 
of the PRC (1983), pp.132-37.
39 For the development and relevant problems, see Chapter 
Three of this thesis.
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to be rather complicated and controversial.40 Although the 
idea of enterprise bankruptcy appeared in China as early as 
1980,41 this was not taken seriously until May 1984 when 
several deputies of the NPC made a proposal for drafting an 
enterprise bankruptcy law. From then on, rapid progress was 
made in relation to the implementation of bankruptcy policy in 
China.
In November 1984, a popular Chinese law magazine 
published a draft bankruptcy and reorganisation law proposed 
by an individual.42 Although this suggested draft law merely 
contained fourteen articles, this unprecedented move in the 
Chinese legal history which clearly advocated the adoption of 
a bankruptcy law attracted a wide range of attention from all 
works of Chinese society. Shortly after this move, in December 
1984, the State Council decided to set up a special group to 
take a formal and official step in drafting a bankruptcy 
law.43
Some local government authorities were even more active 
in adopting bankruptcy regulations in order to force 
enterprises to perform better. In February 1985, the Shenyang 
City Government, in Liaoning Province of Northeast China,
40 For a comprehensive review and chronological survey of 
this process, see Chang, supra note 2.
41 Cited in Cao Siyuan, Tantan Qiye Pochanfa (Discussions 
on Enterprise Bankruptcy Law) , China's Economy Press (Beijing) 
1987, p.13. (Cao was assigned to be in charge of the drafting 
of the Chinese Bankruptcy Law.) However, the author who was 
cited here seemed to be talking about insurance companies 
only. And "daobi" (closing down), rather than "pochan" 
(bankruptcy), was used to describe the situation arising from 
insolvency. Nevertheless, some of the problems for dealing 
with bankruptcy, including compulsory insurance, were 
discussed.
42 See Cao Siyuan, "Zengqiang Qiye Huoli de Falu Cuoshi - 
-Guanyu Zhiding Qiye Pochan Zhengdun Fa de Jianyi" (Legal 
Measure For Enhancing Enterprise Vitality -- On the Suggestion 
for Enacting the Enterprise Bankruptcy and Reconstruction 
Law), in MZYFZ, No.11, 1984, pp.7-9. And the suggested 
Bankruptcy and Reconstruction Law was published in pp.10-11.
43 See Chang, supra note 2, pp.339-40.
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promulgated Trial Provisions Concerning the Handling of the 
Bankruptcy and Closing Down of Urban Collective Industrial 
Enterprises ("Shenyang Provisions").44 The Shenyang Provisions 
may be listed, with some hesitation,45 as the first bankruptcy 
law in the legal history of the PRC. With twenty-four 
articles, the Shenyang Provisions apply to collective 
enterprises only. On August 3, 1985, the Shenyang City
Government declared that three collective Enterprises were to 
be "reconstructed" (zhenqdun) for one year, as a warning and 
the first step of entering bankruptcy procedure as provided in 
the Shenyang Provisions. One year later, one of these three 
enterprises was declared bankrupt.46 More interestingly, even 
before this, on June 21, 1985, the Wuhan City Government, of 
Hubei Province in central China, in the absence of any 
applicable law,47 declared a state enterprise to be "on the 
verge of bankruptcy" (binlin pochan) and required it to be 
reconstructed.
At the national level, however, the adoption of the EBL 
met considerable opposition from the very beginning. In June 
1986, the draft EBL was presented by the State Council to the 
NPC Standing Committee for deliberation. However, because of
44 See Chang, supra note 2, p.3 41. On May 23, 19 87, the
Shenyang City Government issued new Interim Provisions 
Concerning the Closing Down and Bankruptcy of Urban Collective 
Enterprises which replaced the old Shenyang Provisions. See 
the text of the new Provisions in Chinese, in Zuixin Jinqji 
Fagui (The Newest Economic Legislation), Engineering Industry 
Press (Beijing) 1988, Vol.7, pp.353-60.
46 It is debateable in China, whether "provisions" 
(guiding) issued by a city government can be called "law" 
(fa) .
46 For a study on this case, see Henry Zheng, China' s 
Civil and Commercial Law, Butterworths 1988, pp.184-88.
47 It seems that the decision was taken by referring to 
the suggested Bankruptcy and Reconstruction Law drafted by Cao 
Siyuan, supra note 42. On Dec.4, 1986 -- two days after the
adoption of the national Bankruptcy Law, the Wuhan City 
Government issued Trial Provisions Concerning the 
Reconstruction Within a Fixed Term of State Industrial 
Enterprises ("Wuhan Provisions"). See the text in Chinese, in 
Zuixin, Jingji Fagui, supra note 44, Vol.6, pp.365-68.
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the notable opposition, the EBL was delayed for three months 
until its adoption in December 1986.
Opponents of the EBL raised many issues in order to 
dismiss the condition for introducing the EBL as "not mature" 
(bu chengshu). One of these issues was the fact that 
enterprises did not have sufficient autonomy. Since many 
unfavourable outside conditions such as the irrational pricing 
policy forced many enterprises to make losses despite their 
endeavour to enhance economic efficiency, it appeared unfair 
to blame these enterprises and threaten them with bankruptcy. 
In addition, because of the tight government control, 
enterprises lacked the autonomy to make important decisions. 
Another issue raised by the opponents of the EBL was that 
China's social security system was not ready to cope with the 
unemployment problem caused by enterprise bankruptcy. It was 
warned that serious social problems would be present if a 
bankruptcy law was to be adopted and enforced.48
For both proponents and opponents of the EBL, the debate 
represented not only a paradox but also a dilemma. On the one 
hand, most people agreed that enterprise reforms were 
extremely necessary. On the other hand, however, not everybody 
agreed on where and how to take the initiative in the reforms. 
For example, while few people doubted that enterprises should 
be given real autonomy, it was arguable whether an EBL should 
be introduced only after enterprises had obtained real 
autonomy, or the early introduction of the EBL could be used 
as a positive means for promoting and eventually realising 
enterprise autonomy. Similarly, as for the issue of the social 
security system, some people saw this as an issue to be dealt 
with in the implementation of the EBL, but others regarded the 
establishment of a proper social security system as a 
necessary pre-condition for the introduction of the EBL.
Proponents of the EBL made a number of efforts to help 
the adoption of the EBL. They even attempted to draw support 
from the people. The Chinese people, who did not know much
48 See Chang, supra note 2, pp. 368-70.
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about bankruptcy and its consequences but nevertheless hoped 
for efficient enterprise management, showed their ambiguous 
support for the introduction of the EBL.49
Most decisively, the central leadership was very keen to 
see an early adoption of the EBL. A number of measures were 
taken in order to pave the way for the adoption and 
implementation of the EBL. In particular, on July 12, 1986,
the State Council promulgated four sets of Provisional 
Regulations.50 In particular, the Provisional Regulations on 
the Insurance for Unemployed Workers and Staff in State 
Enterprises were aimed at establishing a social security 
system for unemployed workers. It was provided that the 
Provisional Regulations apply to, inter alia, workers of an 
enterprise which has been declared bankrupt, and workers and 
staff who are "dismissed" (iingjian) by an enterprise which 
is, because of being about to become bankrupt, being 
reconstructed for a fixed period of time.51 Moreover, on 
September 15, 1986, the State Council and the Central
Committee of the CCP jointly issued three sets of regulations 
respectively concerning the director, the Party Committee, and 
the Workers/staff's Congress in state enterprises. These 
Regulations sought to establish a favourable environment for
49 Different opinion polls showed different results. See 
Chang, supra note 2, pp. 343-44. The fact might be that more 
than half of the Chinese workers were prepared to accept the 
fact of bankruptcy. In one such survey, when asked about "what 
would you do if your factory closed down or declared 
bankruptcy", fifty-one per cent answered as to "seek 
employment elsewhere", thirty-five per cent "try to open an 
individual business", ten per cent "go to the leadership for 
a settlement of the problem", and three per cent "do nothing 
but wait for the state to provide relief". See Reynolds (ed.), 
Reform in China (Challenges and Choices), M. E. Sharpe, Inc. 
(New York) 1987, p.157.
50 They are respectively concerned with, Implementing 
Labour Contract System, Recruiting Workers, Dismissing Workers 
Violating Disciplines, Insurance for Unemployed Workers. See 
the text in Chinese, in Laws and Regulations of the PRC 
(1986), pp.775-93. See an English translation in Journal of 
Chinese Law, No.2, 1988.
51 Art. 2 .
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enterprises' self-management. It was also implied that 
enterprises had to be completely responsible for their losses 
and debts.
After much debate and considerable controversy, in the 
light of great publicity,5" and under the persuasion of the 
central leadership, the NPC Standing Committee finally adopted 
the EBL on December 2, 1986. This was seen as a remarkable
achievement in the building of the Chinese legal system and 
the reforming of the Chinese economic system.
Nevertheless, the adopted EBL is far from radical. While 
many detailed aspects of this law will be explored later, two 
general comments are considered at this stage.
First, the EBL only applies to state enterprises. The 
policy of adopting a bankruptcy law in China was formulated 
not only as a response to the "needs of the reform of the 
economic structure" as stipulated in Article 1 of the EBL, but 
as a compromise reached between opponents and proponents of 
the EBL. At first, a bankruptcy law was proposed to be applied 
to all types of enterprises, including collective enterprises 
and foreign investment enterprises. But after challenges from 
opponents, a compromise was reached to limit the scope of the 
EBL to state enterprises only.53 In addition, the EBL is meant 
only "for trial implementation" (shixinq).
By the mid-1980s, collective and foreign investment 
enterprises had developed rapidly in China. It was necessary 
to enact laws to regulate the closing down and bankruptcy of 
these enterprises. Before the adoption of the EBL, only a few 
pieces of legislation were applicable to enterprises other 
than state enterprises. For example, as for foreign investment 
enterprises, the only applicable regulations were the 
Regulations Concerning Bankruptcy of Foreign Related Companies 
in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone ("Shenzhen Regulations") 
which were adopted on November 29, 1986 -- just a few days
52 The EBL was passed with 101 affirmative votes and nine 
abstentions.
51 See Chang, supra note 2, pp.361-64.
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before the national EBL was passed.5'1 And collective 
enterprises were only subject to a handful of local 
provisions, including above mentioned Shenyang Provisions. 
Nevertheless, in 1986, the jurisdiction of the EBL was 
restricted to state enterprises only. This fact reflected the 
Chinese leadership's caution towards bankruptcy policy.
Since the mid-1980s, the bankruptcy policy has come to be 
accepted more widely in the PRC. The amended Civil Procedural 
Law ( 1991 ), 55 which contains a chapter (Chapter Nineteen) on 
"Procedures for the repayment of Debts Owed by Bankruptcy 
Enterprise Legal Persons", is applicable to all enterprise 
legal persons other than state enterprises.56 Therefore, 
collective enterprises, foreign investment enterprises, and 
even private enterprises, if qualified as Chinese legal 
persons, are within the jurisdiction of this Chapter. In 
addition to several procedural provisions, the Civil Procedure 
Law also stipulates for some substantial matters such as the 
bankruptcy test.57
Secondly, notwithstanding considerable opposition, it 
took just two years from the formation of an official drafting 
team in December 1984 to the adoption of the EBL in December 
1986. This legislative process was very short -- compared to 
a total of eight years that the SEL experienced.58 When the
54 Adopted by the Standing Committee of the Sixth
Guangdong People's Congress, the Shenzhen Regulations were 
effective from Jul.l, 1987.
55 Adopted by the Fourth Session of the Seventh NPC.
Promulgated on, and effective from, Apr.9, 1991.
56 Art.206 of the Law. Therefore, non-legal person
entities are still out of the jurisdiction of this law.
57 Art. 199. The test is similar to the test adopted in the 
EBL, as discussed below.
58 The SEL was deliberated and then adopted by the NPC. 
In contrast, the EBL was adopted by the NPC Standing 
Committee. According to the PRC Constitution, "basic laws" 
(iiben falu) are to be adopted by the NPC (Art.62), whereas 
the NPC Standing Committee may adopt "laws except those which 
are supposed to be enacted by the NPC" (Art.67). However, it 
is unclear in Chinese law what are the criteria to tell "basic
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EBL was adopted, the SEL was still in the stage of drafting. 
Nevertheless, Article 43 of the EBL provided that the EBL 
would only be implemented three full months after the SEL came 
into effect. It is therefore obvious that the early adoption 
of the EBL was, by "putting the cart before the horse11,59 
actually attempting to put pressures on the legislative 
process of the SEL.
The mere adoption of the EBL failed to resolve many 
difficult problems raised in the drafting of the EBL. The 
opponents of the EBL have never taken its implementation 
seriously. Nor can the proponents of the EBL. Indeed, many 
social, political as well as economic factors which underlined 
the difficulties for the promulgation of the EBL are still 
present ever since the coming into effect of the EBL on
November 1, 1988,
III. Principles and Characteristics of the EBL
A. Tests of bankruptcy
In the process of deliberating the EBL, three general 
tests were suggested. They were ratio of liability to assets, 
ratio of losses to assets, and timely payment of debts.60 
However, the first two were dropped later. In fact, the
differences between these two dropped tests were not
substantial. While the test concerning the ratio of
liabilities to assets was illustrated by a simple method of 
comparing the debts with property of an enterprise, the test 
concerning the ratio of losses to assets was expressed by a
laws" from other non-basic laws. Regardless of the underlying 
reasons why the EBL was treated differently from the SEL, it 
is apparent that the NPC Standing Committee, which meets much 
more often than the NPC, has the convenience and advantage of 
speeding up the process of deliberating and adopting laws, 
including the EBL.
59 This was a criticism for the harsh adoption of the EBL. 
Mentioned in Xiao, supra note 2, p.65.
60 See Chang, supra note 2, pp. 358-59.
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percentage between the 1 accumulated net losses" and, either 
the "productive capital", or "registered capital" of an 
enterprise.61 The connection between these two tests lied in 
that enterprises' debts usually resulted from losses.
The reason for the rejection of the ratio tests may be 
best explained from the viewpoint of reality rather than any 
theoretical rationale. In china, "assets" (caichan) and 
"capital" (zij in) are not strict and well-defined concepts. 
Since state enterprises are only give limited access to the 
public recruitment of capital,62 government departments must 
specify the amount of "registered capital" (zhuce zij in) of an 
enterprise. But some enterprises may never be able to take 
charge of the full amount of their registered capital. 
Instead, with the help of government departments, enterprises 
tend to rely on bank loans. In granting loans to state 
enterprises, state banks had to (and still do) pay great 
attention to the opinions and orders from the government 
departments in charge of enterprises. Thus many inefficient 
and even insolvent enterprises can obtain bank loans with 
little difficulty. Because of the heavy reliance on bank 
loans, a large number of state enterprises would fail any of 
the above ratio tests. The ratio tests, in the opinion of many 
people, would not serve the aim of forcing enterprises to make 
better performances, as these tests did not "directly reflect 
the operating conditions of enterprises".61
On the other hand, even for those who wanted to change 
the practices described above, the ratio tests were also seen 
as inappropriate. However, they took a different approach, 
because they seemed to pay more attention to the "reputation"
61 See ibid. p.359. The idea concerning "productive 
capital" was suggested by Cao Siyuan in his proposal (supra 
note 42), while that concerning "registered capital" was 
raised by the Solicitation Draft of the EBL.
62 Except that, compared with collective and private 
enterprises, state enterprises have the privilege of issuing 
"debentures" (zhaiquan). See the discussion in Chapter Four of 
this thesis.
03 Cited in Chang, supra note 2, p.359.
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(xinvu) of an enterprise in question.04 For example/ even if 
an enterprise was insolvent according to the ratio tests, if 
it had a good reputation, it could still raise money, for 
example, through bank loans to repay outstanding debts.
The EBL is silent as to the meaning of "inability to 
repay debts that fall due".6? One commentator suggests66 that 
the ratio of liabilities to assets ("ratio test") adopted in 
the Shenzhen Regulations is "stricter" than the inability to 
repay debts ("inability test") adopted in the EBL. However, 
this view is unfounded. On the one hand, the ratio test does 
exclude the situation where an enterprise cannot repay debts 
merely because of a cash shortage, not because its liabilities 
have exceeded its assets. Thus, an enterprise which fails the 
inability test may nevertheless pass the ratio tests.67 On the 
other hand, an enterprise which is caught by the ratio test 
may survive the inability test. This is precisely the 
principal reason, as explained above, why the ratio tests were 
dropped after consideration by the legislators of the EBL.
Furthermore, the deletion by the EBL of the ratio tests 
does not mean that the ratio tests are necessarily excluded 
from consideration by the court in judging whether an 
enterprise is bankrupt. Two reasons may be given for this. 
First, as a rule, the ratio of liabilities to assets must be 
considered as a matter of the very basic factor in assessing 
an enterprise's ability to repay its debts as they fall due. 
Other factors which must be looked at by the court include 
"reputation" and even various capabilities such as
64 See Cao, supra note 41, p. 25. Also see Tong Rou (ed.), 
Ouanmin Suovouzhi Gonqye Qiyefa Gailun (Introduction to State
Industrial Enterprise Law), Chongqing Press 1988, pp.268-69.
66 Art.3. Such a definition is, for example, provided in 
S.123 of the British Insolvency Act (1986).
<,G See Zheng, China's Civil and Commercial Law, p. 188. 
Also see Art.3 of the Shenzhen Regulations, supra note 54.
67 See R.M. Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 
Sweet and Maxwell (London), 1990, pp.26-7, especially the 
“cash flow" test, as against the "balance sheet" test.
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technologies possessed by an enterprise which might be used to 
help the enterprise to overcome temporary financial 
difficulties.68 Secondly, the ratio of liabilities to assets 
may in some cases be used as the sufficient legal ground for 
declaring bankruptcy on an enterprise. These cases include, 
inter alia, where the debts of an enterprise significantly 
exceeds its assets, and where a debtor enterprise, upon the 
approval of its superior government departments, files a 
bankruptcy application. Indeed, the first reported bankruptcy 
case concerning a state industrial enterprise appeared to be 
decided by relying merely upon the grounds that the 
enterprise's "liabilities exceeded its assets" (zibu
dizhai) . c'9
The Opinions Concerning Several Issues in Implementing 
the EBL (hereinafter "Bankruptcy Opinions"), issued by the 
Supreme People's Court on November 7, 1991, attempt to solve
the confusion regarding the test for enterprise bankruptcy as 
provided in the EBL. Article 8 of the Bankruptcy Opinions 
provides that "the inability to repay debts" shall be 
understood as referring to the occurrence of the following 
situations: (1) the term for the repayment of the debts has
expired; (2) the creditor has asked for the repayment of the
debts and; and (3) the debtor obviously lacks the ability to 
repay the debts. It is further provided in this article that 
the "inability to repayment debts" may be presumed if the
debtor has ceased to repay matured debts and the state of such 
stoppage has continued, and if no contrary evidence can be 
given.
To some extent, this provision helps to clarify the 
meaning of the inability test by declaring several 
requirements for the presumption of such inability. However,
c,a See Tong (ed.), supra note 64.
69 For the report, see RMRB (Overseas edn.), Dec.7, 1989, 
p.l. The enterprise, called Nanchang Motor Factory, in Jiangxi 
Province, had accumulated losses of 5.26 million Yuan, and 
debts of 9.51 million Yuan, but it only had the assets of 4.67 
million Yuan. The debtor enterprise itself filed the 
bankruptcy application.
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this provision is not completely clear. For example, the 
criteria for assuming the debtor's "obvious" or "apparent" 
(mingxian) lack of ability to repay debts are unknown. It may 
still be very relevant, and indeed necessary, for the 
creditors as well as the judges to look into the underlying 
reasons accounting for the debtor's failure to repay its 
debts. For example, if the failure of a debtor enterprise to 
repay its debts is because it has a temporary shortage of 
cash, and not because its debts have substantially exceeded 
its assets, it may be protected by the court from being 
subject to bankruptcy proceedings. Another area of uncertainty 
is that the Bankruptcy Opinions do not clarify the period of 
time which, if the debtor does not repay its debts, may be 
counted in presuming the debtor's inability to repay such 
debts. In practice, disputes may arise as to the length of 
such a period. It is likely that great discretionary power may 
be given to the judges who may restrain creditors from 
requesting an earlier declaration of bankruptcy on the debtor 
enterprise. It is also likely that a debtor enterprise may 
take advantage of this ambiguity to delay genuine bankruptcy 
proceedings.
Despite the difficulties in defining the inability test, 
it is safe to conclude that, in terms of the economic 
considerations, the bankruptcy test adopted in the EBL does 
not necessarily contain significant differences from the tests 
in other bankruptcy rules such as the Shenzhen Regulations. 
This test is even similar to those adopted in many foreign 
jurisdictions.
In fact, the fundamental difference between the EBL 
bankruptcy test and other bankruptcy tests lies in the non- 
financial aspects. For the purposes of bring bankruptcy 
proceedings against a debtor enterprise, in addition to the 
proof that this enterprise is unable to repay debts that fall 
due, it is necessary to establish that the losses suffered by 
the debtor enterprise is attributable to its "inappropriate 
management and administration" (jingying quanli bushan).
As mentioned earlier, it is a fact that in China some
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enterprises are never profitable because of various reasons 
that are simply beyond their own control. Indeed, the losses 
caused by the supply of materials, the unreasonable pricing 
and other factors which cannot be controlled by enterprises 
themselves are usually termed "policy losses" (zhengcexinq 
kuisun), which contrasts with "losses due to defective 
management" (~i inqyinqxing kuisun) . The state used to, and 
still do, take it as a priority to provide subsidies to 
enterprises suffering "policy losses", in order to keep 
balances among enterprises.
Furthermore, Article 3 of the EBL explicitly lists as 
exemptions from any bankruptcy proceedings two types of 
enterprises. The first type refers to public utility 
enterprises and enterprises that have an important 
relationship with the national economy and the people's 
livelihood, for which the relevant government departments 
grant subsidies or adopt other measures to help the repayment 
of debts. The second type covers those enterprises that have 
obtained guarantees for the repayment of debts within six 
months from the date of the application for bankruptcy.
By putting limitations on both the tests for bankruptcy 
and the grounds for the prevention of bankruptcy proceedings, 
the Chinese government has shown its intention to minimise 
bankruptcy cases by preventing those bankruptcy proceedings 
that are deemed to be unnecessary and unfair. These 
qualifications serve to relieve people from being worried 
about the consequences arising from the otherwise frequent 
occurrence of bankruptcy. Such intention was confirmed by both 
an editorial of China's Legal News70 and a person responsible 
for the Legislative Affair Committee under the NPC Standing 
Committee.71 It was assumed by the officials that bankruptcy
70 "Fazhan Shehui Zhuyi Shangpin Jingji He Jingji Tizhi 
Gaige de Xuyao" (The Needs for Developing Socialist Commodity 
Economy and Reforming the Economic System), ZGFZB, Dec.3, 
1986, p.l.
71 "Qiye Pochanfa Ye Shi Chujingfa" (The EBL is also an 
Enabling Law), ibid, Dec.5, 1986. pp.1 and 4 at 1. The person 
was, however, saying that bankruptcy cases "may be few".
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cases following the promulgation of the EBL would be "few". 
Such a situation was regarded as ideal since the leadership 
did not want economic order and social stability to be 
affected by the implementation of the EBL.
These qualifications, however, may cause considerable 
controversy and uncertainty. First, the criteria for judging 
whether or not an enterprise is under "poor management and 
administration" is unclear. In particular, it is unknown 
whether an enterprises whose loss-making is only partly due to 
its "poor management and administration" can be made subject 
to bankruptcy proceedings. Secondly, the EBL does not define 
the coverage of "public utility enterprises" and "enterprises 
that have important relationship to the national economy and 
the people's livelihood". Even if the term "public utility 
enterprises" can be understood generally to embrace, for 
example, enterprises of transportation services, it is rather 
difficult to draw a line between enterprises that "have 
important relationship to the national economy and the 
people's livelihood" and those that do not. Thirdly, and most 
critically, the EBL does not indicate who, superior government 
departments in charge of enterprises or the courts, are 
entitled to make final judgments regarding the above problems. 
As will be discussed later, due to the potential conflicts of 
interests, government departments may choose to protect 
enterprises under their supervision and therefore make 
judgments in favour of the debtor enterprises. But the court, 
in adjudicating cases, may hold a different view after taking 
into account the interests of all relevant parties, including 
the creditors.
B. Dominant roles of government departments
Under the EBL, government departments, particularly those 
in charge of enterprises (give zhuquan bumen), play a 
significant role throughout the bankruptcy proceedings.
First, according to the EBL, a bankruptcy application may 
be filed either by an enterprise or its creditors. However, in
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the case of a filing by a debtor enterprise, such application 
can only be made "upon the agreement of the superior 
departments in charge".72 Thus, an insolvent enterprise must 
not file for bankruptcy if its superior government departments 
do not agree. In many cases, inefficient enterprises have to 
continue its loss-making operation.
Secondly, where a debtor enterprise is unable to repay 
its debts that are due, the creditors may file for a 
declaration that the debtor enterprise is bankrupt.73 However, 
as discussed earlier, creditors of the two listed types of 
enterprises are prevented from filing applications at all.74 
Moreover, if the enterprise's superior departments in charge 
have applied for reorganisation and if the enterprise and its 
creditors have reached a settlement through consultation, 
bankruptcy proceedings shall be suspended.75
Reorganisation or reconstruction (zhengdun) presents a 
different picture from that which prevails in the West. This 
picture can only be understood in a broader spectrum. As 
illustrated earlier, the Chinese government used to reorganise 
enterprises through purely administrative, rather than legal, 
means. These practices continue until today. Government 
departments have the power and authority to make decisions 
concerning enterprise reorganisation, including guan, ting, 
bing and zhuan. It is against this background that the EBL 
only offers the reorganisation procedure to an enterprise for 
which the creditors apply for bankruptcy. The omitting of such 
procedure for an enterprise which itself applies for 
bankruptcy is therefore not a "drafting error", as some 
observers read.7r> In fact, the requirement that a debtor 
enterprise, before applying for bankruptcy, must obtain
72 Art. 8 .
73 Art . 7 , par . 1 .
74 Art . 3 , par . 2 .
75 Art. 3 , par . 3 .
10 Minor and Steven-Minor, supra note 2, p.1220.
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consent from the superior government departments in charge, 
implies that these government departments may, instead of 
allowing an enterprise to resort to bankruptcy procedure, 
choose to "save" the enterprise by putting it under 
administrative reorganisation carried out exclusively by the 
department.
According to the EBL, with respect to an enterprise whose 
creditors apply for its bankruptcy, the superior departments 
in charge of this enterprise may, within three months after 
the people's court has accepted the case, apply to carry out 
reorganisation of the enterprise; the period of reorganisation 
shall not exceed two years.77 Moreover, the reorganisation of 
the enterprise shall be "supervised" (zhuchi) by the superior 
departments in charge.78 Of course, the court can keep an eye 
on the reorganisation process. For example, the court may 
terminate reorganisation and declare bankruptcy on an 
enterprise if the enterprise does not implement the settlement 
agreement reached between the enterprise and its creditors.79
The provisions of the reorganisation procedure is aimed 
at saving enterprises as far as possible from going into 
bankruptcy. Similar provisions may also be found in the 
Shenzhen Regulations. It is, however, largely unknown what 
impact these provisions have on the bankruptcy proceeding. One 
danger might be that creditors are persuaded or even forced by 
the government departments in charge of a debtor enterprise to 
reach an agreements with the debtor enterprise. This may be 
the case especially where both the debtor enterprise and the 
creditors are under the supervision of the same government 
department. It follows that bankruptcy proceedings might be 
delayed unreasonably for a considerable period of time, 
therefore damaging the interests of creditors.
Thirdly, Chapter Five of the EBL, which concerns 
bankruptcy declaration and bankruptcy liquidation, is placed
77 Art . 17 .
78 Art . 20 .
79 Art .21.
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after Chapter Four regarding settlement and reorganisation. 
This arrangement contrasts with that in the Shenzhen 
Regulations where "reconciliation" (Chapter Five) falls after 
"liquidation" (Chapter Three). According to Article 24 of the 
EBL, a liquidation team shall be established by the court 
"within fifteen days after the date the enterprise is declared 
bankrupt". While in the case of the Shenzhen Regulations, a 
liquidation committee must be formed by the court "within ten 
days after the court decided to hear the case".80 The nominal 
difference between the two provisions is that, in a bankruptcy 
case relating to a state enterprise, no liquidation team shall 
exist before an enterprise is actually declared by the court 
to be bankrupt.31 A significant difference may, however, be 
drawn in that, as shown above, the reconstruction procedure 
for state enterprise cases is dominated by the government 
departments in charge of the debtor enterprises concerned. 
Although the court could exercise a check on such 
reorganisation, a liquidation team is nevertheless kept away 
from any kind of supervision which would be carried out by a 
liquidation committee formed in accordance with the Shenzhen 
Regulations .82
Under both the EBL and the Shenzhen Regulations, members 
of a liquidation team or committee must be appointed by the 
court hearing the case. Apart from requesting that a 
liquidation committee which shall consist of three to five 
members must include an accountant registered in China,83 the 
Shenzhen Regulations are silent as to who else is eligible to 
be appointed as a liquidator. In contrast, the EBL, though not 
specifying a required number for a liquidation team, does 
instruct the court to make appointments from "the superior 
government departments in charge of the bankrupt enterprise,
80 Art. 12 .
81 See Zheng, China's Civil and Commercial Law, p.195.
32 See, for example, Arts.14(4) and 20 of the Shenzhen 
Regulations.
82 Art.12 of the Shenzhen Regulations.
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government financial departments and other relevant 
departments11, as well as from professionals.84 Thus, like the 
case in enterprise reorganisation,85 government departments 
are authorised to play an important, possibly dominant, role 
in the liquidation of bankrupt enterprises.
A liquidation team shall take over the administration of 
the bankrupt enterprise. It shall be responsible for the 
keeping, putting into order, appraisal, disposition and 
distribution of the bankruptcy property. The liquidation team 
may carry out necessary civil activities in accordance with 
the law.ar’ The debtors of a bankrupt enterprise and persons 
holding the property of a bankrupt enterprise can repay debts 
or deliver property only to the liquidation team.87 The 
liquidation team may also decide to terminate or to continue 
to perform the contracts that have not yet been performed by 
the bankrupt enterprise.88
The EBL provides detailed guidance for the composition 
and the distribution of bankruptcy property. Bankruptcy 
property comprises: (1) all property that the bankrupt
enterprise managed and administered at the time bankruptcy was 
declared; (2) property obtained by the bankrupt enterprise 
during the period from the declaration of bankruptcy until the 
conclusion of the bankruptcy proceedings; and (3) other 
property rights that the bankrupt enterprise should
84 Art. 24, par. 2, EBL.
85 In that case, however, governments are supposed to 
"preside" (Art.20, par.1).
88 Art . 2 4, par . 1, EBL .
87 Art . 25 , par , 1 .
88 Art.27, par.2. If the liquidation team decides to 
terminate a contract and the other party to the contract 
suffers harm as a result of the termination of the contract,, 
the amount of compensation for the harm constitutes a 
bankruptcy claim. See Art.26, par.2. Compare with Art.34, 
par. 3 of the Shenzhen Regulations where such harm is denied 
compensation.
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exercise.89 During the period from six months before the court 
accepts the bankruptcy case until the date that bankruptcy is 
declared, some actions of a bankrupt enterprise are null and 
void. These actions include: (1) concealment, secret
distribution or transfers of property without compensation; 
(2) sale of property at abnormally depressed prices: (3)
securing with property claims that originally were not secured 
with property; (4) early repayment of claims that are not due; 
and (5) abandonment of the enterprise's own claims.90 
Consequently, in any of these cases, the liquidation team is 
entitled to apply to the court to recover the property, which 
shall be added to the bankruptcy property.91 In addition, the 
EBL also makes certain requirements as to the disposal of 
bankruptcy property. For example, complete sets of equipment 
shall be sold as a whole, and that which cannot be sold as a 
whole may be sold in parts.92
Finally, the EBL provides guidelines for the distribution 
of bankruptcy property. Any distribution plans shall be 
proposed by the liquidation team, and approved by the 
creditor's meeting, and submitted to the court for judgment 
before implementation.91 Bankruptcy expenses, including 
litigation expenses, must be paid as a priority.94 The 
remaining property shall be distributed in the order of: (1)
wages of staff and workers and labour insurance expenses that 
are owed by the bankrupt enterprise; (2) taxes that are owed 
by the bankrupt enterprise; and (3) bankruptcy claims. Such an 
order with emphasise on workers' interests, which can be 
traced to the practice in the 1950s (described above), 
represents a difference from those in some other
89 Art. 28.
90 Art. 35.
91 Art .35.
92 Art . 36 .
93 Art . 37 , par . 1 .
94 Art . 34 .
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jurisdictions. For example, in English insolvency law, taxes 
are placed before employees' remuneration.95
By putting into the liquidation team a number of 
government officials and by imposing detailed guidelines for 
the treatment of bankruptcy property, the EBL shows that 
liquidation of bankrupt state enterprises must be carried out 
under the control of relevant government departments which 
will certainly take special care of state property in bankrupt 
enterprises. Although the EBL assumes that the liquidation 
team is responsible to, and shall report on its work to, the 
court,96 it is far from clear how the court may actually 
supervise a liquidation team. There is, for example, no 
procedural provision whereby a liquidator may be removed. 
Moreover, as will be examined later, creditors of the bankrupt 
enterprise seem to be prevented from participating in the 
liquidation process, leaving their interests in uncertainty.
Fourthly, as far as liabilities are concerned, the EBL 
not only threatens relevant persons with criminal 
liabilities,97 but also exposes them to possible 
administrative sanctions. Administrative sanctions may be 
imposed under two general circumstances. On the one hand, the 
legal representative9” and the directly responsible personnel 
of the bankrupt enterprise shall be subject to administrative 
sanctions if the enterprise has committed any of the acts 
listed in Article 35 of the EBL (mentioned above) . On the 
other hand, administrative sanctions may be imposed on the 
legal representative of the bankrupt enterprise, who are found
95 See Schedule 6 of the Insolvency Act 1986.
9(1 Art . 24, par . 3 .
97 Arts. 41 and 42, par. 4. It is clear that the crime 
provided in Art.42 (4) refers to dereliction of duty as 
provided in Art. 187 of the Criminal law (1979) . However, it is 
not clear what crimes may be imposed under art.41 of the 
Bankruptcy law. By referring to the activities stipulated in 
Art.35, Art.41 may cover Art.187, and Art.151 (theft) and 
possibly some other crimes.
98 For a definition and explanation of this important 
concept, see Chapter Six of this thesis.
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to be principally responsible for the bankruptcy of the 
enterprise. Moreover, where the superior governments in charge 
of the enterprise which is declared to be bankrupt shall bear 
the major responsibility for the bankruptcy of the enterprise, 
administrative sanctions shall be applied to the leaders of 
such superior departments in charge. In addition, the EBL 
seems to suggest that, as a principle, after an enterprise is 
declared bankrupt, the government 1 supervisory departments"
(j iancha bumen) and audit departments shall be responsible for 
pinpointing the responsibility for the bankruptcy of the 
enterprise.99
The EBL provisions on bankruptcy liabilities are 
principally aimed at forcing all relevant parties, especially 
enterprise directors and leaders of the superior departments 
in charge of enterprises, to do their best to prevent 
enterprises bankruptcy. This is largely in line with the aims 
of the economic reforms. What is, however, problematic is the 
application of administrative sanctions. First, provisions 
regarding administrative sanctions appear to be incompatible 
with the EBL as a whole.100 It is because that administrative 
sanctions are not investigated and applied by the court. Nor 
would they be subject to any form of judicial review. 
Secondly, administrative sanctions seem to be imposed as a 
replacement for financial accountability, since no financial 
liability is applicable to relevant persons. Thirdly, the 
application of administrative liability represents a 
fundamental difference from the treatment under the Shenzhen 
Regulations. According to the Shenzhen Regulations, 
compensations, fines or criminal liabilities, where 
appropriate, may be applied to legal representatives, members 
of the board of directors or senior management personnel of
5,9 Art. 42 , par . 1.
100 It is particularly inappropriate to add these 
provisions in Arts. 41 & 41, as a part of Chapter Five: 
"bankruptcy declaration and bankruptcy liquidation".
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the bankrupt companies.101 The reason for the exclusive 
application of administrative liabilities to managers in 
bankrupt state enterprises, and not to bankrupt foreign 
investment enterprises, is that state enterprises are legally 
owned by the state and government departments which are 
authorised to impose administrative sanctions. This fact also 
explains that, in state enterprises, directors' accountability 
to the government is still predominantly important.
The legal recognition of administrative sanctions is, to 
a large extent, a continuation of the previous practice 
whereby government departments used their administrative 
authority to manipulate enterprises. However, the legal 
provision of administrative liabilities for government 
departments in charge of bankrupt enterprises is unlikely to 
be strictly followed in practice. Indeed, in order to prevent 
their possibility administrative liability, the leader of the 
government departments will attempt to "save", with all 
possible means, subordinate enterprises from being subject to 
any bankruptcy proceedings. This may be the case especially 
where these leaders themselves are suspicious of being 
"responsible" for the bankruptcy of an enterprise under their 
supervision,
C. Protection of creditors' Interests
Article 1 of the EBL lists the protection of the "legal 
interests" of creditors as one of the main aims of the law. To 
a certain extent, the EBL attempts to offer protection to 
creditors of bankrupt enterprises. For example, creditors are 
entitled to file to declare the debtor bankrupt when the 
debtor is unable to repay debts that are due.102 Moreover, 
the EBL contains a special chapter on creditors' meeting 
(Chapter Three). The meeting shall have the following 
functions and powers: (1) to examine materials of proof
101 Arts. 54 and 55.
102 Art. 7 .
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relating to the claims, and to confirm the amount of such 
claims and whether or not the claims are secured with 
property; (2) to discuss and adopt a draft settlement 
agreement; and (3) to discuss and adopt a plan for the 
disposition and distribution of bankruptcy property.103 In 
addition, creditors who owe debts to the bankrupt enterprise 
may offset them before the bankruptcy liquidation.104
Some other protective provisions are, however, not clear. 
For example, property security system is still underdeveloped 
in China. The EBL does contain several provisions in relation 
to security. For example, secured creditors may enjoy the 
right to receive repayment with priority with respect to their 
security. With respect to claims that are secured with
property whose amount exceeds the value of the security 
collateral, the part that is not repaid constitutes a 
bankruptcy claim, and will be repaid in accordance with the 
bankruptcy proceedings.105 But the EBL seems to rule out the 
voting power of all secured creditors unless they abandon 
their priority right to be repaid.106 Therefore, it seems 
that a secured creditor is prohibited to vote even in the 
respect of the balance (if this is the case) of his debt after 
deducting the value of his security.107
Furthermore, since any resolution adopted by unsecured 
creditors shall have binding force on all creditors, it is 
unknown whether a secured creditor who does not have the
voting right is allowed to ask the court to review such a
resolution.108 In addition, although the creditors' meeting
103 Art. 15.
104 Art .33 .
105 Art .32 .
100 See Art. 13 . Also see Art. 16.
107 Such protection is, however, provided in the UK 
Insolvency Rules 1986 (Section 2.24).
108 Art. 16, par. 3 only generally authorises "creditors" 
with such rights.
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may discuss and adopt draft settlement agreements,109 and it 
may in certain circumstances ask the court to terminate the 
reorganisation procedure,110 it is questionable how creditors 
may supervise the reorganisation. For example, while the term 
for any reorganisation should not exceed two years,111 the 
EBL merely requires that the reorganisation process shall be 
reported to the creditors' meeting "periodically" (dingqi), 
and fails to make any specific provisions as to such reporting 
activities.
Thus, the protection of creditors' interests is 
problematic. In fact, there are mainly two policy factors 
which directly affect the balance of interests between debtor 
enterprises and creditors. First, as explained earlier, the 
strict and not completely clear provisions concerning both the 
tests for bankruptcy and the exclusion of bankruptcy 
proceedings, as provided in Article 3 of the EBL, operate to 
restrain creditors from initiating bankruptcy applications. 
Secondly, the active role played by government departments, 
especially those in charge of enterprises, as recognised 
throughout the EBL, necessarily puts creditors' interests in 
danger. Indeed, a comparison between the PRC EBL and the 
Bankruptcy Law currently operating in Taiwan suggests that, 
while the later pays great attention to the interests of 
creditors, the former tends to protect the debtor 
enterprises.112 For example, while creditors in Taiwan can 
appoint supervisors to check the activities of a liquidation 
committee, the EBL does not provides creditors with any rights 
and remedies in relation to a liquidation team.
It must be pointed out, however, that, not every creditor
109 Art. 18 , par . 1.
110 Art .21.
111 Art . 17 .
112 See Li Chunmin and Wei Xing, "Haixia Liangan Pochanfa 
Zhuyao Neirong Zhi Bijiao Yanjiu" (Comparative Studies on Main 
Contents of Bankruptcy Law Across the Taiwan Straits), FXYJ, 
No.5, 1990, pp.53-7.
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enterprise in the PRC seems to care very much about its 
interests. As for state enterprises, since many of their 
creditors are state institutions and fellow state enterprises, 
the protection of creditors' interests appears to be less 
important as the property of bankrupt enterprises may just 
flows from one to another pocket of the state.
IV. The EBL and Consolidation of Companies
The EBL came into force on November 1, 1988. As mentioned 
earlier, it had been predicted by Chinese officials that 
bankruptcy cases following the adoption of the EBL would be 
"few". Nevertheless, it seems that until 1991, the number of 
bankruptcy cases may well have been fewer than had been 
anticipated.113 In practice, the EBL is frequently put aside 
by the government.
Between late 1988 and late 1991, the Chinese government 
conducted the 1 rectification and consolidation" (zhili 
zhengdun) of the economy. One of the main themes of this 
campaign was to "reorganise companies" (zhengdun gongsi) .114 
On October 3, 1988, the Central Committee of the CCP and the 
State Council jointly issued the "Decision Regarding Clearing 
and Reorganising Companies" ("Decision").115 The background 
for launching this campaign was rather complicated. Many 
companies were established and operated by government 
departments and officials concurrently holding government and 
Party positions. Some companies possessed both the right to 
carry out business and the power to exercise administrative 
control. Because of the involvement of government departments
113 Until early 1991, just more than 170 state enterprises 
had been declared bankruptcy in accordance with the Bankruptcy 
Law. Information from ZZJJTZGG, No.5, 1991, p.34.
114 For a description of the concept of "company" and its 
connections as well as differences with that of "enterprise", 
see Chapter One of this thesis.
115 For the text in Chinese, see Bulletin of the State 
Council, No.23, 1988, pp.739-41.
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and officials, many companies were able to engage in "official 
profiteering" (guandao) which disrupted the economic order and 
shook people's confidence in the government.
The main targets of this campaign were companies that 
were established after late 1986, especially those having 
multiple operations and functions, those engaging in 
financial, and circulation activities. Companies that were 
formed before late 1986 and that had "serious problems" should 
also be cleared and reorganised.116
Like the previous consolidations of enterprises in the 
early 1960s and early 1980s, this reorganisation relied 
exclusively on administrative measures. The Decision required 
that reorganisation to be carried out by government 
departments at all levels.117
Many measures were introduced and implemented in this 
campaign. For example, the administrative functions of 
companies were ordered to be cancelled. Moreover, government 
and Party officials, including retired officials, were 
instructed to distance themselves from any such companies.118 
Most importantly, all companies that did not possess necessary 
conditions and that "lack the necessity to exist" should be 
resolutely abolished or amalgamated, with their property and
116 Ibid, par.l. The main reason why a line was drawn for 
1986 was that, there was formerly a consolidation on companies 
which started in 1985 and concluded in 1986. For a brief 
description of this campaign, see Chapter Three of this 
thesis.
117 Ibid, par . 9 .
118 See " Zhonggong Zhongyany Bangongting, Guowuyuan 
Bangongting Guanyu Xianyishang Dang He Guojia Jiguan Tuilixiu 
Ganbu Jingshang Banqiye Wenti de Ruogan Guiding" (Some 
Provisions Concerning Retired Cadres of the Party and the 
Government Offices Who Are Engaged in Doing Businesses and 
Operating Enterprises, Issued by the Office Departments of the 
CCP Central Committee and the State Council on Oct.3, 1988).
For the text in Chinese, see Bulletin of the State Council, 
No.23, 1988, pp.741-42. Also see, "Guanyu Guojia Jiguan Ganbu 
Zai Gongsi (Qiye) Jianze Youguan Wenti de Tongzhi" (Circular 
Concerning Government Officers Concurrently Holding Positions 
in Businesses (Enterprises), Feb.5, 1989) . For the text in
Chinese, see ibid, No.l, 1989, pp.41-2.
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funds seized for the repayment of their debts.119
During this campaign, companies to be abolished or 
amalgamated were required to go through the procedure of 
clearing up its debts as well as its claims. In early 1990, 
the Ministry of Finance, the People's Bank of China and the 
National State Assets Administration Bureau jointly issued a 
Circular on Clearing Up Property, Claims and Debts of 
Abolished or Amalgamated State-Owned Companies 
("Circular") .120 In December 1990, the State Council 
promulgated Provisions on Clearing Claims and Debts of 
Abolished or Amalgamated Companies ("Provisions").121 Both 
the Circular and the Provisions provided detailed guidance in 
dealing with issues of liability and property disposition. The 
liability issue, including especially the limited liability of 
companies as legal persons and the liability of government 
departments as promoters, is discussed elsewhere in this
thesis.122 As far as the debts issue is concerned, the
repeated call for clearing up debts to some extent reflected 
a departure from the past PRC practice whereby the state might 
transfer, cancel, or reduce debts and claims of any kind. In 
this sense, the EBL which aims to sort out debts and liability 
of enterprises has had some positive impact on the
reorganisation of companies.
Although some companies were found to be insolvent 
because their assets were insufficient to repay their debts, 
it is interesting to note that the EBL itself was not 
mentioned by either the Circular or the Provisions. Since this 
reorganisation was purely an administrative campaign, the
clearing up of debts and claims was put under the exclusive
119 Ibid.
120 For the main text in Chinese, see FZRB, Feb. 16, 1990,
p.2 .
121 For the main text in Chinese, see RMRB, Dec. 23, 1990, 
p.2. These Provisions applied to companies operated by mass 
organisation and social groups as well, therefore having 
broader application than the Circular.
122 See Chapter Three of this thesis.
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control of government departments in charge of companies, as 
well as special liquidation teams. These teams were organised 
by superior departments in charge of companies and were 
consisted of members of all relevant government departments 
and other relevant persons.123
In addition, there are two main differences between 
bankruptcy proceedings and the administrative handling of 
debts. First, while the EBL provides for three orders in terms 
of priority for repayment from bankruptcy property, both the 
Circular and the Provisions created four orders. It was 
expressly provided that repayment from property of abolished 
companies, should be made in the order of: (1) reasonable
wages and living expenses (of workers and staff); (2) taxes 
that are owed by the abolished company in accordance with the 
law; (3) loans granted from state banks, credit cooperatives 
and other financial institutions; and (4) other claims. And 
where the property was insufficient to repay all the repayment 
needs in a single order, it should be distributed on a pro­
rata basis. The main feature in this arrangement, which 
differed from the EBL, was that financial loans were put as a 
priority over other claims. Those which provided loans were 
treated as de facto secured creditors. This reflected the 
state's concern over the scale of company's loans from banks, 
especially from state banks. Secondly, the EBL provides that 
creditors who do not report their claims within a certain 
period, shall be deemed to have automatically abandoned their 
claims.124 In contrast, the Provisions explicitly required 
that all claims must be "sought to be repaid positively" 
(zhudong zhuichang) by superior government departments in 
charge and the liquidation teams.
Nevertheless, as far as the distribution of property is 
concerned, the EBL and the government reorganisation of 
companies share one common feature. That is, to a large
123 See Circular, par. 1, supra note 118.
124 Art . 9 . The period is one month for those who have been 
notified, and three months for those not.
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extent, the distribution is a one-way action administered by 
government authorities (including government-controlled 
liquidation teams). As a matter of fact, many creditors remain 
too passive to defend their legal rights and recover their 
claims. What they can do is to wait, rather than to fight, for 
their share of property in an insolvent enterprise.
It seems that administrative manipulation of assets
distribution of an insolvent enterprise might be more 
effective than the formal and legal bankruptcy proceedings. 
This is mainly because that it serves to fit more with the 
government's intentions and it is exclusively controlled by 
the government. Moreover, state property, especially that in 
the form of state loans, can be more favourably protected in 
administrative reorganisation than in ordinary bankruptcy
proceedings. But whatever ideal effects this administrative 
reorganisation may produce, it is a fact that the newly
introduced EBL is almost drowned in the administrative
campaign.
Since the late 1980s, the Chinese government has 
attempted to avert bankruptcy proceedings by encouraging the 
"takeover" (j ianbing) between enterprises. One way to carry 
out this is to let a creditor enterprise takeover its debtor 
enterprise that is insolvent. In the campaign to consolidate 
companies, some companies were ordered to be amalgamated with 
other enterprises. The above mentioned Circular provided some 
guidelines for this kind of amalgamation. For example, while 
the property of a state company had to be transferred for 
value to a non-state company, the transfer of property from a 
state company to a fellow state company might be made either 
for value or in accordance with administrative arrangements, 
depending on the decisions made through negotiations among 
relevant government departments. Moreover, all the funds as 
well as claims and debts that had not been cleared up by a 
company to be taken over should be transferred to another 
company that absorbed the company. One advantage for this kind 
of merger is that workers and staff, if they wish, can be 
transferred to the absorbing company, reducing the pressure of
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unemployment.^  It is likely that government departments may 
order an efficient enterprise to take over an inefficient 
enterprise. As a result, the possibility for bankruptcy 
proceedings is further cut down.
V. Conclusion
The introduction of the bankruptcy policy in post-Mao 
China was once seen by many reformers as a necessary tool for 
state enterprise reforms because the threat of bankruptcy 
would force enterprises to make better performance and enhance 
economic efficiency. Thus, in spite of notable opposition, the 
EBL was adopted in 1986.
The adopted EBL, however, is far from radical. The EBL 
not only preempts the occurrence of bankruptcy proceedings in 
many circumstances, but also inherits many features of the 
past PRC practices regarding enterprise reorganisation. Most 
notably, government authorities are placed by the EBL at a 
dominant position in the liquidation and reorganisation of 
bankrupt enterprises. To a great extent, this has been carried 
out at the cost of creditors' interests.
The EBL today remains a "paper tiger" as only a few 
bankruptcy cases have been adjudicated by the court. Indeed, 
until early 1992, the Chinese leadership has been reluctant to 
enforce the EBL. Three factors may explain the reasons for the 
failure of the bankruptcy policy. First, many creditors remain 
passive. They are either not very interested in, or prevented 
by the government from, initiating bankruptcy proceedings 
against debtor enterprises.126 Secondly, debtor enterprises
i2r’ For an analysis of the legal characteristics of 
enterprise mergers, see for example Fu Tingmei, "Qiye Jianbing 
de Falu Tezheng Chutan" {Preliminary Discussion on the Legal 
Features of Enterprise Mergers", FZRB, Sept.7, 1988, p.3.
126 It has become common practice in contemporary PRC that 
debtors are in a superior position to their creditors. Often 
creditors have to beg debtors in order to obtain a settlement. 
Few creditors would regard bankruptcy filings as the best way 
to realise their rights.
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themselves are prevented by government departments from filing 
bankruptcy applications. Thirdly, government departments tend 
to "save" their subordinate enterprises from bankruptcy 
proceedings. This can be carried by, for example, providing 
help to an insolvent enterprise. Moreover, neither the SEL nor 
the EBL provide clear guidance for the administrative 
reorganisation of enterprises.127 Thus, the government may 
make unilateral decisions to reorganise enterprises. Such 
administrative actions may pre-empt many genuine bankruptcy 
cases. Enterprise insolvency found in the course of 
administrative reorganisation are handled by administrative 
authorities without resorting to, and even contradicting, the 
EBL provisions.
A proper implementation of the bankruptcy policy would 
require many legal as well as non-legal conditions. The EBL 
was adopted without resolving a number of social, economic and 
political difficulties. The irrational pricing policy 
continues despite the government's promise, and indeed some 
undergoing actions, to reform in this respect. The 
unemployment threat has been picked up by many as an excuse 
for delaying the implementation of the EBL. The pursuit of 
economic efficiency at the cost of "social efficiency" remains 
officially unacceptable. Furthermore, enterprises are still 
under extensive government control and do not have a 
significant degree of autonomy in decision-making.
Bankruptcy is a phenomenon necessarily associated with 
market economies. The absence of a genuine market economy in 
the PRC means that there is little impetus for the 
implementation of the bankruptcy policy. Nevertheless, in the 
light of the recent official calls for the development of a 
market economy, it is possible that the bankruptcy policy will 
be implemented more radically in China. And in that case, an 
overhaul of the existing EBL is needed, in order not only to 
limit the dominant role of government authorities, but also to 
provide favourable protection to the interests of creditors.
127 Such a guidance is, however, stipulated in the 
Shenzhen Regulations (supra note 54).
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CHAPTER NINE
THE CONTRACTING (CHENGBAO) SYSTEM: LAW AND PRACTICE
This chapter discusses the contracting, or chengbao, system 
implemented in state enterprises. Although several aspects of 
this system have been discussed in previous chapters,1 this 
discussion is very necessary in that it will examine the 
chengbao system broadly as an important legal mechanism 
employed by the Chinese reformers for settling the relations 
between the state and state enterprises.
This chapter commences with a general description of the 
role of legal contracts in the post-Mao economic reforms. The 
nature of the enterprise chengbao system is then analyzed. The 
discussion continues to explore the practical and theoretical 
confusions existing within the chengbao system. In order to 
explain many policy considerations underlying the chengbao 
system and its practical predicament, a brief comparison is 
made between the chengbao system and the leasing system (zulin 
zhi). Finally, a conclusion is offered with an analysis of the 
functions and the limits of the chengbao system in state 
enterprise reforms.
I. Contracts and Post-Mao Economic Reforms
Since 1981 when the economic responsibility system was 
first suggested to be implemented in state industrial and
1 For example, the impact of the chengbao system on the 
financial autonomy of state enterprises was discussed in 
Chapter Five.
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transportation enterprises,2 many forms of the responsibility 
system have been tested in China. In 1988, the SEL singled out 
chengbao (contracting) and zulin (leasing) as two principal 
forms to be implemented nationwide.3 In addition, however, the 
shareholding system, or gufenzhi, has been cautiously 
experimented with since the mid-1980s.4
Of these reforms, the chengbao system has been the most 
important approach. Since 1987, over ninety per cent of all 
large and medium-sized state enterprises have implemented this 
system. In contrast, the zulin system is applied only to small 
enterprises and therefore has had a limited impact on state 
enterprise reforms.5
The chengbao system currently applied to state
enterprises is by no means the first experiment of its kind in 
post-Mao economic reforms. The much celebrated rural economic 
reforms implemented since the late 197 0s provided a good
example of the immense effectiveness of the chengbao system. 
In 1982, this system was introduced in Chinese rural areas. 
From then on, contracts based on some formal regulations5 have
replaced compulsory orders as a dominant mechanism for
structuring the relationship between peasant producers on the 
one hand and the state and the collectives on the other. Based
2 In April 1981, the State Council convened a national 
conference on industrial and transportation work. See 
Guowuvuan Pizhuan Guojia Jing~ii Weivuanhui He Guowuyuan Tizhi 
Gaige Bangongshi Guanyu Shixing Gongye Shenchan Jingji 
Zerenzhi Ruogan Wenti de Yijian (The State Council Approves 
and Transmits the Opinions on some Issues Concerning the 
Implementation of Economic Responsibility System in Industrial 
Production, Oct.29, 1981).
3 Art.2.
4 For an assessment of this system, see Chapter Ten 
below.
5 For a detailed comparison between chengbao and zulin, 
see the later discussion in this chapter.
5 For example, "Agricultural Sideline Production Contract 
Regulations", issued by the State Council on Jan.23, 1984,
translated into English in JPRS China Report (Agri.), Sept.10 
1984, pp.61-9.
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on case studies, some observers praised the chengbao system by
concluding that
[t]he new rural contracts have far-reaching implications 
for China's future. This is particularly true as the 
contracts establish the rule of law, revamp rural 
politics, and link complex economic relations in a mixed 
plan-and-market economy.7
The great success of the chengbao system in rural 
implementation encouraged the Chinese leadership to extend 
this practice to the industrial sector. As explained in 
Chapter Four, the gradual expansion of enterprise autonomy has 
been the main thread for enterprise reforms. However, as state 
enterprises had to bargain with the state and government 
authorities for more powers, and as many government 
departments which used to dominate enterprise management were 
reluctant to hand over their powers, there was great 
flexibility in the relations between the government and 
enterprises. Such flexibility proved to be unfair for 
different enterprises and constituted one of the major 
obstacles to the expansion of enterprise autonomy.
In fact, in the industrial sector, chengbao had been 
practised between 1981 and 1983. As examined in Chapter Five, 
that chengbao was aimed at giving enterprises an opportunity
7 David Zweig and others, "Law, Contract, and Economic 
Modernisation: Lessons from the Recent Chinese Rural Reforms", 
in Stanford Journal of International Law, Vol.23, 1987,
pp. 319-64, at 361. And see also Crook, "The Baogan Daohu 
Incentive System: Translation and Analysis of a Modal
Contract", in China Quarterly, No.102, 1985, pp.291-303.
Unfortunately, this contract system has been largely abolished 
as the State Council decided in late 1990 to reintroduce the 
previously practised state procurement policy whereby peasants 
are forced to fulfil the tasks ordered unilaterally by the 
government in regard to the submission of grain. The reasons 
for this policy shift were manifold. Apart from that peasants 
were alleged as frequently ignoring legal contracts, one 
official explanation did refer to the fact that the submission 
of grain according to contracts was not different from state 
procurement. Therefore in the opinion of the government, for 
the purpose of describing the nature of the state policy, the 
use of procurement is actually more precise than contracts 
which was misleading. For a report of the government decision 
as well as the official explanation, see RMRB (Overseas edn,), 
Oct.12, 1990, p.l.
367
to share profits. If an enterprise could effectively make more 
profits than a base amount settled in advance by negotiations 
between government authorities and the enterprise concerned, 
it would be entitled to share certain percentage of the 
profits in excess of the base amount. However, that chengbao 
system failed to achieve success and was later replaced by a 
new tax-for-profit system. One of the reasons for the failure 
of that period of chengbao was that the old system of 
administrative control by the government remained unchanged. 
Government departments still occupied a superior position to 
control a number of matters ranging from the settlement of 
base amount of profits to direct enterprise management. In 
addition, the failure to fulfil the fixed base amount included 
i-n chengbao did not result in any liability for either 
enterprises, their managers or government authorities.
The unsatisfactory chengbao practice in the early 1980s, 
however, did not make the Chinese leadership lose its 
confidence in the chengbao system itself. Since it was 
reintroduced nationally in 1987, the chengbao system has been 
vested with a number of new contents and new characteristics. 
Most notably, the legal and contractual mechanism has been 
introduced in an attempt to achieve a fair balance of 
interests among the state, enterprises, and their managers.
II. Legal Nature of Enterprise Chengbao Contracts
The chengbao system applied since 1987 has been 
repeatedly praised by the Chinese authorities as well as by 
many academics. At the very beginning when this system was 
extensively applied, many hopes were put on it. One academic 
writer predicted in 1987 that, for Chinese state enterprises, 
the chengbao system would lead to a fundamental change in the 
relationship between the state and state enterprises, and the 
essential significance was, "from status appendage to the
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formation of contractual relations",8 -- much like the 
function which the institution of the contract had played in 
the European civilisation. In his view, the relationship 
between the government and enterprises would experience 
radical changes from the old system in which enterprises were 
primarily subordinate to government manipulation to a new 
system in which legal and contractual, rather than purely 
administrative, relations were the norm. Nevertheless, one has 
to look at both the provisions in relevant regulations and the 
chengbao practice in order to find out whether this prediction 
accorded with the reality or was just a sincere hope.
On February 27, 1988, the State Council issued the
Provisional Regulations Concerning the Contracting Management 
Responsibility System in State Industrial Enterprises 
{"Chengbao Regulations").9 The basic principles governing 
government-enterprise relations, as embodied in the Chengbao 
Regulations, are that an enterprise guarantees a "base figure"
{iishu) , ensures payments to the state, retains extra profits, 
and makes up for any losses from its own reserve fund.10 The 
main objectives for implementing the chengbao system are 
stated as: enterprises must guarantee profit payments to the 
state, ensure completion of technology transformation, and 
link up their gross payroll with their economic 
productivity.11
A chengbao contract must contain the following 
provisions:
8 See Gu Peidong, "Chengbao Jingying Zerenzhi de Faxue 
Tantao" (Discussions on the Legal Aspects of the Chengbao 
Management Responsibility System), in GMRB, Sept.12, 1987, 
p.3. Reproduced in JJF, No.5, 1987, pp.89-90.
9 For the text in Chinese, see Law and Regulations of the 
PRC (1988), pp.735-44.
10 Art , 5 , ibid.
11 Art . 8 , ibid.
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(1) the form of the chengbao contract,12
(2) the duration for this chengbao contract;
(3) the amount of profit to be turned over or that of the 
losses to be reduced;
(4) compulsory state supply plans and production plans;
(5) production quality and other main economic and 
technological targets;
(6) technology transformation tasks, preservation and 
appreciation of state property;
(7) use of retained profit, return of loan, arrangement
for the credit and/or debt existing before this chengbao;
(8) respective rights and duties of both parties;
(9) responsibilities for breach of contract;
(10) award and punishment for an enterprise manager;
(11) other items agreed by both parties.13
Despite such detailed provisions, it is disputable 
whether chengbao contracts are in essence economic contracts. 
The Economic Contract Law ("ECL") was promulgated in 1981, and 
it did not provide for the regulation of chengbao contracts. 
In fact, the implementation of the rural contracting system
had to rely mainly on separate legislation such as the
Agricultural and Sideline Production Contract Regulations.14
Some Chinese scholars have been optimistic in that they 
insist a chengbao contract is basically a civil or economic 
contract.lf> They argue that both parties to the contract "are
13 According to Art. 9 of the Chengbao Regulations, there 
are usually four forms: (a) turning over to the state a
guaranteed amounted proportional to profit; (b) turning over 
to the state a guaranteed base figure amount of profit, the 
remainder to be divided; (c) turning over to the state by 
enterprises making small profits a fixed amount of profit: (d) 
reducing losses (or compensating) for enterprises experiencing 
losses. For a discussion of the application of these forms, 
see Chapter Four of the thesis.
13 Art. 16, Chengbao Regulations.
14 See supra note 6.
15 See for example Professor Sun Yarning, "Shixing Chengbao 
Jingyingzhi Zhide Tantao de Falii Wenti" (Some Legal Issues 
Concerning the Implementation of Chengbao Management System) , 
in FXZZ, No.2, 1988, pp.8-9. Reproduced in JJF, No.6, 1988,
pp.46-7. In China, despite the differences existing between a 
civil contract and an economic contract, the principles of 
civil law regarding civil contracts shall apply to economic 
contracts which may be generally regarded as a type of civil 
contract.
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in an equal position not only in their rights and duties but 
also in their performance of the contract".16 Moreover, a 
recognition of the civil nature of such a chengbao contract 
would, in their view, ensure that enterprises finally escape 
from government administrative intervention.
Many other observers are, however, not so optimistic. 
They view the chengbao contract as "a type of special contract 
possessing both administrative and civil legal 
relationship".17 In other words, a chengbao contract is 
neither purely economic nor purely administrative, but a 
hybrid contract in nature. Thus, the legal regulation of 
chengbao contracts must consider both the aspects of 
administrative control and the general principles of economic 
contract law.
The debate on the legal nature of chengbao contracts has 
both theoretical and practical implications. In order to 
reveal the true nature of chengbao contracts, a comparison 
between chengbao contracts and ordinary economic contracts 
must be made in three aspects: principles for the formation of 
a contract, the status of contractual parties, and the objects 
of a contract.
A. Principles for the formation of a contract
Chengbao contracts are not formed in accordance with the 
same principles as those which must be applied to the 
formation of ordinary economic contracts. Article 15 of the 
Chengbao Regulations provides that "in concluding a chengbao 
contract, both parties must comply with the principles of 
equality, voluntariness and negotiation". The ECL states, 
however, that the formation of economic contracts must be
16 Sun, ibid. p. 47.
17 See Cheng Yongji, "Chengbao Jingying Zerenzhi de Zhuyao 
Jingji Guanxi Jiqi Falu Tiaozheng" (Main Economic Relations 
in, and the Legal Regulations on, the Chengbao Management 
Responsibility System), in JJFZ, No.1, 1988, pp.10-13.
Reproduced in JJF, No.1, 1988, pp.69-72.
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based on the principles of equality and mutual benefit; 
negotiation and coincidence of opinions; and making 
compensation for equal value.18 Similarly, Article 4 of the 
GPCL states: "in civil activities, the principles of
voluntariness, fairness, making compensation for equal value, 
honesty and credibility shall be observed." Among these three 
different sets of principles,19 those provided in the Chengbao 
Regulations are obviously the narrowest. The most significant 
omission in the Chengbao Regulations is the principle of 
mutual benefit, or more radically, "making compensation for 
equal value" (dengjia youchang), Although the principles of 
equality, voluntariness and negotiation may provide both 
parties with an opportunities for achieving mutual benefit, 
this may not always be the case.
Of the main contents covered in a chengbao contract, some 
are directly involved with economic interests, but others are 
not. It would be incorrect to hold that the involvement of 
non-economic interests would necessarily prevent a contract 
from becoming an economic contract. This is because, as 
recognised in the ECL,20 not only goods but also services can 
be valued in the contract. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to 
view the listing as contractual targets of non-economic 
interests as an obstacle in realising the principle of dengjia 
youchang. Let us take the issue of technological 
transformation as an example. In practice, some chengbao 
contracts have "capitalised" this item by, for example, 
providing in a contract the amount of money with which the 
contractor must invest in technological development.21 On the
18 Art . 5 .
19 One should also note some fundamental principles in 
some other connected articles, for example, the equality 
principle in Art.2 of the GPCL.
20 For example, Art.19, on processing and contracting 
contract.
21 See the Research Group on the Chinese Enterprise System 
Reform, Chenqbaozhi Zai Shijian Zhong (The Chengbao System in 
Practice), Economic Management Press (Beijing) 1988, case 2.7,
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other hand, some chengbao contracts have adopted non-economic 
and flexible methods taking into account technological 
development such as a rise in product quality,22 but without 
specifying the amount of money with which the contractors must 
invest in technological development. In addition to 
technological development, some chengbao contracts contain 
such criteria as the degree of "civilisation" (wenming), 
safety of production and prevention of serious pollution.23
Thus, while the maximisation of financial profits is 
undeniably an important aim for the state as the owner of 
enterprises, the state has to look at both the long term and 
the short term, and to take into consideration not only 
financial interests but also many social factors. Enterprises 
themselves, especially the directors, are more interested in 
making maximum profits in short term, that is, within the 
terms of the immediate chengbao, regardless of any economic or 
social costs. This is particularly obvious as some managers 
are likely to quit their jobs when the term of chengbao 
expires.24 Thus, to a large extent, it is mainly the state, 
as the party that offers the contract, which seeks to impose
pp.2 5-7. The contract in this case provided that during the 
term of chengbao time, the contractor--Nanjing Oil Chemical 
Plant had to invest in technological transformation 6.9 
million RMB Yuan, including 5.3 million of state loan and 1.6 
million of self-raised money. The contract also continued to 
provide for the use of this amount and the way to repay the 
state loan.
22 See ibid. case 2.5, pp.22-3. The quality in this case 
was to be valued by the level of excellence (provisional, 
ministerial, or national) certain products have finally 
reached. The exploitation and subsequent putting into 
operation of new products were also listed in the contract as 
a criterion for assessing technological transformation.
23 Supra note 21, case 2.7.
24 Art.31 of the Chengbao Regulations provides that "when 
the term for the chengbao expires, the enterprise leading body 
responsible for chengbao shall be dissolved." Here "leading 
body" refers to the director, deputy directors and other 
relevant management personnel who are selected by, and 
supposed to assist, the director to charge the implementation 
of the chengbao contract.
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many non-economic goals on enterprises. These non-economic 
targets, when added to economic targets, have contributed to 
a very complex system in which a variety of terms are included 
in a chengbao contract. Such a system makes the notions of 
"mutual benefits" and "equal values" in a chengbao contract 
both undesirable and impractical.
B. Status of contractual parties
As shown above, the fact that the ambiguity of the 
dengj ia youchang principle makes chengbao contracts different 
from typical economic contracts. Nevertheless, in justifying 
their assertion that chengbao contracts are in essence 
economic contracts, many Chinese lawyers have attempted to 
avoid discussing the principle of "making compensation for 
equal value". Instead, they are more interested in exploring 
the wording of "equality" between the state and enterprises, 
in the hope that equality, voluntariness and negotiation can 
help both parties to achieve fairness in chengbao contracts. 
Therefore the status of contractual parties must be examined.
Generally speaking, the parties to a chengbao contract 
are the state (usually called "the party that offers the 
contract" or fabaofang) and an enterprise ("the contractor" or 
chengbaofang). The state, being an abstract norm, is 
represented by government departments. Within each level of 
the government, there are many specialised ministries or 
commissions (at central level), bureaux, departments and 
offices (at provincial, prefectural, municipal and county 
levels).
In some cases, a chengbao contract is concluded between 
an enterprise and several government departments, but in other 
cases, a chengbao contract may be signed between an enterprise 
and a single government authority. This is especially the case 
when this single authority has itself contracted with its 
superior government ("contracting for an industry", or hangye 
chengbao).
In addition, in some cases, the party that offers the
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contract appears to be the highest authority within the 
enterprise concerned, rather than superior government 
departments in charge of the enterprise. In one such case,25 
such highest authority was a board of directors. However, the 
establishment of the board does not make any difference. There 
are two major reasons. First, such cases are exceptions rather 
than general practice. Secondly, government officials are 
always present in the boards. In the above mentioned case, the 
board was headed by a local government officer and composed of 
government officials as well as the leaders of the enterprise, 
including the manager, the Party secretary and the president 
of the trade union.
The direct official involvement, either through its 
departments or through its officers, must be seen from two 
different but almost inseparable perspectives. One is the 
government as the owner of state enterprises. It is 
theoretically possible, from this point of view, for the owner 
and the enterprise to reach, on the basis of equality, a civil 
or economic agreement. But the issue is not so simple as the 
government has another function, namely as the administrator 
of the economy. The most important tools for the government 
are economic planning and administrative supervision. For 
example, the government has considerable power to decide 
financing, pricing, taxation and many other issues.25 
Government control based on the factors of both ownership and 
administration has cast shadow on the principle of equality.
The vertical administrative relationship between the 
government and enterprises poses a threat to the principle of 
equality. In order to achieve equality, it is necessary to cut 
off the vertical administrative relations and replace them 
with pure horizontal relations whereby the government and 
state enterprises have equal basis for the bargaining in, and 
for the enforcement of, chenqbao contracts. The idea that the 
government should separate its administrative function from
25 Supra note 21, case 1.5, p.6.
25 For a discussion, see Chapter Four of the thesis.
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ownership function has paved the way for the chenqbao system. 
But the problem remains whether a chenqbao contract can 
contain any "equality" at all.
It must be admitted that the term of "equality" has been 
understood in different ways among Chinese scholars. Some 
observers27 have analyzed the meaning of equality in terms of 
three aspects: status, effectiveness of expression of
intentions, and rights of parties involved. But as mentioned 
above,28 some emphasize the equality in rights and duties of 
both parties and in the fulfilment of contracts. In addition, 
there are some29 who insist that an enterprise and the party 
that offers the contract are subordinate and superior 
authorities in an administrative relationship; equal 
contractual parties in a contractual relationship; and 
possible plaintiff and defendant in a litigious relationship. 
Therefore the concept of equality does not seem to have the 
same generally agreed contents.
The notion of equality, as reflected in the Chengbao 
Regulations, has two main aspects. The first is in the sense 
of rights and duties respectively provided in Articles 22 and 
23. The party that offers the contract is entitled, in 
accordance with the provisions of a chenqbao contract, to 
inspect and supervise the contractor's production and 
management activities. It shall also, in accordance with the 
provisions of a chenqbao contract, protect the legal rights of 
an enterprise and its manager, and help to coordinate and 
resolve the enterprise's difficulties in the process of 
production and management. Accordingly, an enterprise as the 
contractor enjoys management autonomy provided in laws, 
regulations, policies and in a chenqbao contract. And it must
27 See Li Xiangru and Tang Fang, Hetong (Contracts), Law 
Publishing House (Beijing) 1987, p.2.
28 Sun, supra note 15.
29 See Sheng Guansheng, Ruhe Chuli Chenqxianq Chenqbao 
Hetong Jiufen (How to Handle Disputes Concerning Chenqbao 
Contracts in Cities and Countryside) , Enlightenment Daily 
Press (Beijing) 1987, especially at 67.
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also carry out all the obligations provided in a chenqbao 
contract.
The second area showing the "equality" between two 
parties are the consequences for one, or both parties which 
fail to carry out contractual duties. Article 24 of the 
Chengbao Regulations provides that the party that offers the 
contract must bear the responsibility for breach of contract, 
and its responsible persons may be subject to administrative 
and economic sanctions. Article 25 also makes similar 
provisions for enterprises and their managers. Furthermore, 
according to Article 20, in the process of performing a 
contract, the party that offers the contract is entitled to 
rescind the contract if it finds that the contract is not 
being properly implemented due to the poor management of the 
contractor. Equally, a contractor is entitled to propose to do 
so if it finds that the party that offers the contract has 
breached the contract in such a way that the enterprise cannot 
fulfil the contract. In addition, Article 19 provides that, if 
the State Council has made important changes in taxation 
(including the types and rates of taxes) or in the pricing of 
mandatory planning products, both parties may negotiate for 
the alteration of a chenqbao contract. And in case of the 
appearance of force majeure or some outside and unavoidable 
reasons unconnected with the fault of any party, both parties 
can negotiate for the change or rescission of a chenqbao 
contract.
These provisions regarding the equality of parties are to 
some extent similar to those stipulated in the ECL. It seems 
that, for the party that offers the contract, there would be 
no administrative intervention, except for its contractual 
rights provided in detail in a chenqbao contract. But does 
this mean that the very form of a chenqbao contract has 
effectively excluded the possibility of government 
administrative intervention?
The right of inspection and supervision by the party that 
offers the contract may offer a good example for the present 
analysis. The ECL contains similar provisions regarding, for
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example, the contract of processing and contracting. Article 
19 of the ECL states that a contractor in such a contract 
"must accept necessary inspection and supervision from the 
party that orders the object of the contract". But it is 
inappropriate to confuse this kind of inspection and 
supervision with that in a chengbao contract. The Chengbao 
Regulations do not expressly provide for the contents of such 
supervision and the manner in which such supervision is to be 
exercised, except by generally providing that it should be "in 
accordance with the contract". It is suggested30 that this 
kind of inspection and supervision may refer to the areas of 
production plans, the realisation of profits, the preservation 
and renewal of enterprise property, the technological 
transformation, the use of retained profits, the compliance by 
the enterprise with the financial disciplines and even the 
actual implementation by the enterprise of economic contracts 
with third parties. Thus the right of inspection and 
supervision in a chenqbao contract may be so broad that it is 
simply beyond the capacity of any contract to have all these 
recorded in advance.
The right to inspect and supervise enterprise's 
management and production was formally an important part of 
the administrative functions executed by government 
authorities in their capacities as both social and economic 
administrator and enterprise owner. Even after the conclusion 
of a chenqbao contract, the party that offers the contract has 
retained the same dual capacity. An effective mechanism by 
which the owner and the representatives of state property are 
separated from the administrator of the economy has so far 
failed to be properly established. Therefore, it would be 
unrealistic to classify the right of inspection and 
supervision in a chenqbao contract as a purely civil 
contractual right.
30 See Sheng Guansheng, ibid. , p. 124. Also see Wang 
Shirong and others, Chenqbao Jingying Zerenzhi de Falu Wenti 
(Legal Issues Concerning Chenqbao Management Responsibility 
System), Machinery Industry Press (Beijing) 1988, p.74.
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In fact, the right of inspection and supervision, as 
recorded in the Chengbao Regulations, must be seen as the 
combination of both administrative and civil contractual 
rights. The party that offers the contract is particularly 
keen to inspect and to supervise the contractor when the 
former is itself a contractor with a superior government 
authority. Since a chengbao contract may contain certain state 
plans, failure to effectively inspect and supervise the 
contractor may incur severe administrative penalties on the 
party that offers the contract. The provisions concerning the 
possible rescission of a contract in case of any breach may be 
seen, from the standpoint of the party that offers the 
contract, as not only a right, but also an administrative and 
contractual duty. Furthermore, failure to fulfil a chenqbao 
contract may cause not only economic but also administrative 
liabilities on the party that offers the contract and relevant 
responsible persons.31
Thus, the mere conclusion of a chenqbao contract cannot 
eliminate the possibility of administrative intervention. To 
a great extent, chenqbao contracts have converted former 
administrative powers of government departments into their 
"contractual" rights. By making this conversion, government 
departments, as the party that offers the contract, has added 
in the contracts some provisions which may be nominally the 
same as, but in fact fundamentally different from, those which 
exist in typical economic contracts.
In returning to the issue of equality between chenqbao 
parties, one has to admit that this equality principle has 
been undermined by the failure in the contract to prevent 
1 administrative functioning" by the party that offers the 
contract. The equality of parties is superficial rather 
substantive. The party that offers the contract can still 
"lawfully" intervene in enterprise management by holding those 
rights which are not only civil but administrative in essence.
31 See Art.25 of the Chengbao Regulations.
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C. Objects of a contract
The objects of chenqbao contracts are far from clear. 
Chinese scholars are used to analyzing legal relations in 
three-fold terms, namely, subjects, contents and objects. 
"Subjects" refers to the parties involved. "Contents" concerns 
the rights and duties provided in a contract. And "objects"
(keti) are the targets to which the rights and duties are 
directed. As far as a chenqbao contract is concerned, as shown 
above, the subjects and contents are relatively easy to 
identify. However, as for the nature of contractual objects, 
there have been at least four different views on this 
problem.32 They are: (a) enterprise's management rights; or
(b) chenqbao targets and aims or the act of management; or (c) 
the combination of the above (a) and (b); and (d) the total 
assets of the contracted enterprise. This disagreement shows 
a failure which the law should have made clear. Indeed, the 
existence of such controversy reflects once more the confusion 
over the nature of a chenqbao contract.
It is obvious that a chenqbao contract must define the 
rights and duties of both the contractor and the party that 
offers the contract. At first sight, the four different 
opinions on the objects of a chenqbao contract as cited above 
are all relevant. Without the property (that is, the total 
assets of the contracted enterprise), the contractor would not 
be able to perform the contract. Since the ownership rights of 
this property belong to the state, the contractor would not be 
able to operate if the state would not confer management 
rights on it. Furthermore, it is clear that the primary 
purpose for defining rights and duties of both parties 
involved is to make contractors to fulfil the tasks and aims 
to which they have agreed in a chenqbao contract.
The relevance of all these factors, however, does not 
necessarily make all of them chenqbao objects. As a matter of 
fact, these four different views are, to a great extent,
32 For a summary of these views, see Wang and others, 
supra note 30, p.46.
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mutually exclusive, as each emphasizes only one or two 
aspects. The controversy and complexity of this issue may be 
explained by two observations. First, the contents of chenqbao 
contracts are varied. Different chenqbao contracts may have 
considerably different expressions of rights and duties of 
both the contractor and the party that offers the contract. 
Even within a chenqbao contract, many rights and duties are 
very complex. As analyzed earlier, the imposition on 
contractors of some non-economic targets and the enjoyment by 
the party that offers the contract of the right to inspect and 
supervise have more far-reaching implications than they would 
in ordinary economic contracts. Accordingly, any single and 
simplified explanation of contractual objects would seem 
undesirable.
Secondly, and in my view more importantly, the differing 
conceptions by a contractor on the one side and by the party 
that offers the contract on the other have contributed to the 
difference in views on the nature of the contractual objects. 
Contractors seek to obtain through chenqbao contracts not only 
the assets of enterprises but also all necessary rights and 
powers to carry out their operation. They are anxious to avoid 
administrative intervention by the party that offers the 
contract. They basically demand the right to possess, use, and 
dispose of enterprise property, and to do so within legal 
rather than administrative parameters. On this basis, they 
carry out the tasks and aims settled in chenqbao contracts. In 
addition, and more significantly, they will attempt to satisfy 
their own interests, including those of the enterprise 
managers and the workers.
The party that offers the contract, however, may have a 
rather different view. Government departments want to make 
sure that a contractor must first be obliged to fulfil the 
tasks of a chenqbao contract. In order to facilitate the 
realisation of these tasks, the government devolves on 
contractors certain powers to manage the enterprise. And the 
government may choose to encourage contractors, managers and 
workers by recognising their own interests. On the other hand,
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the party that offers the contract still retains rights to 
intervene on both civil and administrative grounds.
Thus, the contractor and the party that offers the 
contract may have widely divergent views on the objects at 
which the rights and duties defined in a chenqbao contract are 
aimed. It should also be clear from the above analysis that a 
chengbao contract has its own distinctive features which make 
it different in many important respects from typical economic 
contract. The complicated nature of the contents of a chenqbao 
contract, the difficulty in defining adequately the principle 
of equality between the contracting parties, and the differing 
perception of the two parties as to the objects of the 
contracts' rights and duties, make the nature of a chenqbao 
contract uncertain. It is unrealistic to ignore the 
administrative aspect of such contracts. The latter cannot be 
presumed to be purely civil or economic in nature. This 
phenomenon becomes more and more controversial in the 
discussion below.
III. Practical Issues of the Chengbao System
A. Locus standi of the director
In a chenqbao contract, the contractor and its manager 
remain separate. It is the enterprise that is named by the 
Chengbao Regulations as the contractor.13 But the enterprise 
must be managed by a chosen natural person.34 According to the 
Chengbao Regulations, this person can be selected either 
through bidding or by appointment from the government 
authorities although the former is required by law to be given 
first consideration.35 An enterprise or a conglomerate may bid 
for a chenqbao contract. Having succeeded in the bidding, it 
must choose a representative to manage the contracted
13 Art. 14.
34 Art .26.
35 Ibid.
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enterprise.36 The ways by which managers are selected, and 
their legal status have been examined in detail in Chapter Six 
of this thesis. Here the immediate concern is to examine the 
manners in which enterprise managers have affected the 
chengbao contracts.
Nominally, a chengbao contract is concluded between 
relevant government authorities and an enterprise. But, in 
fact, negotiations for, and the drafting of, such a contract 
take place at the same time as, if not later than, the 
selection of the manager. The determination of a manager is a 
prerequisite for the conclusion of a chengbao contract. It is 
not popular, although it does sometimes happen, that the 
selection of a manager falls behind the conclusion of a 
contract or that a person steps into the position of a removed 
manager without negotiating for a new contract. Moreover, it 
is the manager who shall on behalf of the contractor sign a 
chengbao contract with the party that offers the contract.37 
An enterprise manager may select, according to his needs and 
as prescribed by the relevant rules, a number of people to 
form a "leading body" (lingdao xiaozu) in the enterprise. And 
when the chengbao contract expires, this leading body shall be 
dissolved.38 Thus, the treatment of a manager is vital to the 
functioning of the chengbao system.
As to the contents of a chengbao contract, it is certain 
that many rights are enjoyed by, and many duties are imposed 
on, enterprises as contractors. Indeed, these rights and 
duties are directly or indirectly associated with managers 
who, like the enterprises, are deeply involved in a chengbao 
contract. In addition, a chengbao contract must also state in 
express terms the rewards and punishments for a manager.39 
Such a mixture of interests of both the enterprise (presumably
36 Ibid.
37 Art . 14 .
38 Art .31.
39 Art .16.
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the workers) and its manager, in Chinese government's opinion, 
serves to "consider jointly the interests of the state, the 
enterprise, the managers, and the workers, to utilise the 
enthusiasm of enterprise managers and workers, to tap the 
potential of enterprise, to safeguard the profits turned over 
to the state, to strengthen the self-developing power of 
enterprises and to gradually improve the livelihood of 
workers11.40 But this mixture of interests also raises serious 
problems if there is a failure to fulfil a chenqbao contract 
and a legal dispute develops.
According to the Chengbao Regulations, an enterprise 
contractor which fails to fulfil a contract is liable for the 
breach of contract.41 Moreover, it is also provided that a 
manager may, in accordance with the seriousness of the 
circumstances, be investigated and obliged to bear 
administrative as well as economic liabilities.42 By 
threatening managers with administrative and economic 
sanctions, the Chinese authorities have displayed their 
concern over the strict and practical implementation of 
chenqbao contracts.
It might, however, be an exaggeration to hold that such 
the threat of many liabilities is unique to the managers of 
chenqbao enterprises, since the ECL also contains a similar 
provision for ordinary economic contracts.43 Nevertheless, as 
far as liabilities are concerned, a chenqbao contract differs 
from typical economic contracts in at least two respects. One 
is that, while the liabilities for a party directly 
responsible for the breach of contract is put by the ECL in 
the order of "economic, administrative and even criminal",44 
the manager of a chenqbao contractor shall bear
40 Art. 3 .
41 Art.25.
42 Ibid.
43 Art. 32, ECL.
44 Art . 32 .
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"administrative and economic responsibilities". Thus the 
priorities and emphasises are different. The other difference 
lies in that the condition for the imposition of liability in 
an ordinary contract is clearly defined by the ECL as that 
"breach of duty, malpractice or other illegal conducts" have 
caused "serious incident or losses". But the Chengbao 
Regulations only state that the liabilities may be considered 
"in view of the seriousness of the circumstances".45 And no 
further explanation is provided. In consideration of these two 
aspects, it is likely that administrative liabilities are 
easier to impose on managers of chenqbao enterprises. In fact, 
and more importantly, the most distinguished feature of the 
chenqbao contract is that the party that offers the contract 
is the contractor's superior authorities. These authorities 
have the power to impose administrative sanctions on managers 
of the contractors. This power is absent for parties in most 
ordinary economic contracts.
In case of a legal dispute, the locus standi issue of 
contesting parties is controversial. There is no obvious 
problem for the party that offers the contract, that is, 
government authorities. But the mixture of interests of the 
contractors and their managers may cause confusion. In an 
ordinary economic contract, only the enterprise as the 
contractor may sue or be sued. The manager of an enterprise is 
merely the legal representative40 of the enterprise. In no 
case may he be a direct and independent party to a litigation. 
But the situation in a chenqbao contract is quite different. 
As two Chinese judges have indicated,47 there are two 
contrasting views on the identity of the appropriate party. 
Some insist that only the contractor, that is, the enterprise,
45 Art .25.
46 This concept is explored in Chapter Six of the thesis.
47 See Jiang Weigang and Lu Shangxu (the Economic Division 
of the Higher People's Court of Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous 
Region), "Chengbaofang Chengzufang Susong Zhuti de Queding" 
(The Determination of Litigant Parties in the Contracts of 
Chenqbao and Zulin), FXPL, No.2, 1990, pp.82-4.
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can be the appropriate party to a legal dispute. This puts the 
manager in the position only as the legal representative of 
the contractor (as in the case of typical economic contract). 
The fundamental argument supporting this view is that the 
party that offers the contract is contracting with the 
enterprise, not with the manager who should only be in a 
position to "organise" the enterprise to fulfil a chengbao 
contract. It is exclusively the enterprise that is dealing 
with the party that offers the contract. The manager merely 
has "internal" relations with the enterprise in the respect of 
management of enterprises and rewards and punishments for his 
performance. In a word, "it is improper for a manager to join 
the legal suit in his own name".48
This view, however, is opposed by many, including the two 
judges referred to above. They argue that a manager should 
have independent locus standi before a court. Their argument 
is mainly based on the analysis of the reality underlining the 
chengbao system. This reality can be briefly described as the 
de facto separation of the person who should be responsible 
for the contract (that is, the enterprise) and the person who 
is actually responsible for the contract (that is, the 
manager). This separation is mainly based on the fact that a 
chengbao contract is usually devoted to provide for the rights 
and duties of the manager, not those of the enterprise. "The 
enterprise as contractor does not bear the responsibility to 
fulfil the contract tasks, and in contrast, the manager who is 
not nominally the contractor has actually borne the 
responsibility of the nominal contractor".49 In other words, 
the enterprise is only the formal contractor, the manager is 
the de facto executor of the contract. As such, it is the 
manager, not the enterprise, who should be entitled to sue the 
defaulting party that offers the contract.
Neither side of the debate is groundless. In my view, to 
ignore the interests of the managers is unrealistic. On the
48 Ibid, at p . 82 .
49 Ibid.
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other hand, to deny the locus standi of the enterprise as 
contractor, by replacing the contractor with the manager, is 
contrary to the provisions of the Chengbao Regulations.50 And 
such denial is also likely to create difficulties when, for 
example, the party that offers the contract seeks to hold the 
whole enterprise as the contractor to be responsible for its 
failure to fulfil the contract. It is not desirable for the 
party that offers the contract simply to let the contractor 
escape from being sued for such a failure, by simply blaming 
the managers for the breach of contract.
Nevertheless, the recognition of the locus standi of the 
manager in some cases is bound to succeed. It is the intention 
of the party that offers the contract that the manager of the 
contracting enterprise should be bound by the contract. In 
some cases, allowing the managers the locus standi before a 
court provides a desirable means for achieving justice. In 
practice, when the party that offers the contract breaches the 
contract, if the enterprise as the contractor does not stand 
to resist such actions, and if the manager is denied the locus 
standi to bring a legal action, then the manager will not be 
protected from the government's illegal intrusion which could 
threaten the performance of the contract. And more 
importantly, the entire chengbao system may be jeopardised. 
The truth is that, through a chengbao contract, the party that 
offers the contract is not only contracting to the contractor 
but also to a large extent contracting to the managers. The 
manager is not purely a legal representative of the enterprise 
but indeed an independent litigant to the legal proceeding in 
some cases.
As shown in the discussion below, in many cases, the 
court is ready to recognise the locus standi of managers. In 
some cases, the court was even so willing as to protect the 
locus standi of the managers who had been dismissed or removed 
during the term of chengbao contracts. But this tendency seems 
to have been stopped. On August 13, 1991, the Supreme People's
50 Especially Arts. 20 and 25
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Court issued an "Opinion" (pifu)51 answering an enquiry from 
the Higher People's Court of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region 
concerning the locus standi of managers in chengbao disputes. 
The Opinion instructs that disputes brought by managers in 
regard to the dismissal or removal of their position should 
not be accepted by the court. The main arguments which this 
Opinion was based are: first, managers are the legal
representatives of the contracting enterprises; and secondly, 
such disputes are in nature "disputes concerning personnel 
matters" (renshi renmian zhengyi).
But at the same time, the Opinion also confirmed that 
disputes brought by managers in regard to the realisation of 
incomes recoverable in accordance with the provisions of 
chengbao contracts should be accepted by the court. As such, 
the Supreme People's Court attempts to distinguish two types 
of cases involving managers of chengbao enterprises.
In my view, although it is right that the Opinion 
supports the locus standi of managers in cases regarding their 
incomes, the denial of their locus standi in cases regarding 
their dismissal or removal is hardly justifiable. First, as 
analyzed above, chengbao contracts are inseparable from 
managers who are more than merely the legal representatives of 
the enterprises. They have independent interests which differ 
from the enterprises as contractors. Secondly, because of the 
deep involvement of managers, it is not reasonable to make 
distinctions between disputes concerning the chengbao 
contracts and disputes concerning pure "personnel matters". 
Indeed, since managers may rely on the chengbao contracts for 
protection in their incomes deriving from the contracts, it is 
unfair that they are denied the judicial access to claim the 
restoration of their position as managers when the government 
has breached the contracts by wrongfully dismissing them. In 
fact, a full guarantee of managers' locus standi in many cases 
may promote, rather than undermine, the strict performance of
51 Material collected from the study visit to China in 
early 1992 . This Opinion was published in Hunan Shenpan 
(Adjudication in Hunan).
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the chenqbao contracts.
Thus, the denial of locus standi of managers in some 
cases has little legal justification. The only reason for such 
denial, it would seem, is that, by keeping the court away from 
disputes concerning "personnel matters", the administrative 
authority of government departments is better upheld.
B. Nature of internal chengbao
The main concern of the Chengbao Regulations is the 
chengbao contracts concluded between the government and the 
enterprise. Nevertheless, the internal chenqbao system within 
an enterprise is also mentioned. Article 41 provides:" the 
contractor shall, in accordance with the principle of 
integrating responsibility, rights and profits, establish and 
develop the internal economic responsibility system of 
enterprises and improve their internal chengbao system" . In 
practice, after an enterprise (contractor) has concluded a 
chengbao contract with the government, a series of sub- 
chengbao contracts are usually signed between the enterprise 
and its subordinate workshops, in order to implement the main 
chengbao contract.
Much like the main chengbao, the nature of the internal 
chengbao has been subject to debate. While some observers 
stress the economic dimensions of such contracts,52 many are 
reluctant to place equal emphasis on the importance of both 
economic and administrative features.ss
52 See for example Wang Yeqing, "Qiye Neibu Chengbao 
Jiufen Chuli Yuanze" (Principles for Handling Disputes 
Concerning Enterprise's Internal Chengbao Contract), in FX, 
No.4, 1990, pp.40-2.
5:1 See a collection of views in Ge Yunying (ed.), "Qiye 
Neibu Chengbaozhi Zhong de Falu Wenti" (Legal Issues 
Concerning Enterprise's Internal Chenqbao System), in JJYF, 
No . 6 , 1989, pp.5-8. Reproduced in JJF, No.5, 1989, pp.63-6.
The editor of this article believes that enterprise internal 
chenqbao contracts, "although having certain nature of 
administrative operation, generally speaking, can yet be 
regarded as economic contracts".
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An enterprise's internal chenqbao presents some
distinctive features which differ from enterprise chenqbao. 
First, a sub-contractor does not possess legal personality. A 
sub-contractor may, in accordance with the contract, have 
limited power to deal, in its own name and in certain
respects, with outside parties. But since a sub-contractor 
such as a workshop is a constituent part of the enterprise 
legal person, it can never enjoy powers and assume liabilities 
in the same way as the main contractor (that is, the party 
that offers the sub-contract) does. Secondly, sub-contractors 
are always subject to the administrative control of the
enterprises to which they belong. An internal chenqbao 
contract is concluded for the convenience of the enterprise as 
a whole. The implementation of such a contract may not only 
rely on, but also be relied on by, another internal chenqbao 
contract between the enterprise and another part of the 
enterprise. The administrative control exercised by the 
enterprise is necessary to enforce internal chenqbao contracts 
and to carry out effective operation of the enterprise.
Moreover, the enterprise may be held responsible for its sub­
contractor's activities, because of the absence of the legal 
personality of the sub-contractor and of the existence of the 
enterprise administrative control.54
The fact that a chenqbao contract does not exclude 
administrative influences in the internal chenqbao system does 
to some extent help to explain the reason why the main 
chenqbao contract between an enterprise and government 
authorities has failed to supplant pre-existing administrative 
relations with purely civil and economic relations. Perhaps, 
the only difference is that the administrative link is more 
obvious in a internal chenqbao contract than it is in a main 
chenqbao contract.
54 It has been blamed by some managers of the enterprises 
which have been asked to be responsible for the illegal 
activities such as ultra vires acts of the sub-contractors. 
See ibid, pp.64-5.
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C. Dispute settlement
The settlement of disputes concerning chengbao contracts 
deserves careful consideration. In practice, both main and 
internal contracts are likely to be settled in legal and 
extra-legal ways.
In 1989, about twenty per cent of state enterprises which 
had practised the chengbao system failed to carry out their 
chengbao contracts.55 There are no statistics available which 
can be used to analyze in detail the reasons for such striking 
failure in implementing chengbao contracts. A number of 
reports and cases suggest that the following reasons are 
particularly relevant: an unreasonable base figure amount
fixed in contracts; unexpected changes in the market, in 
taxation or in the supply of raw materials or the sale of 
products; incompetence of managers; and failure be enterprises 
to increase economic efficiency.
The Chengbao Regulations have provided, in view of 
different occasions, different remedies for the contracts: 
readjustment, rescission, arbitration and legal action. These 
four methods are considered below.
1. Readjustment
Readjustment of a contract is basically an extra-legal 
device in which the original contract is rewritten. Such a 
remedy needs mutual agreement by both parties. Article 19 of 
the Chengbao Regulations states that both parties may propose 
to make readjustment either when the State Council has 
effected major changes in tax items, tax rates, and prices of 
designated schemes products, or in the case of the occurrence 
of force majeure. In practice,56 the reasons for making
55 See RMRB, Jul.2, 1990, p.3. But in some provinces and 
municipalities such as Jiangsu and Beijing, more than ninety 
per cent of the chenqbao enterprises successfully fulfilled 
contracts. In contrast, in Jiling Province, only 58.6 per cent 
of enterprises were able to accomplish chenqbao contracts.
5(1 See Chenqbaozhi Zai Shijian Zhong, supra note 21, 
p.107 .
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readjustment may include, inter alia, the change made by the 
state in the mandatory supply or purchase of goods or 
products, the removal by the government of managers, and 
mistakes occurred in the process of negotiating the contracts.
2. Conciliation
The condition for the rescission of a contract lies in 
the appearance of irresistible forces57 and the poor 
management by the contractors or breach of contract by the 
party that offers the contract.58 Again, as an extra-legal 
method, rescission needs both parties' consent.
No statistics are available to demonstrate the 
proportion of defected contracts that have been settled
through extra-legal means, that is, by resorting to
readjustment and rescission of the contracts. But it is 
understood that these two methods are very popular.59 In
practice, the party that offers the contract is more
interested in the actual implementation of the chenqbao 
contract than pursuing the contractor's liabilities for 
failing to fulfil the contract. This is not only because of 
the ineffective penalties which might be imposed on the 
enterprise contractors and their managers in case of their 
failure,60 but also because the party that offers the contract 
may be assessed by its superior government authority in the 
respect of the percentage of the successful performance by its
57 Art. 19 , par . 2 .
58 See Art. 20 .
59 In 1989, the number of cases which were concerned with 
chenqbao and zulin disputes and which were heard by the court 
was 6,959. (Information from Ren Jianxin, Work Report of the 
Supreme People's Court in 1989, see the text in FZRB, Apr.11,
1990, p.2.) Considering that a large number of contracts were 
not fulfilled and that zulin cases should be excluded from 
this number, one can imagine that many defaulting contracts 
have been actually passed off without resorting to legal 
channels, though many disputes concerning chenqbao contracts 
might be resolved by arbitration held by the ABIC.
f,° See Art s. 2 5 and 33.
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subordinate enterprises of chenqbao contracts.
On the other hand, enterprise contractors prefer extra- 
legal methods. Often, they can escape administrative and legal 
sanctions. And if they want to keep on good terms with their 
superior authorities, they choose extra-legal rather than 
legal channels to resolve conflicts and disputes. The concept 
of 1 quanxi1 (relations) has always been important in China in 
resolving conflicts. Law is too weak in front of special 
relations. Consequently, the institution of readjustment or 
rescission of original contracts may still be invoked even 
when the situation falls outside legal provisions . And equally 
importantly, it is believed that the use of such extra-legal 
mechanisms is more popular in chenqbao contracts than in 
ordinary economic contracts in which, with the absence of the 
vertical administrative relationship, one party can hardly 
tolerate the breach of contract by the other party.
3. Arbitration
In cases where two parties cannot negotiate an agreement 
to a dispute, one or both parties can, in accordance with a 
chenqbao contract, either go to arbitration or take legal 
action/’1 The arbitration is carried out by the Administration 
Bureau for Industry and Commerce (ABIC) at an appropriate 
level. Until early 1990, the Chengbao Regulations did not make 
clear the relationship between an arbitration and legal suit 
in the case of a chenqbao dispute. The only legal ground were 
the provisions in the ECL and the Regulations Concerning 
Arbitration on Economic Contracts.62 According to the ECL,63 
a party who is unsatisfied with an arbitration can, within 
fifteen days after the reception of the award, take legal
61 Art. 21.
62 Promulgated by the State Council on Aug.22, 1983. See 
the text in China's Foreign Economic Legislation, Foreign 
Languages Press (Beijing) 1986, Vol.II, pp.244-55.
63 See Art.49. Similar provisions are also contained in 
Art.33 of the Regulations on the Arbitration of Economic 
Contract, ibid.
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action to the people's court; if a legal action does not take 
place within this period, the award shall have legal effect.
On February 24, 1990, the State Council especially
amended the Chengbao Regulations by adding three more 
paragraphs into Article 21 of the Chengbao Regulations:
If a chengbao management contract does not provide 
for the method for the handling of a dispute, and if both 
parties have after the conclusion of the contract, or 
upon the occurrence of a dispute, reached a written 
agreement to present a dispute to the ABIC for 
arbitration, then it is the ABIC who shall have the 
legitimate right to resolve the case.
Any party who is not satisfied with an arbitration 
may, within ten days after the reception of the award, 
apply to the higher arbitration authority for 
reconsideration. The arbitration award made by this 
higher authority after reconsideration, or the award 
which was not applied for reconsideration within the 
above period of ten days, shall be the final award.
If a party does not implement a reconciliation 
agreement or an arbitration award which has been legally 
effective, another party can apply to the people's court 
for enforcement.04
This amendment has made the legal status of arbitration 
regarding a chenqbao contract similar to that concerning a 
foreign economic contract.05 Rather strikingly, it represents 
a departure from normal domestic economic contract arbitration 
as mentioned above. In making this departure, the Chinese 
government has enhanced the authority of ABIC arbitration. 
Such treatment has certain advantages. The most obvious merit 
is that it can save time by forcing a contesting party to 
choose either to go to arbitration or to take legal action, 
rather than possibly experience the long process from ABIC 
arbitration to court proceedings. But a far-reaching 
implication from this special arrangement is that the 
jurisdiction of the court has been further restricted, and the 
government as the party that offers the contract can obtain an 
advantage by inserting into contracts a provision making all
64 See the text in FZRB, Mar. 2, 1990, p. 2.
65 See Arts.192 and 193 of the Civil Procedure Law (For 
Trial Impolementation) . Also see Art. 257 of the new Civil 
Procedure Law (19 91).
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disputes subject to arbitration by the ABIC -- another 
government agency.
4. Litigation
Court proceedings are the last resort in resolving 
disputes over chengbao contracts. In fact, even before the 
promulgation of the Chengbao Regulations, the court had been 
ready to adjudicate such disputes. In contemporary China, of 
the four chambers which a court is divided -- criminal, civil, 
economic and administrative, cases concerning chengbao 
contracts are put under the jurisdiction of the economic 
chamber. The ECL and the GPCL are the only two relevant legal 
documents, in addition to the Chengbao Regulations, on which 
the court can rely. Disputes concerning chengbao contracts are 
usually resolved in the following three ways :00 (1) continuing 
performance of the contract; (2) a declaration that the 
contract is void; and (3) alteration or rescission of the 
contract.
If a chengbao contract has been concluded in accordance 
with the law and the policy, and if one party has violated the 
contract while the other has not been found of any serious 
default, then the court may order the contract to be performed 
continuously. Such a result may be possibly accompanied by the 
payment of the default fine and compensation by the defaulting 
party.67
The court's declaration of the nullity and voidness of a 
chengbao contract is based on Article 7 of the ECL and Article 
58 of the GPCL. Generally speaking, the court is willing to do 
so if a contract falls into one or more of the following 
situations:08 (1) it is contrary to the law, or state policy;
66 See Chenqbaozhi Zai Shijian Zhong, supra note 21,
pp.121-30. Also see Sheng, supra note 29.
07 See for example Art. 35, ECL.
08 See Chenqbaozhi Zai Shijian Zhong, supra note 21,
p.124. But unfortunately, the author of the above book failed 
to distinguish a contract which is null and void and a
contract which is rescissible. This distinction, which is
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(2) it is signed by a person against his true intention as a 
result of fraud, coercion, or exploitation of his unfavourable 
situation by the other party; (3) there is lack of authority 
by one party to conclude the contract; and (4) the contract is 
contrary to the interests of the state or the social public. 
Contracts which are null and void shall not be legally binding 
from the moment when the contracts were signed.09
The GPCL distinguishes a civil act which is null and void 
and that which is rescissible. According to Article 59 of the 
GPCL, a party shall have the right to request the court or an 
arbitration agency to alter or rescind the following civil 
contracts: (a) those performed by an actor who seriously
misunderstood the contents of the acts; and (b) those that are 
obviously unfair. As a rule, rescinded civil act shall be null 
and void from the very beginning. However, a rescissible civil 
act (including a contract) is not necessarily null and void. 
For example, a rescissible chenqbao contract is effective 
unless and until the court has at the request of a party 
declared its nullity and voidness, despite that upon the 
court's declaration, the contract is null and void from the 
moment when it was signed.
The ECL also provides for situations in which an economic 
contract may be altered or rescinded.70 These situations are: 
(1) when both parties have agreed after negotiation such 
alteration or rescission which would not damage the state's 
interests and would not affect the implementation of the state 
plans; (2) when the state plans upon which the contract was 
based have been amended or cancelled; (3) when one party has 
been unable to perform the contract, due to its closure, 
stoppage of production, or shift on production; (4) when the 
contract has been unable to be performed, due to the 
appearance of force majeure or due to an outside reason which
described below in the context of this paragraph, is very 
important in Chinese contract law.
09 Art. 7 of the ECL and Art. 58 of the GPCL.
70 Art . 27 .
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has nothing to do with any party's fault and which cannot be 
prevented; and (5) when it is not necessary for the contract 
to be performed because of one party's breach of contract.
These options applicable to different occasions, together 
with the provisions in the Chengbao Regulations,71 have 
founded a relatively comprehensive remedy system in dealing 
with chengbao contracts. There are at least three points which 
are worth noting here. First, it seems, although no detailed 
statistics are available to support it, that most plaintiffs 
in cases regarding chenqbao contracts are contractors, that 
is, enterprises, and their managers. In other words, a prima 
facie case would probably be that the party that offers the 
contract, that is, the government, are alleged to have 
violated the contract. Such violation can be carried out in 
many ways, ranging from the removal or dismissal of managers71 
to the tearing of a contract.71 A common feature of these 
legal actions is that the party that offers the contract 
contravenes contractual duties by unilaterally breaching the 
contract. The contractor, which is in a weak position in its 
vertical administrative relationship with government 
authorities, has to rely on the chenqbao contract for legal 
protection.
Secondly, the court has been willing to protect the 
contractors. Again, there is no statistics to suggest how far 
the court is ready to go. But it seems that many judges have 
been guided by the idea that the legal rights and interests of 
enterprises and their managers must be protected effectively. 
It is not easy to achieve a fair balance between the interests 
of the state, the enterprise and their manager. Court 
decisions in some cases may have to contravene the orthodox 
view that the interests of the state shall always prevail over
71 Arts.19 and 20 as analyzed above.
11 See Chenqbaozhi Zai Shijian Zhong, supra note 21, case
6.11, pp.127-8. However, as shown earlier, due to the Opinion 
issued by the Supreme People's Court, the managers seem to
have been denied the capacity to bring such cases.
71 Ibid. , case 6.9, pp.122-23.
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those of the collective and the individuals.
For example, in one case, when the government violated a 
chengbao contract by removing a manager and replacing the 
existing contract with a new contract,74 the court, while 
denying the possibility for the continuing performance of the 
original contract because of the changed circumstances, did 
order the government to pay, in accordance with the provisions 
of the original contract, a certain amount of bonus to the 
manager and to pay a significant amount of defaulting fine to 
both the manager and the workers of the enterprise.
In another case,75 the party that offered the contract 
dismissed the manager because it was not satisfied with the 
pace of profit increases made by the enterprise in the first 
six months of the chengbao term. The manager, however, 
defended the situation by claiming that the fact of low 
increase at that initial stage was due to his emphasis and 
massive investment on technological development which would 
finally contribute to a rapid increase in the subsequent two 
years of the whole chengbao term. The court found that: (a)
the manager did not seriously contravene the law, discipline, 
or the contract; (b) the increase of the profits was 
reasonable although it was not at the same pace as the 
officials had expected; moreover, the contract did not provide 
that the government could stop the contract under such 
circumstances; and (c) because of the existence of the legal 
contract, the government could no longer use its 
administrative authority to intervene in the enterprise's 
production. Accordingly, although the court did not order the 
government to pay a defaulting fine or compensation to the 
manager, it did declare that the government had violated the 
contract by committing the ineffective act of dismissing the 
manager. The court also went further to order the chengbao 
contract to be continuously performed. In addition, the court
74 Ibid. case 6.11, pp.127-28. Again, this case should be 
read in the light of the Opinion issued by the Supreme 
People's Court, as discussed earlier.
75 Ibid. , case 6.9, pp. 122-2 3.
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declared that, because of the interruption by the government, 
that year should not be counted within the entire chenqbao 
term, and therefore the term for that chenqbao contract should 
be postponed for one year.
These cases demonstrate that the court is ready to 
protect the legal and contractual interests of enterprises and 
their managers, and to prevent abusive actions taken by 
government departments in the course of the performance of 
chenqbao contracts. In some cases, the court has gone even 
further in its attempt to achieve justice by relying on the 
general provisions of the GPCL, In one case,76 when the 
contract was unfair because the manager failed to check before 
the conclusion of the contract the base figure amount which 
was later found to be too high to be fulfilled, the court 
rescinded the contract.77 Afterwards, a new contract was 
agreed on the basis of a lowered base figure. Such a result is 
both necessary and desirable in that the terms for a contract 
must be reasonable to be performed.
Obviously, the making of this kind of protective judgment 
not only relies on the willingness of the court but also has 
some practical implications and difficulties. For example, it 
is arguable whether or not the court should be in a position 
to judge the reasonableness of the base figure recorded in a 
chenqbao contract. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the court 
is able to rescind a contract which has been brought into 
state plans. These complex problems are likely to influence 
the court's decisions in one way or another.
Thirdly, the court is even ready to deal with disputes 
concerning an enterprise's internal chenqbao contracts. In one 
case,78 the enterprise as the party that offered the contract 
unilaterally amended an internal chenqbao contract, mainly
lu Ibid., case 6.10, pp.124-25.
77 Again, the author of the book failed to distinguish 
here a null and void contract and a rescissible contract.
78 See Chenqbaozhi Zai Shijian Zhong, Supra note 21, case
6.12, pp.128-29.
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because it thought the base figure agreed in the original 
contract was too low. The court/ however, found that this was 
not true. The huge profits made by the sub-contractor had 
little to do with the low base figure settled in the contract. 
In fact, the main reason for the alleged significant amount of 
profits was because the sub-contractor effected good 
management. Based on these findings, the court upheld the 
legality of the original contract, and the contractor was 
therefore given permission to get the amount of the bonus as 
provided in the contract.
The court's willingness to adjudicate disputes over 
chenqbao contracts by relying on the ECL and the GPCL echoes 
some academics' claim that chenqbao contracts are essentially 
economic contracts. The court's protection of chenqbao 
contracts can to some extent counteract government 
administrative intervention. This is admittedly significant 
when one considers the enormous and totally uncontrolled 
administrative powers in the hands of government authorities 
before the chenqbao system was introduced.
It is, however, unrealistic to put too much hope on the 
positive effects that the court adjudication of chenqbao 
contracts may produce. In practice, as indicated in earlier 
discussion, only a small number of chenqbao disputes are 
settled through court proceedings.79 According to a survey 
conducted in 1987 -- the year when the chenqbao system was
introduced nationwide, when enterprises were asked about their 
choices for settling disputes concerning chenqbao contracts, 
44.2 per cent enterprises would choose to go to their 
government departments in charge for solutions, 19.9 per cent 
would choose to go to court for adjudication, 19.1 per cent 
would choose to go to the ABIC for arbitrations, 7.8 per cent 
would choose to go to their local governments for settlements, 
and 7.9 per cent would choose other ways, including not to do
79 On the study visit to China in early 1992, when I was 
trying to get information concerning chenqbao disputes, to my 
surprise, some Chinese judges were even apparently unaware of 
the occurrence of such cases.
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anything.80 As such, an overwhelming majority of enterprises 
would choose not to go to court. Instead, they tend to resort 
to administrative help from relevant government authorities, 
including government departments as the party that offers the 
contract.
In practice, in most cases, it is enterprises that breach 
chengbao contracts. Nevertheless, as suggested above, 
potential plaintiffs tend to be enterprises and their 
managers. It is unlikely, though it might happen, that 
government departments will pursue legal action in order to 
hold enterprises and their managers responsible for 
compensation and other legal remedies. Generally speaking, 
government departments are willing to forgive enterprises for 
their failure in carrying out chenqbao contracts. This is 
partly because these government departments, in order to save 
their own "face", tend to protect their subordinate 
enterprises. Instead of legal actions, government authorities 
may prefer to resort to internal negotiation and, sometimes 
administrative sanctions including dismissing the managers, to 
resolve disputes and transfer liabilities for chenqbao 
contracts.
In some circumstances, enterprises directors are required 
to provide personal guarantees to chenqbao contracts. If their 
enterprises fail to fulfil the contract, they may be held 
liable to pay up to the amount of their personal guarantee. 
However, as enterprise contractors are subordinate to the 
government and they do not have their own property apart from 
the property that "is authorised by the state for them to 
manage and administer",81 in many cases, pursuing legal action 
against defaulting enterprises is not meaningful, not to
80 See Xiong Jining, "Zuzhi Gouzao Zhong de Qiyue Falu 
Xuhua" (Fictional Nature of Legal Contracts Regarding 
Institutional Structuring, part 1), ZFLT, No.3, 1991, pp.73-6 
and 6 6, at 76.
81 For a discussion of the property rights of state 
enterprises, see Chapter Three above. For a discussion of the 
financial autonomy and the nature of the so-called "enterprise 
capital", see Chapter Five above.
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mention the time-consuming process for legal proceedings.
On the other hand, it is not easy for contractors to 
insist on their legal rights. This is partly owing to the 
difficult position of the court in adjudicating chenqbao 
cases, as discussed above. Moreover, contractors themselves 
may face serious challenge even if it is obvious that the 
other party has breached the contract. In one of the cases 
discussed above, despite that the court had upheld the 
legality of the chenqbao contract, after conciliation, the 
contractor finally agreed to make a concession to the other 
party by increasing the base figure, which was exactly what 
the other party sought for by breaching the contract. As such, 
the final solution proved to be that both parties were the 
winners.82 The fact that the contractor had to give in to the 
party that offered the contract, to some extent, explains that 
the vertical administrative relations between the two 
contracting parties can still be very significant despite the 
civil and contractual relations between them.
As a matter of fact, the parties that offer the 
contracts, whether being government authorities or 
enterprises, can take advantage of their superior positions to 
manipulate the contractors or sub-contractors even if their 
actions are apparently abusive. In particular, the contractors 
(enterprises) have to consider every possible consequence if 
they do not make concessions to the government as the party 
that offers the contract.
IV. Contracting and Leasing: Some Comparisons
Like chenqbao, zulin (leasing) is also a notable measure 
employed by the Chinese leadership to reform state
82 It is interesting to see that the party that offered 
the sub-contract, that is, the enterprise, succeed in this 
case. However, this is no exception. With the involvement of 
administrative power (held by the enterprise), the weak party 
(that is, the sub-contractor) has to give in in reconciliation 
although it has legitimate right to insist on the original 
contract.
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enterprises. In order to regulate the leasing system, on May 
18, 1988, the State Council adopted the Provisional
Regulations Concerning the Leasing Management of Small State 
Industrial Enterprises ("Zulin Regulations").83
Zulin and chenqbao share many features in common. For 
example, they are designed to implement the separation of 
ownership from management. Moreover, both involve formal and 
legal contracts, which shall last for at least three years.84 
In addition, some duties and rights are similar as to parties 
both in a chenqbao and in a zulin contract. For example, the 
lessors, that is, government departments, have both the right 
to supervise the lessees' activities85 and the duty to protect 
the management rights of the lessees.80 The situations where 
a zulin contract may be altered or rescinded87 are also 
similar to those in a chenqbao contract discussed above.
Chenqbao and zulin, however, represent many differences88 
with which the government as the owner of the enterprises has 
been concerned. First, while chenqbao is widely applied to 
large and medium-sized state enterprises, zulin is restricted 
to small state enterprises.89 Secondly, managers are more 
deeply involved in zulin contracts than in chenqbao contracts. 
Although a lessee may be an enterprise other than the one to
83 These Regulations were effected from Jul.l, 1988. For 
the text in Chinese, see Laws and Regulations of the PRC 
(1988), pp.750-59.
84 Art. 17 of the Chengbao Regulations and Art. 8 of the 
Zulin Regulations.
85 Art . 23 .
80 Art . 24 .
87 Art . 20 .
88 For a general analysis of these differences, see China 
Law and Practice, No.5, Vol.II, 1988, p.52. For a legal
analysis, see Professor Xie Huaishi, "Lun Guoying Qiye
Chengbao Hetong Yu Zulin Hetong" (On Chenqbao Contracts and
Zulin Contracts of State Enterprises), in FXZZ, No.4, 1988,
pp.3-5 and 16. Reproduced in JJF, No.l, 1989, pp.47-9.
89 Art. 2 .
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be leased, or indeed several individuals in a partnership, in 
many cases a lessee is an individual.90 A manager can be the 
lessee to a zulin contract. This position of managers 
contrasts with the situation in a chengbao contract where the 
law has held that a chenqbao contractor must be the enterprise 
to be contracted, not its manager. Moreover, a zulin manager 
is entitled to obtain greater profits than a chenqbao 
contractor and its managers. While the annual income of a 
chenqbao manager may be one to three times higher than the 
average annual income of a worker in the enterprise,91 the 
annual income of a zulin manager can be as higher as five 
times more than the average income of a worker in the leased 
enterprise.
On the other hand, a zulin manager has to take greater 
risks than a chenqbao manager. According to the Zulin 
Regulations, a lessee has to provide security.92 In case of 
an individual as a lessee, he has to provide as security such 
personal property which is proportional to the property of the 
leased enterprise, including a certain amount of cash which 
must be deposited at a special bank account. And he has to 
provide at least two guarantors who have property which may be 
used as security.93 From the day when a zulin contract is 
effective, the wages and bonus of the manager and his partners 
will be stopped, although they can get in-advance-payment of 
living expenses.94 In case of his failure to implement a zulin 
contract, the lessee and his guarantors will be called to make 
up the losses.95
Thirdly, and more importantly, a lessee and a manager have 
more powers and rights but less duties than a chenqbao
90 Art. 7 .
91 Art . 33 .
92 Art. 11 .
93 Art. 11, par . 1.
94 Art .32 .
95 Art . 35 .
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contractor and its manager. As far as a lessee's duties are 
concerned, the Zulin Regulations list five items, namely, (1} 
implementing director's duties which are provided by the
state: (2) carrying out state pricing policy and protecting
the interests of customers and consumers: (3) protecting the
legal interests of workers: (4) protecting the property of the 
leased enterprise, guaranteeing the good condition of the 
equipment, making insurance for the enterprise property; and 
(5) paying rent in due time.96 The amount of rent is agreed 
by both parties before a zulin contract is concluded. Since it 
is based on the property of the enterprise to be leased, it
has little to do with the actual performance of the lessee who
has only to hand over a fixed amount of rent to the 
government. Thus, zulin differs from chengbao in that the
state may choose to obtain the amounts of profits which are 
proportional to the overall profits made by the chengbao 
enterprise. In addition, a lessee rarely has any non-economic 
obligation as usually appeared in a chenqbao contract. For 
example, a lessee does not by contract have the duty to invest 
in technological transformation, though the lessor may give 
all or some of the rent back to the enterprise and order it to 
invest in the development of production and technological 
transformation.97
In terms of rights and powers, a lessee is in a more 
advantageous position than a chenqbao contractor and its 
manager. Under a chenqbao contract, the manager can only 
exercise powers according to the SEL. But a lessee is 
authorised with more powers. The Zulin Regulations describe 
the powers of a lessee as: (1) enjoying the director's rights
provided by the state; (2) appointing or removing deputy 
directors, and reporting it to competent authorities for 
reference; (3) deciding the arrangement of workers released 
from production; (4) adjusting the operation orientation of 
the enterprise in accordance with the market, and making the
96 Art. 26.
97 Art . 28 .
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alteration of registration in accordance with the state 
stipulation.yB Thus, a lessee is authorised with a number of 
powers which are substantially broader than those provided in 
the SEL.<>y For example, as far as the personnel power is 
concerned, a lessee can make his own decisions about the 
appointment or removal of a deputy director, provided that he 
shall report this to the competent authority for reference. 
But according to the SEL,100 such appointment or removal can 
only be made by the government authorities at the request of 
the director. This is very much the case in a chenqbao 
enterprise.
The fact that a lessee may enjoy more powers but bear 
less duties illustrates that the government has adopted a 
flexible policy towards small state enterprises. On the other 
hand, the simple fact that an enterprise is a large or medium­
sized one has been used to justify the official policy that it 
should be subject to more government administrative control.
V. Conclusion
The above discussion has concentrated on the chenqbao 
system in which state enterprises themselves are the 
contractors. In practice, the implementation of the chenqbao 
system is more complicated. For example, as indicated in the 
discussion, enterprises other than the enterprises to be 
contracted can be the contractors. Moreover, not only Chinese 
citizens may become the managers of chenqbao enterprises, for 
foreigners may also have limited access to serve as managers 
of a contracted enterprise.101 In addition, many collective
98 Art. 25.
99 For the powers provided by the SEL, see Chapter Six of 
the thesis.
100 Art. 45, For the position after June 1989, see the 
discussion in Chapter Six above.
101 For a case that a foreigner contracted for a division 
of a Chinese state enterprise, see China Law and Practice, 
Vol.2, No.9, Oct.31, 1988, pp.37-42.
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enterprises and some foreign investment enterprises have 
adopted the legal mechanism similar to the chenqbao system in 
state enterprises.102
The chenqbao system has been a major vehicle by which the 
Chinese reformers have attempted to make state enterprises 
operate more efficiently. This has been carried out by the 
efforts to settle, through legal and contractual means, the 
complex relations between state enterprises and the state.
The employment of the legal and contractual means should 
not be dismissed as completely ineffective. For chenqbao 
contracts have provided a legal basis which can be relied upon 
by relevant parties, especially the enterprises. To some 
extent, the court is willing to intervene, in accordance with 
relevant contractual and legal provisions, in order to achieve 
justice. This is especially the case when an enterprise 
manager is involved. Although a manager is not named by the 
law a contractual party, the court has been drawn to protect 
his interests by allowing his limited locus standi.
One must not, however, overestimate the effects of the 
chenqbao system. Despite their civil or economic features, 
chenqbao contracts cannot eliminate all administrative 
overtones. Chenqbao contracts do not exclude government 
intervention in enterprise management. In case of disputes or 
failure to fulfil chenqbao contracts, relevant parties do not 
often choose to rely on the contracts for a legal settlement. 
Thus, chenqbao contracts are not readily enforceable.
Compared to chenqbao contracts, zulin contracts can more 
effectively cut off the administrative link between the 
government and enterprises, and between government authorities
102 On Sept. 13, 1990, the Ministry of Foreign Economic
Relations and Trade and the State Administrative Bureau for 
Industry and Commerce jointly promulgated the Provisions 
Concerning the Contractual Management of Sino-Foreign Joint 
Ventures. For an English translation of these provisions, see 
China Law and Practice, Vol.5, No.2, 1991, pp.32-40.
On Apr.13, 1990, the Ministry of Agriculture
promulgated the Provisions Concerning the Contracting System 
on Township Enterprises. For the text in Chinese, see 
Collection of Company Laws and Regulations, pp.842-48.
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and enterprise managers.10^ This fact shows that in employing 
the chengbao system to protect enterprise autonomy, the 
Chinese authorities are half-heartedly, rather then fully- 
committed .
Chinese officials have been frank enough to admit that 
there are many problems within the chenqbao system. One of the 
most serious problems is the so-called "short-term behaviour" 
(duanqi xingwei). As enterprises and their managers tend to 
explore the greatest financial outcome within a chengbao term, 
enterprises' long term development which, for example, 
requires continuous investment in research and technological 
transformation has been ignored. In addition, some aspects of 
social and political implications from the chengbao system 
have become more and more obvious. Actually, government 
administrative intervention and enterprises' short-term 
behaviour have been in an inextricable circle. In the opinion 
of the government authorities, it is because of enterprises' 
short-term behaviour that they have to intervene civilly and 
administratively. But enterprises and their managers often 
blame government intrusion for the failure of the chenqbao 
system. On the one hand, enterprises have not yet bargained 
for such independence as to resist government intervention. On 
the other hand, government intervention has been seen as 
counterproductive. In fact, despite extensive government 
control, a fair responsibility system within the state 
enterprise has not been established.
In spite of many existing problems, the Chinese 
leadership has insisted that the chengbao system and its 
principles must be firmly upheld in the near future. By the 
end of 1990, about ninety per cent of the state enterprises 
which formally practised the chengbao system had renewed their 
chengbao contracts for a new term of three years. The 
principles of the chengbao system have also been written into 
the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1990-1995).
In the long term, however, the future of the current
i0J The Zulin Regulations do not even provide for any 
possible administrative sanction against lessee managers.
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chenqbao system remains uncertain. The current experimentation 
of the shareholding system may gradually reduce the 
significance of the chenqbao system, though it remains to be 
seen whether the shareholding system will be able to succeed 
the existing chenqbao system to become the dominant approach 
in reforming state enterprises.104
104 For a brief account of the development and problems 
with this system, see Chapter Ten below.
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CHAPTER TEN
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
I. Legal Regulation of State Enterprises: Efforts and Effects
As suggested in the Introduction to this thesis, the 
legal regulation of Chinese state enterprises can be examined 
from two main ways. The first is concerned with the efforts 
made to place state enterprises within a legal, systematic, 
and regulatory framework. The other is the effectiveness of 
this legal regulation.
A. Efforts of laws and regulations
In any sense, it is a remarkable historical achievement 
in the PRC that state enterprises have been made subject to 
formal legal regulation. Despite the fierce debates involving 
the formulation, and the time-consuming process for the 
introduction, of relevant laws and regulations, in particular 
the SEL (April 1988), Chinese state enterprises, from 
formation and registration to bankruptcy and liquidation, and 
from management to workers' participation, have been placed 
within a legal framework. Moreover, seen as a whole, this 
framework has been carefully prepared and is relatively 
consistent.
As has been shown in this study, the legal framework 
governing state enterprises has been constructed in a variety 
of ways. As a starting point, the state enterprise has been 
granted legal personality, something inconceivable for Chinese 
state enterprises before economic reforms. The legal person 
status conferred on state enterprises was seen by many as a 
fundamental mechanism for generating many other positive
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developments. The most important of these was that state 
enterprises as legal persons would be able to enjoy 
independent interests and to defend their autonomy against 
excessive government intervention. Furthermore, in the view of 
the Chinese authorities, state enterprises as legal persons 
should be fully responsible for their own management. State 
enterprises which continue to be poorly managed would be 
threatened with bankruptcy.
Concurrent with these efforts to give enterprises an 
external corporate personality is the legal reform of the 
internal leadership structure of state enterprises. In order 
to establish the director responsibility system, the role of 
enterprise Party organisations had to be played down. This 
reform was confirmed in the SEL. In addition, in the process 
of reallocating powers within state enterprises, the issue of 
worker participation in enterprise management received legal 
treatment, thereby adding weight to its ideological and 
political significance.
In constructing the legal framework governing state 
enterprises, a central concept has been developed and gained 
wide acceptance. This is the so-called "management right" of 
state enterprises which was confirmed in principle by the GPCL 
of 1986 and subsequently substantiated by the SEL of 1988.1 
This concept was considered by many as sufficient for 
providing state enterprises with adequate autonomy and 
responsibility. It was hoped in particular that the management 
rights would help to settle the relationship between the 
government and state enterprises -- a subject of the greatest 
concern for state enterprise reform.
Since 1987, in an attempt to honour the promise of 
management rights to state enterprises, the contracting or 
chengbao system has been practised in the great majority of 
large and medium-sized state enterprises. By requiring state 
enterprises to conclude legal contracts with government 
departments, it was hoped that the chengbao system would not
1 See Chapters Three and Four above.
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only enhance enterprise autonomy but also bring fundamental 
changes to the enterprise -- government relationship. The use 
of such a contractual mechanism in China has been a major 
solution to the problem of enterprise autonomy in the ongoing 
economic reforms of socialist systems over the past decade or 
so.
B. Effects of laws and regulations
1. Practical analysis
This emerging legal framework has had both positive and 
negative effects. On the one hand, state enterprises have 
under written laws obtained a certain degree of autonomy and 
independence. As legal persons, they enjoy the freedom to deal 
with many other entities independently. They have also been 
put in a position to assume independent civil liability.
On the other hand, the effects of such legal efforts are 
not without problems. As shown in Chapter Nine, the chengbao 
system has failed to guarantee the management rights of state 
enterprises. Notwithstanding the existence of formal legal 
contracts concluded between governmental bodies and state 
enterprises possessing legal personality, various government 
authorities still tend to intervene in enterprise management, 
adding immensely to the difficulties of management autonomy in 
state enterprises. In addition, the contracting system has 
failed to make state enterprises genuinely responsible for 
their management. In fact, the contract used in the existing 
chengbao system is not readily enforceable.
The unsatisfactory implementation of the contracting 
system is just one example of the many unfortunate failures in 
the overall legal regulation of state enterprises. As 
demonstrated in Chapter Five, tax regulations were introduced 
in the early 1980s as a means for establishing the financial 
relationship between the state and state enterprises. However, 
these regulations have been made redundant as a result of the 
implementation of the contracting system which emphasizes 
negotiable profit payments, rather than rigid tax payments, in
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the assessment of the performance of state enterprises. 
Moreover, proper enforcement of the legal provisions 
concerning workers' participation in enterprise management 
remains difficult. In addition, and most significantly, the 
autonomy of state enterprises, as formally recorded by the 
SEL, has not been given serious respect by many government 
authorities.
2. Comparative view
The legal regulation of state or public enterprises in
any country is not an easy task. As early as 1967, the Report
of United Nations Seminar on Organisation and Administration
of Public Enterprises concluded that:
At the very least, the law relating to a public 
enterprise will provide its management with certain
opportunities (which may or may not be taken) and will 
impose certain restrictions upon it which may or may not 
be of an appropriate kind. Legally imposed restrictions 
may indeed be crippling; and until they are removed or 
modified, management may find it quite impossible to 
achieve an adequate standard of commercial operation.2
This is precisely what has happened in China. Although
laws and regulations have been promulgated to promote the
autonomy of state enterprises, they are not as effective as
one would have expected. In fact, state enterprises are still
in a weak position vis-a-vis government manipulation.
As indicated in the thesis, Chinese state enterprise
reform and indeed the economic reforms as a whole were greatly
inspired and influenced by the economic reforms which had
taken place from the 1960s on in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe. In many respects, Chinese reformers either copied or
learned from the experiences of these socialist countries. The
concept of "management right", which originated in the USSR
and developed in some Eastern European countries, is the best
example of this adaptation process. However, state enterprise
reform in the USSR and Eastern Europe did not succeed.
2 United Nations, Report of the United Nations Seminar on 
Organisation and Administration of Public Enterprises, 9 
ST/TAO/M/3 9.
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Although much legislation was adopted to authorise autonomy 
for state enterprises,3 state enterprises were not put in a 
position to enjoy the freedom and independence that was 
necessary for them to carry out efficient decision-making and 
production.
Let us take the former USSR as an example. Although the 
reform of Soviet state enterprise started in the 1960s, a 
comprehensive law on state enterprises was not published until 
1987.4 Indeed, it was widely acknowledged that earlier efforts 
to authorise state enterprises with autonomy largely failed.5 
Furthermore, one analysis of the Law on the State Enterprise 
(Association) of 1987 (and as amended in 1989) suggests that 
the enacted statute has 1 disappointed proponents of 
perestroika" .fl The existence of many restrictions and outside 
difficulties meant that the autonomy of state enterprises
For a review, see Hubert Izbebski, "Legal Aspects of 
Economic Reforms in Socialist countries", American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 1989, pp.703-52, at 723-27.
4 In 1965, Regulations on the Socialist State-Owned 
Production Enterprise were adopted. In 1974, Regulations on 
the Production Association (Combined Works) were adopted. 
However, these were to a certain extent administrative 
regulations. In fact, the proposal to enact a formal law on 
state enterprises was not made until about 1985. Finally, the 
Law on the State Enterprise (Associations) was adopted on
Jun.30, 1987. This law was later amended on Aug.3, 1989. For
the English text of the amended law, see Serge L. Levitsky 
(ed.), Soviet Statutes and Decisions (A Journal of 
Translations), published by M.E. Sharpe, Summer 1990, pp.19- 
6 6 .
5 Professor V.V. Laptev, a leading Soviet lawyer on
Economic Law, was quoted as saying in 1986 that "the idea of 
expanding the rights of enterprises and associations is not a 
new one. There have been numerous attempts at its
implementation. However, departmental rules and regulations, 
in essence, have reduced these attempts to nothing." See 
Satnnslaw Pomorski, "The Future of the State Enterprise and 
the 'Restructuring' of the national Economic in the USSR", 
Tulane Law Review, 1987, pp.1383-95, at 1386.
6 See Paul B. Stephan III, "Soviet Economic Law: The 
Paradox of Perestroika", University of Pittsburgh Centre for 
Russian and East European Studies 1990, at 37.
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under the new law was neither radical nor practical.
Compared to the past experiences in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe, the reform of state enterprises in China has 
several special features. For example, Chinese state 
enterprises face a more complicated supervision system in 
which there is often more than one government department in 
charge of a single enterprise. Moreover, unlike some former 
Eastern European countries, such as Yugoslavia, where the law 
expressly granted property ownership to state enterprises, 
Chinese law has refused to allow any kind of division in the 
exclusive state ownership of state enterprises. In addition, 
Chinese state enterprises have not universally adopted the 
self-management system in which the workers' assemblies or 
other similar organisations may exercise many decision-making 
powers in relation to the management of state enterprises.
Nevertheless, the legal regulation of state enterprises 
seems to suffer similar predicaments in most socialist 
jurisdictions. In fact, the lack of autonomy is not peculiar 
to socialist state enterprises. In many Western countries, 
state enterprises are also widely noted for their 
vulnerability to government intervention and manipulation.7 
Perhaps the only major difference between socialist and 
Western countries is that state enterprises occupy a more 
important position in socialist economies. Accordingly, the 
failure of a policy of enterprise autonomy can be more 
damaging to socialist economies and create more frustration to 
the policy-makers.
In the Chinese context, it is interesting to recall the 
situation of the late Qing Dynasty. As reviewed in Chapter Two 
of this study, in the late nineteenth century, many modern 
enterprises were first established by the Qing government. 
However, the official administration of enterprises made 
efficient management impossible. In fact, the inefficiency of
7 For an assessment of British state enterprises, see 
Tony Proser, Nationalised Industries and Public Control 
(Legal, Constitutional and Political Issues), Basil Blackwell 
(Oxford and New York) 1986. Also see Chapter Four above.
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government enterprises was so deep-rooted that mere 
privatisation, in the form of either joint operation by 
government and merchants or operation by merchants under the 
supervision of government officials, failed to resolve it. 
Even the promulgation of company law could do little to help 
merchants obtain management autonomy.8
In fact, the ineffective legal regulation of state 
enterprises even contrasts with contemporary legal regimes 
governing other enterprises. Despite the fact that these 
different legal regimes started at the same time and have 
operated under the same social, economic and political 
systems, it is generally acknowledged that laws and 
regulations governing other enterprises, especially foreign 
investment enterprises, are more thoroughly applied in 
practice than those governing state enterprises. Other 
enterprises also enjoy a greater degree of management 
autonomy.
II. Laws and Policies in State Enterprises
Over the past four years (1988-1992), the laws and 
regulations governing state enterprises have proved to be one 
of those legal sectors which have been least respected and 
worst implemented since China renewed its legal reforms in the 
late 1970s. This fact is not only recognised by most state 
enterprise managers, but also widely acknowledged by the 
leadership. Since 1991, considerable attention has been paid 
to the need for the full implementation of relevant laws and 
regulations. The official call for a better implementation of 
the SEL has been echoes by many walks of society, including 
legal press.9
A number of reasons have been suggested to explain the
a For an analysis, see Albert Feuerwerker, China's Early 
Industrialisation: Shenq Hsuan-Huai (1844-1916) and Mandarin 
Enterprises, Harvard University Press (Massachusetts) 1968.
9 See, for example, two special editorials published in 
FZRB, Feb.21, 1992, both at 1.
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ineffective and disappointing implementation of the legal 
regulation of state enterprises in China.10 For example, after 
reviewing the impact of legal institutions on economic reforms 
in China, Donald Clarke concludes that “passing laws is not 
enough. Statutes can be effective only within an appropriate 
institutional framework".11 He further argues that "the 
content of reform policy is inseparable from the vehicle in 
which it is expressed" and that "without a fundamental reform 
of the legal system, which in many ways has yet to be 
accomplished, thorough industrial reform cannot be 
achieved. "12
These remarks, which to a great extent coincide with 
complaints made by many Chinese observers, certainly fit the 
PRC case. As demonstrated in the discussion throughout this 
thesis, the ineffective application of laws and regulations is 
partly due to the unsatisfactory performance of law 
enforcement agencies, including the courts and relevant 
government authorities. As shown in Chapter Four, many 
government departments tend to ignore legal provisions and 
intervene in enterprise management. Moreover, as shown in 
Chapters Four and Nine, the court is not in a position in
10 For a summary of a seminar commemorating the third 
anniversary of implementation of the SEL, organised by the 
Legislative Committee under the NPC, the State Economic System 
Reform Commission, the Production Office under the State 
Council, and the China Association of Entrepreneurs, see Lu 
Mu, "Dazhongxing Qiye Chongzhen Xiongfeng Zhi Dao" (The Way to 
Restore the Prestige of Large and Medium-sized State 
Enterprises), in RMRB, Sept.23, 1991, at 2. This report gave 
several reasons for the poor enforcement of the SEL. They 
included the lack of authority of the SEL, the lack of 
independence by enterprises, and the fear of enterprises in 
defending their autonomy.
In addition, it is clear from the materials I read when
I was visiting China in early 1992, that several officials who 
attended that Seminar also raised the issue of the lack of 
appropriate and special enforcement institutions as an 
important reason for the failure to apply the SEL.
11 Donald Clarke, "What's Law Got to Do with it? Legal 
Institutions and Economic Reform in China", UCLA Pacific Basin 
Law Journal, No.1, Fall 1991, pp.1-76, at 3.
12 Ibid.
417
which it can play an active role in protecting the autonomy 
and interests of enterprises.
Institutional design can be very important in the 
appropriate enforcement of relevant laws and regulations. 
Indeed, as demonstrated in this thesis, the legal framework 
governing state enterprises did give extensive attention to 
both internal and external institutional design. The legal 
personality of state enterprises, contracting system, director 
responsibility system, and worker -- staff congresses (WSC) 
are all examples of legal institutions employed by the Chinese 
leadership to facilitate state enterprise reform. However, 
these institutions do not work well. For example, the contract 
as used in the chengbao system has in many cases lost its 
essence as a legally enforceable contract.
In addition, as Clarke points out, there exists the 
difficulty in formulating and enforcing general and legal 
rules. The main obstacles lie in the proper treatment of both 
special situations and distorting effect of political and 
local power when general legal rules are formulated and 
implemented. This is best seen in the immense difficulty 
experienced in making bankruptcy rules applicable to state 
enterprises. In enacting the EBL, the fundamental aim to 
promote enterprise economy efficiency was significantly 
undermined by the need to protect enterprises whose loss- 
making is mainly due to unfavourable outside conditions such 
as irrational pricing policy. Furthermore, the EBL gives 
relevant government departments very considerable 
discretionary powers to decide the fate of insolvent 
enterprises. Inevitably, this undermines the jurisdiction of 
the court.
In fact, poor enforcement of general and legal rules and 
inappropriate design of legal institutions are just the tip of 
the iceberg in the complex of problems facing the legal 
regulation of state enterprises in China. To a great extent, 
legal and institutional designs are an issue of choice. 
Although such designs, either defective or sound, are 
primarily made by the leadership, the execution of these
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designs has to depend on the willingness of both the law­
breakers and their victims. This is demonstrated by the poor 
enforcement of the institution of legal proceedings. As 
demonstrated in Chapter Nine, in adjudicating disputes 
concerned with the chengbao system, the courts have displayed 
an enthusiast willingness to protect the interests of 
enterprises and their managers. However, the reality is that 
the courts cannot play an active role because their
jurisdiction is very limited, and because enterprises, which 
have to be concerned with their overall and long-term 
interests, are too frightened to bring government departments 
to court. For similar reasons, the institution of 
administrative litigation, which was designed by the 
leadership for protecting enterprises from government 
intervention, has never actually been resorted to, despite the 
fact that enterprises' legal autonomy is frequently infringed 
by the government. In addition, government departments are 
unwilling to confront subordinate enterprises in court.
Thus, in examining the effects of legal framework
governing state enterprises, the approach from legal 
institutions and legal rules is helpful, but far from 
adequate. Indeed, it is necessary, as a first step, to analyze 
relevant laws and regulations from the nature and interactions 
of laws and policies.
A. Essence and limits of law
Despite the promulgation of many laws and regulations, 
tremendous difficulties remain in ascertaining and identifying 
the rules which are actually applicable.
Different ministries and localities can, and do, play
different roles in shaping the specific contents of the laws
and regulations. This thesis does not discuss in great detail 
the issue of regional and industrial variations in 
legislation, but this problem is very important in the Chinese
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context.1'1 For general purposes, it is sufficient to point out 
that the legal and actual autonomy of state enterprises varies 
from region to region and even from enterprise to enterprise.
Because the laws and regulations governing state 
enterprises tend to be loose and ambiguous, they are either 
readily restricted by, or only to be interpreted and enforced 
by reference to, other administrative instructions or state 
policies. For example, as we saw in Chapter Four, the 
authorization by the SEL of the rights and autonomy to state 
enterprises was deliberately qualified by many restrictions 
such as "in accordance with the stipulations made by the State 
Council" and "unless the law provides otherwise". This 
cautious approach left great room for administrative and 
policy instructions to play a major role. As a result, 
enterprises' legal rights could be easily restricted, or 
effectively preempted, by various government authorities.
Administrative manipulation is a pervasive fact of life 
in the legal regulation of state enterprises in China. For 
example, although the SEL provides that enterprise directors 
may be either appointed by government departments in charge of 
enterprises, or elected by the WSCs, in practice most 
directors are appointed by the government. Moreover, even 
those directors who are elected by the WSCs have to be 
approved by the government departments. In fact, as shown in 
Chapter Nine, many directors designated "directors" by 
chenqbao contracts have nevertheless been dismissed by the 
government as a purely "administrative and personnel matter" 
which falls out of court jurisdiction. Accordingly, they are 
prevented from resorting to law and contract for protection.
To a great extent, laws and regulations governing state 
enterprises are simply a pulling together of relevant pre­
existing practices through which the administrative control of 
state enterprises was (and to some extent still is) exercised.
13 For example, in coastal areas and Special Economic 
Zones, state enterprises which have to compete with other 
enterprises may actually have more freedom in their decision­
making process. For a general discussion of the local and 
regional powers, see Clarke, ibid.
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The legal regulation of state enterprises bears distinctive 
administrative features which make the laws nominally clear 
but very uncertain in actual content. This factor enables and 
indeed encourages government departments to shut their eyes 
and abuse their authority as if there were no laws. In fact, 
as shown in Chapter Eight, despite the adoption of the EBL, 
liquidation of insolvent companies continued to be dealt with 
in accordance with previous practice and new government 
instructions which simply ignore and even contradict in places 
the provisions of the EBL.
In fact, this uncertainty in the laws and regulations is 
further exacerbated by the fact that legal provisions are 
profoundly policy-oriented. Policies tend to drive and direct 
the legal regulation of state enterprises.
First, the law itself is not clear but must rely on state 
and party policies for clarification. This is best illustrated 
by reference to the director responsibility system. Although 
the SEL sets out the "central position" of directors and 
managers in state enterprises, the powers and authority of 
these functionaries are not self-evident. In particular, it is 
very difficult to identify the role of party organisations. 
The latter used to dominate the decision-making of the state 
enterprises under the pre-reform enterprise leadership system. 
As a result of these limitations in the SEL, it is necessary 
to consult relevant documents issued by the party to discover 
the roles which are supposed to be played respectively by the 
party secretaries and the directors under the new system as 
confirmed by the SEL.
Secondly, although policies may prove to be the main 
force advancing the development of the laws and regulations, 
they may also create significant limitations in the 
formulation of laws and legal concepts. For example, the 
dominant policy of promoting the independence of state 
enterprises has resulted in the legal authorization of legal 
personality for state enterprises. However, this was done 
without a resolute and satisfactory treatment of property 
rights. State enterprises are legal persons but they are not
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allowed to enjoy property ownership. It is largely due to this 
failure that they are unable to defend their own interests 
against the intervention of government authorities 
representing the state as the legal owner.
Thirdly, many of the laws and other legal provisions 
which have been adopted continue to be put aside when they 
prove inconvenient. For example, as shown in Chapter Eight, 
the EBL has remained a "paper tiger" -- despite its cautious 
approach and restrictive wording. The Chinese authorities have 
been unwilling to enforce the law even in its present 
"politically" less controversial form. The main problem 
worrying the authorities is believed to be the threat of 
unemployment and social instability that would come with a 
vigorous implementation of the law. These worries were 
actually admitted publicly before the adoption of the EBL in 
1986 .
In addition, policy factors also lead to some technical 
problems in the formulation of laws and regulations. Thus, the 
inadequate protection of creditors' interests in the EBL is 
undeniably due to the overriding government policy which 
defines this law as being primarily concerned with 
"invigorating" state enterprises. This is mainly because the 
underlying preference at the time of the drafting of the EBL 
was to protect the interests of state enterprises as debtors. 
Moreover, the policy to enhance the authority of enterprise 
directors has been accompanied by the unfortunate fact that 
the duties of directors are not adequately developed by law.
B. Features of policies
As outlined above, the fact that legal provisions are 
often loose and vague means that they have to be interpreted 
and enforced by reference to state and party policies.14 If 
such policies are certain, clearly pronounced, and well 
documented, then they would be a useful guide to the laws and
14 For a brief comment on this feature, see Henry Zheng, 
China's Civil and Commercial Law, at 13.
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regulations. However, our research has shown that it is 
extremely difficult to identify properly, and to state 
clearly, those policies relevant for the interpretation and 
enforcement of laws and regulations.
In essence, the legal framework governing state 
enterprises was built on the general policy of three 
"separations": separation of government administration from
business management, separation of the ownership from 
management, and the separation of the functions of the Party 
from those of the enterprise business operation. However, 
despite various attempts to clarify this general policy, its 
exact meaning has remained unclear and proved difficult to 
identify.
The uncertainty of policies is further complicated by the 
existence of different and usually competing policies. The 
difficulty in identifying the applicable policy cause 
particular problems for any objective assessment of the legal 
regulation of state enterprises. As indicated in the 
Introduction to this study, it has been contended by some 
experts that in studying Chinese law it is necessary to search 
for the "functions" played by relevant legal institutions and 
legal concepts.No doubt, this approach, accompanied by an 
emphasis on the social context of law, is very helpful in 
examining the role of law in all legal systems, especially 
newly-established or recently revived systems such as in the 
Chinese case. Nevertheless, it is necessary to be cautious in 
applying this approach for analyzing laws and regulations of 
the Chinese economic reforms because many legal rules remain 
unsettled in their orientation. The dominance of policy 
considerations -- which usually have to take into 
consideration many conflicting factors -- makes it difficult 
to distinguish the "intended" functions from the "unintended" 
functions of relevant legal institutions.
15 See, for example, Stanley Lubman, "Studying Chinese 
Law: Limits, Possibilities and Strategy", in American Journal 
of Comparative Law. No.2, Spring 1991, pp.293-341, especially 
at 328-33.
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One such example is the EBL. Many potential functions 
compete with one another, adding immense problems for 
assessing the functions of this Law. If the economic purpose 
of this Law is assumed -- as the EBL itself declares -- to be 
"invigorating state enterprises", then the EBL should be 
applied seriously and enterprises forced to perform more 
effectively through the approach of "killing the chicken in 
order to frighten the monkey" (sha ii xia hou) .16 It is clear 
that the social and political consideration of the Chinese 
authorities has superseded the economic and legal functions of 
the Law. In fact, despite the adoption of the Law, its
ineffective functioning cannot be dismissed as "unintended" 
because as indicated in Chapter Eight, even at the time of the 
adoption of this Law, it was predicted that the cases
involving the bankruptcy of state enterprises would be "few" -
- though it was, and still is, unclear how "few" would be
acceptable.
In fact, the policies which inform the interpretation and 
enforcement of laws and regulations are easily changed, making 
the law very uncertain. This is evidenced by the director 
responsibility system. As noted above, dominant party policy 
at the time of the promulgation of the SEL did help to 
strengthen the authority of state enterprise directors. But 
the policy adopted after June 1989 has weakened the supremacy 
of enterprise directors by restoring the "political core" 
position of party organisations. The official call is for 
harmonious cooperation between enterprise directors and party 
secretaries, but, in reality, the law concerning the 
enterprise leadership system has been made even more uncertain 
by this revival of the role of party secretaries.
III. Legal and Economic Reforms: Interactions and Limitations
The legal regulation of Chinese state enterprises 
provides a good case study of the role of law in socialist
16 That is, to punish someone as a warning to others.
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economic reforms. As discussed in Chapter Two, when Deng 
Xiaoping proposed in late 1978 the enactment of a number of 
laws, his main concern was that law would bring stability and 
certainty by preventing policy changes. Since the mid-1980s, 
the Chinese leadership has accepted that in pursuing economic 
reforms law should be used to record and defend the 
achievements of the reforms.17 Furthermore, since the mid- 
1980s, a number of Chinese lawyers have cried for radical 
legal reforms. In their view,18 in order to achieve final 
success, laws and regulations must be employed to guide, 
consolidate, advance, and defend reforms. In particular, legal 
reforms must be aimed at establishing the rule of law in every 
part of the Chinese society, including enterprises.
Our study, however, shows that there have been, and still 
are, tremendous difficulties in carrying out meaningful legal 
reforms .
A. Pluralism and the rule of law
It is widely believed in the West that political 
pluralism is a precondition for the rule of law. In other 
words, the rule of law is impossible if there is not a 
pluralistic legal order in which entities of different 
interests can compete effectively and lawfully with one
17 For example, in 1987, the Thirteenth Congress of the 
CCP, in its Report, declared that "we must on the one hand 
concentrate on construction and reforms, and on the other pay 
attention to the legal system. The building of the legal 
system must be carried out throughout the reform. . . . The 
building of the legal system must protect the order for the 
construction and reforms, and must consolidate the 
achievements made in the reforms. Those which must be promoted 
or reformed must be clarified by law or institution as far as 
possible." See Fazhang Shehui Zhuvi Minzhu, Jiangnan Shehui 
Zhuvi Fazhi -- Youguan Zhongyao Lunshu Huibian (Developing 
Socialist Democracy and Perfecting Socialist Legal System -- 
A Collection of Important Remarks), Law Press 1988, p.262.
18 See, for example, Wang Jiafu, Liu Hainian and Li Buyun, 
"Lun Fazhi Gaige" (On Legal Reforms), FXYJ, No.2, 1989, pp.l- 
9 .
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another.19 In this sense, despite the promulgation of a number 
of laws and regulations, the rule of law has never been 
extended to Chinese state enterprises.
It must be admitted that in the post-Mao reform era, 
attempts have been made to adjust different interests 
involving state enterprises. However, these attempts are half­
hearted and not workable. First, the nature of relevant rights 
is not clearly defined by law. Nor is the extent of these 
rights. This is demonstrated by the uncertainty of the 
management rights. Secondly, the law is not fully prepared to 
set coherent legal rules for the effective protection of 
different and often conflicting interests h° For example, as 
revealed in Chapter Six, because state enterprises are 
prohibited from enjoying full property ownership rights, it is 
impossible to define and identify the "interests of state 
enterprises" in law. Moreover, enterprise directors have to 
represent, as a priority, the interests of the state and 
government departments which appoint, and can subsequently 
remove, them. In addition, whilst workers' right to 
participate in enterprise management is guaranteed by law, 
violation of this right is widespread and little legal 
liability is invoked for such violation.
Because the law has not clarified relevant rights and
19 For an analysis, see Richard Baum, "Modernisation and 
Legal Reform in Post-Mao China: The Rebirth of Socialist 
Legality", Studies in Comparative Communism, Summer 1986, 
pp.69-103. This article concerns primarily constitutional and 
public law. After reviewing the PRC experience of law and 
comparing the Chinese view with Western conceptions of the 
rule of law, Baum concluded that "great caution must be 
exercised in assessing the long-term political implication of 
China's post-Mao legal order. Although incipient pluralism 
seems to have made significant headway in recent years, it 
rests upon an extremely thin political foundation, one that is 
highly vulnerable to the vicissitudes of endless factionalism 
and feudal-style bureaucratism that have long been the 
hallmarks of the Chinese political system." {p.103)
20 This is also a problem for future Chinese company law. 
Standard documents which have been promulgated as guidance for 
the reforms of limited companies (see Chapter One, 
"companies") do not contain any provision for the protection 
of minority shareholders.
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interests, it has failed to create a pluralistic environment. 
As a result, the parties involved are not willing seriously to 
insist on their rights and defend their interests -- even if 
these rights and interests can be accurately identified. In 
situations of conflict and disputes, laws and regulations are 
seldom regarded by relevant parties as the best resort for 
settling their differences. This is most evident in the case 
of the chengbao system. Neither the government, nor the 
enterprises, nor the workers, are interested in bringing a 
legal action against the party which has broken a chengbao 
contract. Also, although relevant laws grant state enterprises 
the right to bring administrative litigation against 
government departments which have infringed their management 
autonomy, such a case has never actually taken place.
In fact, relevant legal provisions have been heavily 
politicised and policy-oriented. The Chinese authorities have 
always asserted that the interests of the state, enterprises, 
and individuals are consistent. It is also advocated that as 
the reforms inevitably affect the interests of one party or 
another, every party must be prepared to take the situation as 
a whole into consideration. However, the "harmony1 among 
different interests has been bought at the price of laws and 
regulations losing their sharpness and effectiveness. Being 
made largely "voluntary" and arbitrary, laws and regulations 
can hardly offer effective protection to different parties. In 
the end, not only the enterprises, their managers and workers, 
but also the state suffers from the ineffective implementation 
of the laws and regulations. The only beneficiaries, it would 
seem, are government departments which can ignore legal 
provisions, continue to enjoy great discretionary power, and 
intervene frequently in enterprise management.
Therefore, within state enterprises, the rule of law does 
not yet exist. To a great extent, there is not even a "rule by 
law"21 as laws and regulations are vague and not
21 In the Chinese context, "rule of law" and "rule by law" 
share the same Chinese pronunciation (fazhi) but have quite 
different meanings. After fierce debates in the early 1980s,
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comprehensive. In fact, state enterprises are essentially 
ruled by policies which have an overriding force in the 
enactment and implementation of laws and regulations. To a 
great extent, the rule by policy allows great discretion in 
the enforcement of laws and regulations.
B. Limits of the legal reforms
Since 197 9, a large number of laws have been promulgated 
in the PRC.22 A new legal system is taking shape. Even in the 
months following the tragedy of June 1989, most observers 
agree that unlike the situation that prevailed before and 
during the Cultural Revolution, there remains hope for the 
contemporary Chinese legal system. This legal system is 
fragile but has not totally lost ground.23
With reference to the above mentioned call made by 
Chinese scholars for legal reforms, it must be admitted that 
law has performed mixed functions. First, the "guidance" role 
of law is relevant but not very apparent. Over the past decade 
or so, Chinese economic legislation tends to fall behind,
most Chinese lawyers agree that while "rule of law" { 
represents the ultimate aim of the legal reforms and legal 
systems, "rule by law" only signifies the existence of
laws and regulations. It seems that the Chinese authorities 
are more interested in "rule by law", whereas scholars prefer 
the establishment of "rule of law". To a great extent, "rule 
by law" has been used in post-Mao China to contrast with the 
previous experience of "rule by man" (renzhi, ) whereby
law was largely ignored, and changeable policies prevailed.
22 Until mid-1992, the NPC and its Standing Committee had 
adopted 117 laws, of which sixty-five are directly related to 
the economy. See a report in RMRB, Jun.20, 1992, p. 4.
23 See, for example, Jerome Alan Cohen, "Tiananmen and the 
Rule of Law", in George Hicks (ed.), The Broken Mirror: China 
After Tiananmen, Longman Group UK Limited 19 90, pp.323-44. 
Also see Gellat, "Law Reform in the PRC After June 4," Journal 
of Chinese Law, Fall 1989, pp.317-25.
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rather than exist to "lead11, reforms.24 The usual practice 
follows the road of reform experimentation (based upon 
policies), formal legislation (whether tentative or not), and 
widespread reforms. Both the SEL and the Chengbao Regulations 
are examples of this process, though one exception is the EBL 
which was adopted in 1986 with little prior experimentation.25
Secondly, the "consolidating" or "recording" function of 
law is widely recognised as more important. To a great extent, 
laws and regulations are able to summarize experimental 
experience and record legal rules and concepts which are 
regarded by the leadership as valuable and worthy of broader 
application. In the case of state enterprises, management 
rights, director responsibility system, and chengbao system 
are all examples of the "recording" role of law.
Thirdly, the role of law in "advancing" reforms is not 
fully realised. As legislation tends to lag behind reforms, 
the advancement function of law is very limited. It is true 
that laws and regulations may promote further reforms by 
stipulating general rules for wider application. However, what 
they record is often past experience and achievement. Although 
such experience may prove valuable for future reforms, there 
is a possibility that further reforms will, as a matter of 
policy shifts, either retreat from or surpass adopted laws and
24 Since the mid-1980s, within China, it is argued that 
legislation, especially economic legislation should have "the 
feature of leading effect" (chaogian xing). That means the law 
should be enacted before the object to be regulated is fully 
developed, in order to ensure the standardized development of 
this object. However, so far, there is no consensus among 
Chinese decision-makers as to this issue. The lack of the 
leading effects of law is even acknowledged by the Chinese 
leadership. The promulgation of many laws, especially a
Company Law, continues to be delayed. For a description, see
supra note 22.
25 As shown in Chapter Eight, before the adoption of the 
EBL, only a few collective enterprises were experimented with 
bankruptcy. Not a single state enterprise was declared
bankruptcy before 1986. Interestingly, although the
promulgation of the EBL was a bold experiment in legal 
reforms, the EBL itself has failed to "lead" a widespread 
bankruptcy reforms.
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regulations. This is especially the case as post-Mao reforms 
have proceeded on the basis of the belief in "touching the 
stones at the bottom of a river to cross the river" (mozhe 
shitou quohe), and therefore lacking a radical or determined 
orientation.
Last, the "defending" role of law in economic reforms is 
very doubtful. As shown in Chapter Six, to some extent, 
written provisions of the SEL concerning the director 
responsibility system did play a role by preventing an 
emotional policy reversal in the aftermaths of June 1989. 
However, political considerations were so overriding that 
significant policy changes were carried out at the coast of 
legal certainty. Despite that written legal provisions 
remained unamended, they had to be understood and implemented 
quite differently. As a result, the law has failed to defend 
the achievements in radically reforming the enterprise 
leadership system.
To some extent, the failure of legal reforms can be 
attributed to the contradiction between law and reforms. 
Essentially, law seeks stability and certainty, and therefore 
tends to be conservative. But reforms are aimed at 
development. The contradiction between relative certainty and 
rapid development is not easy to solve. Although laws and 
regulations may add more authority and enforceability to 
reform policies, it is very doubtful whether or not laws and 
regulations can actively "guide" or "advance" reforms. In 
particular, given the uncertainty of reforms, it seems 
impossible to make laws and regulations which are able to 
bring certainty and to allow flexibility for future reforms.
On the other hand, the factor of the contradiction of 
laws and regulations, though being very helpful, does not 
fully explain the reasons for the limits of laws and 
regulations. In fact, in order to further understand the 
inheritant limits of legal reform, it is necessary to examine 
the theory of law and its impact on economic reforms.
In the PRC, law is officially regarded as a kind of
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instrument.2fl In our case, the "instrumentality" view of law 
is evident in that a legal framework has been constructed to 
"invigorate state enterprises". Accordingly, laws and 
regulations themselves are not the end. As indicated by one 
observer, in China, "law (often, party decisions) is 
frequently seen as a means to promote economic change or 
development, and not as something that develops as a result of 
changes elsewhere".27
The official perception of the instrumental role of law 
has caused many serious problems. First, law and policy are 
used together. As instrumentalities, laws and regulations are 
inferior to policies. Policies used to be the main tool for 
the leadership, and have continued to play a leading role in 
the formulation, comprehension and implementation of laws and 
regulations. Consequently, laws and regulations are not 
independent and self-existent.
Secondly, as an instrument, law has to record policies. 
However, as policies themselves may not always be certain, 
laws and regulations may be left unclear. In order to allow 
flexibility for, and to avoid debates concerning, the reforms, 
the law cannot be made too absolute and too detailed. However, 
the declarative nature of the law has not only left great room 
for administrative manipulation, but also seriously undermined 
the legal authority and enforceability of the law.
Thirdly, laws and regulations has been heavily 
politicised. Many legal provisions are not only social and 
economic necessity, but also political and ideological targets
26 The PRC authorities hold that law should reflect the 
views of the ruling class, and therefore has a strong "class 
nature". In contrast, since the early 1980s, a number of 
Chinese scholars had advocated that the law was not merely a 
tool for class struggle as it also performed many social 
functions. Indeed, some scholars also called for the 
abandonment of the "class nature view of the law" (see, for 
example, Wang, Liu and Li, supra note 18) . However, this 
liberal view was severely attacked immediately after June 
1989 .
27 J. Feinerman, "Economic and Legal Reform in China: 
1978-1991", Problems of Communism, Sept-Oct 1991, pp.62-75, at 
66 .
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which may be neither pragmatic nor seriously treated in 
practice.
Fourthly, as instrumentalities, laws and regulations will 
be easily put aside when they are found inconvenient for 
government authorities, or contradicting already changed 
policies.
Last, but not least, because of various objective 
difficulties, legal rules are hardly possible to enforce. For 
example, in the absence of a sound social security system, 
bankruptcy is not realistic. Accordingly, the EBL is simply an 
unworkable instrumentality.
In view of the above factors, law does not always mean 
certainty. Nor can it operate effectively all the time. 
Indeed, it has become usual practice in post-Mao China that 
immediately after laws, regulations, legal rules, and concepts 
are adopted, they tend to be overpraised by the authorities 
and scholars.28 But such idealisation is soon followed by 
disappointment, suspicion and controversy. While some people 
seek to improve existing laws and regulations, others attempt 
to look for new approaches to replace existing systems. Such 
controversy not only affects the certainty and authority of 
laws, but also diverts public attention towards the serious 
implementation of existing laws.
Reforms in China are still limited. The Chinese 
leadership has so far been only committed to economic reforms. 
However, economic and political reforms cannot be separated. 
Without fundamental political reforms, economic reforms will 
remain fragile and therefore vulnerable to policy changes.
Considerable difficulties are present in the reforms. 
Generally speaking, the various difficulties can be classified 
into two categories. One is objective difficulties which have 
developed in special and historical circumstances. In our 
case, these difficulties are represented by the irrational 
pricing policies and the lack of proper social security 
system. These problems can be reformed, but the establishment
28 Examples include the legal person concept, management 
rights, and the contracting system.
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of new and proper systems may need a significant period of 
time. Another category of difficulties is political and 
ideological obstacles such as the somewhat "bizarre" status of 
enterprise party secretaries in our study.29 These obstacles 
are taboo areas for reforms, and great uncertainty may 
continue to frustrate radical reformers. As a result of these 
objective and political difficulties, laws and regulations can 
only perform a limited function. They may support radical 
reform policies, but in many cases they are only able to 
stipulate vague and often unworkable legal rules and concepts.
Although economic reforms may create an improved 
opportunity for the development of a legal framework, and 
although laws and regulations can be used as instrumentalities 
to help reforms, it is unrealistic to expect them to 
fundamentally change the chaotic social, economic, and 
political systems such as current prevails in China. As 
suggested by some western scholars, "law is a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition for meaningful change or 
development".10 Without fundamental economic and political 
reforms, the role of the law must not be overestimated. On the 
other hand, without a proper treatment by laws and regulations 
of various interests, the reforms are bound to have 
significant limitations.
IV. Recent Developments and Future Prospects
A. Regulations for the Transformation of the Management 
Mechanism of State Industrial Enterprises
This research has been carried out mainly on the basis of 
the material relating to the development of state enterprise
29 Another example is the ideological confusion over the 
status of workers in state enterprises. In shown in Chapter 
Seven, for ideological reasons, workers' rights of 
participation are provided for by law, but remain difficult to 
enforce as a matter of law.
30 See Feinerman, supra note 27. Also see Clarke, supra 
note 11.
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law up to early 1992, As indicated in the Introduction, in 
late 1991, a further reform was called for. The main concern 
is to reduce the number of loss-making enterprises by further 
increasing enterprise autonomy.31 In the wake of a series of 
speeches made in early 19 92 by Deng Xiaoping, China's 
paramount leader, on the need for bolder economic reforms and 
more rapid economic development, state enterprise reform has 
been proceeded with at a faster speed than was expected even 
in late 1991. This drive to reform seems much stronger than in 
19 88 when the SEL was adopted. At that time, a mush more 
cautious approach was taken.
The most significant achievement in the on-going campaign 
has been the promulgation by the State Council on July 23, 
1992 of the Regulations for the Transformation of the 
Management Mechanism of State Industrial Enterprises 
{hereinafter the "Regulations") .32 Comprising a total of 
fifty-four articles, these Regulations33 cover, inter alia, 
the management rights and responsibilities of enterprises, the 
relationship between enterprises and government departments,
31 Until late 1991, of all large and medium-sized state 
enterprises, about one third were obviously making losses. 
However, another one third were making "latent losses"
(giankui). "Latent losses" means that from their balance 
sheets, enterprises seemingly make profits. But if one takes 
into account factors such as overstock, depreciation, and 
inflation, these enterprises actually make losses. See a 
speech made by Zhu Rongji (Vice-Premier) in late 1991 with 
regard to the drafting of the Implementing Regulations for the 
SEL, ZGJJTZGG, No.2, 1992, pp.7-9.
32 For the text of these Regulations in Chinese, see RMRB, 
Jul. 25, 1992, pp. 1 and 3. For the English text of the 
Regulations, see BBC SWB, Jul.29, 1992, FE/1445 Cl/1-11.
33 The drafting of these Regulations formally started in 
December 1991. Eight different drafts were widely discussed 
before the draft Regulations were eventually approved in 
principle by the State Council on Jun.30, 1992. For an 
introduction of the legislative process and relevant contents, 
see State Economic Reform Commission, Guanvu Quanmin Suovouzhi 
Gongye Qive Zhuanhuan Jingying Jizhi Tiaoli de Shuoming 
(Explanations Concerning the Regulations for the 
Transformation of the Management Mechanism of State Industrial 
Enterprises, hereinafter "Explanations"), GRRB, Jul.23, 1992, 
p.3 .
434
and the legal liabilities of enterprises and relevant 
government departments.
1. Main contents of the Regulations
The Regulations consolidate the management rights of 
state enterprises in fourteen aspects.34 Compared to relevant 
SEL provisions (as analyzed in Chapter Four), the Regulations 
not only reiterate the management rights conferred by the 
SEL,35 but also add a new right -- the right of investment. 
State enterprises can, in accordance with the law and the 
provisions of the State Council, invest in other enterprises, 
or even set up enterprise abroad, by using their retained 
funds, materials, land use rights, industrial property and 
non-patent technologies.3'’ The authorization of this right 
represents a new development towards a greater degree of 
enterprise autonomy as enterprises are allowed to make use of 
state-owned assets and earn profits.
The most notable feature of the Regulations is that the 
management rights enjoyed by enterprises are stipulated in 
great detail. Such detailed treatment has aimed at reducing 
the possibility that government departments abuse their 
authority and intervene in enterprise management.37 This can 
be seen in every provision regarding the powers of
34 Arts.8-21. These rights include: decision-making 
concerning production, pricing for products and labour, the 
sale of products, purchase of products, import and export, 
decision-making concerning investment, use of retained funds, 
disposal of assets, economic association and take-over, labour 
administration, personnel management, distribution of wages 
and bonus, installation of internal organisations, refusal of 
random appropriation.
35 As analyzed in Chapter Four, the SEL authorizes state 
enterprises with twelve items of rights. Enterprises' right of 
personnel administration, which was vaguely included in 
relevant articles of the SEL (Arts.31, 45) is listed 
separately as a right.
ib Art.13, Regulations. This provision, however, also 
imposes a number of limitations on the exercise of this right.
37 See "Explanations", supra note 33
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enterprises. For example, the SEL merely contains a brief 
provision about the right to dispose of assets38 and therefore 
did not clarify the scope of the disposable assets. The 
Regulations contain detailed provisions. Thus, in accordance 
with the needs of production and management, state enterprises 
may make their own decisions to lease, mortgage, or assign for 
value their ordinary fixed assets. State enterprises may also 
lease, or upon the approval from competent government 
departments, mortgage or assign for value their key equipment, 
whole sets of equipment or important construction works.39 
Thus, the Regulations attempt to not only clarify the coverage 
of the assets which can be disposed of by enterprises, but 
also in fact expand this right by allowing enterprises to 
mortgage fixed assets which they do not own in the first 
place.
The Regulations also attempt to define both the authority 
and responsibilities of relevant government departments.40 
Like the SEL, the Regulations attempt to define the role of 
government departments in accordance with the principle of 
separating government administration from enterprise 
management. On the one hand, government departments continue 
to bear important responsibility towards the administration of 
the economy and state enterprises; on the other hand, they are 
required to exercise macro control and provide services to the 
autonomous management of state enterprises.
Finally, in order to prevent enterprises from abusing 
their management rights, the Regulations have moved towards 
imposing more severe liability on enterprises and their 
directors. For example, while enterprises which suffer losses 
because of policy reasons or state plans may be immune from 
punishment,41 enterprises which make losses due to poor
38 Art .29, SEL.
39 Art. 15, Regulations.
40 Arts . 40-46 .
41 Art. 28, Regulations.
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management have to face many liabilities. Such liabilities can 
be imposed on enterprise directors, other enterprise leaders, 
and even workers.4"
2. Limits of the Regulations
Despite the comprehensive and detailed nature of these 
provisions, the overall effects of the Regulations should not 
be overestimated. First, the Regulations do not cover all 
aspects of the SEL. As their name suggests, the Regulations 
are only concerned with the "transformation of the management 
mechanism of state enterprises"; they are not full 
"Implementing Regulations of the SEL".43 In fact, the 
Regulations are mainly concerned with the issue of enterprise 
autonomy and responsibility. Therefore, many complex problems, 
which, as revealed in this study have complicated the SEL, 
have not been tackled. For example, the controversial issue of 
the legal and political status of enterprise directors is not 
addressed in detail.44 Furthermore, the relatively marginal
42 Art.29, Regulations. Such liability includes reduction 
of salary, termination of bonus, and administrative sanctions.
43 The enactment of comprehensive implementing regulations 
for the SEL seemed to be the original intention of the policy­
makers. See "Explanations", supra note 33. Many scholars and 
government officials with whom I talked in early 1992 did not 
even agree with the title of the Regulations. They demanded 
the promulgation of the "Regulations for Implementing the 
SEL" . Also, for an official account of the legislative process 
concerning the Regulations, see Zhu Rongji, "Guanyu Zhiding 
Zhuanhuan Qiye Jingying Jizhi Tiaoli de Jige Wenti" {Several 
Issues Concerning the Enactment of the Regulations), RMRB, 
Jul.l, 1992, p.2.
44 The Regulations mention this issue once. Art.3, which 
concerns the principles for the transformation of the 
management mechanism of state enterprises, provides, inter 
alia, that "giving play to CCP grassroots organisations7 
function as the political core in enterprises, implementing 
and perfecting the director responsibility system". This 
provision, by acknowledging the "political core" position of 
party committees, has confirmed the development of the 
enterprise leadership system since June 1989 . The draft 
Regulations, a copy of which I obtained in early 1992, did go 
further in stipulating the concrete role of the party 
committees, for example, in enterprise personnel management.
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institution of the WSC receives scant attention in the 
Regulations.45 These unresolved problems will continue to 
affect the operation of state enterprises in the future.
Secondly, the Regulations fail to provide radical 
measures for resolving many fundamental problems and deep 
contradictions existing in state enterprise reform.
The Regulations do not make any attempt to confer any 
property ownership rights to state enterprises. All the 
property of state enterprises is still exclusively owned by 
the state, which is represented by governments and their 
departments.46 Accordingly, state enterprises continue to be 
put under close supervision by government authorities which 
may abuse their power from time to time.
Furthermore, the Regulations continue to use those 
terminologies found in the SEL to restrict the "management 
rights" of enterprises. Many provisions of the Regulations 
contain qualifying clauses such as "except for where the law 
provides otherwise or the state has expressly prohibited",47 
"according to the stipulations of the state",48 "except for 
where the law or the State Council provides otherwise",49
However, the promulgated Regulations have dropped such 
provisions. The underlying reasons for this change is not 
clear. In my view, it is unlikely that directors in state 
enterprises can freely use their personnel power (as provided 
in Art.18, Regulations) without consulting party committees in 
advance. Therefore, the confusion concerning the enterprise 
leadership system is likely to continue.
45 The Regulations mention twice the role of the WSC. In
addition to the ambiguous provision of "relying whole­
heartedly on the working class" (Art.3), the Regulations 
require that enterprises' plans for wage adjustment and bonus 
distribution be approved by the WSC (Art.24).
46 The Regulations provides that the State Council shall
represent the state in exercising the ownership rights of the
state property (See Art.41).
47 Art. 10, Regulations.
48 Art. 11, Regulations.
49 Art s. 2 0 and 21, Regulations.
438
"upon the approval made by relevant government departments",50 
and "except for where the law and administrative regulations 
provide otherwise".51 These restrictions reflect government's 
cautious approach towards, and will severely undermine, the 
autonomy of state enterprises.52
In addition, detailed provisions contained in the 
Regulations fail to establish coherent legal rules for the 
reasonable treatment of different interests. For example, 
although the Regulations purport to impose stricter 
responsibilities for enterprises and especially their 
directors, this development remains haphazard and incoherent. 
Moreover, the lack of a proper supervising mechanism means 
that such liability has to be decided by government 
departments, therefore enhancing their authority at the cost 
of enterprise autonomy.
In essence, the improvement made by the Regulations in 
regard to enterprise autonomy are quantitative, rather than 
qualitative. Enterprises may rely on the Regulations to obtain 
more, but not full, autonomy. Equally true, government 
authorities may be forced by the Regulations to reduce, but 
not abandon, their intervention and abusive supervision of 
enterprise management.
Thirdly, the practical effects of these Regulations 
remain to be seen. This study has shown that many provisions 
of the SEL have not been effectively implemented. Given the 
lack of qualitative breakthroughs and the defects in many 
provisions, the Regulations may suffer from the same fate as 
the SEL.
For example, as analyzed in Chapter Four, until 1991 the 
right of state enterprises to refuse "random appropriation"
50 Art. 12 , Regulations.
51 Art. 15, Regulations.
52 It has been reported that only upon the special 
approvement by the State Council has Shoudu Iron and Steel 
Company (SISC) become the first state enterprise to be granted 
the full rights of investment, foreign trade, and fund­
raising. For the report, see GRRB, Aug.6, 1992, p.l.
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(luan tanpai) , which had been guaranteed in the SEL and 
relevant regulations, had met with great difficulty in 
practice. Nevertheless, it has been reported52 that despite 
the repeated calls made by the central leadership since late 
1991 to stop such illegal practices, random appropriation has 
occurred frequently and widely. Indeed, so long as various 
government departments continue to possess unchallengeable 
authority and play a significant role in the administration of 
the economy and state enterprises, it is difficult for 
enterprises to enforce their rights.
In fact, as demonstrated in this study, the guarantee of 
enterprise autonomy provided by law is rarely relied on by 
enterprises. State enterprises are neither able nor willing to 
use the law to fight against government intervention. Although 
the Regulations reiterate that the legal autonomy of state 
enterprises shall be protected by law and enterprises can 
report or appeal to relevant government departments or even 
bring legal action in order to defend their legal interests 
and rights,54 such guarantees may just prove to be mere empty 
words.
B. Future reforms and state enterprise laws
Since early 1992, in an attempt to revive the ailing state 
sector of the economy, the Chinese authorities have been 
committed to introduce a "socialist market economy" (shehui 
zhiyi shichang jingji) .55 State enterprises are to be "pushed"
52 See, for example, a recent report on GRRB, Jul.24, 
19 92, p.l: "Luan Tanpai Renrang Wuxiu Wuzhi" (Random
Appropriation Remains Endless). This report revealed the 
random appropriation suffered by state enterprises in Henan 
province where many enterprises were forced to pay various 
fees and contributions.
54 See Art. 22, Regulations.
55 Although the call for pushing enterprises to the market 
was made even in 1991, the nature and role of such a market 
force was not clearly defined. In particular, it was debated 
within China whether a market economy was socialist or 
capitalist in nature. In early 1992, Deng Xiaoping initiated
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to the market place and forced to compete with enterprises of 
non-state ownership types. If this move is to succeed, state 
enterprises will have to experience many significant changes. 
In particular, their management autonomy must be decisively 
strengthened.
The most difficult problem, however, remains the 
contradiction between enterprise autonomy and government 
supervision. Although various laws and regulations claim to 
promote enterprise autonomy, therefore inevitably relaxing 
government domination over enterprise management, government 
administrative manipulation of state enterprises is still 
extremely pervasive. For example, despite the growing function 
of the market force, state economic plans remain very 
important for state enterprises. Government departments also 
hold the power to appoint and remove enterprise directors. 
Moreover, relevant government authorities are entitled to 
conclude and settle chengbao contracts, approve and veto 
debtor enterprises' application for bankruptcy and, indeed, to 
supervise the overall operation of state enterprises. As shown 
in Chapter Four, the powers and authority of government 
departments are essentially legal responsibilities borne by 
these departments in regard to state enterprises.
It would be unrealistic, in any case, to expect 
government authorities to wash their hands of the operation of 
state enterprises. However, the most difficult issue is that 
government departments are not only the de facto owners of 
state enterprises but social administrators and regulators as 
well. In the latter capacity, they may legitimately exercise 
administrative control over the operation of enterprises, but 
this is complicated by that fact that as representatives of 
the owner, government departments are entitled to supervise
a new era of economic reforms in which the market economy is 
described as compatible with either socialist or capitalist 
economies. Theoretically, this paves the way for the 
accommodation of a market economy in China. However, it seems 
that the constitutionality of a market economy is debatable as 
the 1982 PRC Constitution assumes the dominating role of the 
state planning and the "supplementary" role of market forces. 
See Art.15 of the Constitution.
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and intervene in the management of state enterprises. To some 
extent, the dual capacities of government departments can be 
delineated. For example, the Administrative Bureaux for 
Industry and Commerce usually exercise their functions as 
social administrators. But in many other cases, it is 
impossible to draw a clear distinction as many government 
departments concurrently exercise the function of both 
administrators and representatives of the owner. For example, 
government departments in charge of state enterprises may not 
only allocate state plans but also appoint enterprise 
directors. The combination of administrator and owner's status 
makes the legal regulations concerning state enterprises 
necessarily subservient to further administrative control. 
After all, state enterprises are mere managers, not property 
owners . They may only attain a relative degree of autonomy and 
independence. Although it is necessary for various state 
departments to keep an eye on the operation of state 
enterprises, in many cases such supervision is unnecessarily 
intrusive in nature. Many government interventions may not 
only contravene written laws and regulations but even conflict 
with state policies, as was demonstrated in Chapter Four 
concerning the autonomy of state enterprises.
The future reform of Chinese state enterprises has four 
options. The first is that the reform will proceed with the 
existing approach. This means that state enterprises will only 
be allowed a "relative degree of autonomy". The second is that 
radical reform will enable state enterprises to enjoy the same 
full autonomy as other types of enterprise. The third option 
is that limited companies will become the dominant 
organisational form for state enterprises. The fourth option 
is the widespread privatisation of existing state enterprises.
The first option is the most likely. This is actually the 
approach that the SEL and the Regulations have taken. Under 
this approach, the previous system of enterprise 
administration will be maintained, though minor modifications 
and reforms will be made. Government departments continue to 
play an important role in the administration of the economy,
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and state enterprises which are only allowed a "relative 
degree of autonomy" i1'1
If this approach is followed, the legal regulation of 
state enterprises will continue to face the same problems 
encountered in the past. The policy-orientation of laws and 
regulations will mean that enterprise autonomy will be subject 
to administrative and policy restrictions. The legal 
regulations of state enterprises may be improved to a certain 
extent, but in essence, such improvement is no more than 
1 treating the head when the head aches, and treating the foot 
when the foot hurts".57 This is because many fundamental 
problems, such as property ownership rights and the treatment 
of different interests, will remain unresolved. State 
enterprises will be unable and unwilling to confront 
government departments and to protect their own interests by 
resorting to laws and regulations. As a result, state 
enterprises will not enjoy the kind of autonomy which would 
enable them to compete successfully with other enterprises.
Judging from previous experiences, the second option for 
future enterprise reform appears impossible in the near 
future. The development of a socialist market economy 
necessarily requires that state enterprises be given full 
management autonomy. But the implementation of such full 
autonomy will not be possible if many essential problems are 
not first resolved.
In order to realise full enterprise autonomy, it is 
absolutely critical that the law confers property ownership 
rights on state enterprises so that they are free to conduct 
autonomous management. More specifically, first, state
5G It seems that considerable confusion still exists as 
to the nature of the autonomy enjoyed by enterprises. The term 
of "relative autonomy" was first used in the CCP Decision on 
Economic Reform, adopted in October 1984. However, since the 
role of the market was officially acknowledged in late 1991, 
in particular since the publication of Deng's speeches in 
early 1992, Chinese officials have tended to talk about 
"autonomy" of enterprises, instead of "relative autonomy".
57 This Chinese saying means "treating symptoms but not 
the disease".
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enterprises which do not possess property ownership are unable 
to make important decisions concerning their management, or 
defend themselves from unwelcome government intervention. 
Secondly, state enterprises are not able to independently bear 
civil liabilities in regard to the property because they do 
not have ownership rights in the property of the enterprises. 
Thirdly, the failure to confer property ownership on state 
enterprises prevents the development of the concept of the 
"interests of enterprises" which will enable the law to play 
an active role in regulating different interests involving 
state enterprises as legal entities. Finally, and not 
surprisingly, state enterprises which do not have property 
ownership rights can hardly become independent and responsible 
legal persons, able and willing to challenge government 
authorities.
In essence, without conferring state enterprise with 
property ownership rights, any proposed legal regulation of 
state enterprises is bound to have strong policy and 
administrative features and therefore fail to survive policy 
changes and administrative manipulations. However, it remains 
doubtful whether, given its earlier rejection, the Chinese 
government will be willing to reconsider the idea of 
conferring property ownership rights on state enterprises.58
Moreover, the full implementation of enterprise autonomy 
would require the abolition of many government departments, in 
particular, government departments in charge of enterprises. 
As demonstrated in this study, the existence of these 
government departments inevitably undermines the autonomy of 
state enterprises.
The delegation of property ownership rights to state 
enterprises and the abolition of many government departments, 
however, cannot automatically resolve many other problems 
facing an effective and reasonable legal regulation of state
58 The authorization of property ownership to state 
enterprises would have to be sanctioned by the Constitution 
which, although recognises certain autonomy of state 
enterprises, prohibits the damages to the state ownership. See 
Art.16 of the 1982 PRC Constitution.
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enterprises. For example, in order to "relieve" government 
departments of various concerns over the consequences 
resulting from the full realisation of self-management by 
enterprises and their managers, the law needs to be modified 
in order to provide proper treatment of both directors' duties 
and worker's participation in enterprise management. 
Furthermore, it is likely that compulsory involvement of party 
organisations in enterprise management will continue to be a 
perplexing issue in the context of future reforms . As such, 
unless a complete and radical overhaul of the existing legal 
framework is made, effective and proper legal regulation of 
state enterprises is impossible.
The third option for state enterprise reform still has an 
uncertain future. The "shareholding system", or qufenzhi, 
began to be experimented with in pilot areas in the mid-1980s, 
and has been backed with even greater official enthusiasm 
since early 1992 . By transforming existing state enterprises 
into Western-style limited companies,^ this reform seeks to 
eliminate many problems existing in state enterprises. In 
particular, government departments are expected to act in the 
mere capacity of shareholders, and therefore not to 
administratively intervene in enterprise management.
The shareholding system may bring some changes to the 
existing enterprise system.60 In particular, the equity 
participation from investors of different types of ownership 
poses a threat to, and requires changes in, the existing legal 
treatment of enterprises. Nevertheless, a number of problems 
must be considered in assessing the significance of the 
shareholding system. First, the shareholding system is still 
at the initial stage of cautious experimentation, the effects
59 For a brief introduction to the legislative framework 
on shareholding companies, see Chapter One above concerning 
"companies". The Regulations do not apply to limited companies 
(see "Explanations", supra note 33).
00 For an earlier discussion on this potential 
development, see Howard Chao and Yang Xiaoping, "The Reform of 
the Chinese System of Enterprise Ownership", Standford Journal 
of International Law, Vol.22, 1986, pp.365-97.
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of this system cannot be foreseen. In order to ensure the 
dominance by the state and collective investors in China's 
socialist economy, it has been made clear by the Chinese 
authorities that this experimentation must be carried out on 
the basis of the public ownership. However, given that public 
enterprises, especially state enterprises, have experienced 
considerable difficulties in obtaining management autonomy, it 
is very doubtful whether the establishment of limited 
companies can fundamentally reform the existing enterprise 
system.61 Moreover, the property ownership of such companies 
is controversial. As examined in Chapter Three, debates are 
being carried on within China as to whether the investors or 
the company owns the property. Accordingly, the relationship 
between government departments and companies is unsettled. A 
structure which can on the one hand facilitate reasonable 
government control and on the other hand prevent abusive 
official intervention has yet to be established. In addition, 
given the inevitable dominance by public ownership investors 
in shareholding companies, the appropriate ways to both ensure 
the "political core" position of party committees and 
guarantee workers' participation in enterprise management are 
major issues still to be resolved.62
The fourth option, that is, the privatisation of state 
enterprises, remains an impossibility in the current political 
climate. Although a number of small state enterprises have
61 In response to the recent "share fever" among 
enterprises and the public, Mr Liu Hongru, vice-minister of 
the State Economic Reform Commission, is quoted as saying that 
sellers of shares (that is, enterprises) want to raise funds 
while buyers want to earn money. Neither of them care about 
the transformation of the management mechanism of state 
enterprises. See "China's Thirst for Markets Grows", 
International Herald Tribune, Aug.10, 19 92, p. 9.
62 In the current experiment of shareholding enterprises, 
few provisions have been made in these areas. However, as 
analyzed in Chapters Six and Seven, these two issues are so 
important that they cannot be ignored. In my view, if in the 
future shareholding enterprises become the dominant 
organisational form for state enterprises, the company law 
will have to address these issues, perhaps by referring to the 
treatment contained in the SEL.
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been sold to non-state entities,63 a large scale privatisation 
is unlikely to be approved. Such privatisation,64 in the 
official view, would threaten the "Four Cardinal Principles"65 
which have been respected by the leadership as the basis of 
the Chinese socialist system.
Whatever road future state enterprise reform is to take, 
it is certain that successful reform not only requires 
significant improvements in the overall economic and 
enterprise administration systems but also demands many 
fundamental changes in administrative and political 
infrastructures both within and outside state enterprises. 
Given that the Chinese authorities have placed emphasis only 
on economic reforms, although some aspects of the economic and 
administrative deficiencies accompanying the old system may be 
reduced or even eliminated, it remains difficult to deal 
properly with the thorny political and ideological issues 
which have complicated the reform.
In future reforms, laws and regulations will continue to 
be employed. However, as long as laws and regulations are used 
as mere instrumentalities, and if they continue to be policy- 
oriented, considerable difficulties will be present in bring 
into full play the functions of legal regulation. The rule of 
law is a long way for Chinese state enterprises.
63 Recently, for the first time, a large-sized state 
enterprise in Sichuan Province has been sold to a foreign 
investment enterprise in China. But in principle, only small­
sized state enterprises are allowed to be sold.
64 In China, the idea of privatisation of state
enterprises was raised in the mid-1980s. However, this idea 
suffered severe attack after June 1989 . Even the current
shareholding system, which allows private equity participation 
in state companies, has to be carried out cautiously in order
to avoid the accusation of actual "privatisation".
65 These four cardinal principles are: socialist road,
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, the leadership of the 
CCP, and people's democratic dictatorship.
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